Behind barbed wire : internment in Australia during World War II by Bevege, Margaret
Behind 
Barbed Wire 
Internment in Australia during 
World War II 
MARGARET BEVEGE 
uQP 
^ A^fe^5 
1^1^^ 
1 ^ ^ 
58F5X6 
Hill I iiiillllllllll III I 
3 A 0 6 r 0 1 7 2 3 3 1 0 A 
Behind Barbed Wire 
Margaret Bevege graduated from Kelvin Grove Teach-
ers' College in Brisbane in 1959 and is a qualified pri-
mary, secondary and technical teacher. She has taught 
in Queensland rural and city schools, and in secondary 
and TAPE colleges in Victoria. Bevege completed an 
Honours degree at La Trobe University in 1978 with a 
thesis based on an analysis of Suffragists' arguments 
when demanding the vote. It won her a La Trobe Uni-
versity Postgraduate Scholarship. She completed her 
PhD in 1986. Her publications include articles in 
Women, Class and History and Worth Her Salt, which she 
co-edited. 
Her interest in internment germinated in her child-
hood when she was puzzled by a schoolyard argument 
over whose father had to be locked-up during Sie war. 
Years of struggle to gain access to files, forty oral history 
interviews, and many months of background reading 
finally produced the answer 
Margaret Bevege now lives in Sydney. 
uQp STUDIES IN AUSTRALIAN HISTORY 
General Editor: Associate Professor Lyndall Ryan 
Women's Studies Unit 
Flinders University of South Australia 
Also in this series: 
Glen St J. Barclay, A Very Small Insurance Policy: The Politics of Australian 
Involvement in Vietnam 1954-67 
Tom Cochrane, Blockade: The Queensland Loans Affair 1920-1924 
Dennis Cryle, The Press in Colonial Queensland 
Kay Daniels and Mary Murnane, Australia's Women: A Documentary History 
Ray Evans, The Red Flag Riots: A Study of Intolerance 
Ray Evans, Kay Saunders and Kathryn Cronin, Race Relations in Colonial 
Queensland: A History of Exclusion, Exploitation and Extermination 
Gerhard Fischer, Enemy Aliens: Internment and the Home Front Experience in 
Australia 1914-1920 
Ross Fitzgerald and Harold Thornton, Labor in Queensland: From the 1890s 
to 1988 
John McNair and Tom Poole (eds), Russia and the Fifth Continent 
Denis Murphy, Roger Joyce and Margaret Cribb, The Premiers of Queensland 
Kay Saunders, War on the Homefront: State Intervention in Queensland 
1938-1948 
Stuart Svensen, The Shearers'War: The Story of the 1891 Shearers' Strike 
Jan Walker, Jondaryan Station: The Relationship Between Pastoral Capital 
and Pastoral Labour 1840-1890 
In preparation: 
Gail Reekie, On the Edge: Women's Experiences of Queensland 
Yuriko Nagata, Japanese Internment in Australia during World War II 
Bill Thorpe, Colonial Queensland 1840-1900 
Douglas Hassall, Australia and Nazism 
William Douglass, From Italy to Ingham: Italians in North Queensland 
Wendy Selby, Motherhood in Labor's Queensland 1915-1957 
Stuart Svensen, 1890 Maritime Strike 
Behind 
Barbed Wire 
Internment in Australia during 
World War H 
MARGARET BEVEGE 
University of Queensland Press 
Firet published 1993 by University of Queensland Press 
Box 42, St Lucia, Queensland 4067 Australia 
© Margaret Bevege 1993 
This book is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing 
for the purposes of private study, research, criticism 
or review, as permitted under the Copyright Act, no 
part may be reproduced by any process vnthout written 
permission. Enquiries should be made to the publisher. 
Typeset by University of Queensland Press 
Printed in Australia by McPherson's Printing Group, Victoria 
Distributed in the USA and Canada by 
International Specialized Book Services, Inc., 
5804 N.E. Hassalo Street, Portland, Oregon 97213-3640 
Cataloguing in Publication Data 
National Library of Australia 
Bevege, Margaret. 
Behind barbed wire : internment in Australia during World War II. 
Bibliography. 
Includes index. 
1. World War, 1939-1945 — Prisoners and prisons, Australian. 2. 
World War, 1939-1945 — Concentration camps — Australia. I. Title. 
(Series: UQP studies in Australian history). 
940.531794 
ISBN 0 7022 2492 8 
To my personal heroes 
The men of the Australian and American forces who fought the 
Battle of the Coral Sea and in particular: 
• the construction workers of the United States Employment 
Companies, who built the aerodromes around Townsville, 
Woodstock and Charters Towers; 
• the aircrew of the United States Air Force and the Royal 
Australian Air Force who flew from those aerodromes; and 
• the sailors and airmen of the United States Navy and the 
Royal Australian Navy who fought the enemy to a standstill. 
As I lay in my cot on the veranda with the tropical breeze 
blowing through my mosquito net, I was not aware then as I 
am now, that but for these men my life might well have taken 
a very nasty txirn for the worse. That I have subsequently 
enjoyed fifty years of security and freedom is largely due to the 
efforts and sacrifices that these men made in the first half of 
1942. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is over fifty years since the terrible threat of invasion unsettled 
Australians. Yet some of the events relating to this period are 
still sensitive. The fact that thousands of local residents were 
interned in a direct response to this threat is not generally 
known and the picture of that time will not be complete until 
this aspect is added. The post-war migration boom and today's 
multi-cultural ethos have blurred the dominant British influ-
ence in Australia, but in the period leading up to World War II 
links to Britain were so strong that being an Australian equated 
to being a British citizen. The minority non-English migrants 
were not regarded as capable of being British and therefore not 
true Australians. Their commitment to the coimtry that gave 
them economic viability and opportunities for their children 
might be conceded but it did not make them "one of us". This 
perception was at the heart of the arguments over internment 
policy in 1942-43 when huge internment camps imprisoned 
thousands of naturalised and long-term residents as well as 
thousands of enemy aliens. Now that two new generations 
have matured it is time to reflect on why so many had to be put 
behind barbed wire in World War n. 
Since internment involves the detention of people without 
trial, it is the antithesis of the basic principle of habeus corpus. It 
severely curtails civil liberties and in a democratic society like 
Australia it is rarely invoked except in times of grave crisis such 
as war time. The aims of this book are to identify the people 
who had to decide policy and to know the factors they consid-
ered, to discover how policy was implemented and by whom, 
and to trace the experiences of those interned. The focus is on 
illuminating the role of internment in the evolution of Australia 
during six years of war, for internment involved a continuous 
interplay between the basic structure of society — its laws and 
values — and the demands of achieving victory. 
When nations go to war, external and internal security as-
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sume a very high priority. The national leaders' major objectives 
are to protect the physical integrity of their nation, to minimise 
injury to its people and property and, above all, to ensure the 
nation's survival as an entity. To achieve these aims, the armed 
forces are enlarged, essential war industries developed and the 
workforce expanded and, if necessary redeployed. As events in 
Europe in the late thirties became increasingly ominous, Aus-
tralia's leaders began to prepare for the roles the country would 
be expected to play as a member of the British Empire and as a 
nation with responsibility for its own defence. In a war with 
Germany its role would not be dissimilar to the one it played 
in World War I. Most Australians thought it necessary to pro-
vide a second Australian Imperial Force (AIF) to fight as part of 
Britain's resources. The militia would also have to be increased 
and possibly even some forms of compulsory military and 
industrial service introduced. The raising of a large volunteer 
army was less controversial than was the proposal to use it 
primarily for overseas service, some of the doubts arising from 
concern about possible Japanese aggression in the Pacific. To 
satisfy this concern, Britain had established a large naval base 
in Singapore and this bastion was to be Australia's security 
against any opportunistic move by Japan. ^  
Internally the nation had to be secured against saboteurs and 
subversives. Members of the Nazi Party and the Commimist 
Party were perceived as real threats, but membership was small 
and could be dealt with by the Commonwealth Investigation 
Branch (CIB) of the Attorney-General's Department, Military 
Intelligence, and the police Special Branches. Not so with the 
tens of thousands of newly-arrived migrants.^ As migration 
does not always lead to permanent residence or naturalisation, 
it was necessary to assess aliens, particularly those with enemy 
nationality. Refugees could claim to be pro-ally but if they had 
relatives in enemy hands they might be blackmailed. In a war 
with Germany and Italy, many long-term residents would be-
come enemy aliens. Naturalised people could not be expected 
to forget their homeland. To treat long-term residents in the 
same way as new-arrivals would cause many problems. Long-
term residents were used to British justice. They had their 
families and friends to back them and worked in jobs or owned 
businesses. The problems of assessing them would be little 
different from the problems of investigating suspect Britishers. 
To be accused of planning sabotage is a serious matter, and to 
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deny the right of a proper defence would normally be unthink-
able. In war time some basic rights might have to be given up, 
but to what degree? In a war against a "police state", a democ-
racy carmot become equally repressive. 
Another problem was cost. Were the nation's resources better 
spent on the armed forces? The guards needed to run camps 
would drain manpower and if internees families had to be put 
in camp it would increase the expense and complexity of camp 
organisation. The greatest problem however, was psychologi-
cal. A crucial element in a nation's war effort is morale, and 
people or actions that undermined the people's will to fight 
must be countered. But were Pacifists who would not fight and 
Jehovah's Witnesses, who would not stand for the National 
Anthem, or Communists, who did not believe in a capitalists' 
war subversive to a degree requiring incarceration? People 
would react against such dissenting opinion and possibly create 
a threat to law and order, but if the authorities overreacted it 
might give the impression that spies and subversives were 
everywhere. 
Many decisions about the necessity and desirability of in-
ternment had to be made, not only in the basic legal and social 
system of a democracy, but also in a fluctuating war situation. 
D.M.Homer has pointed out that decision-making for external 
defence fell into three broad phases.^ At first the overriding 
consideration was to support the British. When Japan entered 
the war, the need to secure Australia from direct attack was 
crucial and, when that was achieved, managing relations with 
America was most important. Similarly the criteria for internal 
security would differ in each stage of the war. When the major 
thrust was to provide the Second AIF to support the British, it 
was crucial to protect military and naval areas, but when inva-
sion threatened, every town and every inhabitant were poten-
tial enemy targets. In the final phase, when Australia became 
the base for suppling the Americans and the actual threat of 
attack was removed, a more pragmatic use of manpower might 
better suit Australia's best interests. 
In addition to the necessity to stay within a framework that 
did not ignore legal process, and also to take account of the 
different stages of the war itself, the human element of decision-
making cannot be forgotten. Policy is made by people and 
implemented by people. In his introduction to Crisis of Com-
mand, Homer emphasises the personality of the commander as 
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central to military problems,'* and there was a significant mili-
tary contribution to the enactment of interrmient in World War 
II. But the human element is equally central to politics, where 
politicians compete with each other within parties and in the 
electorates, and also in the public service, where departmental 
areas of juristiction are jealously guarded. 
In World War 11 there were four Prime Ministers who all bore 
grave burdens for war-time decisions, and three had to cary 
these burdens in the difficult context of having to justify deci-
sions to a delicately balanced parliament. These four men, 
R.G.Menzies, Arthur Fadden, John Curtin and J.B. Chifley 
brought their previous experience and personal predilections 
to bear. Of the ministers for the Army, Brigadier G.A. Street, 
Senator P.McBride, PC.Spender and Frank Forde, all had im-
portant policy decisions to make; and the Attorney-Generals, 
W.M.Hughes and Dr H.VEvatt brought very different back-
grounds to the problem of balancing civil liberties and national 
security needs. Politicians from all parties and at both state and 
federal levels entered the internment debate but often pre-
sented their individual opinions. There were no clear party 
lines. The Labor Premier of Queensland, W Forgan-Smith, and 
the conservative coalition from New South Wales, Alexander 
Mair and M.F.Bruxner actively campaigned to have the rate of 
internment increased, opposing the policy of minimum intern-
ments supported by the United Australia Party (UAP) leader, 
R.G. Menzies, and the Labor Leader, John Curtin. Backbenchers 
have the freedom to be more extreme than government leaders, 
and both Menzies and Curtin were subjected to severe criticism 
from members of their own parties. 
Military leaders such as Lieutenant-Generals V.A.H. Sturdee 
and C.G.N. Miles and Major-General J.M.A. Durrant had influ-
ential views on internment, and it was part of the role of the 
heads of Military Intelligence, Brigadier B. Combes and Colo-
nels James A. Chapman and C.G. Roberts, to make decisions 
about when certain groups and individuals should be interned. 
The CIB head, H.E. Jones, and his state directors shared this 
responsibility. The heads of the Security Service, E.E. Longfield-
Lloyd, W.J. Mackay and W.B. Simpson oversaw internment and 
releases as an integral part of their job, but in executing their 
responsibilities they were influenced by their personal style and 
their differing military, police and legal training. The views of 
the Police Commissioners of the eastern states were not identi-
INTRODUCTION xvii 
cal and the eminent judges who conducted trials when intern-
ees objected to their detention. Judges E.E. Cleland, G.H. Pike, 
C.G.W Davidson, Frederick Jordan and G.S. Reed, all expressed 
reservations at some aspect of internment. 
In fact, the burden of implementing policy often fell on less 
prestigious officials. Military officers of middle rank, detectives 
and police sergeants often had the responsibility of assessing 
the complaints against individuals, actually making the arrests 
cind supervising detention centres. The responsibility for run-
ning camps was borne to a considerable degree by World War 
I veterans such as Lieutenant-Colonel WT. Tackaberry, who 
established Tatura, Lieutenant-Colonel C.S. Thane, of Hay, and 
Lieutenant-Colonel E.T. Dean, of Loveday. The Garrison troops 
were constantly expanded to cope with local and overseas 
internees and later they held numerous prisoners of war 
(POWs). To cope, a Directorate of POW and Internees (PWI) was 
established under Major J. McCahon. Internment created logis-
tics problems that often had to be dealt with amid a fierce 
competition for resources. Administration of policy was shared 
between all these groups and, while policy was created by 
senior public servants such as EG. Shedden of the Defence 
Department and George Knowles of the Attorney-General's 
Department, less senior public servants such as CIB investiga-
tion officer W.H. Barnwell, and the secretary of the Aliens 
Classification and Advisory Committee (ACAC) Noel W. 
Lamidey, actually did the work to ensure that the policy was 
enacted. The roles and variety of styles of these middle-level 
operators inevitably created some interpretative differences. 
Nor were the general public silent on the matter. Many 
thousands of ordinary citizens expressed their opinions about 
internment through letters and petitions. Pressure groups such 
as returned soldiers orchestrated campaigns to have all enemy 
aliens interned. Some welfare groups appealed for restraint. 
Internment was such an emotional issue that the activities of 
the ACAC, which recommended many releases, were censored 
from the press and have subsequently remained virtually un-
known. Yet the experience of the chairman, Arthur Calwell, in 
dealing with the internees and their families, influenced his 
performance in that vital post-war ministry. Immigration. 
Forty years later, when the research for this work was done, 
the tangled web of internment policy and the twists of its 
implementation could be traced through the departmental files 
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of the Prime Minister, the Attorney-General, Defence (later 
Army), Labour and National Service, Security Service and tne 
Queensland Police and Premier's files. There are problems in 
dealing with a sensitive subject within living memory and tne 
AustraUan Archives protects the names of, or details about, 
internees and files had to be screened before being released to 
the researcher. With access to files on internees being so re-
stricted, the writer augmented the internees' experiences by 
seeking personal interviews. A field trip to North Queensland 
was undertaken in June 1979 witii this prime objective. 
Oral history has its strengths and weaknesses. Factually, it 
can only be the recollections of people living many years after 
the event. However, it has the advantage of adding a personal 
dimension to names on a Ust or headings on a summarised 
report. Interviewees sometimes got facts wrong or out of order, 
but others were very accurate and their details added to the 
written records. Some former internees showed that strong 
feeling could still exist even after so long a time, and its intensity 
seemed to relate to internees' belief in the "rightness" or other-
wise of their detention. 
Interviews with non-interned locals, while suffering similar 
defects, bore some interesting fruit. One man declared that all 
internees had been fascists because decent people like himself 
went into the army. It came as a surprise when subsequent 
research found that the local police had listed him as a high 
priority for internment, but not for being a fascist. British 
women were more communicative than their men. They had 
heard their fathers talking, or were told by their husbands what 
was going on, and years later they were prepared to repeat it 
"on the quiet" while their menfolk claimed ignorance, spoke in 
generalities or told diverting tales. Oral history always takes 
time but on a sensitive topic the problem is exacerbated. An 
archival file is quicker, more reliable and often as quotable. 
The sensitive nature of the topic did limit the usefulness of 
official files, because the time archives staff spent on clearance 
work was budgeted for any one researcher. The problem of 
using internees' real names was solved in thesis stage by plac-
ing an embargo on access and quotation. Now that fifty years 
have passed it is considered fair to publish real names where 
these are public knowledge and where internees have had a 
chance to have their say. Substitute names have been used in 
only a few cases where internees have not been able to be 
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contacted to put their version. Only one internees asked to have 
his name withheld. Although this work is primarily concerned 
with the struggle between individual liberty and community 
security, these theoretical concepts can only be perceived in 
concrete terms. What happened in Australia in World War II 
must be shown through its effects on individual's lives and by 
the thinking and methods of security and intelligence officers. 
Before the passing of the Commonwealth Archives Act of 1983 all 
Intelligence material was closed. But official material also in-
volved another form of screening. The views expressed were 
sometimes a consensus, as with cabinet and committee min-
utes, and personal inputs difficult to fathom. When letters were 
from a senior official they were frequently drafted by an assis-
tant. Reports were most useful in ascertaining the opinions of 
those recommending specific policies or actions. Even these 
were couched in the polite language of the public service. 
Consequently officials' personal views took some teasing 
out, but a study of the signatories of letters over time helped 
build up a picture of the interners. They were of diverse opin-
ions and their profession or group did not make their opinions 
predictable. CIB directors had differing views on Jewish mi-
grants, some lawyers had a greater regard for civil liberties than 
others, and senior army officers assessed security needs differ-
ently. Added to this, the legislation covering internment was 
open to interpretation. Who could be sure what level of intern-
ment guaranteed national security or satisfied public opinion? 
Subjective judgements were forced on policemen, army offi-
cers, lawyers and politicians and it is not surprising that recom-
mendations differed. Most importantly these judgements had 
to be made under sfress:— the stress of going to war, the stress 
of seeing the mother country isolated and bombarded, and the 
sfress of having one's homeland attacked and threatened with 
invasion. Actions taken in these circumstances were not "nor-
mal"; the most that can be expected is that they were reasonable 
and backed by a justifiable suspicion. Internments and releases 
were not static for the interners regularly reassessed security 
needs and reviewed individual cases, trying to balance confra-
dictory pressures to ensure that while the principle of habeus 
corpus could be suspended, it was not forgotten. 
As with most studies, some questions can only be partially 
answered. The gradual operung of more records may reveal the 
answers to the questions being asked by those looking for an 
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explanation of why a particular group was detained or why 
they were kept for so long. The continuing closure of relevant 
British records means some aspects of the Dunera internments 
may not be known in the internees' lifetimes. The gradual 
opening of the registers of German internees in Ausfralia pro-
vides some indication of how many Jews were interned here — 
or at least how many specified themselves as Jews. The register 
of Italians remained closed due to a lack of pressure to analyse 
their cases, in contrast to the concentration on the Germans and 
the AusfraUa Ffrst internees. This has only changed very re-
cently with the challenge by Dr Bob Woods of the Liberal Party 
and Mr Con Sdacca of the Labor Party to have the government 
acknowledge "that grave injustices were done to many Ausfra-
lians of Italian descent who were interned during World War 
n".5 
This book aims to give the overall view and to cover both the 
lesser and the more confroversial internments with as much 
detail as was obtainable. Internment policy should be assessed 
on its success in restrairving fascists and enemy patriots as well 
as on its inevitable mistakes. Its implementation should be 
judged on the army's ability to return its prisoners in good 
health if not in altogether good spirits. Those with the respon-
sibility to order internment did not take their authority lightiy 
The broader group who could recommend internments showed 
a few signs of being prone to generalisations and prejudice and 
occasional over-anxiety. 
The thousands of citizens who urged more internments dis-
played a high level of anxiety, a general prejudice against aliens 
and scant regard for special cases among enemy aliens. The 
comparative lack of coverage of internment in World War 11 
confrasts with its Great War equivalent, and probably has a 
number of causes. The recent opening of official records and the 
protection of sensitive material are imdoubtedly important. In 
addition it flies in the face of Australia's present multi-cultural 
ethos and could be regarded as a relic of the former positivelv 
pro-British nature of our society. A close study, however, reveals 
not only its interconnections with pre-war times, its reactions 
to the progress of the war, but its bridging role between pre-war 
and post-war migration. The Minister for Immigration, Arthur 
Calwell, Labor's most ardent advocate of immigration of non-
British white people to Australia, was head of the Aliens Clas-
sification and Advisory Committee for four years and 
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developed an empathy for many internees and a conviction that 
such migrants would become good Ausfralians. 
In the following nine chapters, the theoretical and practical 
problems of internment are fraced from its pre-war planning to 
the deportations in 1946. It is not a story with the high drama 
and appalling mortality in the European concentration camps 
or the Japanese POW camps. It is the story of how a country 
with a high regard for individual freedom nevertheless consid-
ered the detention of 7,000 local residents (and even more 
overseas civilians) and their subsequent intermittent release 
necessary for, or useful to, its national survival. 

Chapter One 
POLICY 
At 9.15 pm on 3 September 1939 the Ausfralian Prime Minister, 
R.G. Menzies, announced that Ausfralia was at war with Ger-
many. While parliament worked into the night on the measures 
required to galvanise the nation, small groups of police in each 
state searched out those people whose names appeared on a 
predetermined internment list. The police knocked on the door, 
produced a detention order and required their quarry to accom-
pany them to the local police station. Before the dawn broke on 
the first day of the war, the few hundred people regarded as 
likely to act against Australia's interests were behind bars. Paul 
Hasluck, in his history of Ausfralia in war time, says that "this 
action was considered by the military authorities to have effec-
tively broken up the hostile organisations for the whole of the 
war".^ 
Yet other writers consider that Australia lacked effective 
security at the outbreak of war. Noel W. Lamidey, a senior public 
servant, wrote in his autobiography that the opening of World 
War II found Australia unprepared to deal with questions of 
national security because no national corporate body on secu-
rity existed.^ In a study of Australia's spy indusfry, Richard Hall 
claims that many German anti-Nazis were interned at the out-
break of war because of the crude approach of intelligence 
agencies.^ Jessie Sfreet, leader of the United Associations of 
Women, who later in the war served on a committee to review 
internment policy, asserted that after the outbreak of war an 
hysterical campaign was launched against foreigners, and the 
government in a "state of war fever" even put some refugees 
into camps. According to Street, some people in positions of 
authority lost their heads to such an extent that often all legal 
protections and procedures were ignored.^ Thus other writers 
contradict Hasluck's claim that, as a result of intelligence work 
before the war, a small number of people who were mainly 
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leaders of hostile organisations were rounded up immediately, 
and a satisfactory state of internal security was achieved. 
Security agencies 
It is true that before the war internal sectirity matters were the 
responsibility of a number of groups. Each of the armed forces 
had its own intelligence section that took an interest in internal 
as well as external security. The Commonwealth government 
had an Investigation Branch (CIB) within the Attorney-Gen-
eral's department, with responsibility for aspects of internal 
security, and Special Branches existed in some state police 
forces to watch for subversion and treason. All these agencies 
kept files on organisations such as the Commtmist Party (CPA), 
the Nazi and Fascist Parties and the Yabba Club (the anti-se-
mitic, anti-British precursor of the Australia First Movement) 
and on the individuals associated with them; individuals such 
as Dr J.H. Becker, first leader of the Nazi Party in Australia. The 
CIB grew out of the World War I Special Intelligence Bureau and 
Army Intelligence and Censorship records became the basis of 
CIB files. According to its Director, H.E.Jones, the CIB was 
created to provide the Commonwealth with an instrumentality 
entirely independent of the States to investigate offences 
against the federal government.^ The majority of its officers 
were former members of the military Intelligence services. 
The Security Section of the CIB had the responsibility of 
protecting the Commonwealth from people who openly advo-
cated seizing power by unconstitutional means or who incited 
the public to rebellion. Consequently they kept a close watch 
on the CPA, which in Jones' assessment grew proportionately 
to the decline in economic conditions until 1931 when the full 
effect of the world depression was felt in Australia. The CIB's 
other major interest was aliens. The CIB persuaded the govern-
ment to introduce an Aliens' Registration Act in 1921, but 
within a year it virtually became a dead letter because state 
governments demanded payment for administering it. A later 
amendment compelled aliens arriving after 1 April 1927 to 
complete a Personal Particulars form (commonly called Form 
A 42) which required details of finance, relatives, and guaran-
tors, to safeguard the Commonwealth against the alien becom-
mg a public charge. But once completed, there was no further 
record of the migrants' or visitors' movements. 
POLICY 3 
The increase of migration from Italy in 1926-7 brought a more 
political aspect to security. The Consular officials urged, coaxed, 
and even bullied migrants to form fascist organisations. In 
opposition, the anti-fascists formed the "Matteotti Club" 
named after an opponent killed by Mussolini. Security Section 
successfully penefrated Italian Fascism, and also followed the 
activities of the "Camorra" Society, a criminal organisation 
from southern Italy. Friction between Yugoslavs and the Mace-
donian revolutionary society, the "Comitadjis", had an un-
doubted potential for violence. Besides keeping an eye out for 
specifically revolutionary literature, the CIB read all the for-
eign-language newspapers published in Ausfralia and im-
ported from abroad. 
But not all security problems were created by communists or 
foreigners. In 1931 there was unrest over the growth of Com-
munism and Fascism, with some people believing the govern-
ment was not aware of the potential danger in a clash. A number 
of private citizens organised themselves into self- protection 
units such as the New Guard (NSW), the League of National 
Safety (Vic), the Citizen League (SA) and the Black Shirts (WA). 
According to Jones, it was the CIB who took action to force the 
disbcindment of these ill-advised bodies, by cutting oft financial 
supplies, and the withdrawing of certain misguided army offi-
cers who were directiy associated with them. From 1932 to 1935 
the authorities took steps to allay public unease by limiting the 
amount of communist literature allowed into the country. The 
CIB then concentrated its attention on Italians and Germans, 
and in 1936 it prepared a comprehensive report on Fascism and 
a year later it produced a similar one on Nazism.^ Copies went 
to Army and Navy Intelligence. 
A CIB officer, WH. Barnwell was detailed to follow the Count 
and Countess Felix von Luckner during their Australian tour 
in June 1938. Von Luckner was a World War I naval hero, and 
his wife an atfractive Swede. The von Luckners were greeted 
enthusiastically by the German-speaking community and en-
tertained by some prominent Ausfralian citizens, but commu-
nists and anti-fascists considered von Luckner to be a Nazi spy. 
While the Count's yacht Seeteufel remained in Sydney Harbour, 
Barnwell recorded the activities of its ov/ners and crew.'' He 
noted von Luckner's socialising with Arnold von Skerst, editor 
of the pro-Nazi German-language weekly Die Brucke and his 
visit to the Japanese ship Kamo Maru to meet the German 
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businessman Robert Henschel, whose firm supplied bombers 
to the German Air Minisfry Henschel told the press in Sydney 
that he had received orders for new fighters capable of speeds 
up to 360 miles per hour from a countiy "in the East" and that 
he considered Japanese pilots superior to Chinese fliers.^ 
Anti-fascists and communists not yet jolted by Stalin's So-
viet-German Non-aggression Pact, demonsfrateci against von 
Luckner at the Sydney Town Hall, in Adelaide, and also in the 
North Queerisland sugar town of Innisfail. Die Brucke's local 
Innisfail correspondent, L. Muller, reported that the Count's 
speech had made a great impression and that the Coimtess had 
been entertained by the CWA and the German women. In the 
evening the Count gave a lecture which in spite of a demonsfra-
tion by the Communists was well attended. The Communists, 
in Muller's opinion, "had made themselves very ridiculous by 
their behaviour" and had done "no harm to Germanism". 
Muller expressed appreciation for the interest of the German 
Constd-General, Dr Asmis, who visited Innisfail in May, and to 
Dr Neumann from Sydney, who had come and lectured on the 
Reading Association and on the political position in Europe.^ 
Dr Rudolf Karl Asmis was Germany's official representative 
in Ausfralia from 1932 and he was constantly watched as the 
drift to war continued. Security took particular note of the 
individuals who accepted Asmis's invitation to join the SS 
Neckar, three miles out of Sydney Harbour in international 
waters, where it became a polling booth for those who wished 
to vote in the plebiscite to endorse Hitleir 's take-over of Ausfria 
—the Anschluss—completed in April 1938.^ ° Those who voted 
on the Neckar were regarded as self-declared Nazis as the vote 
was a public declaration similar to that observed in Austria 
where few bothered, or dared, to cast their ballots in the secrecy 
of a booth.ii The Neckar list, Barnwell's von Luckner list and 
those from Asmis's social fimctions were cross referenced to 
find the people with pro-Nazi learungs. 
A few months after the Anschluss the international scene 
darkened dramatically. Hitler demanded the incorporation of 
the Sudeten disfricts of Czechoslovakia into Germany. Al-
though the Mimich agreement temporarily averted war, one 
resident reacted. A technical representative for a German firm, 
he flew to Germany on 29 September 1938 in response to a 
warning from company headquarters. However, as war did not 
break out, the technician came back on 13 December 1938, 
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accompanied by his wife, only to be interned in Australia for 
the duration because in September 1939 his passport had one 
day to clear before Germany invaded Poland.i^ Similarly the 
Vienna Mozart Boys Choir were about to embark at Fremantle 
at the end of their Australian tour when they heard the news-
paper boys shouting that war had started. They had suddenly 
become enemy aliens, but their youth and their subsequent 
employment in the choir of St Patrick's cathedral, Melbourne, 
protected them from consideration for internment at this stage 
of the waxP 
After the 1938 Munich crisis the Ausfralian authorities put 
even more effort into war planning,!^ including internment 
policy. Internally the nation had to be secured against possible 
saboteurs and subversives. Wharves, munitions factories, com-
mvmications establishments and important public buildings 
would be fenced and guarded against attack, but as prevention 
is the best security, any enemy agents should be caught before 
they acted. As spies,saboteurs and subversives are by definition 
secretive, all groups in which they might be operating became 
suspect. The Ausfralian Nazi Party and the Communist Party 
were perceived as real threats, despite their antipathy for each 
other. The Nazis were closely associated with the German 
Consulate and directly in touch with the party in Germany. The 
Communists followed the policy set by Moscow, where Stalin, 
in an effort to forestall an immediate confrontation with Hitler, 
would sign a Non-aggression Pact. 
In addition to the politically committed, there was danger 
from the enthusiastic amateur and the agent's agent. The en-
thusiastic amateur would probably be a pafriot who might see 
it as a duty to harass the national enemy. Consular officials were 
most certainly pafriots but as diplomats they would be imme-
diately resfricted and sent home. An agent's agent would be a 
person who for some reason would act for the enemy. Such 
people might be paid, or blackmailed, or even bear some over-
whelming grudge against the government and the people. The 
group most likely to include the enthusiastic amateur or the 
blackmailed agent's agent were short-term residents particu-
larly those who still had strong ties to relatives living under the 
enemy's confrol. 
Short-term residents could be holiday visitors, employees of 
international firms temporarily working in Ausfralia, or immi-
grants who had only recently arrived but who intended to stay. 
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Visitors might be willing to make a gesture of defiance or 
bravado, but their instinctive response would be to rush home. 
Employees of enemy firms would normally be solidly behind 
their homeland. Those with technical expertise or knowledge 
of Australia's btisiness and shipping organisation, and those 
with technical expertise, might be too valuable to the enemy to 
be allowed to go home. But their families were probably not 
dangerous, so were they to be deported or allowed to remain in 
Ausfralia under restrictions? Was the safest and possibly most 
himiane course to intern the whole family? And what of those 
employees who regularly visited their firm's headquarters, but 
who had resided in Australia for so many years that they 
regarded it as their home? Woolbuyers and shipping executives 
who lived permanentiy in the better suburbs of Sydney, were 
worthy of investigation. Fortunately their numbers were not 
great, and might be handled by such security agencies as Aus-
fralia had. 
It would be a different story with newly arrived migrants. In 
the five years prior to the outbreak of war some 9,000 Germans, 
10,000 Italians and 20,000 other continental Europeans had 
migrated to Australia.^^ Some sought refuge from Nazi or Fas-
cist rule, some were normal economic migrants seeking jobs or 
a better life for their children and some were joining family 
members already in Ausfralia. In normal times these migrants 
would assimilate and after five years confirm their transfer of 
loyalty by seeking naturalisation and becoming British subjects. 
However the 39,000 migrants who had landed less than five 
years before September 1939 had not fulfilled the residential 
qualification, so their intentions were not known. 
Security required that these new arrivals be investigated, for 
nationals do not normally transfer their loyalty overnight, nor 
does migration always lead to permanent residence or natural-
isation. It was particularly necessary to assess enemy aliens, for 
among genuine migrants the enemy might have planted agents 
or kept back relatives or property as a means of coercing ofriers. 
The numbers involved a massive increase in investigative and 
recording work and no organisation was geared to do it. Refu-
gees could claim an understandable commitment to an allied 
victory but they often had close relatives in enemy hands and 
might be open to blackmail. Perhaps the answer was the re-
moval of the means of implementing any action. If enemy aliens 
were not allowed to fravel or have short-wave radios or explo-
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sives, they could not carry out enemy instructions. Civil liber-
ties might even be invaded to the extent of telephone tapping 
and censoring mail. 
The more the problem of what level of internment guaran-
teed security was considered, the more the complexities 
mounted up. In the event of war with Germany and her ally, 
Italy, many long-term residents would become enemy aliens 
and there would be many naturalised British subjects of enemy 
origin who could not be expected to entfrely quench a natural 
love of their homeland. The numbers were not so daunting in 
the case of war with Japan, as Asians were rarely allowed 
permanent residence. To view long-term residents in the same 
way as short-term ones would raise many problems. Long-term 
residents were used to the British system of justice. They had 
their homes, families and friends around them and they were 
economically integrated into their local community. In many 
ways the problems of assessing them would not be very differ-
ent from those of investigating British subjects who for some 
reason might be anti-war. They came under three broad head-
ings — ideological, practical and psychological. 
Policy considerations 
The basis of the British system of justice decrees that a person 
is innocent until proven guilty. From this base flow assumptions 
such as the right to know the accusation, the right to defend 
oneself and question witnesses. To be accused of sabotage, or 
even of planning it, is a serious matter, and to deny the right of 
normal defence would in peace time be an outrage. Common 
sense dictates that, in war time, the requirements of the war 
effort might have to override some of these basic rights, but to 
what degree? In a war against a police state, a democracy 
cannot allow its security to become too oppressive. The greatest 
of the practical problems was cost. Should every non-British 
person be investigated or were the nation's resources better 
spent in fraining and equipping the army? Most long-term 
residents were established in some form of occupation, so any 
detentions would be an economic disadvantage and the guards 
needed to run camps would draw manpower from other areas. 
Families would either have to be interned, and increase the 
expense and complexities of camp organisation, or likely be-
come a welfare burden. 
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The most difficult problem, however, was psychological. A 
crucial element in a nation's war effort is morale, a belief in the 
ability to win and a preparedness to make sacrifices. Here the 
question of subversion is important. Undermining the people's 
will to fight is dangerous, and the authorities must cotinter such 
people. Pacifists who would not fight might influence others, 
and Jehovah's Witnesses, whose only king was a heavenly one, 
would not acknowledge the British monarchy. Communists, 
who did not believe in a capitalists' war, might persuade their 
co-workers to "go slow" and cause munitions and manufactur-
ing shortfalls. Were such people dangerous to the degree of 
needing to be removed from the rest of society? The diverse 
anti-war groups were small and their philosophies were not 
likely to attract extra converts in a popular war, but the general 
public could react aggressively, even violently, against dissent-
ing opinion. A threat to law and order wovild divert resources 
better used against the enemy. 
Another possible reaction could be resentment expressed in 
the form of withholding complete support. Parents might dis-
courage sons from volunteering if their neighbours were not 
eligible because they were not British. Aliens might not engage 
in subversive activities, but the community could atfribute it to 
them. In desperate times the very presence of such people could 
become an intolerable irritation. But for the authorities to over-
react to complaints against all people who were not British 
subjects might be counterproductive. Clumsy investigation 
that implied suspected disloyalty might, in fact, provoke it. Nor 
was there any guarantee that extreme official action would 
content the general public. Rather than being reassuring, 
heightened activity could encourage the belief that spies or 
subversives were everywhere. Many decisions about the neces-
sity and desirability of internment had to be made, not only in 
the basic legal and social system of a democracy, but also in a 
fluctuating war situation where defeats or victories would alter 
perceptions of threat. Guidelines for interrmient were finally 
agreed and printed in the Department of Defence Y^ar Book. The 
aim of internment was to prevent an individual from "acting in 
a manner prejudicial to the public safety, or the defence of the 
Commonwealth".i8 Although thg detention of all enemy aliens 
was considered the only means of total security, it was decided 
that internments should be kept to the "narrowest limits con-
sistent with public safety and public sentiment". 
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An Inter-Departmental Committee coordinated war plans 
between the federal departments and with state agencies and 
the Commonwealth War Book specified that the Attorney- Gen-
eral's department was to hand over the records of the CIB to the 
Intelligence Section of the General Staff at Army headquarters 
(AHQ) during the time when war was considered to be immi-
nent. Arrangements were to be made between the CIB, the 
police and the army for the control and internment of aliens. If 
the National Security Act, which would legitimize the intern-
ment of British subjects, was not passed before war was de-
clared, there was sufficient authority under the Crimes and 
Defence Acts to detain suspected persons.i^ 
The military and security 
The decision to give the military both the responsibility for 
security and for the files and personnel of the CIB was not 
unanimous and in many ways was a confradiction of the nor-
mal role of the military in a democracy, but the army in fact had 
good reason to feel it had the most knowledgeable of the 
security networks. A military reporting system covering every 
country town and district was established soon after Hitler 
came to power in Germany. Lieutenant-Colonel C.A.K. Cohen 
remembered the establishment of this internal security system 
in terms of the "new Lavarack regime''.^''Major Berfrand Com-
besi^ became Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) in May 
1934 and Lieutenant-General John D. Lavarack, Chief of the 
General Staff (CGS) in April 1935.i^Combes and the Intelligence 
section at AHQ moved to establish an intelligence system 
within Ausfralia. According to Cohen, although British MIS 
was in contact with Major Jones of the CIB, it had little confi-
dence in the CIB as its equivalent in Australia. Cohen recalled 
that conflict soon developed between the services' Intelligence 
Section and Jones of the CIB, who was supported by the head 
of the Attorney-General's department, George Knowles. Cohen 
felt Jones and Knowles wanted an American style Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for Ausfralia. Cohen's impres-
sionistic recollection of the immediate pre-war months was that 
there were conferences, checks and counter-checks and that by 
the outbreak of war nothing had been done to establish an 
adequate security orgainisation. 
Captain CD. Coulthard-Clark, of the Australian Intelligence 
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Corps, confirms that from the time of the 1938 Munich crisis the 
army had the chief responsibility for national security and other 
organisations were to hand over their material to military intel-
ligence.20 In February 1939 the Inter- Departmental committee 
considered setting up a Defence Security Organisation. This 
could be done either by creating a new organisation as an 
adjunct to the Defence Department or by expanding the CIB. 
The army needed a group to secure defence establishments, so 
efficiency suggested this group take the enlarged role. The CIB's 
activities included many mundane activities, such as serving 
bankruptcy notices and following up departmental queries 
with no security aspect. The cooperation the army hoped for 
from the CIB did not eventuate and although some records 
went to AHQ, the CIB resisted the army having the internal 
security responsibility. Despite the CIB's separatist attitude, the 
army had collected a considerable amovint of internal security 
information between 1934 and 1939. In the coimfry areas, for-
mer World War I officers kept watch on anti-war activists, 
communists, unemployed groups, foreigners and anarchists. In 
Victoria, there were military reporting officers (MROs) operat-
ing in all major country towns. Twenty-tivo new MROs had 
been sounded out on their willingness to do this work and were 
recommended on 5 October 1936 while five others were termi-
nated as unsatisfactory. In November, an additional eight were 
added and in October 1938 seven more,including a "Travelling 
MRO", whose address was c/- Graziers Association, Collins St, 
Melbourne. In total, 64 men acted as MROs in Victoria.^^ 
These former officers collected leaflets handed out at meet-
ings of the unemployed and reported speeches where violence 
was advocated to redress grievances. They were concerned that 
the Anti-War League discouraged recruiting in 1935 when there 
was a possibility of Britain going to war against Mussolini over 
Ethiopia, and they were very interested in the communists. In 
the Newcastle area of New South Wales there were files on 300 
residents who were active unionists or subscribers to commu-
nist publications, together with about 50 files on Jehovah's 
Witnesses.^ Coombes had updated the military Intelligence 
Diaries and Summaries in 1934 to include an exfra section on 
Internal Security and the army's major interests can be deduced 
from its Monthly Intelligence Notes.^ 
Six themes appeared regularly activities of Japanese, Italians 
and Germans, Communists, Peace Movement activists and the 
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development of Ausfralian resources. The new mines at Yampi 
Sound, new dams and frrigation projects and new hospitals and 
bridges were noted. International Peace Movements and con-
ferences were reported on and while many participants were 
credited with a genuine desire for world peace, the movements 
were suspect because of the involvement of communists. The 
communists' views on defence were frequently quoted and the 
army was obviously concerned that if there was a war, Ausfra-
lian communists would not fight, except for a Soviet Australia. 
If they did enter the army, the commvinists indicated they 
would either be urging soldiers to demand their rights and 
decent allowances or be learning all they could about arms 
storage facilities to use when the time came to overthrow the 
frue class enemy on both sides. The army was convinced that 
communists were behind certain sfrikes and that politically 
they were desperately trying to become part of a united front 
with the Ausfralian Labor Party (ALP) which found this "most 
distasteful". Interest in the activities of foreigners was usually 
cenfred on Japanese, German and Italian visitors, particularly 
military men, and thefr contacts and reception by residents 
noted. The Japanese economy, its shipping and its army were 
of great interest. 
A full set of Intelligence Summaries for 1936 have been 
scrutinised.2'* They were the responsibility of Major James A. 
Chapman, of the fritelligence Section of the General Staff based 
in Melbourne. Copies were distributed to AHQ, the CIB and 
local Intelligence officers. Economic details about Japan are 
highlighted. Japan was the second largest purchaser of wool, 
taking twelve million pounds worth. The tonnage and routes 
of her ships and her resource problems at home were frequently 
mentioned. By comparison, Germany and Italy get little men-
tion, although this would not necessarily hold for 1937-9. Re-
ports from strike meetings are direct quotes and knowledge of 
union leaders and their political affiliations suggests a broad 
coverage of industrial activities including Trades Hall meet-
ings. The pro-fascist organisations of interest were the Ausfralia 
First Movement, the British Racial Guild and the Italian Fascio. 
The Victorian Council Against War and Fascism was of interest 
for its anti-war stand as well as its anti-fascist politics. The army 
was convinced that involved pacifists and clergymen were 
influenced by the communists. The formation of the Council of 
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Civil Liberties was noted and in October the graduates of the 
university's Japanese language course were named. 
Of greatest concern was the Communist Party.^^ Two meet-
ings addressed by J.B. Miles, the leader of the CPA, had at-
fracted "between 3-4,000". The women wore red berets or 
rosettes, and motions condemning the "reactionary" Lyons, 
Dunstan and Stevens governments and the banning of the 
anti-fascist play "Till the Day I Die" were applauded. However, 
the press had not reported these meetings and the army com-
mentator complained that the "ignorance of the general public 
in the matter of commtmist activity was exfraordinary, particu-
larly as history showed how an organised minority can force its 
will on an unorganised majority". 
The police and security 
The third contender for the job of handling internal security was 
the police force. The state with the biggest Special Branch was 
New South Wales. Its Chief Commissioner, W.J. Mackay ex-
pressed his views in the following terms.^^ There were some 
people who lived in Sydney, who enjoyed a lifestyle well be-
yond their means. They mixed with military and naval officers 
at official receptions and their movements were not continu-
ously monitored. Some of these people were women. Along the 
Sydney foreshore lived many aliens who had jobs on the water-
front. "Women agents" could get documents from ships' mas-
ters and pass them to enemy agents in Australia. Mackay 
favoured establishing an Intelligence Bureau on the lines of MIS 
with definite liaison between the police, the army and the navy 
He had already established some liaison between his detectives 
and a military officer and the basis for a comprehensive record 
of possible enemy subjects and suspected enemy agents in New 
South Wales. Mackay offered the help of the police Special 
Squad for making specific inquiries into aliens under the cover 
of its normal enforcement of state liquor and betting laws. 
Mackay's concept of a joint Intelligence Bureau was based on 
cooperation and mutual access to records. Under the pre-war 
system, information collected by each branch of internal secu-
rity was not automatically passed to others and aliens bent on 
espionage could remain undetected. Mackay felt the matter 
was particularly pressing because Britain had moved to return 
Nazi agents to Germany and the United States had discovered 
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that the employees of a German steamship line had an extensive 
espionage operation underway. Mackay laid out a nine point 
plan for the establishment of a Military Intelligence section in 
each state police headquarters and at Darwin, with Melbourne 
becoming Commonwealth headquarters. Mackay's plan was 
supported by his Premier, B.S.B. Stevens, who urged the Prime 
Minister to consider it carefully. It was at the level of the 
Inter-Departmental Committee created after the Munich crisis 
that the decision to pass internal security to the army was made. 
This committee was very much under the influence of the 
secretary of Defence, E.G. Shedden.^^ However it was Lt-Col. 
Jones' Commonwealth Investigation Branch that had done the 
detailed work on the most dangerous aliens. Membership of the 
Nazi party was regarded as prima facie grounds for internment, 
so the Attorney-General, WM. Hughes, ordered the branch to 
list party members and Jones instructed his state inspectors to 
invite all known or suspected party members to interviews. 
Nazis and Germans 
Inspector D.R.B. Mitchell, of the Sydney CIB, interviewed Al-
fred Henschel, who was in charge of the Nazi Party at this time. 
Henschel was asked for a list of party members from the freas-
urer's records, but he refused on the grounds that the Ausfra-
lian group was an integral part of the party in greater Germany. 
When Mitchell threatened to search the houses of members or 
raid a meeting, Henschel referred him to Barnwell, whom the 
Nazis had guessed was an investigator for the CIB. The authori-
ties were helped, though, when material on party membership 
was found by the freasurer's landlady under the linoleum of 
his Sydney flat.^^ After his interview with Mitchell, Henschel 
wrote to Berlin informing them that the Ausfralian authorities 
did not know all members, and proposing working through 
subsidiary organisations, such as the Winter Help charity. That 
this was effected is doubtful. Henschel's letter was intercepted 
in Britain and a copy returned to Ausfralian security. Nor did 
the German cultural and charity groups have an overt political 
ethos. 
In assessing the attitude of German-born Ausfralians in the 
mid-thfrties, the German Consul-General, Dr Rudolf Asmis, 
concluded that the Germans in Australia had been divided 
before World War I by distance and religious differences. The 
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first war had brought "tiie brutal oppression of everything that 
was German", and the few people who continued in German 
clubs were "strongly anglicised".^^ By confrast the demogra-
pher Charles A. Price's analysis of German settlers in South 
Ausfralia states they were slow to become absorbed into British 
society.30 Before World War I the German community had fifty 
day-schools, two branches of the Lutheran Church with 20,000 
adherents in South Australia, several cultural and social clubs 
and a number of German-language newspapers. During World 
War I the schools, clubs and newspapers were closed and even 
the German names of towns were changed. One branch, the 
Evangelical Lutheran Synod of Australia, began to use Ausfra-
lian-tiained pastors and in both branches the number of serv-
ices conducted in the German language declined. In the 1920s 
the German club reopened and later two German-language 
newspapers appeared. The German Historical Society success-
fully re-established most of the old German names and orches-
trated a suitable tribute to the German pioneers during the 
South Ausfralian centenary of 1936. The German schools never 
reopened, but there were Saturday language-schools and Sun-
day schools where German was used. 
Price points out that Dr Joharmes Becker, a medical practitio-
ner at Tanunda and a committed Nazi got films showing events 
in Germany with portions of speeches by Hitler and other 
German leaders. Ernst Starke was the leacier of the Adelaide 
Ncizi branch and was elected president of the German General 
Club in 1937. Paul Beckmann, the German consul in South 
Ausfralia, took over the Adelaide Nazi branch in 1938 and 
succeeded in becoming president of the German club also. The 
ntimber of functions to celebrate specifically Nazi occasions 
increased and the Winter Help relief fund, which distributed 
blankets to the poor in German cities and the women's group 
were active. Price claims that through Beckmann's influence the 
German consulate in South Ausfralia was "most successful in 
its task of penefrating the Australian German community and 
in influencing it towards Nazi racial policy" .^ ^ 
This is not borne out by Price's own subsequent evidence. 
Sections of the Lutheran church were upset by Hitler's efforts 
to unite all branches of the Lutheran church in Germany into 
one state church, the promotion of Christ as a Nordic hero and 
the pagan doctrine of "Blood, Race and Soil". As early as 1935 
the Australian Lutheran, the newspaper of the Evangelical Lu-
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theran Synod, criticised the Racial League of Germans Abroad 
for one of its radst publications. These Lutherans resented 
plans to imbue German-Australians with the Nazi spirit and 
took exception to being classed as German nationals with an 
implied allegiance to the Reich, and for being treated as mate-
rial for Nazi propaganda. 
Price estimates that in 1938 some 7,000 of the 25,000 people 
of German origin kept to the German language and culture, that 
is, over 25 per cent. He estimated that "at least a thousand South 
Ausfralians succumbed to Nazi influences". Price does not 
make it clear why he nominated one thousand, as the security 
services placed party membership in the whole of Ausfralia at 
only a hundred and seventy.''^ There is no doubt that the Ger-
man consuls in all parts of the world actively promoted the New 
Germany and its leader, and that they fried to use the natural 
sympathies of German descendants to support this promo-
tion.33 To state that one thousand "succumbed" implies that 
these people would be influenced to act in Germany's interest 
even if it was to the defriment of their own native or adopted 
country. There is no proof that the South Ausfralian Nazi party 
members had anything Hke this influence. 
Price suggests that the sfrongest supporters of Germany 
came from the United Evangelical Lutheran Church in Ausfra-
lia. Yet this branch was unequivocal when it came to a choice of 
loyalties. Its newspaper, the Lutheran Herald, admitted in July 
1939 its campaign to promote German culture but protested 
that this had nothing to do with Nazism from which they 
considered they held aloof as they were Ausfralian having no 
other flag than the Union Jack. The paper urged citizens not to 
resist the National Register and when war broke out the Lu-
theran Herald reminded its readers that their ancestors had come 
to Ausfralia originally to find religious freedom and urged 
Lutherans to help Ausfralia preserve her liberty and freedom. 
Able-bodied readers were exhorted to volunteer for national 
service and it was suggested to less fit readers that they will-
ingly donate their money and time to the war effort. 
Price, in confrast to Asmis, is the external observer very 
impressed with the survival of the German language, the clubs 
with a cultural flavour and the few highly publicised Nazis. On 
the other hand Asmis is the internal observer seeing how far the 
Ausfralian-Germans had moved from the mainsfream in Ger-
many. Asnus' assessment is the more convincing but the line 
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between interest in a culture and commitment to the political 
aims of a foreign power were under continual review and the 
fact that Henschel had proposed the use of non-party organisa-
tions to promote Nazi aims placed their members under suspi-
cion. 
There was a third church which bore Lutheran in its title, the 
German Evangelical Lutheran Federated Church of Germany.^^ 
It was strongly connected to the German state church and had 
only two congregations, Melbourne and Sydney. Among the 
Sydney congregation was Dr Asmis and some forty Nazi Party 
members and this church deservedly atfracted security atten-
tion but it primarily served officials and visitors from Germany. 
Among its Nazi Party members was A.N. Wolf who is described 
as the Leader. Wolf was the party freasurer but may have 
succeeded to the leadership as other members returned to 
Germany. The immediate pre-war leader was Walter Laden-
dorff, who had succeeded Becker to the leadership in 1936. 
Ladendorff had come to Ausfralia in 1929 and taken out 
naturalisation. During a period of severe economic sfress he 
took to drinking heavily, but after joining the party he worked 
so diligently that Asmis recommended him to replace Becker,^^ 
who was in disgrace over the mishandling of the Winter Help 
relief funds. Asmis and Becker also disagreed about tactics.^^ 
Becker had established the Australian Nazi Party and a "Union 
of the Friends of Hitler Movement" as political groups that 
included naturalised British subjects. Asmis felt this work 
among "non-Reich" Germans would undoubtedly lead to in-
terference by the Ausfralian government. Asmis preferred to 
cultivate Germanism through broadly-based cultural activities, 
and he xmited the major German clubs into a Bvmd, called the 
"Alliance of Germanism in Ausfralia and New Zealand". 
The Alliance co-sponsored Die Brucke, which Asmis insisted 
should not overstep the "quite determined conditions" under 
which it was allowed to appear. Asmis considered that exfreme 
material would result not only in official censorship but also in 
the Australian reader simply dismissing it as Nazi propaganda. 
Asmis worried that Becker's pursuit of oufright political activi-
ties would mean immediate internment for all Union and party 
members in case of war; but he got littie change from Becker, 
who regarded himself as only accountable to the Foreign De-
partment of the party in Hamburg. When the chance came in 
1936, Asmis seems to have outmanouvered Becker, and the 
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party cenfre moved to Sydney, where German nationals at-
tached to the big wool-buying, engineering and commercial 
ffrms became core members of the party. 
Ladendorff had business connections in Singapore and secu-
rity monitored his journeys there and back. In June 1939 Laden-
dorff called on Mitchell of Sydney CIB to inform him of an 
impending frip to Germany. He sfressed that he had every 
intention of returning and that there was no danger of war 
because his overseas principals would not have refused to pay 
for his wife if there was any such danger. Barnwell kept up 
surveillance, and when he reported that Mrs Ladendorff had 
joined her husband on board ship, this was relayed to Can-
berra.'^'' 
Before the Nazi leader left for Germany a "surprise party" 
was held at the German Club to farewell him, and Detective 
Constable Norman Spry of the NSW Special Squad got himself 
an invitation and a seat at the table with Henschel, Dr Neuman 
and other key party members. The main speaker was the local 
party leader, Waldeman Weber and also very prominent was 
Herman Junge the "Master of Ceremonies" who amused the 
gathering with a comedy monologue in the Bavarian dialect. 
During the dinner another of Spry's hosts, Eduard Hagedorn, 
recalled how he had persuaded Admiral von Spree not to 
bombard the wireless station near Apia, Samoa, early in World 
War I, because this would have disclosed his position to the 
British. Hagedorn became a prisoner of war in New Zealand. 
Later Spry was approached by a member of the club not at-
tached to the Nazi group and reproached for associating with 
the Nazis. Spry was not sure whether the man was genuinely 
part of the anti-Nazi faction in the club or a pro-Nazi testing his 
reaction. About fifty men and "a number of ladies", out of the 
280-sfrong club, were present, and although Spry could not 
understand German, he noted those who wore the party badge 
and gave the Nazi salute.^ Thus the police Special Squad 
contributed to the drawing up of lists and the compilation of 
evidence of pro-Nazi sentiment that was being recorded for use 
in warrants. 
Although the Sydney police were the most active, all state 
police were included in pre-war planning. The Commonwealth 
would depend on state police forces to arrest persons suspected 
of being spies, and enforce regulations relating to aliens, includ-
ing internment. In Chapter HI of the Police War Instructions, 
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policemen were warned that persons "of potential enemy na-
tionality", "of hostile association and subversive or evilly-dis-
posed elements" might attempt to obtain defence information, 
destroy important installations, and lower morale by demon-
strations "under the guise of anti-war propaganda".^^ Al-
though the Intelligence organisations of the three armed 
services were expanding, tiiey were not adequate to keep all 
suspects under continuous observation and the police were to 
provide the necessary investigation officers. In the precaution-
ary stage, lists of those considered to need controlling were 
drawn up. Finally, when war was declared and the legislation 
passed, the police were to arrest the persons to be interned and 
hold them in temporary custody for the military. 
By mid-1939 all known party members were being con-
stantly watched. When von Skerst travelled to Melbourne in 
June 1939, Mitchell sent a comprehensive report on him to the 
Melbourne CIB.^ o Von Skerst was born in Riga, Latvia, of Baltic 
German stock and became a diplomat for Imperial Russia. He 
moved in White Russian circles in the twenties and was Foreign 
Affairs officer for the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria. 
Migrating to Sydney in 1932 he resigned from the Russian ex-
servicemen's association and began cultivating Germans. He 
established Die Brucke in February 1934 and it claimed a circu-
lation of 3,000. Although it was the official organ of the Alliance 
or "Bund" created by Asmis, and the German Chamber of 
Commerce, both of which were regarded as non-political or-
ganisations, security felt Die Brucke had become an instrument 
of Nazi propaganda at von Skerst's direction. Von Skerst 
changed his wife, religion and nationality on an average of 
three times each, and was not entirely tiusted by either the 
German or Russian communities. 
It was established tiiat von Skerst's income depended on Die 
Brucke, and he was interned at the outbreak of war. No one 
could mistake tiie approving descriptions of anniversaries of 
the friumphs of the Third Reich. This is Die Brucke's pictiire of 
tiie celebrations of Hitter's advent to power in its issue of 4 
February 1939: 
For the celebration of 30th January the big haU of the German Club 
Concordia was beautifully decorated with Swastika flags and pen-
nants and with evergreen . . . Among those present were: the rep-
resentative of the Reich, German Consul Dr ASMIS, the 
representative of German sovereignty Regional Leader of the 
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N.S.D.A.P., LADENDORFF; the President of the German Alliance 
in Australia and in New Zealand, Herr O. von DREHNEN; and 
many others . . . the Acting Local Group Leader of the N.S.D.A.P., 
W. WEBER, delivered an address. He said Adolf Hitler had led 
Germany up from weakness and humiliation and given her again 
equal rights among the nations. He believed in the German people 
and the German people stood by him . . . After the death of l in-
denburg. Hitler became Chief of State. Very important social and 
other measures are next: marriage loans, racial hygiene, labour law. 
Winter Relief work. Strength Through Joy, National Socialist Wel-
fare Organisation, Hereditary Farms Law, taxation reform, relief 
works . . . motor roads . . . arts, big National Festivals, the Olympic 
Games, the Reich Party Rallies. Thereafter the speaker gave a 
summary of the Third Reich's successes in foreign policy during 
the six years of National Socialist governmental 
The authorities took the view that von Skerst and party 
members represented a security risk for the whole of the war, a 
view diffictdt to disagree with. 
Members of the Nazi Party were interned quickly when war 
was declared, and the files are a testament to the painstaking 
work of those who had a responsibility for security. Lamidey is 
wrong to conclude that Ausfralia was unprepared to deal with 
questions of national security because there was no corporate 
body called the Department of Security. If war had broken out 
as a result of the Munich crisis of September 1938, security 
agencies would have been as unprepared as the rest of the 
nation, but the CIB, Military Intelligence, and the Special 
branches of the police used the breathing space to good effect. 
Whether they caught every party member is unprovable, as 
party files were deliberately destroyed, but the extensive cross-
checks made it unlikely that many slipped through the net.^^ 
Non-Nazi internees 
Hall, in The Secret State, claims that many anti-Nazis were 
interned so who were these other internees who go beyond 
Nazi membership? The Secretary for the Army told the Secre-
tary of the Prime Minister's Department on 28 November 1939 
that 343 Germans had been arrested and then 66 released.^^ Hall 
offers only the evidence of the activities of a few gungho mili-
tary officers lack of frust in politicians and disregard for legal 
form to support his view^ and while it is comparatively easy 
to frace the few prominent Nazis who appear in the investiga-
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tions prior to the war, become camp leaders, and feature in the 
newspaper reports of the deportation frials at the end of the war, 
the evidence on the other internees is not conclusive, but does 
not favour Hall. 
In his study of Fascism and anti-Fasdsm in Australia, Gian-
franco Cresciani sets out the categories of Italians who were 
assessed as security risks.'^ Those in Category A included peo-
ple suspected of espionage, former members of the Italian 
armed forces, and those with Communist, Fascist and Mafia 
associations. Category B comprised people connected with 
shipping, port or harbour works, fransport or commimication 
systems, factories for war material and public utilities. Cate-
gory C included all leaders and people of influence in the Italian 
community, while category D included all Italian males of 
military age, capable of bearing arms, while O included aU 
ordinary harmless persons. All those listed in Categories A, B 
and C, and some under D, had detention orders prepared 
against them, according to Cresciani. A similar categorisation 
of Germans can be assumed because members of the Fascist 
Party were interviewed by the CIB at the same time as members 
of the Nazi Party. Other internees were selected from ex-mili-
tary men, communist fellow-fravellers, criminals, those work-
ing in vital indusfries, ethnic leaders and fit young men. But as 
the number in these categories far exceeded the number in-
terned, discretion was clearly applied. Being listed was not the 
same as being arrested. The War Book referred to the situation 
of those in the B category whose employment or place of 
residence was the cause of concern, and recommended that 
prohibitions and restrictions be applied.'*^ It is unUkely that, 
with the "narrow" policy of 1939 internments went much be-
yond category A. 
Among newly arrived Germans there were social-democrats 
and socialists, as well as numerous Jews who fled Germany for 
their survival. The British had decided in August ti:\at there 
would be no general internment of enemy aliens on the out-
break of war, but some measure of internment exchanges would 
probably be inevitable.^^if general internment had to take place 
because of public opinion,less severe restrictions for refugees 
should be considered. Only those women who were under 
suspicion of committing hostile activities would be interned 
and no children. By 2 September London stated that enemy 
aliens wishing to leave Britain could apply for exit permits to 
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embark from the larger ports.^^ All aliens would have to register, 
giving personal details, photograph and address and enemy 
aliens would be prohibited from fravelltng over five miles from 
home without permission. In relation to refugees^^ there was a 
general desire to avoid freating them as enemies. All Germans 
and Austrians would be individually assessed by a legal panel 
in thefr home disfrict. Friendly aliens would be encouraged to 
take up work through the employment exchange to ensure they 
were usefully employed without taking British people's jobs. 
English householders would not suffer the "unnecessary" dif-
ficulty of being deprived of their live-in domestic servants. 
British women married to foreigners would not have to register 
but those who had been Germans or Austrians before marriage, 
would. Overall, the policy would be an assessment through a 
careful review of individual cases. Thus in accordance with 
both British and Ausfralian policy, migrants from Germany or 
Ausfria were not likely to be interned unless they were actively 
associated with the Communist Party,^° or had other factors 
combining against them. 
Age was a factor the military did take into account. When the 
Minister for Defence requested information about internments, 
the Military Board explained that the principles observed were 
to include "enemy aliens of military age", or any others "rea-
sonably suspected" of being likely to act or to "cause disaffec-
tion". The Board sfressed that the Nazis were the prime target.^i 
A man who appears to have been interned on three grounds — 
nationality, age and disaffection — was Heinrich Flauaus, a 
fitter by trade who had emigrated in 1929. Flauaus worked as 
a fencing contractor in western Queensland before getting a 
fradesman's job with Mt Isa Mines. Flauaus would have also 
had his three year service with a Pioneer Corps of the German 
army held against him. Flauaus was released shortly after his 
internment and returned to his job at Mt Isa Mines, but his 
workmates refused to go underground with him, so he had to 
take alternative emplojmient selling ice-cream in Brisbane.^^ 
Although not frusted by his workmates, Flauaus had no con-
nections with the Nazi Party and his release and that of others 
may have been the result of the Military Board drawing the 
attention of commandants to the variety of confrols such as 
prohibiting aliens from moving out of their police districts. A 
suspect person was "not to be interned unless his being at 
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large" constituted "a potential danger to the public safety or the 
defence of the Commonwealth".^ 
Another internee released early in 1940, George Edelmann, 
seems to fit the category of those closely associated with Nazis. 
Edelmann was arrested on 4 September 1939. He had arrived 
from Austria in February 1938. He had acquired German citi-
zenship as a result of the Anschluss. A fussy man, very con-
cerned about his diet and health, his ambition was to raise 
chickens. To save the necessary capital, he took a job with G. 
Hardt and Company, and placed a deposit on a farm at 
Quaker's Hill just as war broke out. Hardt and Co. was a 
declared enemy firm, with Nazi directors, and Edelmaim's 
employment there caused his internment, but his case was 
investigated by a Review Committee established by the army. 
The committee comprised senior officers from the Intelligence 
Branch and the General Staff, and a chairman with the rank of 
Lieutenant-Colonel. Any recommendations for release were 
finally approved by the General Officer Commanding (GOC) 
each area, the same officer who had the Minister's delegated 
authority to intern. The case against Edelmann was that he was 
of German nationality, had been in the military reserve in 
Ausfria, and had worked for a firm controlled by "a fanatical 
Nazi". It was reasonable to assume that this director would not 
have employed anyone who did not subscribe to Nazi princi-
ples. However, as there was no record of any Nazi activities on 
the part of Edelmann, Lt-Col. W B. Simpson, Chief Legal Officer 
and Chairman of the GOC's Review Committee, recommended 
Edelmann's release in February 1940.^ 
The cases of Flauaus and Edelmann provide some clues as 
to the people on the original list beyond party members. There 
are also some glimpses of criminals. On 12 February 1940 the 
Argus reported that Alfred Fritz Yackels (alias Joseph Alfred 
Schmidt) disappeared from the Liverpool internment camp. 
Yackels was described as being "well known to police".55 Nor 
were people necessarily interned even if they had sfrong asso-
ciations with German-based organisations. Von Luckner's Bris-
bane contact was the secretary of the state's German Club and 
he organised the reception for the Count in Queensland. A 
British subject by virtue of his father's naturalisation, he joined 
the German Club in 1934, became vice-president in 1936 and 
secretary in 1938. A few pro-Nazis successfully gained execu-
tive positions in the club but he stayed on as secretary. In early 
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September 1939 the Club voluntarily suspended its activities 
and offered is building in Vulture Sfreet, South Brisbane, to the 
Commonwealth government for amy purpose but preferably 
for the use of the Red Cross. On 15 September 1939, the club's 
president and secretary called on R.F.B.Wake, the CIB's inspec-
tor in Brisbane, to request that small withdrawals from club 
funds be allowed for expenses such as council rates and to 
support internees' families. The secretary's home was searched 
on 28 September on a warrant issued against supporters of "The 
Friends of the Third Reich". In February 1940 the German Club 
was searched and the account books, correspondence. Hitler's 
photo and the German flag confiscated. The secretary described 
the club in Brisbane as having a membership of between 350 
and 400 of whom two-thirds spoke German and one-third 
English. In the course of his duties the secretary was regularly 
in touch with the police in South Brisbane and he was a Justice 
of the Peace. He was not a member of the Nazi Party, he was a 
long-term naturalised citizen and while a policy of keeping 
internments to a minimum prevailed, the Queensland German 
Club secretary did not suffer the fate of the newly arrived 
Edelmann.5^ There is no evidence that many German anti-Nazis 
were interned at the outbreak of war. Some internees appear to 
have represented little security risk, and perhaps they were 
politically neutral, but they had been investigated individually 
for internment and were judged at the time to give cause for 
concern. Some, like Flauaus and Edelmarm, were soon released. 
The reports of the Victorian director of the CIB, Roland S. 
Browne, put Hall and Sfreet's criticisms further into doubt. 
These reports show that Browne and his colleagues were well 
aware of the anti-Nazi feelings of Jewish refugee immigrants. 
But Browne went beyond a passive intellectual acceptance of 
the Jews' position, he actively defended them. Browne worked 
closely with the army and sent in his proposed list for intern-
ments to the 3rd Military Disfrict HQ well before war began. 
When Southern Command took over responsibility for intern-
ments in October 1939, Browne explained his recommendations 
and gave opinions on aliens, communists and others as re-
quested. A study of six hundred of his reports reveals some-
thing of his perspective on the people and issues he dealt with.^^ 
Browne believed in migration and often summed up people by 
saying they would make excellent citizens. He approved of 
family migration in particular. He described Jewish migrants as 
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anti-Nazis and often added that these people were "highly 
thought of in this office". Flis knowledge of their family and 
financial situations suggests conversations beyond mere re-
quests for statutory information. And once he felt he knew a 
person, he was unequivocal in his defence of them against 
anonymous letter writers or amateur sleuths who found their 
activities suspicious. It would be most unlikely that any genu-
ine Jewish migrant would have been interned in Victoria. 
Brov^me was sympathetic to the culturally minded and liberal 
thinkers. Such people, despite associations with the German 
Club or interest in left-wing politics were not given critical 
assessments by Browne. In a report on a member of the Italian 
Fascio at Werribee, Brov^nie recommended restrictions for the 
man rather than internment. When queried by Southern Com-
mand, he justified his opinion on the grounds the local British-
ers regarded the naturalised Italian highly and he was not 
regarded as dangerous. 
This is not to say that Browne hesitated to recommend in-
ternment or surveillance or to give adverse reports. Dr Franz 
Haslinger, the agent for the "Wanderer" car of Stuttgart, al-
though a man of good address and keen intelligence, was an 
enemy subject of military age, deprived of his livelihood, whose 
unresfricted presence in tiie community would be likely to 
cause some degree of disaffection and he was recommended for 
internment. The subject of report 162 was a Polish Jew, about 
whom Browne was prepared to repeat the Sydney branch's 
view that the man was "arrogant" and his "behaviour in the 
Kings Cross neighbourhood" was known. He was the "type 
that gives some understanding of Hitler's attitude towards the 
Jews". And although Antonio Agostini, tiie advertising man-
ager of II Giornale Italiano had not taken out Fascist party mem-
bership in Ausfralia, he had "described himself as a Fascist at 
heart", and Browne had listed him for internment.^s 
Browme had considerable confidence in his own judgement 
and would back it against other agencies or even other state 
branches. When a Pole was rejected for naturalisation Browne 
protested that he had met the man many times and he knew 
nothing against his loyalty and suggested the officer who gave 
the adverse report had only a limited knowledge of Polish Jews, 
because there were relatively few in his state.^^ Browne quoted 
the Society of Friends and Jewish welfare agencies as authori-
ties on refugees and given his clearcut reports, it required some 
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definite contradictory evidence before the military in Victoria 
went against Browne's advice. Not only did Browne have con-
fidence in himself, he had a background that would give the 
army confidence in his judgements. Browne was an Intelligence 
Officer with the 28th Battalion, First AIF and was wounded in 
1916. He began work with the CIB in 1921, was a prescribed 
authority for war gratuities from 1923 and in the Militia he was 
attached to the 3rd Military Disfrict in 1935.^ The fact that a 
Queensland internee, wrote to Browne in February 1940, asking 
for release and stating that he had been the only Jewish refugee 
in the Queensland camp at Gaythome and was similarly placed 
in the Victorian camp,^i suggests that very few refugees were 
among the original internees. 
So newly arrived migrants were not interned merely because 
they had just arrived, nor was there an hysterical campaign 
against foreigners as soon as war broke out. Migrants from 
Germany, Ausfria, Czechoslovakia and Poland held public 
meetings to express their loyalty and gratitude to Ausfralia and 
their willingness to enlist an these were reported in the press.^^ 
No doubt some individuals did react aggressively but official 
policy was not against them. The Prime Minister, R. G. Menzies, 
appealed to Ausfralians to refrain from any boycott of friendly 
aliens and declared that a display of thoughtfulness and kind-
ness towards enemy aliens would not be incompatible with the 
determination to fight for a good cause. It was as important to 
preserve justice in Ausfralia as to fight for it internationally. 
When a large company belonging to a friendly power found 
that its managing-director had been interned they contacted 
Menzies. The Leader of the Opposition, John Curtin, claimed 
that the Prime Minister ordered the man's release without even 
looking at his dossier. Menzies countered that he had requested 
that an enqufry be made in case there had been a mistake. 
Brigadier G. A. Sfreet, the Minister for Defence, explained that 
although the man was released pending the enqufry, he had 
been reinterned once his nationality was substantiated.^ But 
the War Book!s recommendation that internment be kept to the 
"narrowest" limits was not to be flouted. The government 
announced that state-based Advisory Committees, presided 
over by judges, would be established to hear appeals by aliens 
against their internment.^* 
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A balancing act 
Many considerations confributed to the decision to keep intern-
ments to a minimum and the most practical one was money. 
Concern to keep cost to a minimum was highlighted by the 
World War I experience. During World War I, some German and 
Ausfrian military reservists were interned immediately and in 
February 1915 they were all taken in. When there was a setback 
on the war front anti-German feelings increased. Many Ger-
mans, thrown out of their employment, had given themselves 
up for internment voluntarily, and their dependents also had to 
be housed and fed. All these internees had been added to the 
public servants from German New Guinea, the crew of the 
Emden and other prisoners-of-war, until 6,739 men, 67 women 
and 84 children had been interned. It had cost Australia one and 
one half million pounds for internments in 1914-18.^^ If the new 
war was to follow the pattern of the old, with the theafres of 
operations in Europe, tiie cost had to be weighed against the 
security risk. 
While expense was a fairly sfraight forward practical consid-
eration, the more complex problem was how far authoritarian 
action in the name of victory would be accepted by the people 
of a democracy. The relative importance of civil liberties and 
national security were argued out in parliament in the debate 
over the National Security Act. Parliamentary members of the 
Ausfralian Council of Civil Liberties, Frank Brennan and 
Maurice Blackburn, complained that the Bill was potentially 
more repressive than its World War I equivalent. Brerman felt it 
was designed to imdermine the authority of representative 
government and to suspend the power of parliament, but 
Menzies denied this, claiming that the government also had 
civil rights firmly in mind. He said, that "whatever may be the 
extent of the power that may be taken to govern, to direct and 
to confrol by regulation, there must be as littie interference with 
individual rights as is consistent with concerted national ef-
fort". In Menzies' view the "greatest fragedy that could over-
come a country would be for it to fight a successful war in 
defence of liberty and lose its own liberty in the process". The 
new powers would be exercised firmly, but "witiiout intoler-
ance and with a due respect for the interests of minorities". 
Maurice Blackburn accepted Menzies' present intentions as 
"generous and liberal", but his recollections of World War I 
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made him unwilling to rely on the assumption that the govern-
ment would maintain those liberal intentions for the whole of 
the war. War changed the opinions of people with the commu-
nity subjected to great nervous tension. The opposition to the 
Bill was most vocal against the sections that allowed a ministe-
rial regulation to nullify any previous Act of parliament, a judge 
to hold "political" frials in secret, and the police to detain 
suspects for ten days without charge.^^ 
But even if basic legal rights were potentially suspendable, 
it does not follow that legal form was overturned with the 
outbreak of war. It was not the intention of the government, or 
of the Military Board, to act repressively. The power to detain 
naturalised or British subjects did not pass to the military and 
the Board did not ask for such powers. The "onus of proof", 
however, was placed on the person concerned to show that he 
or she was an alien of "a particular class", or was not an alien 
at all.^ ^ So one basic legal principle was sacrificed to security: 
the onus of proof was shifted to tihe alien, but those claiming to 
be refugees found that family ties and welfare associations were 
sufficient evidence for the authorities. At this time, while there 
was no external threat to public safety, and morale remained 
high, internments were few and carefully considered. Ausfralia 
had laid down her internment policy well before war began and 
despite their overlapping responsibilities the CIB, the military 
and the police executed it promptly to remove the threat from 
organisations and individuals who were potential security 
risks. 
Chapter Two 
EARLY DAYS 
The desire to keep costs down and concern for democratic 
principles minimised the number of initial internments, and 
the nature of the war before May 1940 ensured that there was 
no alteration to this narrow selection policy. Apart from the 
naval battle of the River Plate, few British servicemen were 
involved in major engagements before May, and most Aus-
tralian servicemen were still in training. One third of the 6th 
Division, Second AIF, went to the United Kingdom, but it did 
not arrive there until 16 June 1940, after the evacuation of 
Dunkirk and too late to fight in Europe. It was still "the 
phoney war". 
Ausfralia's defence policy was based on the 1923 Imperial 
Conference decisions that each dominion would look after its 
own defence, maintain maritime communications and develop 
an air force, but the economic depression of the thirties directed 
priorities away from defence spending.^ Australia had urged 
Britain to establish a naval base at Singapore but the Singapore 
base was still not completed when it was officially opened on 
14 February 1938. During the twenties. Colonel H. D. W5mter 
suggested that the Australian army should be developed to the 
extent that it could defend the south-east corner of the Ausfra-
lian continent until help arrived, but this was rejected. When 
the Opposition leader, John Curtin, urged the development of 
a larger air capacity in 1937, it was considered that Australian 
indusfry could not cope with the rapidly changing technology 
of aeronautical engineering. Thus Singapore was the corner-
stone of Australia's defence. When Winston Churchill, the First 
Lord of the Admiralty, reassured a hesitant Australian govern-
ment in the early months of the war that any attack by Japan on 
Singapore would be a "mad enterprise", the 22,000 men who 
had enlisted in the AIF, and the 11,000 selected for the Royal 
Ausfralian Air Force, were organised for overseas service.^ 
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Registration of aliens 
Most Australians believed that the war would be fought "over 
there", and consequently Australian authorities had no need to 
intern anyone beyond the few considered to be hostile. The 
regisfration of all aliens proceeded in an orderly way. Approxi-
mately 50,000 aliens aged sixteen and over were required to 
complete a regisfration form at their closest police station. The 
regisfration form asked for basic personal information and for 
details of migration, political allegiance and military service 
and this information was then processed by the security 
authorities. Enemy aliens were subjected to resfrictions on their 
movement beyond thefr police disfrict and had to report to their 
Aliens Registration Officer (ARO) at the police station every 
week. Cameras, guns and radio sets capable of overseas frans-
mission had to be handed in. Individual aliens could not angli-
cise thefr personal or frade names, and they had to swear not 
to do anj^hing that might be "prejudicial to the safety of the 
British Empfre".^ For most enemy aliens these were their only 
formal hardships and when the war situation improved in 1943 
even these resfrictions began to be revoked. 
The regisfration procedures highlighted two complications. 
First, many recently arrived migrants from Germany, and Ger-
man-held territory, claimed to be refugees and wanted to be 
classified as friendly aliens; and, secondly, some married 
women were surprised to find that they had lost their British 
nationality because they had married a foreigner. To assist the 
committees classify newly-arrived migrants. Colonel J. North-
cott. Director of Military Operations and Intelligence,* drew up 
some guidelines. In Instruction No. 4 he sfressed that, although 
the national interest was paramount, "sjnnpathetic freatment" 
was to be accorded to enemy aliens who had left their own 
country on political, racial or religious grounds. Northcott 
warned that care should be exercised to sift out persons claim-
ing to be friendly, but who were not, although how the commit-
tee was to do so was not specified. Former Czechs were not to 
be classified as enemy aliens as a general rule, but any individ-
ual who gave cause for concern was to be restricted. Northcott 
recommended that each committee should include an intelli-
gence officer and a legal officer and that societies who dealt 
with refugees should be consulted. Persons judged to be 
"friendly disposed to the British Empfre" and "trusted not to 
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do anything damaging to tiie national interests" were to be 
given a certificate "Form Z" which exempted the holders from 
the restrictioi\s that applied to enemy alieris.^ 
The Jewish Welfare groups had records of the ortiiodox 
Jewish migrants tiiey sponsored, and Catholic welfare looked 
after Catiiolics. The Eviropean Emergency Committee, begun by 
the Society of Friends (Quakers), helped Lutherans, Old Catho-
lics, members of the Greek Orthodox church and those who 
were specified as "no religion". The NSW Special Investigation 
Branch reported that there were 259 refugees on the commit-
tee's books, including people with some Jewish ancestry mar-
ried to Christians, and Christians married to Jewish spouses.^ 
Other migrants used the capital J stamped on the passports of 
non-Aryans by German officials for proof of refugee status, and 
the Australian immigration form A42 that requfred migrants to 
state if they were a Jew was useful to others. In order to screen 
these thousands of aliens and particularly to assess the enemy 
aliens, the Intelligence Corps had to be increased. Appropriate 
men, including some from the Reserve of Officers (R of O) were 
sought for Intelligence work.^ In Tasmania, Lieutenant-Colonel 
C. A. Clowes recommended, among others. Lieutenant E.C. 
Stephens who had been tiansfered from the R of O and sec-
onded to HQ as an Intelligence Officer (lO) in August 1938. The 
latter's legal training had been very valuable to the Security 
sub-section. Captain E.E. Von Bibra became the lO at 
Launceston. Men such as these would form part of the assess-
ment and review committees. 
Migrants motivated by economic, political or family reasons 
had to rely on their own credibility, backed by references from 
friends, family and business acquaintances, for while many 
German migrants were Jewish refugees, non-Jews were in the 
fraditional sfream of seekers of political and religious freedom, 
family reunions and employment. Germany was a regular 
source of migration to Ausfralia from as early as 1836 and chain 
migration followed with significant numbers of Germar\s set-
tled in South Australia, southern Queensland and the Wimmera 
disfrict of Victoria.^ The Lutheran Church also established a 
number of missions in Australia, especially among the Aborigi-
nes, and in New Guinea. There was a break in migration from 
Germany from 1914 until December 1925, but when it was 
restored the fraditional chain migrants were boosted by the 
Jewish refugees and other anti-Nazis. 
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As its contribution to alleviating the world-wide migration 
pressures caused by Germany's attitude to non-Aryans, Aus-
fralia agreed to take a quota of 15,000, almost half of whom had 
arrived by 1940.^ It was not an easy task for the military com-
mittees to screen migrants from Germany, as some political 
anti-Nazis were communists likely to be sympathetic to the 
anti-war policy dictated by Soviet Russiai°, but in these early 
days Jews and political refugees were usually given the benefit 
of the doubt. 
The other group complicating the regisfration procedure was 
married women who found they had lost thefr status of British 
subject on marrying a foreigner. The laws on nationality at that 
time were not universal or agreed. A few countries held to the 
principle that all native-born people kept their original nation-
ality even if they migrated to another counfry and obtained 
naturalisation there. Most coimfries relinquished thefr claims 
to nationals who obtained another nationality. Germany and 
Italy continued the pre-World-War-I practice of giving a woman 
her husband's nationality. In confrast, American women kept 
their United States citizenship on marriage, but it did not 
fransfer to spouses. To prevent a woman becoming stateless, 
Britain, and therefore AustraUa, adopted the convention that a 
married womcin normally took her husband's nationality, but 
if this was not possible, she kept her own.ii 
The Ausfralian Nationality Act of 1937 also gave Australian 
women married to foreigners the opportunity to retain their 
British privileges while they resided in Ausfralia. Further this 
act allowed wives to renounce their husband's nationality alto-
gether and to take out British naturalisation for themselves so 
that they retained British status anywhere in the world. Senator 
H.S. Foil, the Minister for the Interior, publicised this clause 
when he found that many married women were "suffering 
unnecessary hardship" through the regisfration of aliens pro-
cedures.i^ So Ausfralian women married to aliens could retain 
thefr Australian privileges, take out complete British citizen-
ship by becoming naturalised, or take their husband's nation-
ality and forgo their claims to either British or Australian 
resident status. Nevertheless, if they took their husband's na-
tionality, even if it were German, they were virtually exempt 
from internment. 
In the War Book it was originally declared that women would 
not be interned "as a general rule", but when it was necessary 
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they would be "kept in custody". Shortly after war commenced, 
the Military Board instructed the War Book officer to amend this 
rule because it was "at variance with British practice", and 
because gaol was worse than an internment centre. The gentle-
manly board felt that there was "no apparent reason why 
women should be tieated more harshly than men". As the 
original decision was made with the concurrence of AHQ, the 
War Book officer was somewhat peeved at being put in the 
wrong, but he recommended the alteration.^^ Of the thousands 
of women of alien birth or acquired nationality in Australia, 
only seven were regarded as a sufficient security risk to be 
interned. 
Reciprocity 
These seven women became the subject of a tug-of-war on an 
international scale. When the German consul, Dr Asnus, and 
his staff left Australia, the Consul General for Switzerland, Herr 
H. Hedinger, undertook the responsibility for German interests. 
All queries from Berlin concerning Germans and their property 
in Australia were directed from Berne through London to Hed-
inger's office in Pitt Street, Sydney. Hedinger contacted the 
relevant Austialian authorities and sent their reply through 
London to Berne for fransmission to Berlin. It became Hedin-
ger 's responsibility to protect the interests of the original intern-
ees, most of whom were German citizens. The American 
Embassy in Berlin did the same for British interests and intern-
ees in Germany. 
The United States urged that the rigorous internments and 
reprisals of World War I not be repeated^^ and it was proposed 
that there should be an agreement to prevent these and to 
guarantee speedy and automatic hearing of appeals by intern-
ees. After London had considered the proposal, the Secretary 
for the Dominions, Anthony Eden, passed the matter on to other 
governments for their comment. ^ ^ Internees would be freated 
in accordance with the Prisoner of War Convention (commonly 
called the Geneva Convention) of 1929. The Germans offered to 
allow British citizens to leave, if those of military age swore not 
to bear arms. Britain had already agreed to let women, children 
and males under 18 and over 60 depart, with only security 
exceptions, and they were not averse to releasing all internees 
"having regard to the small number of Germans interned in the 
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British Empire". However, the Dominions had interned many 
more than Britain, and Germany wanted to know what would 
happen to these people. Australia agreed with British policy as 
far as women, children and non-military age men were con-
cerned, on condition that the Germans reciprocated. 
The seven women held in Ausfralia were released in Febru-
ary 1940 having been originally housed in the women's section 
of Long Bay and fransfered on 26 October 1939 to a house on 
the Hawkesbury River, i^  Also released was Nancy Reichelt, an 
Ausfralian held in Germany, i^  In March 1940 news came from 
London that another Ausfralian, Alma Graf, was interned in 
Charlottesburg Gaol, Berlin, i^  A British woman who saw her 
there passed on Graf's plea to the Ausfralian government to 
release a German woman in exchange. Her captors continually 
told her that she would remain incarcerated for years unless 
Ausfralia released women internees. Graf was suffering from 
influenza and becoming morose "on account of the monotony 
and hopelessness of the dreary prison routine". She ate break-
fast before dawn and was sent to bed at 8 pm. Her room was 
heated and clean, and the food good, but mainly limited to 
bread and soup. Graf's worst fear was mixing with the other 
women prisoners who were "convicts". 
Telegrams were despatched to the Dominions Office, Lon-
don, on 27 February and 29 March 1940, affirming Australia's 
decision to release all women and placing no obstacle in the way 
of their departure. For some reason it took until 29 May for the 
British to inform the Germans, who replied through the United 
States Embassy that they would reciprocate in respect to Aus-
fralian and New Zealand nationals in Germany. But by the time 
this decision was relayed to Ausfralia on 4 July 1940 practical 
difficulties had arisen.!^ Germany had attacked Norway, the 
Low Counfries and France. Demands on shipping for war 
purposes were great and fravel on the high seas dangerous. 
Thus, while reciprocity became a firmly established principle 
in internment policy, delays in commimication and other fac-
tors often frustrated its implementation. 
While Ausfralia felt that its behaviour in respect to women 
was exemplary, there had been an unpleasant incident during 
the fransfer of male internees from Queensland to Victoria. The 
Quartermaster-General arranged for the movement of 59 in-
ternees from Brisbane's Enogerra army camp to Sydney by train 
as part of the plan to congregate all internees at Tatura, Vic, 
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where a special internment camp had been constructed. The 
Queensland internees, on reaching Sydney, were to join 94 from 
New South Wales and sail on SS Katoomba for Melbourne, while 
27 internees from Western Australia and South Australia came 
across on the MV Duntroon?^ When first arrested, internees had 
to spend a few rughts in the cells of the local police station, but 
they were then moved to regular prisons where internment 
centies were established. The Sydney group, the largest, spent 
some time in Bathurst Gaol while those in South Australia went 
from Keswick Barracks to Gladstone Gaol. Western Australian 
internees went to the Northam Race Course, and Victorians to 
Dhurringle.2^ Now the time had come for them to go to a 
permanent Internment Camp. 
The Queensland internees were housed in a fenced off sec-
tion of the Enogerra Military Base referred to as the Gaythorne 
Internment Camp and on 18 January 1940 Hugo Hilderbrant 
and Hubert Wunck escaped. They planned to get a boat from 
Tin Can Bay, a remote fishing spot near Maryborough, and from 
there to sail to New Guinea. The third member of the escape 
party, who had the necessary charts, failed to get out, and 
Wunck was arrested in Urangan, and Hilderbrant at Marybor-
ough.22 As a result of the escapes, exfra precautions were taken. 
The remairung internees were locked up from 6 pm to 6 am, and 
roll calls by day and torch checks by night were stepped up. For 
identification purposes during the tiansfer tiip, the internees' 
clothes were stamped "P of W". The proposed fransfer was not 
announced until twenty-four hours before being put into effect. 
More dangerous for its implicatior\s for reciprocal tieatment, 
the internees were handcuffed in pairs throughout the journey 
to Sydney. 
The Swiss Consul protested that the treatment in camp after 
the escapes and on the tiain "amounted to collective penalties" 
for the actions of the individuals who escaped, and was in direct 
contravention of Article 46 of tiie International Convention.23 
There was no doubt that all the internees, except one who had 
two artificial legs, and a second who had a broken ankle, were 
handcuffed for all but three hours of the twenty-six hour jour-
ney. The aim was to prevent a concerted rush at the guards as 
they pafrolled down the cenfral aisles of the railway carriages, 
or during the darkness while going tiirough tunnels.24 That the 
internees resented their freatment was clear from thefr official 
complaints and their mail, which was always read. One in-
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ternee felt that the officer from the CIB, whom he possibly 
remembered from his pre-war interview and consequently 
identified as his persecutor, was a sadist. Another internee 
could not understand why civilians should be subjected to 
freatment that would not be meted out to criminals, and a third 
internee harboured his grudge and determined to repay Aus-
fralians in kind when the fortunes of war changed.^^ 
The Northern Command officers argued that the drastic 
resfraints were warranted by the "truculent" attitude of the 
internees and because of the three former escapees who were 
"considered definitely desperate characters". The precautions 
at the railway station were necessary because a Brisbane con-
tingent of the Second AIF were also on the frain, and there were 
many people seeing them off, making it dangerous to use 
ffrearms to prevent escapes, and their continued use was justi-
fied by the long tunnels and broken lights. Major-General H.D. 
Wynter, backed the Assistant Provost-Marshal, who had expe-
rience in the regular army and civil police, and who "was in 
touch with the temper of the men" and whose responsibility it 
was to ensure that there were no escapes.^^ 
Sfreet replied to Hedinger that the intensified security meas-
ures at Gaythorne were not a collective punishment but a 
precaution against further escape attempts. The internees had 
been given the option of wearing government-provided 
marked clothing as an alternative to having thefr own shirts 
branded. The presence of the former escapees had heightened 
tension and anticipation among all the prisoners and made 
handcuffing necessary, but the handcuffs had been removed for 
washing and visits to the lavatory. Sfreet indicated he would 
allow interstate relatives to visit for two hours. Overall, Street 
supported the guards, but he also confirmed that the policy of 
the Ausfralian government was not to inflict any unnecessary 
hardships on internees.^^ After checking that Sfreet's reply was 
for forwarding to Germany, Hedinger sent it to London.^s 
Most other arrangements in the early days of internment 
were negotiated with less drama. The Australian post office 
agreed to carry internees' mail and parcels at the same rate as 
the Geneva Convention prescribed for prisoners of war. Gen-
eral Wynter told his staff in Brisbane that internees were nor-
mally to be treated as prisoners of war with the rank of private. 
An issue of one pafr of ankle boots, dungaree jacket and frou-
sers, two flannel shirts and a white hat was to be made to each 
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internee. Internees could not be paid for work done around the 
camp, but the possibility of their employment was being inves-
tigated. Because former itinerant workers and merchant sea-
men had few savings, they were anxious to have some means 
of gaining a small income for, although the most basic needs 
were met, the issue of soap, shaving cream and tobacco was 
below what they desired, and such items had to be paid for at 
the canteens provided. Internees with savings were allowed to 
draw a small sum from their accounts each week. Liquor was 
banned altogether.^^ 
Some internees' families were destitute and, to help them, 
the Secretary of the Mihtary Board sought permission for the 
payment of a 17s 6d weekly allowance provided by the War 
Financial Regulation.^" Because so many families needed full 
accommodation and sustenance in camps in World War 1,^ 1 it 
was deemed to be more economical to pay an allowance and 
keep the families out of camps. The rate set for internees' 
families was the same as the separation allowance for members 
of the Ausfralian military forces on war service. In addition to 
the 17s 6d a week for wives, 5s 3d was provided for each child 
under 14. Some wives fried to join their men in camp and 
petitioned Herr Hedinger who pressed Sfreet to have married 
quarters at Tatura. This was considered but when the cost was 
realised it was abandoned.'^^ 
The problem of destitute families quickly surfaced with 
charitable groups. The Anglican Archbishop of Sydney wrote 
to Menzies about the plight of the men of German birth who 
had been "dropped from jobs connected with shipping, 
whether naturalised or not". The Archbishop was anxious that 
if these men remained unemployed a great amount of misery 
could result and "the victims" would soon be dependent on the 
clergy for help. Menzies wrote to all State Premiers sfressing the 
undesirability of repeating the World War I experience when 
despite appeals to the public to avoid discrimination against 
harmless enemy aliens, many had to be interned to save them 
from starving. Cleverly Menzies pointed out that the most 
practical and economical way to deal with the problem would 
be for the states to continue to use "their machinery for granting 
sustenance" to pay unemployed aliens, thus giving the states a 
good motive to keep them employed.33 
Again with the World War I precedents in mind. Official 
Visitors drawn from the judiciary of each state's Supreme 
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Court, were appointed to each camp. Their monthly visits were 
notified in advance and those wishing to speak to a visitor in 
private could make an appointment. The Visitor had no influ-
ence over releases. His role was to see that the regulations 
governing the management of camps were being carried out, 
and he dealt mainly with the camp leaders selected by internees 
to speak on their behalf. After consulting the camp leader, the 
Visitor spoke to the camp commandant and dealt with minor 
matters on the spot. Outstanding matters were then officially 
reported to headquarters. The Visitor's report went to the rele-
vant army authorities, such as the Quartermaster's branch if 
the problem was issue of clothing, or the Accounts Branch if the 
delay in financial fransactions was criticised. Matters relating 
to the area of the camp commandant's area of jurisdiction, such 
as the physical state of the camp, or camp orders, were referred 
from headquarters to the commandant for reply. It was policy 
that an Official Visitor (OV) should be "a gentleman of high 
position" so that, as in the Great War, foreign powers would be 
impressed with the Commonwealth's desire to fulfil its obliga-
tions to internees.'^ 
Another reason is suggested in the comment by Brigadier 
Sfreet to a request from the Daily Telegraph to visit Bathurst gaol 
to write an article on the freatment of aliens interned there. The 
military authorities were against press visitors because it would 
be difficult to discriminate between newspapers and to limit 
reports to general questions rather than individual cases. Street 
wrote on the discussion paper that he wanted official visitors 
appointed in each state "as early as possible".^^ The reasons 
given for the appointment of Official Visitors in the Official 
History of Internment are more expansive. There was the World 
War 1 precedent and the need for civilians to be able to appeal 
to fellow civilians. Internees were placed in military custody for 
national security reasons and not as a punishment, and their 
conditions should be reviewed by civilians who could give 
assistance with the problems arising from the internees' sudden 
removal from civilian life. Official Visitors were also appointed 
to avoid retaliatory action and as a defence against ill-founded 
complaints. The Official Visitor to Gaythorne was Mr Justice 
Neal Macrossan, Senior Puisne Judge of the Queensland Su-
preme Court. In "Victoria Mr Gavin Duffy of the Supreme Court 
visited Tatura, and Sir Fredrick Jordan , Chief Justice of New 
South Wales visited Liverpool. When camps expanded later in 
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the war, prominent men with legal experience were added to 
the list including a former Chief Justice of Gibraltar and a judge 
of the Supreme Court of Malaya.^^ 
Appeal system 
Once internees were in camp they were given a copy of the rules 
in their own language, and appeal forms to fill out if they 
objected to their internment. These objections were heard by a 
committee or tribunal, who advised the authorities whether 
they considered the objector had a sufficient case to justify a 
trial. Although this method of handling objections was de-
signed to streamline hearings, it did not succeed. An internee 
might object, yet the military claim that because he was a 
member of the German Labour Front, an organisation closely 
aligned to the Nazi Party, his internment was correct. The 
objector would argue that he was at best an a nominal annual 
subscriber without active participation. With the cross-exami-
nation and explanations of the relationship between the Labour 
Front and the Nazi Party and further arguments as to whether 
only the active and executive members were significantly de-
voted to be "likely to act", the hearings were drawn out. They 
might as well have been trials, for if the committee advised that 
the objector had a case the whole thing had to be gone over 
again. Members of the Nazi Party were often refused leave to 
object outright, and tribunals later combined leave to object and 
objection hearings.''^ 
The Chairmen of Advisory Committees and Appeals Tribu-
nals were, or had been, judges in state courts. The Advisory 
Committees heard the objections of British subjects and natu-
ralised subjects only. These committees were established in each 
state on the nomination of the premiers. To support the chair-
man-judge, two men of high standing in the community were 
also nominated. The objectors heard by the Advisory Commit-
tees were those arrested under Section 26 of the National Secu-
rity (General) Regulations, while the cases of aliens arrested 
under Section 20 of the National Security (Aliens Control) 
Regulations were reviewed by the GOC's committee. Basically 
all British, naturalised, and alien objectors who protested were 
reviewed, in secret, according to the criteria for internment set 
down in the VJar Book. 
Advisory Committees were chaired by Justice J.D.Morris 
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(Tas.), Justice Sfr John Northmore (WA), Justice Roslyn 
Philp(Qld), Justice Edward Cleland (SA) and Justice Fred Mar-
tin (Vic). No. 1 Advisory Committee (NSW) was chaired by 
Justice CoUn G.W.Davidson, supported by WMonahan, KC, 
and W.J.Wilson, and sat intermittently from 26 September 1939 
until 7 February 1940 to hear the objections of the naturalised 
British subjects of German origin and from 15 July to 23 Decem-
ber 1940 to hear naturalised Italian objectors.'^ To support the 
Victorian chafrman, the Premier nominated Colonel Rupert 
Ryan of Berwick and Mr George Young of Melbourne. Colonel 
Ryan was described as "an ex-Imperial Officer" aged about 60 
and "a European linguist of some note", and Mr Young was a 
partner in a large ffrm of shipping agents. The Queensland 
Premier nominated Hubart J.H.Henchman, the Solicitor-Gen-
eral of Queensland and George W.Watson, Under Secretary in 
the Premier's Department. A police magisfrate from Brisbane 
was omitted as he took up chafrmanship of the Defence Depart-
ment's Committee to investigate aliens recommended for in-
ternment.^^ The use of judges and lav^ers on Advisory 
Committees put a strain on the courts and legal system, espe-
cially as some objectors were able to hire senior counsel. Thus 
the legal profession was second only to the military in its 
involvement in internment procedures. This is an example of 
the interaction and "cross-poUenation" between the two groups 
over appeals from the correspondence of the Deputy Crown 
Solicitor; Lt.-Col. G.L.Mayman, Southern Command's Legal 
Officer and Mr Justice Martin of the Supreme Court and Chafr-
man of the Advisory Committee were to meet to discuss appeal 
hearing arrangements. The Chief Justice was willing to lend No. 
2 High Court and Justice Martin's associate would act as secre-
tary. Mr M.E. Burbank of Counsel was a member of the Army 
Legal Corps and an lO who worked on aliens and was "well 
acquainted with the dossiers of the appellants", and HQ South-
ern Command suggested the Attorney-General might nomi-
nate Burbank to appear for the Minister of the Army.*° But 
adminisfrative details and allocating appropriate personnel 
were technical decisions and easily achieved, but because the 
two groups brought a different perspective to the problem their 
overall interaction was not so easy. Lawyers are not accustomed 
to the onus of proof being with the accused; on the confrary, the 
basic premise of British justice is that the onus of proof rests 
with the Crovm. The committee men were not insensitive to the 
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needs of national security, nor did they reject the concept of 
secret tiials, or baulk at the lack of material witnesses appearing 
in court to be cross-examined. They were not comfortable with 
this style of tribimal hearing but they knew it was legally 
constituted under the National Security Act and was a war-time 
phenomenon. Nevertheless, as cases progressed, the funda-
mental differences between the legal men on the committees 
and the army prosecution became marked. 
In a case where the evidence against an objector lay in his 
membership of the Winter Help organisation, a number of 
questions arose. The military regarded the Winter Help as a 
Nazi-inspfred charity, patronised by Hitler and used by the 
Nazi propaganda macWne to show caring Nazi youths distrib-
uting blankets to the poor and underprivileged. The argument 
rein that a person who made contributions to such a scheme 
must be a Nazi sympathiser and could be a secret member of 
the party. Even if he were not, his contribution to an organisa-
tion so identified with the Nazi leadership made his sympathies 
suspect and warranted his detention. The objector would argue 
that he did not deny his contribution to a charity helping the 
slum dwellers in his city of origin. Any migrant who had been 
successful in Australia would understand the natural desire of 
a native son to help his less fortunate kith. The objector would 
categorically deny any association with the Nazi Party either in 
Germany or Australia, and it was left to the committee to decide 
if he was sincere. 
The military provided evidence, which the objector could not 
see, of agent's reports on the objector's social association with 
known members of the party, or of comments made by the 
objector, as reported by neighbours. This evidence could not be 
cross-examined nor the witnesses produced and in a normal 
frial it would be worthless. Mr Justice Cleland, of South Aus-
fralia, expressed his concern after hearing appeals in late 1940. 
These appellants were from a group well beyond the original 
internments. He found that his duties were 
particularly distasteful because there is nothing "judicial" about 
them. Ffrst of all I understand that the onus of satisfying the 
Committee that any person detained is loyal lies upon the person 
detained and the more general and indefinite the charge against 
him is,the more difficult it is for him to satisfy the Committee. 
Again, on the one hand the Committee had before it the oath of the 
person detained subject to cross-examination and, on the other 
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hand, the unsworn reports of one or more anonymous individuals 
(nearly always described as being "a particularly reliable agent") 
and some of these reports may be possibly malicious, probably 
honest, and sometimes, no doubt, inspired by patriotic hysteria.41 
Other matters connected with their committee work also 
agitated the lawyers. There was a mix up over payments for 
time and expenses. When Cleland asked for recompense the 
state government would not back him, but as no arrangements 
were made to provide a secretary or clerical staff or a meeting 
place, judges had to arrange for the use of courts and asked their 
Associates to act as secretaries for the Advisory Committees. 
Eventually committee members were paid, but amounts were 
inconsistent and there were lengthy delays.'*^ 
The military Review Committees, which looked into the 
cases of aliens, were not hampered by the preoccupation with 
court procedure that made Advisory Committees nervous. The 
army's committee was an internal reassessment. As early as 20 
September 1939 the solicitor of the Austrian internee, Georg 
Edelmann, was enquiring about his possible release. Edelmann 
had written to his former landlady about the unpalatability of 
camp food, and his wish to complete the purchase of the poultry 
farm he had saved for; and his landlady's family contacted the 
solicitor handling the purchase. The solicitor put the facts to the 
officer-in-charge of the Aliens Squad at police headquarters, 
Sydney*^ Before the war actually began, Edelmann had become 
upset by war rumours and fear of losing his job and agitatedly 
asked the solicitor for his deposit back, which was the reason 
he had so much money on him at the time of his arrest. A 
cautious man, Edelmann had noted the numbers of the bank 
notes on the inside of his dictionary. When the camp guards 
noticed the numbers they suspected a code. The solicitor 
sfressed that his firm was not asking for Edelmarm's release but 
was prepared to act for him if the authorities decided that he 
would be safe enough on the property, which was well away 
from the harbour. Having acquired "a stake in the country" this 
"might be considered a satisfactory bond" with the national 
interest. 
The Review Committee decided that, as there was no record 
of Nazi activities by Edelmann, he could be released on parole 
and under resfrictions, if arrangements were made for him to 
live on his land. Edelmann agreed to purchase a suitable tent 
and to depart with this and his bedding and cooking utensils 
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immediately on release. He left Liverpool camp on 7 February 
1940, before the remaining internees moved to Tatura.'*'* In 
Edelmann's case the perceptions of security had been modified 
because the war had not then flared up into a major anxiety for 
Austialia. The combination of facts against Edelmann had not 
changed, but it was held that his level of security risk did not 
warrant precautions beyond his living away from the coast and 
regularly reporting to police. The similar release of Heinrick 
Flauaus, the German fitter from Mt Isa,*^ confirms that only 
those who gave some real cause for concern remained in-
terned.^ Whenever internment ran over into the peripheral 
categories, corrections were made to return to the policy of 
keeping internment basically for "prima facie" fascists and 
those with stiong cases against them. 
Frictions 
Borderline cases were also released for the practical reasons of 
reciprocity and cost. Reciprocity was highlighted in the freat-
ment of women and the transfer of Queensland internees, but 
the federal government's problems did not end there. The state 
government's police forces and judges were being used to 
implement federal responsibilities and some premiers wanted 
reimbursement for the use of their resources. State Premiers 
asked for some recompense for the use of state police forces in 
making arrests, temporary holding of internees in lock-ups and 
gaols, and for collecting evidence.^^ j ^ g premier of New South 
Wales, Alexander Mair, was both an outspoken critic of 
Menzies' narrow internment policy^^ and also anxious to de-
fend his income from federal demands. When his Minister for 
Healtii told Mafr that an enemy alien from the Bathurst Intern-
ment Camp had been placed in the Mental Hospital at Orange 
on 21 September 1939, Mair complained to Menzies that not 
only had the patient not been dealt with under the NSW Lunacy 
Laws but that some mental patients who were internees in 
Worid War 1 were still in state institutions . He wanted the 
situation "regularised".^^ 
With the federal government's own ranks tiiere was also 
friction from the dispute between the Attorney-General's CIB 
and the Army's Intelligence Branch. The argument centied on 
the files of accumulated evidence gathered by the CIB on indi-
viduals and organisations. While the War Book made the confrol 
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of aliens a military responsibility, the lists for the initial deten-
tions were compiled mainly from the evidence collected by the 
CIB who still had the responsibility for investigating subversive 
organisations. George Knowles, secretary of the Attorney-Gen-
eral's Department, insisted that as his department adminis-
tered the legislation in relation to subversive organisations, the 
records could not pass elsewhere. Although the army had the 
legal responsibility to confrol aUens, and the CIB had files on 
many aliens, Knowles argued that the Inter-Departmental 
Committee had, "by a majority only, favoured the fransfer" of 
records to the army, and this recommendation had not received 
cabinet approval.^° 
The Secretary of the Military Board, C.B.Laffan, complained 
that the War Book's recommendation that Military Intelligence 
take over the CIB's records and personnel as soon as war 
started, had not been adhered to. The Board urged that it was 
"wnrong in principle" to have two authorities concerned with 
investigation . In the Board's view the proper role of the CIB 
was to supply its information to the military authorities. In 
August 1939 the Attorney-General's department was asked to 
get their inspectors to make arrangements with District Com-
mandants to hand over records on "aliens and others knov^m or 
suspected to be connected with subversive activities". Part of 
the problem was that the areas of responsibility overlapped. 
Subversive organisations had some members who were aliens 
and others who were British subjects, and subversion could be 
defined as anything likely to undermine law and order, war 
production, morale or military efficiency. But the main problem 
was that each body responsible for security wanted to make the 
decisions and not to have its judgements subjected to scrutiny 
by another body. There was a professional rivalry and a definite 
annoyance in the military that the CIB had flouted the Inter-
Departmental Committee's recommendation. Coulthard-Clark 
wrote that the protests by the Military Board "received no 
satisfaction". Later the army complained that their reports on 
individuals were often given less credence than those of the 
CIB. But while the CIB remained somewhat aloof, the army was 
working closely with the police, particularly in New South 
Wales. In 1938 a special squad of 30 police officers had been 
placed under military control and later army officers took up 
full time duty directing the Police Commissioner's Military 
Police Intelligence Section. The group developed a records 
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system on suspect persons,^^ particularly aliens and subver-
sives, which covered more than 12,000 people and firms.^^ The 
relationship between MI and the NSW police was described by 
Laffan as having been very good for many years.^^ 
The Commtmist Party was the largest organisation under 
observation for subversive activities because of their adoption 
of a pro-Soviet, anti-war line, their tight organisation and their 
history of participation in the violent overthrow of govern-
ments. Intelligence felt there was "a danger in the existence of 
an active, organised and determined group whose whole sym-
pathy was with a country which was already in alliance with 
the Allies' enemy and with which the Allies might some day 
find themselves at war." The Military Board told War Cabinet 
that the communists had deliberately planted "cells" in army 
units to stir up tiouble, and there had been a case at Ingleburn 
Base (NSW), where the communists attempted to create discon-
tent over alleged profiteering in canteens. There was also the 
possibility of sabotage. On 18 January 1940 the Argus reported 
a Sydney CIB investigation into an attempt to wreck the valu-
able caneite manufacturing machine at CSR's Pyrmont works 
by placing iron bolts in the gears and between rollers. This 
attempt was made on 14 December 1939 but not released to the 
press until mid-January during the Military Board's submis-
sion to War Cabinet on the communists.^ A communist direc-
tive of 9 November 1939 suggested that certain vital areas in 
each state would become targets if Britain and France declared 
war on Russia. 
The Military Board was supported by the Naval and Air 
Boards and they wanted the government to declare the Com-
mtmist Party to be illegal, or failing that, for the military to be 
given the power to restrict or detain individuals under the 
National Security (General) Regulations.^^ Ir\ effect this would 
have given the military the right to intern naturalised and 
British subjects, and regtilated the CIB to a minor role in inves-
tigating subversives. The army failed to win the day with War 
Cabinet, but a conference of police and the relevant Common-
wealth departments was called for 22 January and chaired by 
Colonel B. Combes, DMO&I. The service representatives were 
joined by Lt.-Col.H.E. Jones and Major R.S.Browne of the CIB, 
and the state police commissioners and a member of the De-
partment of Information. They decided it was not useful to 
declare the CPA illegal as this would give it too much publicity. 
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but it was desfrable to take action against individuals. Methods 
of obtaining evidence on members needed to be tightened up 
and made speedier. It was suggested that police be given wider 
powers of obtaining evidence and that an intense counter-
propaganda campaign be undertaken.^^ 
After reading the conference report Menzies decided to defer 
putting it to cabinet because he wanted more details. What was 
the machinery proposed for uncovering the personnel of Com-
munist and other subversive elements and what would be 
involved in giving wider powers to the civil police? Menzies 
instructed Shedden to point out to Combes that the subject 
matter of the report was of "a highly political nature".5''Combes 
explained the conference had put forward general views and 
looked to cabinet to name the areas where detailed proposals 
were required. One means suggested for uncovering commu-
nists in government and essential indusfries was to plant agents 
in the suspect's workplace or social venues but this was subject 
to local factors and the cost could not be estimated. Combes said 
the conference members felt there had been a reluctance to 
launch prosecutions against people for subversive activities 
because they were required to get the Attorney-General's ap-
proval. Energetic action could be achieved if there were some 
decentralisation of authority to the Police Commissioner and 
police Commissioned Officer level.^^ But Menzies was more 
concerned for the infringement of the rights and privileges of 
innocent persons if approval was "given to principles without 
regard to the details and methods of implementing them and 
the provision of safeguards to prevent their abuse".^^ 
While the military had not succeeded in its attempt to oust 
the CIB from its investigation role, the basis was laid for what 
the Intelligence officer Austin Laughlin described as a feud.^° 
The Director of the CIB, Lt-Col. Jones, fought to defend his 
territory, and his greatest weapon was his long-standing rela-
tionship with Britain's security service, MI5. Jones also argued 
that military officers were not necessarily qualified for the work 
the CIB was especially frained to do. Neither group wanted to 
yield precedence to the other and the scene was further compli-
cated when the state police commissioners decided to establish 
Special Branches in the states that did not have them.^^ The 
police were used by the military to arrest aliens and the CIB was 
critical of this, considering itself a better medium to deal with 
civilians who were not criminals. The Military Board felt the 
46 BEHIND BARBED WIRE 
involvement of the CIB would just create extra complications 
in the execution of warrants.^^ 
The draft instructions on arrest prcxredure recommended 
that arrests be carried out in daylight but it also urged that they 
be carried out with despatch.^^ As war broke out after 9.00pm 
it would have been illegal to have rounded up anyone before 
the Prime Minister declared war and it could have been dan-
gerous to have waited until the next morning. The bulk of those 
arrested were Nazi Party members or those regarded as "likely 
to act" against Australia's interests. They were probably more 
basic differences behind the CIB's interest in the process of 
arrest. One document on internment implies that, from shortly 
after the war started until June 1940, there was a virtual suspen-
sion of internment.^ The army had interned people who were 
later released and the CIB may have opposed the arrest of these 
lower-level security risks. At the basis of the friction between 
the army and the CIB however was the dispute over files and 
which service would dominate the security field. 
Early camps 
Meanwhile the internees who had not appealed, or whose 
objection had been rejected, settled into camp life. In Victoria, 
internees were guarded by the 17th Garrison Battalion, formed 
at Broadmeadows on 6 October 1939. Lieutenant-Colonel 
WT.Tackaberry was appointed to command the 7 officers and 
124 other ranks who were mainly former members of the First 
AIF. Tackaberry had a vast experience in a military context. 
Born in 1879, he served in the South African War with the 
Victorian Mounted Rifles. In World War I he was an officer in 
the 3rd Light Horse Regiment and the fact that he was chosen 
to act as Adjutant and Quartermaster when the Boorara em-
barked in May 1917 suggests his organisational abilities. In the 
Middle East, Tackaberry served with the Desert Mounted 
Corps and became Town Mayor of Haifa following its capture. 
After some headquarters fraining with the 1st Light Horse, 
Tackaberry agafri acted as Adjutant to supervise the brigade's 
embarkation for Australia. After the war Tackaberry stayed on 
in the army and retired from the Staff Corps of the 3rd Military 
Disfrict in 1936. Now aged sixty, he came out of retirement to 
take charge of internees in Victoria.^^ The initial members of the 
17th Garrison Battalion marched through Melbourne on 18 
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October 1939 and took charge of the 47 internees from the 14th 
Militia Battalion.^ The prisoners occupied the Dhurringle 
building, a squatter's mansion of eighty rooms built in 1870, the 
soldiers lived in tents.^'' 
They all left Dhurringle for the new camp — a camp of huts 
this time — at Tatura on 25 January 1940, marching the four 
miles to the music of an internee band. The detailed instructions 
for the custody of internees were drawn up before war began, 
but these carefully worded documents were concerned with 
preventing escapes, conforming to the Geneva Convention and 
the correct compilation of the financial and administrative rolls 
and returns. They took little account of the realities of inmate 
life. Most internees suffered a fraumatic culture-shock, an in-
evitable result of any sudden change of life style. Civilians do 
not quickly adjust to living in huts, sleeping in bunks, eating set 
menus and having a regimented parade and roll call inter-
spersed with long hours of idleness, let alone forced separation 
from waves and families, and all the other frustrations and 
humiliations that are inevitably a part of prison life. 
The ffrst group did have some advantages over subsequent 
ones. German was the common language, and some internees 
were personal friends. Because most had been interviewed 
before the war, and knew they were shortlisted, they had time 
to make alternative business and family arrangements. Those 
working for German firms knew that they and their families 
would receive allowances. Their morale was fairly high and 
they confidently believed that Germany would win the war and 
their incarceration would be short. They began organised 
physical activities such as table and deck tennis, football, calis-
thenics, fistball and handball. A library was established and 
later augmented by the resources of the German Club.^ 
With the move to Tatura, lectures and musical performances 
were held regularly, an internee showed movies once a fort-
night on his own projector, and Dr G. Neumann edited a 
roneoed camp magazine that painted a picture of friendliness, 
co-operation and camaraderie. Neumann was a biased reporter, 
no doubt enjoying the opportunity, albeit enforced, of practis-
ing those healthy aspects of the Sfrength Through Joy program 
he had enthusiastically espoused on his speaking tours. Also, 
as a university lecturer, Neumann would have had prestige as 
an expert on language and literature, and as a prominent mem-
ber of the party he would have been one of the powerful inner 
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circle. It would not have been such a satisfactory experience for 
all internees. It is a comment on the internal discipline the Nazis 
established in the camp that Neumann's camp record broad-
sheet was not discovered until 1941. In Tatura two exhibitions 
were organised; one entitled "A Creative People behind the 
Barbed Wire", and an otiier called "Our Zeal and Ability", held 
at Christmas 1940. Hitler's successes in Europe during the 
middle of 1940 were celebrated enthusiastically, and on 4 Sep-
tember 1940 there was a special party in the A compound to 
commemorate the fact that "a great part" of the internees had 
been detained for one year. The fraditional harvest festival and 
other German cultural and religious observances were enacted. 
But behind Neumann's facade of camaraderie lay the reality 
of personal internee stress. The cramped physical conditions 
forced people together who were not always compatible. Minor 
irritations were exaggerated, and tender egos placated at other 
people's expense. Even the Nazis had their own internal rifts. 
Becker was argumentative, desirous of paying back the "Syd-
ney crowd" who had snubbed him in 1937, and personally 
affronted when Herman Junge was chosen as camp leader. Von 
Skerst, always sensitive to his own importance, ruffled many of 
his fellow Nazis' feathers and resigned from the party.^^ 
However these internal squabbles did not undermine the 
sfrength of the leadership group. Internal Courts of Honour 
were elected by the internees and had power to recommend 
punishments such as solitary confinement and extra work for 
breaches of camp rules. Although these offences and their 
punishments were supposed to be reported to the camp 
authorities there was no guarantee that they were. Men not in 
total sympathy with the pro-Nazi group kept their opinions to 
themselves. On top of the oppressive internal discipline, the 
external restraints and the poor physical conditions,70 tiiere 
were worries about how families were faring. 
When Yackels, alias Schmidt, the enemy aUen with the crimi-
nal record, escaped from tiie Liverpool Camp by hiding under 
tiie sanitary wagon to put the bloodhound off the scent,^^ it was 
to visit his wife who was just discharged from hospital. The 
police found Yackels by following his wife. Yackels climbed 
onto the roof, where police caught him and lowered him over 
the front verandah on a rope. His wife was arrested at the police 
station later. Strains on relationships were exacerbated for in-
terstate internees by the move to Tatura. Visits were expensive, 
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and two-hours non-contact time once a month, supplemented 
by two short letters a week, were not much of a family or sex 
life. Children grew up hardly seeing their fathers, and often 
desperately lonely wives began to feel that camp life, despite 
its prison stigma, was a desirable alternative. But that was not 
possible in these early days, when Australia's policy was firmly 
for reciprocity on the non-internment of women, children and 
the elderly. It would have been expensive, and minimum ex-
pense was also policy. It also went against the overall policy of 
only interning the selected few who were "likely to act" and 
against whom there was some evidence. 
In Queensland a number of naturalised men of German 
origin had not been arrested because evidence against them 
was lacking. A cafe proprietor was alleged to be a Nazi but 
Northern Command had no documentary proof, no witnesses 
to disloyal statements or records an any suspicious activity. 
Personal details on L.M.Muller, whose article in Die Brucke was 
so admfring of prominent German visitors to Innisfail, were 
missing and evidence was "insufficient to prepare a case for 
submission to the Minister ". The names were to be resubmitted 
with the evidence needed to justify the internment of a natural-
ised person.^ But the "phoney war" allowed for a breathing 
space. Major-General Wynter was content to allow these natu-
ralised pro-Germans to develop "a certain amount of careless-
ness in their organisation", making it easier for the army's 
agents to get information against them. The additional infor-
mation would be gathered and a consolidated report containing 
"the sfrongest possible case" presented early in the New Year.^ ^ 
On 30 October there were 237 males and 7 females interned 
of the 50,000 registered aliens.^'*This represented one half of one 
percent of the aliens registered and two and one half percent of 
recently arrived Germans. Most,but not all, problems had been 
anticipated in the War Book plans. Friction between the CIB and 
the army smouldered on, and a few legal men and state officials 
were uneasy about some aspects of internment. Knowledge of 
the finer details of the Geneva Convention took a little time to 
develop, and a few early mistakes were atfributable to the 
newness of the situation. Internees were prisoners of a special 
kind: they were neither prisoners of war, as captured soldiers 
are, nor criminals. Army officers tended to liken them to the 
prisoners they knew — captured soldiers; the police tended to 
see them more as the prisoners they normally dealt with — 
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criminals; and to both misconceptions was added the distaste 
for treachery that internment implies. Yet the internees congre-
gated at Tatura were not completely unhappy. They were more 
homogeneous than any subsequent group. They saw them-
selves as German pafriots, and sang "Deutschland Uber AUes" 
and the "Horst Wessel" song with shining eyes and eager 
voices. Most considered they were the victims of their physical 
location at the outbreak of war, civilian internees whose loyalty 
was to Germany. Thefr position was neither comfortable not 
desirable but they could comprehend it and accept it. 
Chapter Three 
THE "FIFTH COLUMN ft 
In the middle months of 1940 Britain and her European allies 
suffered a series of dramatic defeats. In April the Germans 
successfully invaded Denmark and Norway. In May, Holland, 
Belgium and Luxembourg came under swift and effective at-
tack. The British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, made 
way for a new leader, Winston Churchill, who formed a coali-
tion government to cope wtith the crisis. Sir Nevile Bland, British 
Ambassador to the Netherlands, returned from The Hague to 
warn of the new tactics being employed by the Germans, the 
"Fifth Column".^ In his report of his experiences in Holland, 
Bland atfributed the decisive victory of the Germans to the 
effectiveness of this menace. Certainly the Germans had used 
agents to collect information before tiie war, and in countries 
with sfrategic German-speaking minorities a significant num-
ber had associated themselves with the invasion, but it was the 
parachute landings and the highly-trained froops that won the 
day for the Germans in the Low Counfries. Nevertheless, spies 
and fraitors were fixed in Bland's mind. The sudden loss of 
Britain's allies on the North Sea coast was credited to the Fifth 
Column, and Bland considered that, when Hitler gave the 
word, the same befrayal would occur in England, and that this 
befrayal would be perpefrated by the Germans and Austrians 
then living in Britain. Many of these people were refugees from 
Nazism, and had taken up domestic work to support them-
selves, but — according to Bland — even the "paltriest kitchen 
maid"^ not only could be, but generally was,"a menace to the 
safety of the country". He recommended that all Germans and 
Ausfrians be interned at once. 
British internment policy 
Britain had provided temporary and permanent homes for 
73,000 former residents of Germany and Ausfria and tribunals 
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had categorised aliens into security risks: grade A — sfrong 
German pafriot who was likely to act or who had skills and 
knowledge potentially useful to the enemy, B — anyone who 
could not convince the tribunal that they were outright victims 
of Nazi oppression, and C — those who were clearly the victims 
of Nazi persecution. The British Aliens Tribunals constituted 
three local eminent citizens including an experienced lawyer. 
In October 1939 some three hundred from category A were 
interned and the British government expected that 1,500 at most 
would be taken. To accommodate the first internees, two camps, 
based on social status, were opened. Those with money could 
buy privileges for 4s 6d a day at Paignton while at Seaton camp 
the basic requirements were provided. But the original British 
policy that had provided for a lower proportion of internments 
than even the "narrow" Ausfralian policy, changed with the 
Allied losses in Europe. On 12 May 1940 2,000 males of enemy 
nationality, including Jews, who were resident in the coastal 
counties were arrested "as a precautionary measure". Most of 
them were moved into a council housing estate at Huyton near 
Liverpool. Another 1,000 men, many of them German merchant 
seamen, were held at the Lingfield Race Course. The leader of 
the British Union of Fascists, Sir Oswald Mosely, was among 
the 60 extreme right-wingers also taken at this time. The police 
began to intern Category B risks in the non-coastal counties, and 
these 3,000 men swelled Britain's internee holdings to 5,000. 
Less than two weeks later the British cabinet was told of the 
befrayal of secret communications with the United States by an 
American embassy clerk, Tyler Kent, to a German agent, Anna 
Wolkoff. A list of members of the Right Club was found among 
Kent's papers, and there followed further arrests of right 
wingers, the brothers of Lord Haw Haw, Mosely's wife, and 
some pacifists and conscientious objectors. As the withdrawal 
to Dimkirk began. Category B women and their children began 
to be rounded up. Boarding houses on the Isle of Man were 
being prepared but many of these 3,600 women had to wait in 
prison in the interval. 
Peter and Leni Gillman state that General Vernon Kell, the 
head of MI5, was replaced and a new body, the Home Defence 
(Security) Executive, chaired by Viscount Swinton of Masham 
and including the new MI5 chief. Brigadier A. Harker, took over 
the confrol of aliens.^ The Chief Constables of the counties were 
told that they could now intern any Austrian or German man 
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or woman whose reliability they doubted. Acting on their 
newly-delegated authority, senior police officers initiated ar-
rests until Britain had over 12,000 internees. 
Lord Caldecote, successor to Anthony Eden as Secretary for 
the Dominions, appealed to Canada for help, but the response 
was far from enthusiastic, Canada protesting that it had prob-
lems with its own enemy aliens, and that fear of the Fifth 
Column had disturbed its own population. The stories of the 
Fifth Column activities in Europe had received extensive cov-
erage in the dominions and the losses in Europe and the evacu-
ation of Dunkirk profoundly shocked all British people. 
Australia's reaction 
In Ausfralia letters to the editor revealed local anxieties. On 22 
May 1940 "Vigilante", East Malvern complained that enough 
was not being done about the menace of the Fifth Column 
which was organised systematically and skilfully in Australia. 
"Vigilante" believed that naturalised Germans were the most 
dangerous, and that there were many wolves in sheep's cloth-
ing among the refugees. It was better to intern 100 innocent 
aliens than risk having one fifth columnist at large. "Precau-
tion", Melbourne, was alarmed at the increase in the naturali-
sation of Italians, for Italy's leader, Benito Mussolini, showed 
increasing interest in joining in the war on the German side. 
"Precaution" considered that a suspension of such naturalisa-
tions would create confidence as the danger of the Fifth Column 
was well-known, and the recent coal strike not reassuring.^ 
Official action was to keep in step with this public sentiment. 
The naval and police authorities in Sydney were concerned 
about the vulnerability of the docks^ from aliens and the army's 
Intelligence branch was worried about the effects of the "go 
slow" tactics inspired by the CPA members on the waterfront. 
These had increased with the outbreak of war between Russia 
and Finland and consequently the probability of war with the 
U.S.S.R. The rates of loading raw materials such as butter and 
sugar and the incorrect storage of wool bales was slowing up 
the flow of produce to Britain. Aliens could be refused access to 
wharves under the National Security regulations but many 
communists were either naturalised or British born.^ The Naval 
Board was concerned that among the new naval recruits there 
were communists and their gravest fear was that of sabotage 
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and espionage on behalf of Russia.'^ At the conferences on the 
situation in January and February, no decisions against the CPA 
were taken but the army continued to note the anti-British 
Empire, pro-Russian and increasingly anti-conscription tone of 
communist speakers at sfreet meetings.^ On 13 May War Cabi-
net discussed the dismissal of two communist employees from 
the Government Munitions factory. The talk broadened to a 
discussion of "acts done with intent to assist the enemy" as 
expressed in Regulation 82 and the Attorney-General was 
asked to submit "a statement of law" on this later.^ On the 30 
May Combes confirmed that a conference of MI, police and the 
CIB would meet in each command to go through all dossiers 
and to ascertain leaders for possible internment.^" Estimated 
numbers were to be wired to AHQ and names and dossiers 
were to foUow.^ ^ 
On 31 May 1940, while Category C male aliens were being 
rounded up in Britain, the DMO and I in Ausfralia issued his 
13th insfruction on Aliens Control,^^ and it represented a major 
shift in policy in relation to refugees. Insfruction 13 reiterated 
that internment was only to be used if other controls were not 
adequate, and that there must be a reasonable case against an 
individual enemy alien, but the emphasis was changed to give 
the benefit of the doubt to the national interest in any borderline 
case. In respect to refugees the director pointed out that pres-
sure could be exerted on these people through thefr relations 
and property in Germany. It was desfrable that refugees be 
given an opportunity of stating their case but the onus was on 
them to prove that they had thrown in thefr lot with Ausfralia 
to such an extent that they would not give in to enemy pres-
sures. 
The degree of resistance a refugee had to display is impossi-
ble to interpret from the wording of the instruction. In one 
instance it seems sufficient for him to show that he was "not 
likely to be influenced by the possible consequences to rela-
tives", but later it says that he must convince the military that 
there was "no prospect of his yielding". But there can be no 
mistaking the tone of the new insfruction. Refugees were under 
suspicion, and those with relatives in German-held territory 
were to be reviewed. Details of next-of-kin were recorded on 
the Alien Regisfration Forms and information that had ap-
peared innocuous now took on new meaning. Concern about a 
few refugees being Gestapo agents and intimidating genuine 
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refugees in London in May 1939 was picked up by the Ausfra-
lian press. When W.J. Mackay had included this press item in 
his submission to establish a joint military police security serv-
ice before war broke out, his plea had been ignored.^^ But now 
fear of a Fifth Column and the possibility of refugees being 
blackmailed^^ fell on receptive ears in New South Wales. On 6 
June 1940, hundreds of aliens were arrested in the area under 
the control of Eastern Command. In Sydney, policemen in 
groups of three called their listed suspects from their beds, 
allowed them to dress and took them to mefropolitan gaols.^^ 
The Argus of 6 June 1940 headlined Germany's new offensive 
into France and later analysed the motives for the round-up of 
aliens in New South Wales. The raids, according to the newspa-
per were made by the police working with Military Intelligence 
and were the result of nine months of meticulous investigation. 
The round-up indicated that the Federal government had de-
cided to intern "on broader evidence than was hitherto ac-
cepted because of the experience of European counfries, in 
which highly organised 'Fifth Columns' existed unknown to 
the government". The new internees were broadly identified as 
predominantly Germans living in flats in Sydney's eastern 
suburbs. Many refugees lived in this area.^^The eastern suburbs 
provided superb views of the enfry to Sydney Harbour, the 
most sensitive military target in Australia. 
They were in the same plight as the refugees removed from 
the coastal counties of Britain — they were in the wrong place 
at the wrong time. Some released internees were re-arrested as 
the "meticulous research" cited in the Argus report probably 
consisted largely of reassessing people on the new criteria of 
having dose relatives in German hands, combined with living 
close to Sydney Harbour or overlooking the sea.^'' 
Among those reinterned were Heinrich Flauaus, the fitter 
turned ice-cream sellter, and the Austrian, Georg Edelmann. At 
his frial at the end of the war, Flauaus admitted using a pseu-
donym when fravelling around Ausfralia and writing articles 
for overseas papers on his fravels. He said he pretended to be 
Swiss to avoid questions about World War I, or about Nazism 
as he had left Germany in 1929.^ ^ j ^ the atmosphere of June 1940 
such deceptions and activities were seen as typical of Fifth 
Columnists. Georg Edelmann was reassessed on the same 
grounds as originally: his employment with G. Hardt and Co. 
The managing-director of that company, Herbert E. Hardt, had 
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been the economic advisor to the Nazi Party in Ausfralia and 
when he was recalled the docfrinaire Captain Georg Kollat 
promptly dismissed all Hardt employees of Jewish exfraction. 
Party-leader Walter Ladendorff, and persons suspected of be-
ing German agents, had been frequent visitors to the ffrm's 
premises, and the company had been declared an enemy firm 
in both wars. What damned Edelmann was the Military Police 
Intelligence Section's declaration that, under Kollat, no Ger-
mans were employed at Hardt and Co. "unless they were true 
Nazi sympathisers".1^ Not having engaged in Nazi activities 
got him released under the narrow policy, but in June 1940 tiiere 
was no benefit of the doubt and association with known Nazis 
was sufficient cause. 
The increase in internments occurred in all states. In Queens-
land 41 were taken into Gaythorne. Most of the Brisbane resi-
dents in this group were members of the Physical Culture group 
associated with the German Club, and others were sugar work-
ers from Irmisfail.20 Alate arrival was Ludwig Matthaus Muller 
(almost certainly the L. Muller who was the Innisfail correspon-
dent of Die Bruke]). He was 58 years old in late May 1940, but 
he suffered deep lacerations and cracked ribs when his fractor 
turned over on a greasy creek bank.^i The Queensland Commis-
sioner for Police saw the news item referring to the accident in 
the Courier Mail and instructed the Innisfail police not to arrest 
Muller until his doctor certified he was fit to fravel. Conditions 
at Gaythorne, according to Neumann's camp record, were not 
good. The mess tent was lit by hurricane lamps and with the 
lafrines next door it was impossible to enjoy meal times. Hot 
water was not available and the bunks were lined with "dirty 
sfraw palliasses with tiiree poor blankets". When the new 
arrivals increased the numbers, Neumann claims that there 
were fights for bread but after a visit from the Swiss Consul 
things improved.22 
The New South Wales internees included former friternees 
previously released from Bathurst and Liverpool, as well as, in 
Neumann's term, "a party of non-Aryans and refugees". They 
went from their local police cells to Darlinghurst gaol, then via 
"the well known cages in frams" to Long Bay Hedinger visited 
them on 7 June 1940. The prison warders were described as 
"visdous (sic) and hateful", ft was partiy a case of different 
expectations—the prison guards freated the internees as crimi-
nals, and the internees saw themselves as either upright citizens 
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of a worthy enemy or twice-victimised refugees. But they were 
soon to be removed from the confrol of the New South Wales 
prison service. So many had been interned that they could not 
be accommodated at Long Bay. 
The first group of 113 internees were moved westwards on 
10 June. Another shock lay in store. The army had pressed the 
Orange Showgrounds into service as an internment cenfre. The 
sleeping quarters consisted of a huge, rough built and draughty 
barn with a dirt floor of clay and broken asphalt. The stalls were 
divided into bunks and each internee had minimal space for 
bed and luggage. Recreation and mess quarters were set up 
under the grandstand. There were fewer seats than internees, 
and no heating. While Lieutenant Bass, formerly of Liverpool 
camp, fried to recreate the "happy family" atmosphere of Liv-
erpool, conditions were against him, and it was no comfort to 
the internees to be reassured that the soldiers were worse off. 
In South Ausfralia the internees quartered in a corner of 
Keswick Barracks. The internees regarded their segregation as 
"purely formal", with the guards having only revolvers. The 
record produced by this group contains the only accusation 
sighted of misconduct by an Australian officer of the guard. 
According to these South Australian internees one officer "was 
guilty of robbery" and behaved badly when drunk and was 
hated by guards and internees alike. Later came more Germans 
who had lived in Ausfralia for years and some "whose families 
had settied generations ago". In Western Ausfralia the Freman-
tie Gaol received Germans from Perth, Kalgoorlie, Wiluna and 
Norseman, prospectors from the distant areas of the state and 
farmers from the south. Some of these new internees Neumann 
spedfied as Jews. The internees' cells were furnished with 
straw palliasses and "the famous 'pots' ". The officers and crew 
of the Remo and other Italians came in but were moved to 
Rottnest Island. 
In the Northern Territory the fear of the Fifth Column had 
grown to such proportions that all Germans in the territory 
were arrested, including those from Termant Creek, Mt Brassy 
and Mt Brady. They were brought to Alice Springs, where, 
according to Neumann again, they were held in the gaol and 
forced to do six hours hard labour a day without pay. This was 
made more unpalatable by the fact that "niggers were housed 
in the same prison at the same time". In New Guinea the fifteen 
new internees included fraders, gold miners, missionaries and 
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a plantation owner. They travelled steerage on the Macdui to 
Sydney, an indignity usually reserved for natives. 
While Australia was hard-pressed to accommodate its new 
round of internees, probably numbering about five hundred at 
this time,^ Britain had both an accommodation and defence 
problem with its 12,000 internees. The fall of Dunkirk effec-
tively made Britain a forfress and there was a real danger of 
invasion. Britain wanted to deport its internees, particularly the 
pro-Nazi sympathisers who would be a source of danger in the 
event of a parachute attack and for pressing logistic and morale 
reasons. Britain needed all its manpower for defence, food and 
war production and its camps for army training cenfres. British 
morale had received a great set-back and Churchill, steadying 
the people's nerve with his stirring, uncompromising speeches, 
did not want large numbers of internees in the country at all. 
He even considered St Helena Island and Newfoundland as 
reception areas. The initial non-committal reply of the Canadi-
ans led the British to also ask South Africa and Australia for 
help.24 
The South African Prime Minister, Jan Smuts, was "in real 
difficulties" himself, having interned 2,000 Germans, and sus-
pecting a number of South African nationals as being actively 
anti-British. Among those interned later was a future leader of 
South Africa, John Vorster. Smuts also suggested the Falklands, 
and refused to take any of Britain's internees. Britain's appeal 
to Ausfralia was cabled on 14 June and Australia gave general 
agreement within two days. Canada had, by then, consented to 
take 4,000 internees and 3,000 prisoners-of-war and Ausfralia 
settied on an overall figure of 6,000.25 Plans were laid to build 
an internment centre at Hay and to extend Tatura, for accom-
modation in Australia was put under further pressure once 
Italy joined the war on 11 June 1940. 
Italians become enemy aliens 
Numerically ftalians represented the largest migrant group 
after those from the British Isles themselves.^^ Early Italian 
migration included the destitute remnants of the Marquis de 
Ray's Utopian scheme to settle tiie New Hebrides in 1880, who 
finally established themselves in tiie Richmond River Disfrict 
of New South Wales. In 1891 the Queensland government 
introduced 335 Italian agricultural labourers to help replace the 
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Melanesian sugar workers who were deported to bring 
Queensland into line with the other colonies on the White 
Ausfralia policy prior to federation. Some of these Italian mi-
grants to Queensland pioneered cane farms in the Ingham 
disfrict and there was constant chain migration to North 
Queensland, imbroken by World War I because Italy had then 
sided with Britain against her fraditional enemy, Austria. Even 
earlier, Italians had come to Ausfralia among the men from all 
nations in search of gold, and an Italian, Raffael Carboni, agi-
tated with Peter Lalor. Miners of Italian origin worked at Broken 
Hill and other cenfres. Italians became fishermen at Fremantle 
(WA), Port Pfrie (SA) and on the southern coast of New South 
Wales; and the Queensland tobacco towns of Texas and 
Mareeba atfracted Italians who wanted to be farmers. Thus 
Italians were spread throughout the country, although there 
were concentrations in certain areas and in the cities, where 
many were restaurant workers, fruit and vegetable sellers and 
labourers. 
In the middle of the twenties the United States government 
placed a resfriction on the immigration of Italians to its shores, 
and there was a consequent increase in Italian migration to 
Ausfralia, much of which went to North Queensland, until 
Mussolini discouraged emigration in the thirties. Suffering the 
effects of the depression, the Ausfralian government required 
migrants from Italy to be "called" by an established resident 
who had to provide for the migrant until he was employed. As 
a result male migration from Italy dropped further in the later 
thirties and most newcomers were related to residents. When 
war with Italy began there were 27,500 persons of Italian origin 
in Australia of whom 14,000 were naturalised. 
Just before Mussolini's declaration of war a boatload of 
migrants, including some Italians, arrived on the Remo and 
some indignation was expressed in the press. A woman from 
Geelong West demanded to know who was going to be respon-
sible for their upkeep, and asked whether the Australian gov-
ernment realised that an army would be needed "to keep Italian 
migrants in order if Italy declared war on Great Britain".^'' But 
the government was not caught unprepared. Detention orders 
had long been prepared for the internment of Fascists and 
others of interest to the authorities.^^ Censorship was used to 
stop the wrong sort of publicity about security moves.^^ On 20 
May 1940 any mention of the despatch of exfra police to North 
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Queensland was banned. This ban was lifted on 7 June but 
editors were told that to reveal that a squad of spedal police 
had been rushed to a spedfic location in the north for a particu-
lar purpose would be indiscreet. On the other hand the censor 
considered it was desfrable that tiie public should be reassured 
tiiat the authorities were "taking precautions against eventuali-
ties in Queensland by amplifying the police forces". Later the 
censor urged editors to delete any inflammatory matter from 
reports from North Queensland and instructed that any specu-
lation on the number of Italians interned was forbidden. 
Membership of the Fascist Party did not appear to involve 
the strength of political commitment shown by the Nazis, and 
it had a sfrong social ethos. Fascist groups existed in some areas 
where sufficient numbers of Italians lived. Each Fascist group, 
called a fascio, took the name of a "martyr", that is, an Italian 
who had died in World War I or in the Fascist rise to power. In 
Victoria, the fascio "Gino Lisa" operated in Melbourne, and 
there were branches at Werribee and Wonthaggi, but attempts 
to start branches at Myrtleford, Shepparton and Mildura were 
unsuccessful. Security placed fascio membership in Melbourne 
at 100, with 20 in each of the counfry cenfres.^o There were 
known to be fascios in the capital cities of Sydney, Melbourne, 
Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth, while smaller branches existed 
in Babinda, Innisfail and Cairns in Queensland, Port Pirie in 
South Australia, and Fremantle in Western Australia. A fascio 
in New Guinea operated among the Italians at Edie Creek. 
By far the largest fasdo was the "Luigi Platania" in Sydney 
and its secretary, Dr Icilio FaneUi, was the manager of a shipping 
company. Fanelli claimed that fascios in overseas countries did 
not spread fascist propaganda but only reminded members of 
the loyalty they owed to the motherland, a claim that did not 
reassure Ausfralian security. Membership was open to natural-
ised citizens because Italy accepted dual nationality. Some busi-
nessmen who fraded directly with Italy claimed they joined the 
fascio to facilitate business arrangements, while some restau-
rant owners claimed they became members because it brought 
tiiem customers. Attached to the fascio, or at least operating 
from the same premises, were sporting and cultural associa-
tions and Saturday morning school to teach the Italian language 
to the young. Italian Clubs, as such, had a much larger mem-
bership than the fascios and were broadly based. Their facilities 
were used for dances, card nights, pool and meetings ranging 
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from the fruit marketeers to the literary Dante Society. Justice 
G.S. Reed, who studied the interactions of Italians in depth, 
concluded that the activities of the Italian Clubs would have 
been "no more harmful" than those of the Scottish community's 
Caledonian Sodety if it had not been for Italy's entry into the 
war.^ ^ 
When Italy did enter the war, those on the original list of 
fascist sympathisers were arrested during the night as soon as 
the news came over the radio. An ex-internee journalist went to 
bed knowing he was short-listed, but convinced that, as the 
overseas news had stated that the Italian Crown Prince was 
visiting the front line, war was "not on" that night. The heavy 
pounding on his door told him of his mistake. He was given 
time to pack, but not to make arrangements about his books, 
which he never saw again. By the time he left the building with 
the plainclothes police, the early buses were running, and the 
detectives offered him the choice of taking a cab at his own 
expense or going on the bus. He chose the bus and the men got 
on, sitting separately so that none of their fellow passengers 
would realise that one was under arrest.^^ 
Also interned in this round up was the Italian aristocrat, 
Alfonso del Drago, a man aged over sixty, whose social status 
had made him President of the Italian Returned Soldiers, and 
of the Dante Sodety and the senior member of the Sydney 
fascio.'^ Prince Alfonso attended the Italian Club on special 
occasions and admitted wearing the full black Fascist uniform 
to the celebration of the March on Rome'^ every year since he 
had settled in Potts Points in 1927. The Japanese Consul, who 
protected Italian interests, approached the Australian govern-
ment to exchange del Drago, but the Australian authorities did 
not know the names or importance of Ausfralians being held.^^ 
The GOC Eastern Command, Lt-General C.G.N. Miles felt tiiat 
the person exchanged would have to be "suffidently important 
to justify the return of a prominent Fascist to Italy" .^ ^ In early 
December 1940 the US embassy in Rome found that an Ausfra-
lian woman was being held in the Villa Lauri concentration 
camp in PoUenza, Italy, and by April 1941 six others had been 
located.3^ Whether or not other arrangements were made for 
these Ausfralians is unknown to the writer, but del Drago 
certainly remained in Ausfralia for the entire war. 
Besides the Fasdsts, who were comparatively easy for secu-
rity to frace because some of Fanelli's receipt books were con-
62 BEHIND BARBED WIRE 
fiscated intact,^^ there were the sfrong pafriots and probable 
sympathisers who gave some cause for concern. Security read 
the Italian-language newspapers, Vade Mecum, II Giornale and 
Italo-Australian,^^ and from these newspapers tiie autiiorities 
exfracted the names of the pafriotic women who donated thefr 
wedding rings to support Mussolini's 1935 Ethiopian cam-
paign, of those in the fasio and those who attended social 
functions. But arrests of Italians went far beyond the committed 
Fasdsts, except perhaps in Victoria where security reckoned 
there were 140 fascio members. In Victoria a total of 343 men 
from its 11,530 male aliens were interned giving Victoria the 
lowest percentage of internees of any state.'*° In New South 
Wales hundreds of Italians were arrested, pladng pressure on 
Long Bay and even more pressure on the unsuitable Orange 
Showgrounds. At Gaythorne in Brisbane, the new Italian in-
ternees so overcrowded their section of the camp that some had 
to be redistributed to the German section.*^ 
The Italian ship Romolo had left Brisbane just before war was 
dedared, and it was chased by HMAS Manoora. Rather than 
have his ship pass into Australian hands, the captain scuttled 
her. The Manoora arrived in time to pick up the survivors. These 
Italians were ffrst held in Gaythorne. Another Gaythorne in-
ternee, Ross Costanzo, was arrested because he was a newly-
arrived immigrant who, although he had family to vouch for 
him, had been a conscript in the Italian army during the Ethio-
pian war. He described Gaythorne at this time as a turbulent 
mass of incompatible, unhappy men. He said, "You did not 
have to choose sides — they were chosen for you. German, 
Italian, Jew. Every day there was blood! Everyday — blood!"^^ 
The situation in relation to fascist sentiment in Queensland, 
with its concenfration of Italians in the sugar areas, is obscure. 
While security knew of fascios in Cairns, Babinda and Innisfail, 
and suspected there were also branches in the tobacco areas of 
Texas, Mareeba and Inglewood, there were none listed in other 
areas with concenfrations of Italians such as Ingham and Ayr. 
The records of the Queensland Fascist Party were desfroyed 
before the headquarters was raided, but in 1943 Mr Justice Reed 
made a detailed study of Italians in Australia, and he consid-
ered that there "must have been hundreds of members", yet the 
majority of North Queensland Italians he interviewed pro-
tested complete ignorance of Fascist groups in the area.^^ It 
cannot now be ascertained whether the internees Reed inter-
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viewed were deliberately obtuse, or whether Reed overgener-
alised from the South Australian situation, especially at Port 
Pfrie, with which he was more familiar. In Port Pirie most 
Italians came from Molfetta in the Province of Bari. Many were 
fishermen and naturalised, members of the Fishermen's Co-op-
erative and of the Port Pirie fascio.^ 
One Italicm arrested at this time who considered Australia's 
internment policy towards Italians to be wrong, was Oswald 
Bonutto. He wrote a spfrited defence against his internment in 
his autobiography, A Migrant's Story. In his opinion the Federal 
government's internment policy caused grief and hardships 
tiiat were not justified by national security. The policy was 
"economically and morally wrong" and not beneficial to Aus-
fralia.^ Bonutto considered that Italy's conquest of the Ethiopi-
ans could reasonably be compared to America's domination of 
the Red Indians; similarly, if "Ausfralia had been left to the 
Aborigines, there would be no Melbourne, Sydney or Bris-
bane". He pointed out that British-born Australians who fa-
voured Italy's actions in Ethiopia were not considered disloyal. 
It was Bonutto's opinion that the internment of himself and 
other Italians in June 1940 was a gesture to agitated public 
opinion. The war was going badly for the Allies at that time, but 
"instead of blaming tiie Allied leaders for bungling things" 
Bonutto considered that all the blame was piled up on fifth 
column activities. People with non-British names were "either 
interned or looked upon with suspicion". These people "were 
made the scapegoats for the Allied defeats". 
In the Northern Territory, Giuseppe Zammarchi was taken 
from his prospecting lease at Termant Creek.^^ Zammarchi was 
born in Parma, Italy, in 1901 and emigrated to Australia in 1927. 
A truck driver, he worked for many years in timber at St 
Arnaud, Victoria.^^ He was regarded by the Melbourne CIB as 
a member of the Communist Party and also of the "Victorian 
Coundl Against War". In his report of Zammarchi's arrest, the 
Police Sergeant at Termant Creek explained that he had been 
informed that Zammarchi was "an avowed communist" and 
that he discussed communism with other people. Before mi-
grating, Zammarchi had been a commercial fr aveller in Western 
Europe and at the time of his arrest there was a charge pending 
against him for larceny of a quantity of gelignite. Zammarchi 
had been in frouble once earlier, when a number of miners 
became involved in a brawl. Although communistic tendencies 
64 BEHIND BARBED WIRE 
might make Zammarchi a suspected Fifth Columnist, it seems 
from the police report that a number of factors worked against 
him. 
On tiie 14th June, 1940, after Italy had entered tiie war Captain J.D. 
Balfe was sent to Central Australia to investigate tiie enemy alien 
position, and arrest those that warranted internment. At Tennant 
Creek, Zammarchi's camp was raided and Communistic literature 
was fotmd. At this time feeling amongst the Australian miners 
against Italians on the field was very strong, and it was discovered 
that a Vigilante Committee was in process of formation witii the 
intention of running the Italians out of town, Zammarchi being an 
especially marked man. It was decided, owing to Zammarchi's 
Communistic affiliations, his general attitude of truculence, and as 
an aid to his own personal safety, to intern him, and he was taken 
to Adelaide.48 
Policy in Western Australia 
In Western Ausfralia, the senior military officer, Major-General 
J.M.A. Durrant, was responsible for the preparation for the 
internment of Italians. Major-General Durrant was a perma-
nent army officer with extensive active service in World War 1. 
Between the wars he served in senior adminisfrative positions 
and when war broke out he took command of the Field Troops 
in the 5th Military District. He became the GOC for Western 
Command on 13 October 1939.^ ^ Included in the suggested list 
for internments in Western Australia were a number of natural-
ised citizens and the Army Minister was asked to sign the 
detention orders on the understanding that they would not be 
executed until war was declared. On 15 April 1940, AHQ asked 
all commands to estimate the probable number of internees 
who would be taken if Mussolini joined Hitler;^ Lt-Col. H.D. 
Moseley, head of Military Intelligence in Western Australia, 
telegraphed that this was impossible.^i There were 1,900 Ital-
ians in the state, living chiefly in Perth, Fremantie and the 
gold-mining areas. Moseley considered that the chief danger 
lay in the goldfields where tiie mines and the Kalgoorlie Power 
House were dependent on the supply of wood for fuel. The 
feeling between the Italians and the dominant wood-suppliers, 
the "Slavs", was "always antagonistic", and the Italians on the 
goldfields were regarded as "generally anti-British". 
Headquarters apparentiy pressed for further details because, 
in May, Durrant wrote to explain the situation and to justify 
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some names that were on his internment list.52 It is not unrea-
sonable to assume that these were the naturalised persons, for 
the Minister, Brigadier G.A. Sfreet, did not sign detention orders 
for naturalised citizens solely from a list. Durrant explained that 
the "names were listed in accordance with Aliens Control In-
sfruction No. 6": the men were reported to be members of the 
Fasdst Party. While there was "no absolute proof", the infor-
mation was considered "fairly reliable", and "on the assump-
tion that it is correct" internment was indicated. Durrant 
supported Moseley's opinion that the number of probable in-
ternments could not be estimated accurately, but that in his 
view the "only really safe course" in the goldfields area was to 
intern large numbers and release individuals only after satis-
factory subsequent inqufries were made. 
When war with Italy was declared, Durrant interned 1,044 
Italians in Western Australia, and on 16 August AHQ wanted 
to know what "local conditions" required the internment of "so 
large a number". Of the 1,901 Italians and naturalised Italians 
interned throughout Ausfralia at this time, the huge majority 
were taken in Western Australia.^'^ Durrant gave the reasons for 
his action,^ and this provides a detailed explanation of this 
military commander's interpretation of his responsibilities un-
der the Aliens Confrol legislation. 
In Durrant's estimation the goldfields area was the most 
dangerous "owing to the feeUng that has always existed against 
foreigners" there and large numbers had to be interned because 
riots were feared. Durrant's concern was probably based on the 
1934 riot in Kalgoorlie following the manslaughter of a local 
man by an Italian barman. Thus large internments were held to 
be necessary where there was a threat to law and order. Further-
more, Durrant considered that, in any such riot, mining prop-
erty might be desfroyed, and that this would affect the general 
war effort and cause a loss of morale. These considerations 
extended over the whole area that provided the fuel for Kal-
goorlie, Boulder, Coolgardie, and the Eastern and Murchison 
fields. From this area Durrant interned 690 men initially, al-
though 70 were released before Durrant replied to AHQ. 
The area Durrant regarded as the next greatest problem was 
Geraldton. It was a strategic port, and the second largest oil 
reserves in the west were stored there. There were no military 
units stationed at Geraldton, and few police, so the oil stocks 
and the port area could not be guarded, nor could its concen-
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fration of Italians be supervised by the police. Durrant interned 
65 local tomato growers and 60 fishermen from tiie Geraldton 
disfrict. But this had created its own problems. To save the 
tomato crop, Durrant considered he could release half tiie farm-
ers "without affecting tiie interests of national security" by 
putting them on tiieir parole to stay on their properties and not 
congregate in Geraldton. Supervision of fishermen was too 
difficult for release to be contemplated. In the southern areas of 
Western AustraUa, only 83 ftalians were interned, while 317 
were allowed their freedom without any explanation, except 
that they were mainly farmers and timber workers. In one 
timber area there had been reports that there would be sfrikes 
unless the Italian wood-cutters were interned, but when things 
settled only a few were taken. 
In confrast to their compafriots in the country, few Italian 
residents of the mefropolitan area were interned. Included in 
those interned from the cities were the 125 taken from the Remo, 
but these were not locals. The reason Durrant allowed the 550 
mefropolitan Italians to contfriue to go about their normal 
occupations was that there were enough police in Perth and 
Fremantle to watch them. However, the productive capacity 
bottled up in internment camps was clearly on Durrant's mind, 
and he assured AHQ that investigations were being carried out 
"continuously" to release internees to "resume their normal 
employment and to carry on production". But he was adamant 
that releases to the goldfields would be minimal, although some 
of these internees might be released to work on farms in the 
south. 
Durrant's explanation to AHQ shows that he was basically 
concerned about the damage unsupervised Italians might do, 
not only on their own initiative but also as victims of anti-
Italian feeling. In the gold areas they were likely to be provoked 
by the Ausfralian miners, and in the wood collection areas by 
the Slavs, and in the jarrah-cutting areas by their competitive 
cutters. These antagonisms were based on economic rivalries 
that long pre-dated the war, which might provide the spark, the 
excuse leading to a conflagration. This does not seem as evident 
in the farming areas, but Durrant was not prepared to risk large 
numbers of Italians unsupervised near key installations. He 
does not suggest that many were politically active or suspected 
of being engaged in Fifth Column activities, but Mussolini's 
attack on France was regarded as a "stab in the back" and, 
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consequentiy, many Ausfralians credited all Italians with the 
potential for underhand actions. 
Durrant saw it as his responsibility to keep an eye on all 
Italians, either through the police or, where this was impossible, 
tiirough internment. In his view this was the only way to 
achieve security. On the other hand, he was also aware of the 
value of the Italians' contribution to the economy of Western 
Ausfralia. Durrant had the responsibility of finding the balance 
between security and production in the nation's best interests. 
AHQ felt he had come down too heavily on the side of security, 
imposing a huge adminisfrative burden and forcing the reopen-
ing of the old World War I internment cenfre at Rottnest Island, 
and risking the supply of fresh food to Perth. 
Differences of opinion 
However, Western Command was not alone in being out of step 
with AHQ over internment. When AHQ asked for the esti-
mated increase in German internees as a result of Instruction 
13,55 Eastern Command indicated that it would have none to 
send.56 As the Argus report of 6 June, indicating the arrest of 
"hundreds" in Sydney, was undoubtedly read by Army head-
quarters staff in Melbourne, Eastern Command was asked why 
it had none to send. From its answer, the Military Board de-
duced that there appeared to be a scheme arranged between the 
Minister of the Army and the State Premier (Alex. Mair), where 
the State Government was sending up warrants to the GOC 
(Eastern) Command for executing. The GOC was putting the 
warrants into effect and people interned on these warrants were 
being kept in N.S.W. and not being sent to Victoria. So far the 
State Government had sent up 150 warrants which had been 
executed and they expected to go up to 500.^ ^ 
This was a flagrant departure from the previous channels of 
authority. In effect it meant that the right to dedde who was to 
be interned had passed to the State Premier, who disagreed with 
the Menzies "narrow" policy and who had a reputation for 
disliking refugees.^^ The conservative coalition partners, Mair 
and Bruxner, were instituting the internment of persons 
through the military's delegated authority over enemy aliens. 
The GOC Eastern Command at this time was Lieutenant-Gen-
eral V. A.H. Sturdee. With a background in engineering, Sturdee 
had served at GaUipoli and commanded the 4th Pioneer Battal-
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ion. He instructed in military engineerfrig and surveying at the 
RMC Duntroon and later worked in tiie War Office and the 
High'commission in London. From 1933 until 1939 he was the 
DMO & I, then Director of Staff Duties at AHQ. He raised the 
8tii Division but suddenly he had to undertake the job of CGS 
and on him would fall the onerous responsibility of preparing 
tiie defence of Australia. In those frightening times, the politi-
cians would rely on him heavily and D.M. Horner has described 
Stiardee as "the rock on which the army, and indeed the govern-
ment rested during the weeks of panic in early 1942".59 
Rock-like in his own loyalty Sturdee lacked sympatiiy for 
enemy aliens and refugees. When asked for his opinion on the 
desirability of an independent tribunal system to classify aliens, 
General Sturdee replied that the only really effective way of 
dealing with enemy aliens was to intern every one and he 
suggested an immediate start be made by interning all those 
who had arrived in the previous two years.^^Nor was the police 
chief in New South Wales, W.J. Mackay renowned for his em-
pathy with foreigners and his pre-war appeal to his Premier 
showed not only a general tendency to equal foreigners and 
criminals but an almost obsession with the freachery of 
women.^^ The opinions expressed by Jessie Sfreet and Richard 
Hall, that war hysteria caused many refugees and anti-Nazis to 
be interned, have some credibility in this period. 
The involvement of the State politidans, however, was not 
the only bone of contention between the Board and Eastern 
Command. The Board complained that effect should not have 
been given to such a scheme without first telling the Board, who 
had the responsibility to decide how and where internees were 
to be held and to ensure that the relevant Conventions are 
complied with.^^ Xhey also complained that the policy of con-
cenfr ating internees away from the coast was not being effeded. 
Defending himself, Lt.-Gen. Sturdee replied that "it was not 
intended to imply that the internees concerned would never be 
sent to Victoria".^ Orange had been selected because the ac-
commodation was "readily available". The site was well away 
from the coast and secured by a 9-ft fence of wfre, outside of 
which lay loose coiled barbed wire attached to an outer rim of 
a 6-ft fence also stranded with barbed wire and the internees 
were guarded by a detachment of the 54th Garrison Battalion. 
The Chief Engineer, Eastern Command explained that by the 
"clearing out of certain pens from the main building" bunking 
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accommodation for 638 was installed, and by extending the 
compound "accommodation could be provided for approxi-
mately 1000 internees". The "feeding arrangements" under the 
main grandstand were considered satisfactory, "but cooking 
arrangements" needed improvement. Approximately two and-
a-half acres were endosed and the whole of the fence and 
compound was floodlit from 20-foot poles. Eastern Command 
received fuU support from the acting Premier of New South 
Wales, M.F. Bruxner, who pushed the matter by publicly claim-
ing that dangerous enemy aliens "were left at large", and by 
writing privately to the federal government urging the intern-
ment of women.^^ Bruxner's letter to the federal authorities 
related to thirteen persons, some of whom were naturalised 
males, and some women recommended for internment by the 
NSW Attorney-General, H. Manning, who had examined the 
police files and felt that these women were too dangerous to be 
free. The debate over the desirability of giving the military 
confrol over naturalised citizens intensified and the suggestion 
that women be interned was brought again before federal cabi-
net.65 
The group branded as Fifth Columnists, and with a commit-
ment to try to alter public opinion, but containing many British 
subjects was the Communist Party. Faithful Communist Party 
members in Ausfralia supported the alliance between Stalin 
and Hitler, instituting sfrikes and go-slow tactics. Their actions 
were not generally popular and sometimes the police had to 
confrol crowds who wanted to attack communists or to throw 
them into the river.^^ The military had wanted to be allowed to 
detain any individuals they considered subversive under the 
National Security (General) Regulations, but Menzies had been 
worried about the possible infringement of the rights of inno-
cent people if approval were given for such a sweeping delega-
tion of authority without considering the methods of 
implementing it.^ -^  As the war situation worsened, Menzies' 
concern for safeguards was less popular. What constituted 
subversion in war time, and to what degree it could be toler-
ated, were spelt out in the Governor-General's speech on 17 
April. The limits to freedom of political thought and action were 
reached "when men profess an allegiance to a nation other than 
their own, when they plan to overthrow constitutional govern-
ment", and "when they direct their activities to the defeat of 
their own counfry in a war to which that country is committed". 
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Colonel Combes' direction to each command to produce, in 
conjunction with the CIB and state police, a list of communist 
leaders for possible internment, resulted in a very long list.^ It 
was political dynamite. In a nation where freedom of belief and 
speech are ensured, arrests of this magnitude would create a 
furore. Actual internments could perhaps be kept to those 
people against whom there was proof of engaging in activities 
that aimed at defeating the war effort. While the pros and cons 
were being debated behind the scenes and in public forums, 
parliaments and the press, the general public were also having 
their say. The communists were weU aware that their days of 
freedom could be numbered. The state police forces moved 
ffrst. When the National Security (Subversive Assodations) 
regulations were gazetted on 15 June they raided CPA head-
quarters, and a number of officials were arrested.^^ 
Why did Australia intern so many men in response to the 
threat to the British Isles in June 1940? Overwhelmingly of 
British stock, Australians became overtly pro-British at this 
time, even though the actual fighting was on the other side of 
the world. This was completely in keeping with her fradition 
from World War I, when men flocked to the defence of Britain 
even though many had no idea who the Archduke of Ausfria 
was, or where to find Sarejevo on a map. To most Australians, 
a generation later, Britain was still "home" psychologically 
even if not physically. So aggressively pro-British was majority 
sentiment in mid-1940 that even the citizens of friendly alien 
countries became nervous at the rising tide of public agitation 
and the exclusion of anything or any person not British. As an 
indication of public feeling in June 1940, the following items 
were reported in two consecutive days.^° Wild rumours cfrcu-
lated in Sydney, naming "leading citizens of exemplary charac-
ter" as being interned, refugees were called parasites in one 
letter to the editor, Poles were hurt at being denied the right to 
enlist, and Greeks in South Australia decided to wear "con-
spicuous badges" to distinguish them from Italians. Even some 
British-born citizens were warned. The Fifth Column was seen 
as having many facets, and incongruous groups were lumped 
together. People who have a conscientious objection to bearing 
arms are not popular in war time, but the consistent fortitude 
of religious-based groups such as the Quakers (or Society of 
Friends) in adhering to thefr beliefs during World War I had 
won them the respect of the community. Nevertheless even they 
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were warned that they would be exempt from prosecution only 
if they kept their peace-loving ideals within thefr own circle and 
refrained from propaganda. Tolerance of those perceived to be 
anything less than totally behind the Empire's war effort was 
wearing thin, and those who were not with us, were increas-
ingly seen as being against us. 
Chapter Four 
LOYALTY AND LOGISTICS 
June 1940 saw a dramatic increase in internments, basically as 
a response to the losses in Europe and the entry of Italy as an 
enemy, but in July and August the forces for and against this 
broader internment policy sfruggled for supremacy. These 
forces were various, and many had precedents in World War I, 
but some were quite new. At the core of it all lay the meaning 
and essence of nationality. A national is required to be loyal and, 
in times of war, the fit young men are expected to bear arms. 
This was a major assumption throughout World War I and 
World War H. But who is a national? All those born in the 
country are taken to be nationals and to them are added those 
who have become naturalised. In peace time the law upholds 
the equality of both claims to nationality but naturalised per-
sons of enemy origin can be relegated to second-dass status in 
war time. In World War I the status of naturalised citizens was 
devalued and it was assaulted again in World War II. To further 
complicate matters in World War II the Nazi government's 
freatment of its non-Aryan citizens created a class of stateless 
people. The problem of nationality impinged heavily on intern-
ment because it was so interwoven with concepts of loyalty. 
World War I precepts 
During World War I the original internments were of German 
and Ausfro-Hungarian males who were on their countries' mili-
tary reserves. J.D. Davies has done an extensive study of the 
Commonwealth government's response to Germans and Ger-
man descendants in Ausfralia during the 1914-18 period, and he 
nominates the cenfral problem then as being how to freat differ-
ent categories of Germans so as to maintain a balance between 
the adequate military security of the country on the one hand, 
and considerations of justice, the rights of individuals, adminis-
frative practicality and finandal cost on the other. Internments 
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went from two thousand in March 1915, to almost three thou-
sand a year later. They peaked in July 1917 with 5411 males 
detained and fell a littie by the end of the war. Because of incom-
plete records, Davies could not find the precise time of the dou-
bling of internments, but he judges it was sometime in 1916.^  
The official war historian, Ernest Scott, reported that "when 
the first long casualty lists from Gallipoli began to arrive the 
feeling against local Germans became intense". Many Germans 
were dismissed from thefr employment, became destitute and 
gave themselves up for internment. All enemy reservists were 
taken in Australia in February 1915, after two Turks attacked a 
frain of picnickers outside Broken Hill. In 1916 the camps in the 
individual states were scaled down and most internees were 
concenfrated at Liverpool. By then, 3,272 Germans who had 
been resident in AustraUa before 1914 were interned, along with 
393 naturalised British subjects of German origins.^ 
So sfrong was anti-German feeling in parts of Australia that 
attacks were made on well-known men of German exfraction, 
some with long records of public service. Herman Homburg, 
the Attorney-General of South Australia, was forced to resign 
and a naturalised parliamentarian refrained from standing in 
the Commonwealth election of 1917. Moves against all natural-
ised citizens of enemy origins began when W. A. Holman, Labor 
Premier of New South Wales, suggested removing their privi-
leges.'^  H.V. Evatt, in his biography of Holman, claims that, in a 
press campaign against people of German origin, Holman was 
denounced for not moving against the employment of a few 
former Germans in the public service. In Evatt's opinion, Hol-
man failed to understand that it was the widespread anxiety 
"of the mothers and wives, the fathers and brothers of the 
soldiers" that was substantially behind the anti-German agita-
tion and Labor lost an important by-election."* Holman quickly 
learnt the poUtical lesson and became vocally anti-German. 
W.M. Hughes, the Attorney-General and Prime Minister, disen-
franchised Germans on the federal level from April 1917 until 
six months after the war ended. Hughes felt this move would 
improve the Yes vote on conscription.^ 
Naturalisation and loyalty 
Similar moves against naturalised citizens were made in World 
War n. Herman Homburg, who had returned to politics, and 
74 BEHIND BARBED WIRE 
served a further term as Attorney-General for South AusfraUa 
from 1927-30, and a term in tiie Legislative Coundl from 1933, 
was again detained.^ There were also moves to freat naturalised 
citizens as if they were aliens and these highlighted the complex 
legal and emotional situation of naturalised people. The Ger-
man and Italian governments upheld the Delbruck Law of 1913 
and gave their natives a permanent citizenship that was not 
altered by naturalisation elsewhere, so a dual citizenship ex-
isted. The problem was further complicated when these rights 
were passed to chUdren who were under-age when their father 
became naturalised. The motivations to become naturalised 
were sometimes as much a matter of commercial expediency 
or a necessary prerequisite for owning land, as a definite frans-
fer of loyalty. In many states, licences for fishing-boats de-
pended on naturalisation, and in fishing areas such as 
Fremantle and especially Port Pirie, Italian fishermen were 
naturaUsed while holding office in the local Fascist Party 
branch. In Queensland, land for farms depended on naturali-
sation, and some observers felt that migrants took out citizen-
ship for that reason alone. Many Italians made no secret of the 
fact, but they saw it as the commonsense thing to do, implying 
no disloyalty to their native nor their adopted land.^ A great 
part of the problem was that dual loyalty was not only legally 
but also emotionally possible. A migrant who took out natural-
isation did not expect that there would be a war and, therefore, 
a conflict of loyalties. But an application for citizenship made 
in the expectation of continuing cordial relations between the 
country of origin and the adopted country, is not clear evidence 
of potential disloyalty. Nor is it logical to assume that migrants 
who deliberately chose to move half-way around the world, 
and who found there the economic security they craved, would 
act to undermine their new country. 
The army showed particular misfrust of naturalised persons, 
and the fact remained that a number of Fascist Party members 
and the two leaders of the Nazi Party, Dr Becker and Walter 
Ladendorff, had been naturaUsed. The military leaders in South 
AusfraUa were particularly concerned. Brigadier H.C. Bun-
dock, the officer in charge of the SA area, was an expert in 
artillery and had served as a Commander of Coastal Defences 
in the thirties.^ When war broke out he was put in charge of the 
field froops in Western Ausfralia and also given temporary 
command of the 5th Military Disfrict. In December 1939 he was 
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appointed as the GOC of the 4th MiUtary Disfrict. Bundock 
considered that the power to intern enemy-born citizens should 
be given to District Commanders. Under the organisational 
system in operation before the war, the six military districts, 
together with the militia divisions and independent brigades, 
reported to and were directed from the MiUtary Board. The 
Inspector-General, Lieutenant-General E.K. Squfres, recom-
mended a major reorganisation with four commands based on 
Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne and Perth where senior officers 
took responsibUity for all units in their command.^ While Dar-
win kept an independent garrison from October 1939, Tasmania 
and South Australia came under the confrol of Southern Com-
mand, Melbourne. 
As a Disfrict commander, Bundock Wcmted to be able to use 
his owm discretion and intern naturaUsed people as he was 
already able to do with enemy aliens. Bundock claimed that the 
local bank manager regarded most of the "Australian born 
Germans" of Tanunda, South Australia, as anti-British and in 
sympathy with Hitler. There was alleged to be a pronounced 
pro-Nazi feeling throughout the District, and a particular re-
sentment of the withdrawal of fire-arms. The bank manager 
was also concerned by a drop in bank deposits and little invest-
ment in War Savings Certificates. He atfributed this "to propa-
ganda by unwitting 5th Columnists" and a Ungering suspicion 
that the government might have been serious about some form 
of conscription of wealth. Brigadier G.E. Manchester of Tasma-
nia also wanted naturaUsed citizens sfripped of the privileges 
their British status gave them. He felt they should register in the 
same way as aliens had to, but he was more concerned that, if 
the pubUc were not satisfied that action could and would be 
taken immediately it was thought necessary, civil disturbances 
could result.^° This was almost identical to the complaint by the 
Naval Staff officer at Port Adelaide that there was a popular 
critidsm of the authorities "for their inactivity in not appre-
hending these people".^^ The public was not aware of the fact 
that some were already under restriction. These officers com-
plained that while they could detain unnaturalised aliens "if 
thought expedient", it was exfremely difficult to obtain orders 
against naturalised and "AusfraUan born Germans". They 
sfressed how well off these people were and how many had 
motor cars. Bundock felt it would only need one more major 
miUtary success by Hitler in Europe to trigger organised fifth 
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columnist activities such as attacks on the Port Pirie smefters, 
the Whyalla shipyards and the IsUngton explosive stores. Bim-
dock wrote that it would be "entirely in keeping witii Nazi 
thoroughness to have hidden machine guns, hand grenades, 
and light french mortars ready to produce when required". 
Bvmdock considered the law gave "too free a hand to natural-
ised aliens and their progeny". The Disfrict commanders urged 
AHQ to press the War Cabinet for the necessary legislation and 
delegated powers. 
The GOC Southern Command, Lieutenant-General J.L. 
Whitham, considered the matter and concluded that some dele-
gation to district commanders would faciUtate quick action in 
an emergency but, to ensure reasonable uniformity of policy, he 
felt that the Minister's power should only be given to the 
officers in charge of commands and not to the disfrict com-
manders. ^ ^ Even in this situation there was some risk of "lack 
of uniformity, due to the varying personal view points of the 
officers concerned", but this was minimised because GOC's 
were advised by a frained, efficient staffs, who knew the local 
conditions and who could appreciate the repercussions in local 
public opinion, arising from any proposed action. Basically 
Whitham did not disagree with Bundock about the prindple of 
military confrol over naturalised citizens; he differed only over 
the level at which it should be instituted. But he did not support 
the de-naturalisation of all enemy aliens. Such action would 
probably magnify the very problem it was desired to avoid, and 
would be out of harmony with our whole concept of citizenship 
in the Commonwealth. Whitham considered the negative ef-
fects of any wholesale moves against naturaUsed citizens. 
Reputable long-term citizens would feel besmfrched and dis-
frusted and their attitude towards Australia could turn hostile. 
They would lose faith in the British legal system under which 
they had chosen to live. Furthermore, over the years they had 
established families and friends who might also respond unfa-
vourably to their relatives' and neighbours' arbifrary detention. 
Bundock's idea that every naturalised person should be de-nat-
uralised and requfred to re-apply would have created an ad-
ministrative and legal nightmare. The government was only 
prepared to revoke the naturalised status of people who were 
proven to be disloyal. Evidence of disloyalty was the same as 
that used for internment, but the evidence had to comply with 
the terms of the Act. It had to friclude the source of the informa-
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tion and the dates on which it was obtained. The Director of 
Military Operations and Intelligence admonished all military 
area commanders on 1 June 1940 because in certain recent cases 
the Minister had pointed out that the evidence submitted was 
insufficient to justify him signing detention orders and he 
would presumably adopt the same position with incorrectly 
documented applications for de-naturalisation. ^ ^ 
The confrasting attitudes of Whitham and his two disfrict 
commanders shows the differences between individuals with 
authority in the internment area. The attitudes of Generals 
Durrant and Sturdee were uncompromising towards enemy 
aliens. Bundock and Manchester extend this distrust to include 
British subjects who originally came from Germany and Italy. 
Whitham qualified his views and believed that the British 
system of justice could be understood and appreciated by peo-
ple from non-British backgrounds and that they could transfer 
their loyalty. It is always dangerous to speculate, but the com-
parisons are fascinating. Whitham's comparatively liberal atti-
tude could be due to local factors such as the number of genuine 
refugees in Melbourne and the influence of the CIB director, 
Ronald S.Browne. On the other hand, perhaps Whitham's 
prime concern was to see that only officers at Command level 
be given such far reaching powers. 
Despite Whitham's caution and War Cabinet's decision not 
to delegate power to detain naturalised people to the military, 
Bundock remained suspicious of the 60,000 persons of German 
descent in South AusfraUa. While they were normaUy loyal and 
peace-loving, Bundock felt they were being told by pro-German 
elements that it was their duty to support the Fuhrer and were 
being enticed by the prospect of getting the rich farms currently 
owned by Britishers.^^Intelligence informant No. 214, after two 
weeks of mixing "with the people in Clubs, Hotels, Bridge 
parties and Evenings", had found Tanunda people guarded in 
their conversation, but he had no doubt regarding their sympa-
thies. In his report. No. 214 cited examples of four local men in 
the area who gave overt signs of pro-German sentiment by 
actions such as singing "Deutschland Uber AUes", saluting an 
Ausfralian army vehicle with a "Heil Hitler", and makkig 
comments favouring a German victory. However, it is not clear 
whether No. 214 actually saw and heard these incidents for 
himself, or whether they were part of the cardparty gossip. 
Bundock wrote, "Strong bodies of armed and determined men 
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properly organised and equipped with fast fransport and as-
sisted by surprise tactics could cause fremendous destruction 
and loss of life before forces could be marshalled to combat 
them". Bundock correctly argued that the Australian authori-
ties would be at a disadvantage if such an attack took place, 
espedally considering that the 4th Garrison Battalion was 71 
under establishment, and there was no reserve company or any 
organised Home Guard Defence force. On the other hand, there 
was no proof that the 60,000 German descendants in his mili-
tary area, or even a fraction of them, were planning to act as a 
mobile, armed raiding party on South Australian faciUties, 
Because a naturalised person owned a car, it did not mean that 
he intended it to become a Fifth-Column armed transport. 
Nevertheless, in the heightened tension of June 1940, there was 
great pressure put on local authorities to intern more potential 
enemies. 
As soon as war broke out there were complaints about the 
church school at Light's Pass, South Australia. The South Aus-
fraUan State Council of the RSL asked the government to close 
it and indeed all German schools in the state. The school denied 
it was a "hotbed of Nazi propaganda".^^ The confroversy over 
the use of German in the Lutheran schools and churches had 
precedents in World War I.^ ^ There was an extended debate in 
Victoria over the eleven small schools clustered around Hamil-
ton and Horsham. These schools had an enrolment of 300, were 
registered with the Council of PubUc Education and German 
was not spoken during the four hours of standard education 
each day. They were confrolled by the Luthern Evangelical 
Synod in Australia, descendants of a group who had migrated 
from Prussia in 1838, eventually settling in Western Victoria as 
farmers. Apuritanical sed, they considered that the state church 
diverged from Luther's teaching. They refused to have any-
thing to do with the celebrations of the Kaiser's jubilee because, 
as British citizens, they felt they had no connection with the 
affairs of a foreign ruler. When their attfrude on this issue 
brought condemnation from other German-speaking groups, 
they argued that, as they enjoyed the rights and privileges of 
British citizenship, they owed it thefr "full and undivided 
patriotism". R.J.W Selleck claims that the debate on the closure 
of the German schools fri western Victoria "held up a mirror' in 
which Australian attitudes to migrant groups were reflected. 
These attitudes are that migrants come to Australia "on the 
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condition that they absolutely throw in their lot with us" and 
that "what is good for Australian born boys and gfrls is good 
enough for anyone else who comes here". Migrants are ex-
pected "to become as English as possible, and as soon as possi-
ble". SeUeck considers these attitudes are profoundly 
embedded in the Ausfralian character, and are more conspicu-
ous in wartime.^'' 
During the Great War debate over the church schools in 
Victoria, the government had opposed their closure and its case 
was most eloquently put by the member for the Western Disfrict 
seat of Lowan, James Menzies,^ ^  father of the Prime Minister in 
1940, Robert Menzies. James Menzies argued that from his 25 
years experience with the German settlers he could not express 
the suspidons, "without discrimination", other members had 
done. He referred to thefr pioneering contributions, to the right 
of access to a religious-based education and to the dead soldiers 
of the AIF with German names. At the time of his father's 
defence of the Lutheran schools, Robert Menzies was a twenty-
one year old law student. He enjoyed a happy home life in 
whidi both his parents imbued him with a sense of fairness. ^ ^ 
As Prime Minister in World War H he always upheld a limited 
internment poUcy and sfressed moderation in dealing with 
enemy aliens, and exfreme caution with naturalised citizens. 
His stand could well have been influenced by his father's 
defence in World War I of people who the family knew were not 
a security threat. 
Many sections of public opinion were not satisfied with the 
stridly legal consideration shown to naturaUsed subjects enun-
ciated by Menzies. Much of this general pubUc unease was 
based on prejudice and jealousy with agitation in the remoter 
areas very strong in World War n.2° The action against large 
numbers in Sydney in June 1940, and the publicity surrounding 
it, may have cahned the Sydneysiders, and the availability of 
police in Perth was a paramount consideration in Durrant's 
internment policy in Western Australia. City people had the 
comfort of the proximity of a dominant British population. 
Isolation, and the existence of non-British neighbours, height-
ened anxiety in some rural areas. Sightfrigs of "signals", meet-
ings of strangers, and the comings and goings of foreign-born 
neighbours, were more frequently reported from the country, 
where people were also very concerned with undefended prop-
erty their owm and the government's. Railway bridges, power 
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Stations, water-supply pipelines, and the farm equipment of 
absent servicemen, are mentioned frequently as potential tar-
gets in letters to cotmtiy members of parliament. 
Farmers expressed fears that former migrants coveted their 
property. In fact, Austialian farmers reciprocated and coveted 
the farms built up by hardworking migrants, because the desire 
for land in Australia is insatiable, and holdings of good arable 
acres are prized above all. Constant expansion is the dream of 
farmers and graziers as a buffer against bad times, a chance to 
enjoy the economies of large-scale production, and something 
to pass on to sons. This rivalry for land, and tiie envy it provokes 
was still at the base of much anti-migrant public opinion. A 
similar hostility simmered between Australian city labourers 
and migrants over jobs, and the protests against aliens that 
came most stiongly from the country were echoed from the 
working-class suburbs of the cities. 
The military and the police had to consider this tension 
because it endangered law and order, but there was a limit to 
how far their response could include internment. The question 
of who should control the internment of naturalised persons 
was settied in August 1940 when the Minister stated that he did 
not intend to delegate his power over naturalised persons, and 
the decision would be reconsidered only if there was an emer-
gency. Evidence supporting requests for the internment of nat-
uralised people had to be "reasonable", and show how it had 
been gathered.^^ 
Police reaction 
The other group with a major input into recommending intern-
ments were the police and in contiast to some of the military, 
they were not given to making broad generalisations on 
grounds of nationality. They showed particular care when deal-
ing with naturalised people, especially the law-abiding ones. 
The police were involved in the selection procedure because 
they were the reporting officers for aliens. They took down all 
the information on aliens in 1939 when registration began, kept 
the records and aliens had to report to them every week. In any 
selection based on a set of criteria such as "all men of Italian 
nationality, who were of military age and who had arrived 
between 1938 and 1940", the police took the names from the 
regisfration forms. During the crisis of June 1940 many people 
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contacted their members of parliament, or the miUtary or the 
police about individuals in the community whom they thought 
were disloyal. In the areas outside tiie metropoUtan cenfres the 
investigation of complaints was done by the poUce. The degree 
to which the poUce were arbifrary or consistent is relevant to 
the implementation of internment policy. 
A survey of about one hundred such investigation reports 
shows that the poUce displayed a fairly uniform caution against 
precipitous actions.^ They appear not to have relied on one 
person's word and they sometimes expressed the opinion that 
the motives of the complainant were mixed. In one case a 
naturaUsed family of German origin in a small town in southern 
Queensland were reported to be exceedingly pro-German. The 
police made several enquiries but it was only the accuser who 
had ever heard the family say anything anti-British. The com-
plainant was bom in Durham, England, and had many relatives 
there. He made his complaint just after a devastating Luftwaffe 
attack on Durham. The police reported that the man could be 
described as "prejudiced", and they did not recommend any 
action. They did however have "a long chat" to an aggressive 
young man who had painted a swastika on the cow bails of his 
family's dairy.^^ There are no further entries in his file. Natural-
ised citizens who were the subject of close poUce questioning 
quickly recognised thefr situation and took a low profile. One 
couple gave up regular weekday frips to towm and confined 
themselves to a visit of a few hours on Saturday morning, when 
they quickly did their necessary shopping and restricted their 
conversation to returning courtesy greetings.-^^ 
The police did recommend action when there was some 
evidence to justify the suspicion of disloyalty. For example, one 
family of brothers painted a large Italian flag and a much 
smaUer Union Jack on the roof of their farm-house. When 
requested to obUterate the offending flag, they did the job so 
ineffectively that it remained clearly visible from the road and 
the air. The brothers were listed together with other suspected 
Fascist supporters, members of the "Black Hand Gang" and 
those with criminal records including possession of an illicit 
still.25 In another case it was claimed that a man had frequently 
been seen going off to the neighbouring town centre every 
Saturday afternoon wearing a black uniform. Although the 
policeman had not seen this himself, a number of long-term 
British residents were prepared to swear it was frue. Enquiries 
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among long-term naturalised men of Italian origin revealed 
that the man was regarded by his fellow Italians as "a bad man" 
who often carried a knife and a shot-gun and was very aggres-
sive towards neighbours. He reportedly beat his wife and the 
police discovered that his son had left home because of the 
domestic violence. This combination of facts earned the man a 
place on an early internment list. 
Overall, the police reports tend to give an emphasis to law 
and order and to some degree, morality. One man was interned 
because ten years before he had stabbed another man in the 
hand with a penknife during an argument over work pay-
ment.2'' Although his sentence for grievous bodily harm was 
served and his naturalisation successfully reapplied for, years 
later it was held against him. In the same district there was a 
young Italian who had a dispute with some Britishers in 1938 
and the argument "finished up in a brawl''.^^ The young man 
was the son of a naturalised farmer. In the town there was 
another young Italian man who had recently arrived with 
someone else's wife, causing a violent scene when the irate 
husband followed. Both young men had disturbed the peace 
and were recommended for internment. The newly arrived 
wife-stealer was interned but the fighting son of the farmer was 
not. He was already in the army before the blanket internments 
in mid-1942 saw his name listed for internment. 
The police sergeant from this area reflected on the results of 
his pre-war recommendations: There were 240 naturalised Ital-
ians in his district and their conduct and that of Italians overall 
was "good". However he had listed 23 for internment but when 
Italy entered the war only 9 of the unnaturalised men were 
taken and none of the naturalised ones. He seemed unaware 
that assessments such as "of low moral character", "said to be 
a member of the Communist Party" and qualifications such as 
"no documentary proof" were guaranteed to be rejected as a 
basis for a ministerial warrant. 
The same police sergeant took an entirely different view of 
46 men, who had been listed by an anonymous writer as "facist 
and cumunst all" (sic).^^ The sergeant reported that all but two 
were naturalised and many had achieved their migrant dream 
of owning a farm. One man had been naturalised in 1913 and 
had lived in the district almost from the time it was opened for 
selection. There was little likelihood that these men were fas-
cists, for no party branch existed in this disfrict. Nor would their 
LOYALTY AND LOG ISTICS 83 
material success lead them to gravitate towards communism. 
That they would hold both positions simultaneously was un-
beUevable. The writer could have been a jealous unsuccessful 
migrant as the style of wnriting and spelling on the note suggests, 
or, as the police sergeant thought, one of the many who had 
attended a recent "Win the War" raUy, where one resolution 
caUed for the internment of all enemy aliens, and who had 
dedded to furnish the list "with a view to having the resolution 
given effect to". The policeman's inquiries suggested that the 
note be disregarded. Respectable people were protected from 
outlandish accusations and police judgments were based on 
local evidence and individual behaviour. 
Planning for overseas internees 
AusfraUan authorities had no wish to see blatant acts of an 
anti-British nature go unpunished, but they wanted no unnec-
essary internments because they were having problems coping 
with the large number of enemy aUens scooped into camps by 
the enthusiasm of Eastern Command and Western Command. 
In addition, the troopship Dunera, loaded with about 2,500 
internees was approaching Australia. To accommodate these 
and the 300 internees whom the government of the Sfraits 
Settlements had also asked the Australian government to ac-
cept, the Military Board proposed to the War Cabinet that 
£330,000 be allocated to build camps at Hay (NSW), Loveday 
(SA), and Rushworth (Vic). The military also requested that 
£150,000 be reserved for camps for locals or for the 3,000 ex-Brit-
ish internees still to be taken up in the quota Australia had 
undertaken to receive from the Churchill government. The 
accommodation of some thousands of overseas internees had 
suddenly become a major undertaking for Australia's political 
and miUtary leaders.^^ 
There is no doubt AusfraUa desired to fulfil her obligations 
to internees in keeping with the Geneva Convention; the ac-
commodation and food rations were the same as that provided 
for the Australian Garrison troops, and where shipments in-
cluded women and children, extra efforts were made. The 
Adjutant-General notified the Quarter-Master General, and 
others who would be involved in this major undertaking, that 
2,164 male Germans and 202 male Italians were expected in 
mid-August, and an even larger mixed group of men, women 
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and children were expected to depart from Britain about the 
same time.^^ (The large mixed group did not come because of a 
change of poUcy in the UK.) From tiie Sfrafts Settlements, the 
145 male and 120 female Germans and 18 male and 14 female 
Italian internees would indude married couples, chUdren and 
single men and women. The Adjutant-General warned his men 
that while prisoners of war were of a similar physical standard 
to AusfraUan froops, internees were arrested irrespective of age 
and medical condition and that this necessitated modified con-
ditions. Special eirrangements would have to be made for 
women and children, and a suitable ration devised for the 
Italians who were unused to the foods being suppUed at that 
time. In view of the exfreme change of climate exfra warm 
clothing was to be ready when Malayan internees arrived. 
On the other hand the government was also conscious of 
cost. Although Great Britain and the Sfraits Settlements were 
willing to contribute to the cost of camps and the maintenance 
of prisoners, the Military Board's proposed outiay of a half a 
miUion pounds was not well received by the Australian War 
Cabinet.32 j^ie Minister for the Army was told to review the 
estimates and check that all proposed expenses were really 
necessary. The Governor of Singapore and the Dominions Of-
fice were friformed that Australia would charge the full cost of 
providing the guards and running the camps. The reply from 
the Sfraits Settlements that "reasonable expenditure" would be 
met was not altogether reassuring, and both expatriating gov-
ernments were billed while their friternees were still on the high 
seas. Unless the two governments were prepared to accept an 
averaged per capita expenditure, separate accounts would 
have to be kept, fri addition to providing separate camp group-
ings for nationality, sex, age and marital status. To further 
complicate the matter, the British government asked for a fur-
ther separation. Dangerous enemy aliens were to be kept under 
"strict custody", but the British wanted Ausfralia to "apply a 
system of less rigid custodial freatment to genuine refugees 
from Nazi oppression and those not falling within the poten-
tiaUy dangerous class". The request was somewhat puzzling, 
given that the Dominions had been asked to take the internees 
because they were too dangerous to be in Britain. The request 
for preferential treatment for refugees recognised that these 
people were actually stateless, and the British authorities were 
asking for Ausfralia's understanding. But the Australian War 
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Cabinet at that time was worried about cost, and wanted to 
know how expensive this further differentiation would be. 
The Army proposed the following cost cuts.^^ Cases involv-
ing surgery would go to local hospitals and pavilions erected 
in the grounds if necessary. The Quarter-Master General, Major 
General E.K. Smart, advised the cabinet and they approved 
revised estimates. Altogether an expenditure of £278,000 was 
agreed. Britain was apportioned £127,500,while £150,500 was 
considered to be Australia's contribution. But the cabinet was 
upset because someone had authorised spending £16,500 up-
grading the Orange Showgrounds camp. The Swiss Consul had 
been disgusted with the accommodation and threatened to 
report it to Berlin unless improvements were promptly carried 
out. While the Consul held his report, the army went to work; 
however the money had, not been released by Treasury and 
cabinet demanded to know the name of the officer who had 
authorised the work. The Army Minister refused to comply on 
two grounds. The report of the Consul would have endangered 
reciprodty, so that British and Australian prisoners could have 
suffered, and the money would have been spent anyway, as the 
Orange camp was to become an Ausfralian miUtia base as soon 
as it was vacated by internees.'^ Thus cost and reciprocity again 
placed parameters on the number of internments. Australia had 
to keep her own internments within a manageable level if she 
was going to cope with them and with those about to arrive 
from overseas. 
Overseas internees were not unique to World War II. In the 
Great War the Liverpool, Bourke and Trial Bay camps became 
the home of planters and public servants from German New 
Guinea and Samoa. As with the later internees from the Sfraits 
Settlements, there were often family groups and the World War 
I camp on the Molonglo River was specifically for families. They 
brought malaria and fropical diseases with them and com-
plained of the dust and cold of outback Australia.^s However, 
internees and prisoners of war had not been sent from Britain 
before, and there was no precedent for the extraordfriary group 
of men who arrived on the Dunera. 
HMT Dunera 
Accounts of the ship's journey cannot help being dramatic.^^ 
Sections of the ship were overcrowded and some men had to 
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sleep on the tables or under tiiem. Toilets and washing facilities 
were minimal. Exercise periods were short and the brutality of 
the British guards comparatively unrestricted. The internees' 
property was not safe, and was taken from their suitcases in the 
hold, from their quarters and in body searches. The ship was 
torpedoed by a German submarine, but not damaged. Two 
internees died on the journey, one by suicide, and the ship was 
set aUght when an oil lamp spilt. 
There were surprises, too, in those deported. Two hundred 
were survivors of the Arandora Star, which was sunk by a U-boat 
off the coast of Scotland when carrying internees to Canada. 
Despite barely surviving the shipwreck, these men were arbi-
frarily reallocated to the Dunera. The high death toU of the 
Arandora Star raised questions as to the propriety of deporting 
prisoners through highly dangerous waters and, when the 
names of the internees involved became knowm, serious doubts 
about the whole policy began to be voiced in Britain and Can-
ada. An interested observer of Britain's internment policy, Fran-
cois Lafitte,^^ speedily produced The Internment of Aliens, 
published as a Penguin Special in November 1940. At 6d each, 
almost 50,000 copies were sold. Lafitte listed some of the emi-
nent scholars caught up in the broad internments at the time of 
Dunkirk, some of whom were well known anti-Nazi authors. 
The leader of the Sodal Democratic Party in Saarland, sculptors 
and artists whose works were banned by the Nazis, and men 
who had spent many years in German concenfration camps, 
had been taken into custody. 
The public reaction to Lafitte's book added further to the 
doubts afready being expressed within the Home Office and 
there was also criticism within the Foreign Office.^ ^ Richard 
Latham, son of the Chief Justice of the High Court of AusfraUa 
was a Rhodes Scholar and a Fellow at Oxford. During the 
Spanish Civil War he drove a supply truck to Republican Bar-
celona and over Christmas in 1938-9 he visited BerUn to help 
refugee migration. He urged Australian autiiorities to drop 
their demand for landing money, as he considered that among 
tiie refugees tiiere was "some splendid human material for 
AusfraUa". fri mid-1940 Latham worked in the Refugee Section 
of the General Department of the Foreign Office. He critidsed 
internment policy and urged tiie formation of an advisory 
committee on refugees. The internment of 27,200 people in 
Britain almost reached the World War I total of 29,000. Investi-
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gators into the deportation of Italians to Canada concluded that 
tiie commanders of internment camps were sent quotas to fiU 
and, if enough fascio members were not in the camp, the 
remainder were selected at random. The Refugee Section con-
cluded that MI5, whose job was to investigate and judge indi-
vidual cases, had succumbed to the stress of public opinion, and 
to "the influence of high authority in the War Office", and 
"adopted the rule of thumb that any person of foreign nation-
ality" was presumed to be hostUe.'^ ^ 
fri response to the protests the Home Secretary armounced 
on 23 July 1940 that category C internees, that is, those who were 
refugees, would soon be able to apply for release. The main 
reason given for this dedsion was the need for manpower. 
Churchill, who had been an ardent supporter of the broad 
policy, reversed his position.^° In reviewing British internment 
the Home Secretary said that mistakes were due partly to haste 
and partly "to stupidity and muddle".'*^ By the end of the of 
August 1940, one thousand internees were freed, but this did 
nothing for the 650 who had drowned on their way overseas, 
and Uttle for the 7,350 who were in Canada and AusfraUa. 
The Dunera entered Fremantle on 27 August 1940 and the 
AusfraUan authorities got a brief glimpse of a group of men 
who claimed that their valuables had been taken, that they had 
been denied access to their suitcases for the whole journey, and 
that they had rarely shaved. The ship then went dfrectly to Port 
Melbourne where the German and Italian seamen and the 
survivors of the Arandora Star were disembarked .'^ ^ They went 
by frain to Tatura where the camp commandant was surprised 
to discover a man still dressed in the only clothing he had, a kilt 
given to him after he had come ashore in Scotland in the first 
week of July.*' The Dunera entered Sydney Harbour on 6 Sep-
tember, and the press reported that these internees were "dan-
gerous",*^ but the guards on the train to Hay found them 
pleasant, well educated and anti-Nazi. The internees, in return, 
were impressed by the guards' humanity.*^ 
Hans Hammerstein, a concenfration camp survivor, felt that 
the fresh fruit, sandwiches and cakes served by the guards on 
the frain to Hay "were so much the more delicious because of 
the manner in which the Australian soldiers disfributed them". 
Everything was done with a smile, and when an approach was 
made, it was done with a "please" or "thank you". At first the 
commandant at Hay refused to beUeve tiiat the British guards 
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had pocketed internees' goods, had shown a total disregard for 
personal papers and possessions and had slashed suitcases 
with bayonets to facilitate rifluig thefr contents, but when the 
remmants of tiie battered luggage finally turned up, tiie Aus-
tiaUan officers were "aghast".^^ The officers m charge of the 
British guards were entertained in Sydney and in Hay. Lieuten-
ant-Colonel W.P Scott, tiie guard commander, was "an impres-
sive kilted figure", who had lost three brothers in "the present 
war". The internees were "fed better than any British froops" 
he told the press, in confrast to the claims of underfeeding by 
the internees.^7 i^ the Army's weekly report to cabinet on 10 
September 1940, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff (DCGS) 
pointed out the apparent contradiction between the British 
request for differential treatment for internees who were the 
victims of Nazi oppression, and the statement of the Intelli-
gence officer from the Dunera that all persons sent to AusfraUa 
were internment cases. A few internees were recalled to Britain 
immediately tiiey arrived in Sydney and they had to be pro-
vided with complete sets of new clothing. The DCGS conffrmed 
tiiat all internees had arrived poorly clad and that the records 
relating to them were incomplete.'*^ 
One thing about the Dunera internees soon became evident. 
They included hundreds of Jews.^^ Some were practising Or-
thodox Jews, some were practising Liberal Jews, many were 
nominal Jews, a few were Zionists and otiiers were atiieists and 
sociaUsts — but Jews in terms of Hitter's Nuremberg Laws. 
Because of these racial laws many Jews had fried to leave 
Germany but most countries restiicted their enfry. When a 
Jewish youth shot the German Embassy's Thfrd Secretary in 
Paris, the Nazis took reprisals on the entire German and Aus-
tiian Jewish community. On 9-10 November 1938, many shops, 
homes and synagogues were desfroyed. Because of the amount 
of smashed window glass this was referred to as "Kristal 
Nacht".50 Between 20 and 30 thousand Jews were arrested, 
(among them Hans Hammerstein) and sent to concentration 
camps. Hammerstein and 50 others were released when transit 
visas to Britain were arranged. They lived in the Kitchener 
Camp with 3,000 others. Many hundreds from the Kitchener 
Camp were persuaded to embark on the Dunera because their 
commandant told them they were going to Canada, and a 
release there would leave them on America's doorstep.^^ 
Other Dunera internees were young men whose families had 
LOYALTY AND LOGISTICS 8S 
urged them to leave Germany. One of them was Werner Pelz. 
He worked in England on the land but was interned in mid-
1940. He heard rumours that the internees would be freed on 
landing, and this seemed logical to him. He was convinced that 
no one would dream of sending them halfway around the 
world just to be put into another camp.52 The 19-year-old K.G. 
Loewald was unconcerned about leaving England. Propa-
ganda in the British press against the refugees at the time of 
Dunkirk prepared him for the possibiUty of internment. He felt 
he had nothing to lose and had his bag packed when the official 
came to coUect him.^s Another young man, Hugo Wolfson, had 
a permit to enter the USA and was at the Huyton Camp near 
Liverpool when, wdth other similar youths, he volunteered to 
join the Dunera because they were told that going overseas 
would mean more freedom, possibly work and no change to 
their migration plans.^ Married men had been told that their 
families would soon follow and some were given forwarding 
addresses in Canada. A family man who came through the 
Kitchener Camp, G.E Chodziesner, was fortunate that his wife 
and son Ben escaped to Chile, but on 21 August 1940 he re-
corded in the diary he kept on toilet paper on the Dunera that 
Jacob Weiss from Vienna, "a comrade of the Kitchener Camp", 
committed suicide by jumping overboard. Weiss had a mother 
and brother already in Buenos Aires, but the visa for Argentina 
that had come through for him just before he was interned had 
been confiscated at the beginning of the voyage. It had expired 
on the day of his suidde.^^ 
Other internees who were not Jews but Lutheran and Catho-
lic, were also pushed to the brink of despair. Hans Lindau had 
worked for the Student Christian Movement in Britain and was 
a member of Toe H and other benevolent clubs. He was devas-
tated by the search he was subjected to when he entered the 
ship. The roughness with which his person and goods were 
handled sfripped his individuaUty from him. The soldiers "did 
not understand" his opposition to Hitler and his basic desire 
that England and Germany, with their common religious and 
racial origins, should be aUies and friends. For three hours after 
the search Lindau rested with his head on his rolled up topcoat 
and agonised with his God. The motion of the boat made him 
feel seasick but he eventually regained his mental and spiritual 
equilibrium.^^ 
Another internee to draw heavily on his religious sfrength 
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was Walter Konig, a Jesuit priest. He had been expelled from 
the CoUege of St Aloysious in Bad Godesberg by the Nazi 
autiiorities in 1939. He taught in Sheffield until he was interned 
on tiie Isle of Man. At tiie Hay camp, Konig recalled five men 
who had to be removed to a sanatorium, and in his own hut 
there was a Viennese youth who had seen the Gestapo hurl his 
parents out of the window of their home. On moonlight nights 
the lad "ran yelling through the hut". There was also "a highly 
gifted boy" who "fri front of everyone, tried to open the veins 
of his wrists". Only sfrong nerves were capable of standing up 
to the trials through which many Dunera men and youths had 
come. They had been persecuted, they feared they would never 
be reunited with their families, they were rejected and deni-
grated by their national government, and there were few wel-
coming arms fri the rest of the world. Finally they had been 
deported on a "hell ship" to the antipodes where the stars were 
"upside down" and familiar northern sights and sounds miss-
ing. Ludwig Hirschfeld Mack, who had taught mathematics in 
the famous German Bauhaus Gropius School of Architecture 
that came under such attack from the Nazis that most of the 
teachers fled to Britain or America, constructed a relief map of 
Ausfralia for the Hay camp. Everyone knew that the distance 
from the camp to the coast held them more firmly prisoners 
than the strands of barbed wire around their compound and 
Konig compared the internees to the original convicts of the 
1788 penal colony.5'' 
Jews interned in Australia 
While the Dunera internees included many Jews, they were not 
the only refugees in camp in AusfraUa. Australia herself had 
gathered up others in the raids following the new guidelines on 
refugees with relatives in enemy territory, and they were iden-
tified by Dr Neuman fri his camp record as Jews and "non-Ary-
ans". The frials of internee objectors in 1941 reveal some, but 
only a guess can be made of the overall number.^s 
In an article on the internment of German-Jewish refugees in 
AusfraUa, Konrad Kwiet estimates that of the 10,000 local civil-
ians interned "somewhat more than 2,000 would have been of 
German-Jewish origin''.^^ He includes aU those who were in-
terned even briefly to arrive at his 10,000 total, but official 
figures would round out at 8,000. There is no doubt that the 
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second wave of local arrests included German-Jewish refugees. 
Not only is there the evidence of Neuman, the camp recorder, 
and of the Swiss Consul, but Kwiet has found the personal 
papers of 25 Jewish internees who were sent first to Orange and 
then to the Nazi dominated compound lA at Tatura. The leader 
of the group. Max Joseph, had been a successful accountant in 
Berlin until he was sent to a concentration camp after "Kristal 
Nacht". He migrated to Australia via HoUand and England and 
estabUshed himself in a laundry business. According to Kwiet, 
denunciation caused Joseph's arrest on 10 October 1940. In the 
Orange camp the group had achieved some segregation but in 
lATatura only their sleeping huts 26 and 27 were their own. The 
group clung together, sfressing their Jewish heritage, celebrat-
ing their religious festivals and agitating for release. Joseph was 
eventually successful and left camp on 12 July 1941.^^ Although 
the experiences of Joseph's group is a caution against labelling 
any camp or compound, it does represent the situation of a 
minority, and a minority significantly smaUer than one-fifth. 
Perhaps Kwiet unconsdously fransposed the Dunera situation 
on to local internments. Other overseas internees included a 
high proportion of Jews, with the internees from Singapore 
being described as mainly Jews who originaUy came to the 
island as refugees.^^ 
Queensland records suggest only a few Jews in the earlier 
groups.The internee registers show that many taken in Queens-
land were fradesmen Uving in country towns and some had 
been in Australia over ten years. Kwiet does not deal with the 
third wave of local internments — early 1942. At that time all 
German nationals were removed from the vulnerable northern 
coast, and this would have included any refugees. But the 
numbers were smaU for Jews are traditionally city dwellers. The 
Sydney experience cannot be fransposed to other areas, fri 1941, 
Queensland internee 152 specifies his religion as Jewish and his 
nationality as German (Refugee). His mother lived in Berlin and 
this could well have been the reason for his internment. Q191 
also states he is a Jew. In the group taken in February 1942 Q202, 
a pastrycook from Atherton specifies himself as a Jew, as does 
a former Pole, Q218, and a later internee Q236.''5 But they are a 
small percentage of the Germans taken in the first half of 1942. 
Of the approximately 1,200 German internees who were resi-
dent in Australia, 240 would have to be Jewish to reach one-fifth 
and the evidence suggests many fewer. Kwiet's proposition that 
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2,000 of the 10,000 interned were of German-Jewish back-
ground cannot be sustained among the "local" internees, al-
though the proportion of German-Jews among the European 
internees held in AusfraUa from aU counfries, could well be 
higher than a fifth because of the large number on the Dunera. 
To separate refugees from other Germans it was proposed to 
introduce a system of independent committees. On 21 June 
1940, AHQ notified commanding officers that independent 
fribunals might be set up in each military district to classify 
aliens. This suggestion was not favoured by any militaty 
leader.^ Western Command considered that the expense was 
not justified. Eastern Command considered that "the only re-
ally effective way of dealing with enemy aliens" was to intern 
them all before "setting up a fribunal to review the cases of 
internees who consider that they can submit proof that they are 
fraitors to their own country".^ In Northern Command there 
was a feeling that there was already too much opportunity to 
appeal in the existing legislation; that command wanted the 
right of naturalised citizens and British subjects to appeal to be 
abolished and no new tribunals established. 
In Southern Command the proposed tribunals were rejeded 
because the military review committee had frequently allocated 
the refugee classification and they considered that the problem 
was that their military-assigned "Certificate Z", (indicating 
refugee and friendly aUen) had not been given legislative status. 
Major R.S. Browne had arranged to submit reports on those 
who based their claims on the Personal Statement Form A42. 
Southern Command was also convinced that the established 
miUtary review committee was best able to deal with any 
modifications that a changing international situation might 
warrant.^5 jj^ classifying aUens, the military review panels had 
used files from the CIB and the Special Aliens Branch of the 
State poUce forces, and also MiUtary IntelUgence reports. The 
miUtary regarded their operational methods and files as secret 
and they did not want others to have access to them. They 
questioned the domkiance of lawyers on the proposed commit-
tees because lawyers would look for evidence that would stand 
in a normal British Court, but in the tribunals established by the 
National Security Regulations the onus of proof was on the 
accused. Besides as General Sturdee pointed out, a "really 
dangerous enemy aUen must necessarily be a man who has 
completely cloaked himself with an innocent character ".^ So it 
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was decided not to proceed with the independent classification 
committees. 
Reaction sets in 
The attempts of the New South Wales politicians, Mair and 
Bruxner, to have Uiternment extended to naturalised and fe-
male persons through their police force's access to Eastern 
Command, created a backlash. Mair sent Menzies a telegram 
urging the internment of all German aliens on 12 June 1940 '^^  
and Bruxner was reported in the Sydney Morning Herald two 
weeks later as complainfrig of the Commonwealth's "inactiv-
ity" in not uiterning enemy aliens.^^ Their foray into the public 
press finally brought condemnation by the Prime Minister,^' 
who could see that undermining the confidence of the general 
public in the effectiveness of the security forces would eventu-
aUy be defrimental to morale. After Menzies' positive denial 
that dangerous enemy aliens were still at large, a more balanced 
press cover of items about enemy aliens developed. Letters in 
the press and to government leaders pointed out the number of 
enemy aliens who were actually stateless or had suffered per-
secution.^° The announcement of the British government's Au-
gust White Paper exonerating category C internees gave some 
critics pause, and rumours of the actual freatment meted out on 
the Dunera began to frouble some consciences. 
Added to this mounting concern about the freatment of 
refugees,''^  was indignation at the number of arrests shown to 
be frivial. Such abuses were particularly resented by the left of 
AusfraUan poUtics. Communist officials of frade unions were 
harassed and the files of unions were searched, although most 
members were not communists. Sections of the National Secu-
rity Regulations were an affront to civil righters.''^ Many of the 
more active were politicaUy left of cenfre, and they realised that 
their chances of free expression rested on overall freedom of 
expression, but civU rights groups also included many liberal 
thinkers, pacifists and devotees of legal correctness. Protest 
peaked when the radical unionists, Horace Ratliff and Max 
Thomas, were arrested and imprisoned for distributing anti-
war Uterature in December 1940. 
A few cases of excessive and stupid zeal threw considerable 
doubt on security actions. An old couple from Kalgoorlie had 
their home raided. The house search revealed a newspaper with 
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an item about the internment of their son-in-law, a German-
born miner with fifteen years residence in AusfraUa. The par-
ents-in-law were told that if they were only interested in their 
relative they would have kept only a cutting, and not the whole 
leftist newspaper.73 j ^ Sydney, on the Domain, a young woman 
art student was arrested because she carried a drawing of a 
head that resembled Mussolini. In court she successfully 
pleaded that her drawing was modelled on the bust of 
Beethoven.-^^ These frivial arrests certainly went beyond the 
intent of the legislation, and the critidsm of arbifrary arrests 
and detention of refugees belong to this period — May and June 
1940—when the war first became a reaUty to many Australians. 
But there was a reaction to these exfremes and, according to 
Paul Hasluck, a feeUng against general internments grew in the 
later months of 1940. 
[Ijntemment of enemy aliens, which had hitherto been exceptional, 
tended for a time to be general, and individual hardship was 
imposed on alien refugees who were interned for no other reason 
than thefr foreign bfrth. The injustice of indiscriminate internment, 
however, roused Australians themselves and, as a result of public 
protests and appeals, the appUcation of the security powers was 
made less drastic and at the end of November 1940 enemy aUens 
were given the right to submit objections to an AUens Tribunal 
which could recommend release if it were satisfied that the deten-
tion of a person was "neither necessary nor advisable for the public 
safety, the defence of the Commonwealth or the efficient prosecu-
tion of the war", or that the release of the persons "would not be 
Ukely to occasion serious unrest in any AustraUan commnunity".''5 
The decision to give enemy aliens the right to object to their 
internment was partiy the result of representations made to the 
Prime Minister regarding German missionaries associated with 
the Roman Catholic Mission at Kimberly, WA. Thirteen Pal-
lotine priests were removed to Broome gaol, triggering a protest 
by Bishop Raible of Perth. Archbishop Mannix, backed by a 
public meeting of Catholics and others, appealed to the Prime 
Mfriister. Ten were released to return to the mission after an 
investigation by the Broome stipendiary magisfrate ordered by 
the Minister for the Army, Percy Spender. The remaining tiiree 
missionaries were paroled to appear before an independent 
inquiry later. As a consequence, enemy aliens were placed on 
tiie same footing as persons friterned under Regulation 26, tiiat 
is, they were to be allowed to appeal against their internment, 
but this decision spedfically excluded internees fransfered to 
LOYALTY AND LOGISTICS f S 
AusfraUa under arrangements made with the Governments of 
other parts of the Empire.''^ 
It would be pleasant to credit Australian altruism and love 
of justice with being the dominant force behind the second 
thoughts about internment that prevailed in late 1940. But 
logistic problems, including lack of accommodation, were 
probably an equally important consideration. To the end of 1940 
the number of local internments in Australia was about half of 
those in the Great War. As with the Great War, there were 
assaults on the status of naturalisation but this time they met 
with no official success. In World War II there was the compli-
cating factor of the Jews whose land of origin rejected them. 
While Ausfralia was prepared to act to allow any of its own 
resident Jews, induding recently arrived refugees, to appeal 
through AUens Tribimals, it hesitated to make decisions about 
the Jews sent from overseas. The Australian authorities re-
garded their role as custodial only. While acting as custodian 
for these thousands of internees and prisoners-of-war from 
overseas, AusfraUa was at the same time building up her own 
miUtary forces and mobilising her economy. This placed her 
organised resources under a great strain and for a time, the 
standard of care and accommodation for prisoners fell below 
the level AusfraUa had set herself and promised internationally 
to provide. 
Chapter Five 
IMPLEMENTATION DEBATES 
In the closing months of 1940 the authorities at Hay struggled 
to accommodate the Dunera internees who had arrived before 
the buildings were there to house them, and the internees 
struggled to accommodate themselves psychologically to being 
on the opposite side of the world and to adapt physically to an 
Ausfralian summer in the outback. The army crowded as many 
as possible into the huts that had been erected, and put up tents 
for the rest. Although the internees did not complaUi about the 
army's efforts in the early days at Hay there can be no doubt 
that conditions were primitive.^ 
Hay camp and its occupants 
The people responsible for reporting on the situation in Intern-
ment Camps were the Official Visitors. In New South Wales 
these were the Chief Justice, Sir Frederick Jordan, and a Su-
preme Court judge, Mr Justice C.G.W. Davidson. Sir Frederick 
inspected Hay on 29-30 October 1940 and reported his findings 
to the MiUtary Board in some detail,^ although he confined 
himself essentially to his roles as a commentator on the physical 
conditions of the camp and its occupants, and as a negotiator 
between the internees' representatives and the camp comman-
dant. Even so, Jordan found that the internees were preoccu-
pied with matters not related to the camp or their freatment 
there. In separating the internees' complaints about their jour-
ney,3 from the remainder of his report, Jordan was complying 
with the National Security (Internment Camp) Regulations 
which spelt out the rules for the conduct of camps and the role 
of tiie Official Visitor.^ A copy of the Visitor's report went to 
Eastern Command and the military then put in frain their 
responses and forwarded the report with their responses to the 
Secretary of the Department of the Army for the information of 
the Minister.^ 
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The internees barely mentioned the accommodation prob-
lems, and expressed their appreciation of the camp officers and 
guards.^ The camp commandant, Lieutenant-Colonel C.S. 
Thane took command of the 16th Garrison Battalion in July 1940 
and he brought to his job of estabUshing an internment camp 
on the dusty western plains, his World War I experience in the 
54th Sikhs of the Frontier Force of the Indian Army.'' The intern-
ees were somewhat anxious about the weather as many men 
were middle aged and they were all unused to the Australian 
inland climate, with its exfremes of temperature, and also about 
the lack of meaningful activity for the himdreds of student 
youths in the group.^ However, they were preoccupied with 
getting across to the British authorities their protest at being 
interned at all, and their indignation about their maltreatment 
on the Dunera. The Official Visitor had no jurisdiction over 
internments, releases, or British froops, but because the com-
plaints were serious, and because the internees utterly refused 
to have dealings with the Swiss Consul,^ Sir Frederick under-
took to pass on the internees' representations. The internees' 
spokesmen, H.H. Eppenstein, from Compound 1, Camp 7, and 
Dr Frankenstein, representing the 250 former Kitchener-camp 
inmates from Compound 2, and Leonhard Posner, of Hut 33, 
Compound 1, who represented the Czech-Fund refugees, ex-
plained the anomaly of their continuing internment. The Kitch-
ener-camp men had entered Britain on special permits that 
acknowledged their status as refugees. The Hay camp popula-
tion was described by its leaders as consisting of up to 90 per 
cent Jews and "to one hundred per cent of anti-Nazis in every 
respect".^° 
The Czechs had also entered Britain after "careful scrutiny 
as to their reUability" and they were maintained by the Czech 
Fund. They argued that as the British White Paper of 14 July 
1940 virtuaUy exonerated all Category C internees, their release 
was "only a question of time". Being financiaUy independent, 
they proposed that they live in an AusfraUan town and help the 
war effort. ^ ^ Other internees asked that releases be effected 
quickly, as those migrating to Palestine had landfrig permits 
due to expire on 31 December 1940. The married men requested 
that their wives and families be allowed to jofri them, or, if the 
situation was to be rectified by the husbands' return to Britain, 
any crossover be guarded against. Jordan summarised the in-
ternees' position.^2 In England the general detention orders of 
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June 1940 were now realised to have been "unnecessary and 
unjust", and tiie Whfre Papers of July and August 1940 had 
release of many in Britain. The fransported internees claimed 
that they were also "the victims of error" and they asked that 
someone be appointed by the Commonwealth government to 
assess their claims. Jordan did not agree. Australia was not in a 
position to know what precise circumstance led to each British 
internee's arrest. While they might be on our soil, they were 
undoubtedly not one of us! However, Jordan conceded that it 
did seem reasonable to give the internees an opportunity to put 
their case to the British and he suggested that someone be 
appointed "to act as a channel of communication with Great 
Britain". 
In relation to the ill-freatment and robbery that the internees 
aUeged against the guards on the Dunera, Jordan found their 
story consistent with two substantive comments by Australian 
officers at Hay. When the internees had arrived they were 
"cowed and abject", and the luggage when it finally arrived 
showed signs of having been broken into by bayonets.^•^ While 
some of the complaints might be exaggerated, and it was nec-
essary to hear the other side, Jordan was of the opinion that 
there was substance enough to warrant an investigation. He 
advised the internees' representatives to prepare detailed state-
ments and he knew that the British High Commissioner, Sir 
Geoffrey Whiskard, was "interesting himself in the matter". 
The Military Board passed Jordan's memorandum on to the 
British authorities, but informed him that there could be no 
Court of Inquiry as none of the ship's crew were in AusfraUa to 
give evidence, and turned to answering Jordan's complaints 
about the physical conditions at Hay, particularly the sleeping 
quarters. ^ ^ EHist, mosquitoes and flies poured in through a 
ventilation gap between the top of the wall and the roof. Hay 
was notorious for its dust storms, and during the war years 
AusfraUa experienced one of its longest droughts. Jordan 
wanted some protection against the dust and it was agreed that 
hessian would be tacked over the ventilation gap to sieve the 
dust and insects. Mosquito nets on the bunks were ruled out 
because of the danger of fire. 
In each camp there were 36 dormitory huts, each of which 
held 28 men. The beds are arranged fri a double line along the 
cenfre of the hut, separated by a partition along the middle. On 
either side of the partition the bunks are arranged in pafrs, one 
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immediately above the other as in a raUway sleeping compart-
ment, and Jordan took a sfrong disUke to this layout. ^ ^ Bits of 
sfraw filling and dust from the hessian mattresses fell on the 
lower sleeper each time the man on the upper bunk moved. 
Jordan wanted the dormitories arranged in the same way as 
those at Ingleburn Army camp, that is, with single bunks 6 ft 
apart along the two long walls of the hut. To back his point, he 
quoted Article 10 of the Geneva Convention, which specified 
the total area, minimum cubic air space and fittings and bed-
ding material appropriate for internees. He interpreted the 
words "as for the depot froops of the detaining power " to mean 
that the Hay huts should be laid out in the same way as at 
Ingleburn.^^ The army was not impressed. To remove the two-
tiered bunks would mean exfra huts to the tune of twelve 
thousand pounds, and the army's medical opinion was that 
they were not unhealthy. Furthermore, this bunking arrange-
ment "as in vogue at Liverpool during the 1914-18 War"\^'^ 
In other areas the army fried to oblige Jordan. He had noted 
that the internees were making hats for themselves from hes-
sian, and sandals from old car tyres. Their few underclothes 
were wearing out fast. Although many internees were not poor, 
their money was delayed in reaching AusfraUa. A remittance of 
over twelve thousand pounds sterling was received early in 
November 1940 for credit to individual internees. By the time 
the lists were sent to command headquarters, and from there to 
camps, three months had elapsed since the arrival of the intern-
ees in Australia. ^^  Jordan asked that supplies of clothing, hats, 
footwear and toothbrushes be rushed to Hay. He quoted Article 
12, which specified that basic necessities be provided, and in 
this case the army agreed with him. Basic clothing would be 
provided. The problem had arisen because no one had foreseen 
that when the men arrived many would have no money and 
only the clothes they stood up in. Jordan also commented 
unfavourably on the inadequate supply of cooking utensils and 
cleaning materials in the kitchens, the smallness of the laundry 
and the lack of recreational huts and craft materials for occupa-
tional therapy. All these things the army promised to rectify. The 
army accepted that the medical, dental and optical services 
were inadequate, and they reassured Jordan that there would 
be improvements. In the sanitation area they were already 
considering replacing the large urine cans, which were sitting 
in the open on the earth along one side of the outside of the 
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latrine, with a frough. Between Jordan's visit to Hay on 29 and 
30 October 1940, and the receipt of his report by the secretary 
of the Military Board on 6 November, the camp was visited by 
E. Sydney Morris, a Quaker and President of the European 
Emergency Committee. ^ ^ Morris was fri Hay from 1 to 4 No-
vember. He found the area unatfractive and the surrounding 
country "virtually deserf'.^o The annual rainfall was eleven 
inches and the summer temperature frequently went over lOOF 
in the shade. After rain the soil became "tenadous mud", but 
during most of the year the district was subject to severe dust-
storms. It seemed to Morris that this camp site had been chosen 
so that any escapee would have to keep to the Murrumbidgee 
River in order to survive. 
Morris listened to the internees' stories and thought it "the 
most depressing experience" that had ever befallen him. The 
internees pressed on him, as they had done on Jordan, their 
objection to remaining interned, sfressed that the British White 
Papers had exonerated the same groups in Britain, and ex-
plained their anxieties about famiUes and businesses and visa 
expiration. They inquired about the possibility of some intern-
ees remaining in AusfraUa, but Morris had to tell them that this 
was fafrly unlikely as the "Australian Government regarded 
itself merely as a frustee for the British". He was concerned 
about the depth of the internees' anxiety, some of them being 
depressed to a point of hopelessness. Most of the young men 
had been sent to England to give them a chance to get fraining, 
and while there was little that could be done about thefr "men-
tal anguish" for their parents in Europe, Morris considered that 
efforts should be made to fit them for life after thefr uiternment. 
Morris was obviously impressed by the positive attitude of 
Captain Carrington, who had formed a Scout Unit and re-
garded tiie friterned youths as of as high a calibre as any boy 
migrants he had placed before the war.^i 
Morris listed a number of items he thought would be well 
used; text-books, handicraft materials and Lutheran hymn 
books among them. He noted that Lt-Col. Thane was "anxious 
to develop the whole camp on a productive basis", and Morris 
sfrongly supported him. If the Dunera internees were modern 
convicts, then Thane was Arthur PhilUp. Thane's plans in-
cluded market gardening, bread- making to supply the camp, 
raising pigs and poultry, tailorfrig, makfrig mail-bags, and even 
constructing a low-level dam across the river to form the basis 
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of a canal-irrigation system. If internees could be paid pocket 
money for doing this work, they could buy the basic necessities 
they badly needed, such as toothbrushes and shaving cream. 
Morris sfressed this aspect of Thane's plan, for Morris was 
shocked at the destitution he saw. He described the men as 
having arrived in "ragged" clothes and some men were "forced 
to clean their teeth by means of a moist finger dipped in sand 
or grit". Boots were wearing out and some men had to go 
barefoot. Although Lt-Col. Thane had immediately requisi-
tioned complete outfits for each internee, two months later only 
200 outfits had arrived. The delay, as Morris understood it, was 
largely due to military requirements being greater than suppli-
ers could meet. Some clothing had been sent by the Australian 
Jewish Welfare Sodety, but "an enormous amount" was 
needed. 
The internees were well organised and involved in lecture 
programs and entertainments, and were willing to work inside 
and outside the camp. The inhibiting factor was the lack of basic 
equipment. For those who needed special medical care or post-
operative spedalist treatment a hospital had been established 
in the old Hay gaol, whose thick walls made it one of the coolest 
buUdings in the disfrict. For less severe cases there was a smaU 
sick-ward in each compound staffed by internee doctors. The 
internee dentists and dental technicians were unable to be of 
much use because of lack of equipment. "It was rather pitiful," 
Morris wrote, "to see one of these dentists endeavouring to do 
what was possible with the aid of a few instruments fashioned 
out of nails." 
The army minister reacts 
Morris's report is dated 11 November 1940 and on that same 
day the Minister for the Army, Percy C. Spender, wrote a letter 
to General Miles at Eastern Command. Lieutenant-General 
Charles G.N. Miles was a permanent officer who served in 
World War I. He was the Director of Military Art at the Royal 
Military College in the 1920s and its commandant from 1935-9. 
A member of the Military Board when war began, he was 
attached to AHQ but took over Eastern Command when Stur-
dee became CGS. He retired on 19 December 1941.^ 2 Spender 
wrote that he had information from "a responsible source, 
concerning the conditions of the internees at Hay". There can 
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be little doubt that Morris was Spender's source. He repeats 
Morris' words. The internees were "in ragged clothes", "some 
are barefoot", many had "neither toothbrushes nor shaving 
gear" and, in general, the equipment position was "very bad". 
The Minister did not mince matters. He concluded: 
I take a most serious view of this matter and I requfre an immediate 
report showing whether the facts placed before me are substantially 
true and, if so, advice should be furnished not only in general terms 
but as to who are the officers responsible and why simple equip-
ment of this description to deal with the situation has not been 
provided.23 
General Miles replied that Spender's information was "sub-
stantially correct" but action was being taken "to alleviate the 
position".^'* Greatcoats and sets of clothing had been des-
patched to Hay but there was "no authority to issue tooth-
brushes or shaving gear". Educational fadlities were being 
discussed with the YMCA, but money and exfra building work 
would be needed. A policy statement on the employment of 
internee fradesmen, such as bootmakers, had only just come 
from AHQ. It was based on the suggestions of Lt-Col. Thane, 
who was then in Sydney, negotiating with welfare groups, with 
a two hundred pound grant for each of the three camps to 
spend, fri addition to the army initiatives, the Official Visitor 
had submitted "a very detailed report" on the inadequacies at 
Hay but it had only been received on 7 November. General 
MUes concluded his reply by stating that no officer could "rea-
sonably be held responsible for the conditions at Hay", which 
were "being rectified as fast as possible". 
Spender was not satisfied, and asked for a copy of the Official 
Visitor's report, and the name of the officer responsible for "the 
unsatisfactory conditions" at Hay, flatly asserting that the re-
sponsible officer should be discipUned.^s On 16 November, the 
MiUtary Board contended that Eastern Command was respon-
sible for the conditions at Hay and told General Miles to name 
the officer and provide a report on the failure "either to provide 
items or to make the necessary representations".^^ Miles pro-
tested, arguing that AHQ held ultimate responsibility, but the 
Adjutant-General denied this and Spender still wanted an an-
swer to the question "What is being done about the equip-
ment?".27 
General Miles replied fri detail. He had sent Colonel W.B. 
Simpson, the chief legal officer, to Hay for a five day investiga-
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tion. Seven hundred sets of clothes were forwarded and 400 
were foUowing. Toothbrushes, razors and shaving brushes had 
now been dispatched. Tools were supplied in part, and the 
balance was on order. A draft agreement on Thane's land and 
water project had been negotiated with the state authorities. 
There were now 72 educational classes being attended by over 
three hundred internees, but more money was needed for text-
books. Men from the Department of Agriculture were to be 
appointed as employment officers so outside work could begin. 
The Catholic church had nominated a chaplain, but other de-
nominations had been unable to supply any. The YMCA was 
only able to supply some materials but the committee of Public 
Librarians had agreed to equip each camp with a library. Gen-
eral Miles detailed the considerations that had affected the 
army's ability to cope with the sudden influx of overseas intern-
ees. The highest priority, in Miles' view, had to be provision of 
food and shelter, and this had been achieved. There had been a 
lack of definition as to what constituted the "other necessities" 
required under National Security (Internment Camp) Regula-
tion 12, but in any case, if toothbrushes had been provided to 
internees on the Dunera's arrival, it would have meant a short-
age for the froops of the AIF. Lt-Col. Thane had now been placed 
in direct contact with supply officers and Miles had instructed 
them to ensure that there be no delays in meeting requisitions. 
Lack of funds was holding up the required additions and 
alterations to camp buildings, but the camp hospital now had 
an establishment of 110 beds and exfra staff. Miles could not 
resist adding that AHQ generally confrolled hospital arrange-
ments, but these were "now likely to be expedited". Miles 
attached Thane's budget of six hundred pounds for tools, and 
a request for one and one half thousand pounds for requfre-
ments to 30 June 1941. This had the effect of redirecting some 
of the pressure on to the Minister. Tools and equipment were 
costly items, difficult to supply and justify when every effort 
was being put into gearing up fridusfry for war production. 
Miles still felt that it was unfair to blame any officer in Eastern 
Command. He had admitted delay in the supply of dothfrig but 
he was "not prepared to apportion blame", and he had taken 
steps to prevent a recurrence.^^ 
The MiUtary Board supported Miles, and the Adjutant-Gen-
eral, Major-General V.P.H. Stantke, stressed that the internees 
had arrived from camps in England and it had been assumed 
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that they had "ordfriary personal necessities". Stantke put the 
blame back where the problem had originated — the hasty 
round-up and departure from England and the British guards 
who had looted the internees' possessions.^^ Yet the Mfriister for 
the Army was stiU not moved and members of the War Cabinet 
were not satisfied with the reply that blame could not be at-
tached to anyone. Unless responsibility could be sheeted home 
to someone, something was badly wrong with the system!^ 
So Miles had to do some more explaining. Eleven days before 
the Dunera internees had arrived at Hay on 7 September 200 
sets of clothing had been ordered, but they were not sent until 
14 October because "a junior temporary messenger employed 
in Ordnance" had "inadvertently filed the original copy in the 
dupUcate requisitions file". When Hay pestered for more outfits 
it was realised that the original order had not been filled. Hay's 
second requisition for 800 sets of clothing was reduced to 500, 
in a mix up between the quartermaster at Eastern Command 
headquarters and the acting-quartermaster at Hay, but these 
were sent off on 11 November. The officer at Hay "was found 
to be unsuitable" as an organiser of supplies and had been 
fransfered while the HQ quartermaster had worked hard since 
the outbreak of war and had a breakdown in health before being 
returned to regimental duties.^^ The strains on inexperienced 
junior staff and unfrained senior staff, trying to cope with an 
unprecedented demand on inadequate resources were show-
ing. The looting of the internees baggage and the camp building 
confractors' inability to get the labour and supplies to finish the 
camp in tune increased the sfress on everyone. 
Spender persuaded the War Cabinet on 10 December 1940 to 
grant large kicreases in spending on internment camps and 
recruitment to the Garrison.^^ The Garrison Battalions were to 
be increased by 9,000 members. This involved a capital expense 
of £100,000 and other expenditure of £601,500. An additional 
£135,350 was authorised for capital works on internment 
camps, and £248,000 on exfra mafritenance. At tiie same meet-
ing, the conditions were agreed under which the Apostolic 
Delegate and other religious representatives should be allowed 
to operate in visits to internment camps. 
While Spender was urging Eastern Command to improve 
conditions at Hay, AHQ sent Major J. McCahon there to prepare 
a report for the Director of Personal Services.33 By early Novem-
ber 1940 tiiere were 2,507 fri tiie three Hay camps and transfers 
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from other commands would bring the group to its full capacity 
of 3,000. Camp 6 already held 526 Australian-Italian internees. 
Camp 7 held 955 internees from the United Kingdom, and 
Camp 8 had 991 German and Austrian internees. There were 35 
internees in hospital and 64 were in the compound sick-wards. 
The senior medical officer at Hay recommended the transfer of 
89 UK internees to a more temperate cUmate. Because of the 
pressure of numbers, the Orange camp was being re-opened; it 
could hold 425 men until further permanent camps were au-
thorised and consfructed. McCahon sfressed that only the new 
compounds at Orange were to be used. However the garrison 
froops were stiU in tents and their conditions were no better 
than in July 1940 when Lieutenant Bass had told the German 
internees from Sydney that the guards were "worse off" than 
they were.3^ 
The Official Visitors react 
In January 1941 Dr H.O. Lethbridge, MBE, inspected the Hay 
camps in his capadty as Assistant to the Official Visitors.^^ 
Lethbridge had been the Government Medical Officer at Nar-
randera for 30 years and in his experience the weather in the 
Riverina was healthy provided people dressed correctly. There 
were periods of exfreme heat but they were frequently relieved 
by a cold front that could cause the temperature to drop dra-
matically. These cool chemges were not harmful in themselves 
but could bring on diarrhoea if people did not adjust their 
clothing. Lethbridge strongly supported Thane's plan to plant 
willows and poplars west of the camps and even suggested the 
planting of quick growers, such as peppers and wattle, in the 
compound to minimise the dust. Lethbridge anticipated that as 
Hay got very cold in winter, further supplies of warm clothing 
and blankets would be needed. 
When Lethbridge met the representatives of Camp 7 he 
found them wUling to speak out.^^ This confidence, so quickly 
regained in Ausfralia, is to be noted. Jordan had reported the 
Hay officers' comment on the "cowed and abject appearance" 
of these internees when they first arrived, but that he himself 
had found "no frace" remaining of this fear by early November 
1940.37 Now, in January 1941, Lethbridge found them forthright 
about the unsatisfactory conditions. ITie urinal pans were stiU 
standing in the open and when it rained they overflowed. There 
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were no water hoses to clean the lavatories which were not 
fly-proofed. In the kitchen there were not enough brooms, mops 
or tea towels, soda or soap, and some plates were rusty The 
laundry had no proper boiler. Internee doctors lacked sticking 
plaster and bandages and optical and dental services were 
unobtainable. There was no kit to repair boots and the sfraw in 
the palliasses had been renewed only once since the internees 
had been at Hay. 
The Official Visitor to the adjofriing Camp 6 which housed 
Italians interned in Ausfralia, the Hon. Mr Justice Davidson was 
angry about conditions there also.^^ In November 1940 he had 
visited the camp, and been assured that work to benefit the 
internees "would be undertaken immediately". This included 
the cementing of the toilet floor and the covering of urine pans, 
repairs to the hot showers, a proper wash-house, dust protec-
tion, a bread oven and paving around the kitchen. Because he 
had been led to believe that everything was available for these 
projects, Davidson had passed on the army's assurances to the 
camp representative. Prince del Drago, who had now written 
to tell him that three months later "nothing whatever" had been 
done. Davidson's anger was not lessened by the fact that his 
mail from the internees had been marked as passed by the 
Censor, an act confrary to the regulations, the Prince's state-
ments were accurate, Davidson considered that either someone 
had been deplorably inefficient, or that the military had 
breached faith with himself and the internees. Davidson saw 
his role as Official Visitor not just to see that the Geneva Con-
vention was observed, "but also to ensure that reasonable 
freatment" was being offered to those who were interned. He 
threatened the Military Board: 
I can not tolerate for one moment being used as a mere blind to 
enable the pubUc to be deluded with the idea that the proprieties 
are being observed and unless I can ascertain that something is 
being done at once in connection with the matters I have mentioned 
I shaU have to resign as a protest.39 
Further, Davidson stated that he would be writing to the Min-
ister separately In February, Dr Lethbridge submitted a further 
report on Camp 7, where there was "a rather serious epidemic" 
of endocarditis, an inflammation of the membrane lining the 
cavities of the heart.^o Sir Frederick Jordan was convinced that 
it was related to the "disgraceful" way the internees were 
"huddled together fri their sleepfrig quarters owing to the de-
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fective layout of the bunks", and particularly to straw and dust 
falling from the top bunk. Jordan considered that aU his and 
Davidson's representations on the problems with bunks had 
been met with "an obstinate refusal to Usten to reason". To drive 
home his point he wrote, "I frust that it will not be necessary 
for a number of deaths to occur before it is realised that the 
matter is reaUy serious". These vigorous protests by the Official 
Visitors made an impact. 
The Chief Inspector for Army Catering, Major C. Stanton 
Hicks, and Captain G.G. Hack, of Western Command, visited 
Hay on 2 March to investigate.^^ They reported that the cement-
ing of the area on which the urine buckets stood was a problem 
because it had to be sloped so that any runoff drained into the 
sewage system and incorrect sloping of concrete was a common 
fault among cement workers in Army Camps. Problems with 
rusty plates and inadequate soap were sfraightforward; sup-
pUes had been requisitioned but had not come. The supply store 
was the DriU Hall, and a check of the vegetables there showed 
that 15 per cent of the potatoes were inedible. The quartermas-
ters in the compounds were unfrained and with the Garrison 
being 200 men short, they had to do other duties as well. To 
make matters worse, the compounds did not have a stable 
population: up to 50 men at a time could be absent, appearing 
before appeal fribunals. Sometimes goods disappeared be-
tween the supply store and the compounds, having been fraded 
for drink at local hotels. 
In two instances the army's policy of accepting contracts on 
a price basis had proved a faUure. The lower tenderer for the 
laundry contract had failed to fulfil requirements, and the 
cheaper meat supply from Deniliquin had to come by roads that 
were periodicaUy impassable, and some deUveries had been 
condemned. Freshness of food needed to be a higher priority 
than fractional price differences, and the inspectors wanted the 
meat confract to revert to the local butcher, who had continued 
to supply Kosher meat slaughtered at the Rabbi's instructions 
because the orthodox Jews who would not eat any other. The 
two investigators interviewed the two Italians representing 
Camp 6, Prince del Drago and Captafri Qualia of the scuttled 
Romolo. Their camp was now completely occupied by men of 
Italian origin, so the four negotiators agreed on alternative 
ration supplies. Veal, rabbit, macaroni, cheese Roman, tomato 
pulp, olive oil and salami were to replace corned beef, tinned 
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beef, sausages, tomato sauce, jam and 50 per cent of the oatmeal 
and tea suppUes. 
The inspectors considered that all the essential difficulties at 
Hay arose from shortage of staff and delay in carrying out 
necessary and authorised works. The Quartermaster had no 
staff and there was no Ordnance Officer but on the books stood 
"goods to the value of £120,000. The position could reasonably 
be described as a company organisation functioning as a Bat-
talion".^ The sudden increase fri internments within Ausfralia 
in May and June 1940, and the arrival of the Dunera ki August, 
had created a need for camps well beyond the capacity of the 
army confractors to build them, since priority had to be given 
to accommodating the thousands of recruits in the AIF and the 
AME43 
But the demands on Ausfralia as a reception area for prison-
ers of one sort or another were not to decrease. The promise to 
take 6,000 from Britain still stood, and England continued to 
expect it to be taken up. Fighting in the Middle East had brought 
the war to Egypt, and one neighbouring base for Australian 
froops was Palestine, where there were German-speaking 
members of a religious group called the Temple Society, or 
Templars, as well as representatives of German firms, both of 
whom were considered security risks. There were also thou-
sands of German and central-European Jews in Palestine who 
had fled the Nazi advance and entered Palestine illegally. On 9 
September 1940 London asked that Australia fulfil its promise. 
The War Cabinet agreed to accept an additional 800 civilian 
internees from Britain and 1,000 Luftwaffe POWs. Takfrig into 
accotmt the 2,542 Dunera internees already in AusfraUa, the War 
Cabinet considered they had an obligation to accept 1,658 oth-
ers, who could be civilian German or Italian internees from the 
United Kfrigdom or Palestine. But the War Cabinet sfressed 
three points.^^ First, male prisoners were preferred. Secondly 
the capital expense would have to be increased to cover the 
accommodation of officers, and Britain should "reimburse" 
these expenses. Finally, the acceptance of any aliens for intern-
ment in AustraUa was "subject to their prior internment in the 
UK or Palestfrie and to the distinct understanding that" they 
would remain friterned in Australia and subsequently be repa-
friated to the UK or Palestine for release. Australia stuck to these 
principles as far as possible. When on 20 November 1940, 
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Britain wanted AustraUa to take 3,500 illegal Palestinian immi-
grants, the cabinet refused. 
Cabinet also refused to take the non-interned wives and 
famUies of the British fritemees,45 despite a plea from senior 
British Ministers that the non performance of their promise to 
reunite families was a poUtical embarrassment to them. The 
Ausfralian government could see that the political embarrass-
ment to the British might easily become a double embarrassment 
to them. When they arrived the UK voluntary family internees 
might not Uke the conditions and agitate for release and the 
families of Ausfralian internees who were finding "thefr present 
position difficult" could weU ask for the same opportunity to 
join their men. It seems that 6,000 was considered the limit, and 
the reports on the accommodation and supply problems at Hay 
are evidence that the decision was justified. 
But even when proof that most of the Dunera internees were 
not enemies became overwhelming, the government stuck to 
its non-release policy. When the representative of the British 
Home Office, Major Julian Layton, came to Ausfralia he could 
offer the British internees some restitution for their property 
losses, a return frip to England through U-boat infested waters, 
but not release in AusfraUa.'*^ While Layton began organising 
shipping, the Dunera internees were fransfered from Hay to 
Tatura and Orange in May 1941, much to thefr relief.^'' Even 
Konig, who saw a magic and beauty in the glorious colour of 
the sunsets at Hay, had had enough. He felt he was "no longer 
equal to the hardships". To another internee, Kurt Fischer, 
Tatura appeared luxurious. There were "trees, grass and hills" 
and "the place looked Uke a holiday resort compared to Hay". 
The huts "were subdivided into cabins" and each cabin had a 
separate enfrance, a small table, two chairs, two beds and a 
window. It was "cosy". There were bathrooms with white bath 
tubs and the food was "good, tasty and plentiful". While Lay-
ton continued his work sorting out the internees and frying to 
arrange passages, questions were asked in parliament about 
internment policy and practice and about the manpower re-
sources tied up in internment camps. 
Questions in parliament 
The UAP/Country Party coalition government had not been 
convindngly successful in the elections in 1940 and held on to 
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power by a thread. There was also a real concern tiKat AusfraUa 
would soon have to face a powerful enemy in tiie Padfic area 
and some internal dissatisfaction about the organisation of the 
war effort. The Prime Minister, R.G. Menzies, went to London 
between February and May 1941 to sfress Ausfralia's point of 
view to tiie ChurchUl cabinet. He left the shaky coalition gov-
ernment in the hands of Arthur Fadden, the balance of power 
resting with two independents. The Labor Opposition worked 
through the Advisory War Council to keep parliamentary fric-
tion to a manageable level, but a few individuals within the 
coalition itself mounted some strong attacks on the govern-
ment. One came from Archie Cameron, the member for Barker 
(SA), who went as far as moving a vote of no confidence in the 
Minister for the Army, Percy Spender, for his handling of intern-
ment. 
Cameron was furious when the War Cabinet decided in 
November 1940 to aUow enemy aliens interned in Australia the 
right to appeal to fribunals. Iinmediately the amendment im-
plementfrig this decision was gazetted, Cameron moved that it 
be disallowed. On 2 April 1941, he claimed that the new Statu-
tory Rule 269 was void. Both Spender and the leader of the 
Opposition, John Curtin, argued against him, but Cameron 
considered that the Minister for the Army had lost the confi-
dence of the House "because of his handling of the uiternment, 
frial and release from internment of certain enemy aliens".'** 
Spender persuaded Fadden that such an attack on the Army 
Minister in war time should be dealt with quickly, so Fadden 
allowed a full debate. 
Cameron began by arguing that while Australian citizens, by 
birth or naturalisation, "were entitled to all their rights under 
the law, even in war time", enemy citizens who were in Ausfra-
lia when war broke out should "enjoy no rights whatever". 
They were "in enemy territory". Cameron claimed that the 
release of some aliens had "been confrary to the best interests 
of the country", and he beUeved that this claim was supported 
by the poUce and army officers whose job was to maintain 
internal security. Statutory Rule 269 placed the Commonwealth 
"in the hopelessly ridiculous position of appearing before a 
fribunal to defend its own actions", he declared. Internees were 
not accused of being criminals, they were merely the citizens of 
a country at war with Australia who had, in the opinion of those 
with responsibility for maintaining national security, the capac-
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ity to become "a danger to the nation". Enemy aliens "capable 
of bearing arms or of coUecting or fransmitting information" 
were best interned. If such an enemy alien was released he 
might engage in espionage, and sabotage industry, fransport or 
morale. He might collect and fransmit information or friterfere 
with recruiting. It was Cameron's settied opinion that the 
"proper place" for an enemy alien capable of bearing arms, or 
of interfering vsdth the war effort, was an friternment camp, 
"unless something very definite" could "be shown to the con-
traty". To Cameron, nationaUty was fixed, and a capacity to 
harm was enough.'*^ 
Cameron described as "pansy" the government's action in 
taking the exfraordinary situation of refugees into account; it 
was certainly not the method of the Germans, who had just shot 
a British officer for putting his head out of a window confrary 
to camp orders. Cameron claimed that the new regulation did 
nothing more than elicit information on the poUtical beliefs of 
the internees before they came to Ausfralia and this new infor-
mation had "nothing to do" with Australia's security. Cameron 
argued that tribunals cost too much and that it was a waste of 
time and effort for army staff to have to prepare evidence and 
fransport internees to hearings. He complained that the police 
were also put under extra sfrain in keeping up surveillance on 
released internees, that there was a lack of uniformity in fribu-
nals procedures and that wealthy internees were favoured 
because they could hfre counsel. To top it aU, the government 
had recently issued a dfrective that internees were to be heard 
in the state where they had been arrested, adding even further 
to costs. The solution, in Cameron's view, was to hear British 
and non-enemy aliens in the camps and to get "competent 
authorities" to make a half-yearly report on any changes that 
might affect the circumstances of enemy aliens. 
Despite the opportunity Fadden had given for a debate, not 
one other member in the chamber would second Cameron's 
motion and it lapsed. Nevertheless, Spender wanted to reply, 
both because the charges were serious and because they came 
from an ex-Minister of one of the armed services. He also 
wanted an opportunity to put his version for the benefit of the 
press.5° He had been charged with being "incompetent or neg-
Ugent, or perhaps even worse", and although the charges had 
not been substantiated, they would be published throughout 
the country, and it would take "a long while to overtake and 
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rebut" them. While tiie actual attack was on tiie fribunal system, 
the poUtical damage would faU on Spender, who resented 
Cameron using his "dual position" as a member of Army 
Intelligence and of the House of Representatives. Cameron's 
sole purpose, in Spender's eyes, "was to indulge his peculiar 
megalomania in order to get some notoriety out of his action". 
No doubt Cameron was playing to the press, but it was an 
open question whether this was purely personal. As a member 
of Army Intelligence, how far had he discussed the matter with 
the army officers and police involved, and how far did his views 
represent theirs? His words and examples suggested that he 
was the mouthpiece for at least some officers disgrimtied with 
internees having the use of cars for fransport, but how general 
among army officers was annoyance at having internment 
decisions questioned, and resentment at being forced to defend 
their actions? Richard Hall's most frenchant criticism of Army 
Intelligence's behaviour in World War 11 was its disregard for 
the higher level of authority, its lack of "any sense of responsi-
bility" to its "political masters". He points out that in the totality 
of Austin Laughlin's book. Boots and All, they are never referred 
to. He also claims that Intelligence officers had a sense of being 
the first Une of defence against subversion and the bastion of 
internal as weU as external security. If this attitude was general, 
and LaughUn is at pains to show how enthusiastically military 
officers took on their intelligence role, there can be little doubt 
that they would be irritated by any contravening of their rec-
ommendations.^^ 
Part of the problem lay with the wording of the act that 
allowed for a flexible policy, where considerations of the state 
of the war and "public sentiment" were legitimate fadors in 
internment dedsions. In tunes of national crisis some security 
officers felt it safer to err on the conservative side, and they 
judged nationality by bfrth, and capacity to bear arms, as suffi-
cient reasons for internment. Another part of the problem lay 
in the original delegation of authority to the army over enemy 
aliens. Any questioning of the army's handling of enemy aliens 
by the civil and poUtical authorities was bound to be regarded 
as impertinent. If the parliament wished to take over the confrd 
of enemy aliens it had to introduce new regulations as Spender 
was doing with Statutory Rule 269. ft the government was to 
become totally disillusioned with the army's handlfrig of in-
ternment, it would have to revoke the army's delegated author-
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ity. But such a dedsion in war time, and with the government 
so tenuously supported, could be very divisive. 
The mUitary's political power is an implied but unspoken 
dimension in the parliamentary debates on internment. There 
can be no question that in war time the leaders of the armed 
forces have much more frifluence than they have in peace time. 
The people look to them to provide leadership and military 
victories. The poUticians rely on their expert advice. What 
would be the situation in a case of conflict between the military 
and the poUticians in the heightened atmosphere of war? And 
how much more leverage would the military have when the 
political parties were so evenly divided that the desertion of one 
or two members would change the government? It may be 
speculation to suggest that Cameron was the spokesman for 
those sections of miUtary intelligence that wanted the unques-
tioned right to intern enemy aliens, including refugees, but it is 
a speculation that would offer yet another explanation of the 
continued internment of the Dunera internees in Australia. 
When the Anglican Bishop Venn Pilcher wrote to the Menzies 
government, suggestfrig that fribunals be estabUshed to classify 
alien internees, and asking to visit internment camps, Menzies 
repUed that he would be grateful if the bishop would not press 
his request. Pilcher thought that it was the visit to the camp that 
would embarrass Menzies, but the problem could have been 
the whole matter of the continuing internment of refugee aUens 
from overseas. The Inter-Church Committee prepared a memo-
randum explaining why the Dunera internees could legaUy be 
released in AusfraUa, and Cyril Pearl says that the army rebut-
ted the memorandum, contending that there were ample legal 
grounds for the internment of anyone whose "sovereign or 
state" was at war with the King.^^ The army minute also stated 
that an enemy alien had "no rights at all" and concluded that 
"the position had been made quite clear in Ausfralia by the 
issuing of internment orders against each internee under the 
National Security (Aliens Confrol) Regulations". If the Ausfra-
lian government released the overseas internees, they could be 
instantiy reinterned by the army under its own powers. The 
government-created fribunals could override the army where 
it knew the facts about the locally friterned enemy aliens, but it 
would have needed a sfronger government to try to assert 
confrol if the army was determined to hold the overseas intern-
ees about whom there was no local knowledge. 
114 BEHIND BARBED WIRE 
Although Cameron was soundly defeated in April, he re-
turned to attacking the concept of the aliens fribunals on 3 July 
1941. In this debate^^ he showed a more overt anti-semitism, 
there was evidence of government members' dissatisfadion, 
and the opposition was more restive and inclined to see the 
issue as an ideological one, where basic civU rights were threat-
ened. Cameron complained that the government was looking 
after people who had come "to save their own skins" or because 
"the Nazis wanted to plant them here". This time Cameron was 
supported by W.J. Hutchinson, the UAP member for Deakin 
(Vic), and J.G. Duncan-Hughes, the UAP member for Wake-
field (SA). HutchUison was concerned that aliens suspected of 
subversive activities, who took "great pains to cover their 
fracks", would be able to appeal to a court of law where the 
onus would be on miUtary fritelligence officers to prove that the 
objector was guilty of subversion. Duncan-Hughes, who him-
self had a military background, was convinced that military 
frials were more likely to result in "substantive justice" than 
frials in civil courts, where lawyers requfred "absolute fruth" 
and complete satisfaction that no injustice could be done. In war 
time, Duncan-Hughes contended, Australia could "not afford 
to demand that complete proof be secured", especially when 
considering alien internees who were "not really members of 
our own community". Duncan-Hughes recalled the experi-
ences of Holland, France and Yugoslavia early in the war, where 
fifth colurrm activities showed "how widespread and effective" 
the Nazi organisation was. 
In leadfrig the debate for the Opposition, Frank Forde, the 
member for Capricornia, rejected the alternative of leaving "the 
whole matter in the hands of the military authorities". These 
men were "exfremely busy" and consequently internees appli-
cations "might be ill-considered". Forde argued that a right 
extended to naturalised persons should apply to a person who 
wanted naturaUsation but who had not been in the country long 
enough to apply. Forde described the new system as "a substan-
tial improvement" without which injustice might be done "to 
loyal members of the community". Eddie Ward, representing 
East Sydney, spoke of the need for a uniform policy on intern-
ments and releases. Ward cited three cases to demonstrate how 
erratic policy was. An Australian-born returned soldier "was 
interned without being given the reason" while another man, 
Philip Hentze, was released very shortly after his internment, 
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without the authority of the appropriate fribunal. From his 
examination of tiie NSW police dossier. Ward claimed that 
Hentze had been employed by the propaganda leader of the 
Nazi party in AustraUa, was an assodate of tiiree other intern-
ees, and was "in a position to obtain information concerning 
the movements of ships taking AusfraUan wool to England". 
Ward's third case was a Greek, who had come to Australia at an 
early age, was well known in the frade unions and had "refer-
ences from most reputable people". Ward claimed he was not 
judging any of the cases, only pointing out their inconsistency. 
Ward's speech also had a more theoretical component. He 
argued that persons should not be interned "without being 
given the reason for thefr internment" and that the government 
should have "sufficient evidence to support its action". A 
charge should be laid, for Australian and aUied citizens ought 
not, in Ward's view, be placed in internment without "an open, 
public frial". 
Frank Brennan, a most consistent Labor spokesman against 
rule by regulation, objected to Cameron's motion on the ground 
that it infriiiged civil rights. On these grounds he had originally 
objeded to the 1939 National Security Act and to all the drastic 
regulations that had subsequently been added to it. Brennan 
beUeved that if the prindples of democracy were worth dying 
for, they were "worth maintaining fri the face of death itself". 
Contrary to Cameron's claims that aliens had no rights, Bren-
nan claimed that they had rights the moment they stepped on 
to British soU. It was part of the British tradition that when men 
had come to Britain seeking political asylum, they "found 
sanctuary" there. The principle of democracy, in Brennan's 
view, required that access to fribunals be given to refugees who 
obeyed the laws, paid taxes and were entitled to the protection 
of AustraUa's laws. Brennan, Forde and Ward were, in effect, 
challenging any literal interpretation of internment policy that 
made capacity, and opportunity, and nationality, enough to 
make a man potentially dangerous. Some in the Labor Party 
were increasingly worried not only by the application of the 
internment regulations but also by the Subversive Activities 
Act. Thefr continual reference to the broader area of civil rights 
for all, was in anticipation of a major debate on aspects of the 
Subversive Activities Act that Labor's most outspoken civil 
libertarian, Maurice Blackburn, precipitated almost as soon as 
the aUens fribunal debate was over. 
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But before that new debate began, Cameron spoke again, 
pointing out that the government was currentiy applying 
harsher laws to alien seamen, and he protested that officials of 
the Attorney-General's Department were being used to repre-
sent the Minister for the Army at fribunal hearings. Spender 
had insisted that 80 per cent of his representatives were army 
officers. He acknowledged that aUen seamen were subjed to a 
regulation promulgated on 20 June 1941, permitting the arrest 
and detention of any alien seaman who absented himself from 
his ship, refused to sail on any ship that offered him a job, or 
was reported for refusing to perform his regular duties on 
board. In relation to the methods of appeal. Spender explained 
the actual practice of the Advisory Committees that dealt with 
British-born, naturalised and non-enemy aliens, and the AUens 
Tribunals that dealt with enemy aUens. All Advisory Commit-
tee recommendations came to the Minister, but Spender had 
found that the dossiers provided by his military advisers some-
times contained "contradictory information". The sources of 
the information were often not indicated, but assertions could 
be as different as naming the same man a Nazi and a Commu-
nist. Spender had to go through every dossier because he 
refused "to act as a mere amanuensis" and sign detention 
orders just because the Intelligence Branch advised him to do 
so. 
With Aliens Tribunals, dossiers and decisions came to the 
minister only if there was a disagreement between the GOC and 
the fribunal. Spender conceded that fritelligence officers had a 
difficult task to perform, but he also knew that, in many cases, 
when the dossiers on which the original detention order had 
been signed were scrutinised by an Aliens Tribunal, and the 
objector had a chance to speak for himself, the whole case 
coUapsed. Above aU, Spender sfressed that the onus of proof, 
which Cameron kept implying was being devolved on to the 
interning authority, remained with the objector. In cases where 
the GOC protested. Spender had sometimes made judgements 
against tiie fribunal because when there was any doubt, it 
"must be resolved in favour of the country". In regard to the 
particular case of PhiUp Hentze that Ward had raised. Spender 
protested that the man was a naturaUsed citizen and, to his 
certain knowledge,^* the man's dossier contained deficient and 
unreliable information. The whole dossier had gone to a fribu-
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nal chairman who decided that there were no grounds for 
Hentze's internment. 
The positions taken by most of those who took part in the 
debate were predictable, but R.S. Ryan, the UAP member for 
Flinders (Vic.) made an impressive, reasoned contribution. 
Colonel Ryan had served on appeals fribunals in the early 
months of the war and heard about 50 cases. The fribunal had 
to weigh "the balance of suspidon as to whether an aUen is, or 
is not likely to be a danger". In Ryan's experience the evidence 
against the interned aliens was often "exfremely slight", and 36 
were recommended for release. When this went to the Minister, 
he released some but not others. Ryan was in favour of the new 
aliens fribunals procedure because if their recommendations 
were agreed to by the GOCs it meant that the Minister, who was 
"very much overworked", did not have to sift through large 
files,-^ ^ on the other hand, contested cases did have a second 
chance, and through the Minister's "expert advisers" the Army 
also had a second chance to protest. Ryan's only critidsm of the 
fribunals was the expense involved in fransporting the intern-
ees down to capital cities under guard; fribunal sittings in the 
camp would be appropriate and much less expensive. Ryan 
opposed Cameron's motion to disallow the right of aliens to 
appeal, and his opinion was supported by the large majority of 
members. 
On that issue of internment the opposition supported the 
government, but then came the different debate.^^ Maurice 
Blackburn moved to disallow another new regulation, 42A of 
Statutory Rule 69 of 1941. The aim of regulation 42A was to 
prevent people from frying to influence public opinion "in a 
manner likely to be prejudicial to the defence of the Common-
wealth, or the efficient prosecution of the war". It was more 
punitive than the equivalent British regulation, and it included 
a clause preventing anyone from being prosecuted without the 
consent of the Attorney-General. Blackburn was suspidous that 
this clause would prevent well-known figures being prose-
cuted, while ordinary people could not "safely discuss any 
point" of Government war policy. When Spender protested that 
the courts would use their "common sense", Blackburn replied 
that he had seen in World War I that in times of crisis "police 
courts" were "very largely devoid of common sense". He was 
supported by Arthur Calwell, tiie new Labor member for Mel-
bourne. Calwell argued that the punishment of six months 
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imprisonment meted out to a Gallipoli veteran (who conse-
quentiy became a "human derelict") for a drunken outburst, 
showed that police and stipendiary magisfrates could not be 
relied upon "to deal out even-handed justice in a moment of 
crisis or public exdtement".^'' 
Labor men were restive over at least two other cases that 
influenced thefr thinking. On 20 June 1941 the ALP member for 
Wannon, D. McLeod, complafried that the police had searched 
the homes of the executive of the Portland branch of the ALP in 
April, acting on a tip-off in an anonymous letter accusing the 
secretary of being a Communist, and McLeod was angry that a 
"libellous" statement could so easily lead to the embarrassment 
of a member of a party that had publidy purged all Commu-
nists.^^ In a small country town the news of the poUce raid 
would spread quickly, and fear of similar freatment might even 
prevent people from joining the party or taking office in it. 
The second case was that of Ratliff and Thomas.^^ Horace 
RatUff, an Australian, and Max Thomas, a New Zealander, were 
charged with preparing and disfributing Communist propa-
ganda that was "Ukely to prejudice the effident prosecution of 
the war". When they were arrested in December 1940, the 
Communist Party of AusfraUa was illegal and the two men 
were sentenced to six months hard labour. Soon after they were 
released the military wanted them interned because of their 
active assodation with the Communist party and their refusal 
to desist from further propaganda. On 3 April 1940 the War 
Cabinet had decided that the "profession of Communism as a 
political doctrine" would not be enough to warrant internment, 
and that the Mfriister for the Army would have to be satisfied 
that the person had been engaged in subversive or other ads 
against the national interest, before issiung a detention order 
Spender considered extending the grounds for interning com-
munists to include speaking in such a way as to "unpede the 
prosecution of the war", or "undermine the cause for which 
AusfraUa" was at war but this was not accepted by the Advisory 
War Coundl on 18 April. Hasluck states that there is "no record 
of any objection having been raised to the idea of internment 
by Ministerial order after release from imprisonment" so when 
RatUff and Thomas allegedly continued to spread Communist 
propaganda after leaving gaol. Spender signed their detention 
orders and they were interned on 14 June 1941. 
About a week later Germany attacked the Soviet Union and 
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many people felt that this should alter the government's atti-
tude towards the Communist party.^ Ten days after the entry 
of the Soviet Union into the war, and one day before the debate 
on Subversive Activities and regulation 42A, Ratiiff and 
Thomas began a hunger sfrike to draw attention to their case. 
Dr H.V. Evatt, a former Supreme Court judge and the newly 
eleded Labor member for Barton, took up their case publicly 
soon afterwards. With these practical examples of "overkill" in 
mind, the Labor members took a stand against the government 
on regulation 42A, despite their granting of supply and their 
general cooperation with the government. Hasluck claims that 
this set-back did not have much practical effect on the govern-
ment's "confrol over subversive activities", as the original pow-
ers given to the poUce and the military under the National 
Security Act early in the war remained in force. In Hasluck's 
view the importance of the debate was that the parliament "had 
exerdsed its right and its democratic duty of scrutinising regu-
lations".*^ fri relation to internment, these debates are important 
because they show the thinking of the men who within a few 
months took office, and into whose hands the poUcy and prac-
tice of internment fell at the time of Australia's greatest security 
crisis, early 1942. 
While this first set of questions on internment cenfred on civil 
rights, a second set revolved around the practical consideration 
of the manpower resources tied up in internment camps. In 
June 1941 two Labor members asked Spender why internees 
from Britain and the Malay Straits, who had been cleared and 
who had speciaUst skills, could not be paroled to work in 
indusfries essential to war production.*^ Labor MPs had been 
alerted to the presence of the internees by senior Labor parlia-
mentarians in Westminster and, when they visited Tatura, they 
found "highly reputable members of the Amalgamated Society 
of Engineers" and otiier British Labor organisations who had 
been picked up from the coastal towns when an invasion of the 
Mother Country seemed imminent. Among the Malay intern-
ees there were also weU-qualified men who were most anxious 
to assist with the war effort. 
The questioners were Unpatient that their queries were al-
ways met with the response that British friternees must be 
released in England, and the employment of speciaUst internees 
was a matter for the Minister for Labour and National Service. 
When the coimtry urgently needed the skiU possessed by some 
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internees, and notiiing had been found against tiiem "after six 
months of investigation", ft seemed strange not to release them 
for work. The questioners realised tiiat it would be "defrimental 
to the interests of Australian workers if friternees of ordinary 
skiUs' were released and allowed to take jobs "while Ausfralian 
people were out of work",*^ but witii spedalist workers the 
benefit to the war effort was obvious. Spender replied tiiat 
while it seemed "harsh" that those uiternees given "a clean 
sheet" by Layton could not be released in Australia there were 
"obvious difficulties in tiie way of that bekig done".*^ 
These difficulties related to tiie deeply ingrained resistance 
to migrants taking jobs when Australians were unemployed, to 
providing welfare support for ex-friternees until they were 
established, and to the fear of bad publicity to a shaky UAP 
coalition government if any released internee, especiaUy a Ger-
man speaker, could be assodated with a security leak. Cabinet 
itself was probably not united on the matter of releasing intern-
ees, even speciaUsts; in the minute recording the cabinet's de-
cision to release such people, it was specified that none was to 
be released without reference to the whole War Cabuiet.*^ There 
is also no doubt tiiat sections of the opposition were against the 
use of friternee labour. At the meeting of the Advisory War 
Council, even camp-centred work was considered unfair com-
petition to Australian workers; the non-government members 
did not favour fr and asked to be consulted if it was proposed 
to be Uifroduced in the future.** 
Australian tribunal results 
While the impetus to intern people had been swift, there was 
much more caution in implementing releases. The procedure of 
Advisory Committees and Aliens Tribunals was slow, the onus 
of proof remained with the internee, and the system of checks 
after the hearings, ensured that the rate of releases of AustraUa's 
own internees would be slow. In fact, fribunals established in 
late 1940 granted fewer than 150 releases after a year of opera-
tion.*'' Before the Victorian Tribunal heard any objectors, they 
had internment policy explained to them by a representative of 
the Minister for the Army, and they were given a comprehen-
sive account of pre-war Nazi and Fascist organisations.*^ In 
addition, a senior officer of Military Intelligence, Lt-Col. S.F 
Whitttngton, answered the fribunal's questions on finer points 
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of policy. Colonel Sydney Ferguson Whittfrigton was a miUtia 
officer who became a General Staff Officer with Southern Com-
mand on joining the InteUigence Corps on 1 November 1939.*^ 
While the members had no questions about proven Fascists, 
they did ask for more clarification about those whose cases 
rested on remote connections, and the policy regarding the 
internment of enemy aliens professing or alleged to be Com-
munists. The Victorian tribunal was particularly concerned 
about the internment of refugees whose cases depended on the 
claim that the enemy would use thefr relatives to put pressure 
on them, and they were reluctant to refuse release to a man 
solely because he had no employment and might be vulnerable 
to the approaches of enemy agents. 
Whittington explained that Communists were interned only 
if their activities made them potentially dangerous.-^^ He as-
sured the tribunal that the military took full account of the 
rights of citizens and aliens to freedom of speech and ideas, but 
when a professed Communist combined beliefs with carrying 
out the party's "active work", he became dangerous. If an 
enemy alien who was a Communist took part in activities that 
created "frouble and ururest", he was interned, but if he was not 
an "agitator", and did not "mix himself up with Union strikes" 
but "went about his business", he was not regarded as danger-
ous. 
Whittington admitted that some cases might "appear weak", 
but the fribunal could rely on the opinions of his officers be-
cause they were "entfrely unbiased". He sympathised with the 
fribunal having to assess, without the benefit of the normal 
"legal structure" or "all the information" available to the mili-
tary, a situation that had taken military intelligence experts 
"some 15 years or more to appreciate". His sfrongest argument 
was that as only about 120 had been taken from an estimated 
8,000 Communists and very few Jehovah's Witnesses, the tri-
bunal members should believe that there was a "good reason" 
in these cases. Lieutenant P.G. Proctor, whose responsibility was 
to watch the Jehovah's Witnesses sect, considered that their 
activities were subversive.''^ Their efforts to convert people to 
pacifism had "an effect on recruiting". Their refusal to recognise 
the King, by sitting with their hats on during the national 
anthem, and their defence of their beUefs at public meetings, 
had created public unrest. 
Together with their recommendations, AUens Tribunal No. 2 
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sent an explanation of their tiiinking.^ They had difficulty in 
formulating prindples on which to make decisions, for the 
regulations gave little help in deciding when the public safety 
did not require contfriued detention. They had to work out their 
own rule of thumb. Modern "total war" provided a case for 
general internment, as in Great Britain during the latter part of 
1918 and, agafri, in June 1940, but such a poUcy caused hardship 
on individuals, was never practised by the United States, and 
nor did the AusfraUan government require it. Internment 
seemed necessary at the point when the internee represented a 
potential danger, and the tribunal felt that it could release 
internees if "there was no reasonable probability or likelihood 
of hostile or disloyal activity on the part of an objector". So 
Aliens Tribunal No. 2 made its test: were there any reasonable 
grounds for doubting the objector's loyalty to this country? 
Although each case was different, the fribunal found some 
patterns. Reasonable grounds for doubting an objector's loyalty 
were membership of tiie Nazi Party (even if proof was suppUed 
that the motive for joining had been business reasons), employ-
ment in German firms confrolled by Nazis, or recent arrival in 
AusfraUa with no intention of makfrig it a permanent home. 
Ordinary membership of the German Labour Front was not 
sufficient for internment, but leadership was. Nor was an un-
willingness to desfre a British victory held as crucial. Even a 
German who had "thrown in his lot with AusfraUa" would 
"hate the thought of his Fatherland being destroyed and his 
people suffering". The utmost the Australian could "justly 
expect" was that he would "do nothing to stab his adopted 
country in the back". This tribunal was unwilling to rely over-
much on camp assodations. There was a "natural camaraderie" 
among men suffering "a common misfortune". Any "ostenta-
tious dissociation from the Nazi group" would be an obvious 
ploy for any internee who wished to sfrengthen his case for 
release. The fribunal was also unwiUing to place too much 
emphasis on the possibiUty of persuasion through pressure on 
relatives in German hands, or potential unemployment in Aus-
fraUa. They were not convinced that too much emphasis should 
be placed on "utterances about the Nazi regime in Germany" 
overheard by other people. The fribunal members wrote that 
they had "been forced to realise" that "the possibilities of 
misunderstanding, distortion, or even sheer invention in such 
matters, more especiaUy in times of public excitement or appre-
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hension" were great. The fribunal acknowledged the "essen-
tially relative and provisional character" of their judgements 
on recommending release, for both the military situation and 
the state of pubUc opinion were variables. They knew that if the 
country was under immediate threat of actual military opera-
tions, pubUc opinion would become "highly apprehensive or 
inflamed", and a great increase in internment could be "effec-
tively demanded". 
The statement that the evidence shown to the fribunal was 
"meagre" compared with the fullness of army files did not 
impress. The fribunal had been given their task "by law" and 
had to make decisions "on the material submitted". They 
thought it likely that theirs was the first investigation into the 
circumstances of an objector's detention, and the first chance 
for new evidence to be shown. In any case, whatever the differ-
ences between the army's recommendations and theirs, the 
ultimate decision lay "with the Minister himself". The Ausfra-
lian Archives has limited research access to the frials of those 
for whom the tribunals recommended release. The extreme 
nature of the proof required to warrant a recommendation for 
release is iUusfrated by the following cases. It seems that fribu-
nals were very conservative and only the blatant mistakes were 
approved for release. 
Guiseppi Zammarchi, Italian timber-getter turned gold 
miner, was clearly anti-Fascist. At Zammarchi's triaF^ Mr O.J. 
Gillard, insfruded by the Crov/n Solidtor, appeared for the 
Minister for the Army. Mr J.V. Barry, one of the "Uberal lawyers" 
active in the Ausfralian Coimcil of Civil Liberties, appeared for 
Zammarchi, who had been interned because he was an 
"avowed Communist", had "communist literature", and had 
been in arguments around tov^m. After 32 pages of evidence, it 
franspired that the internee's partner had just won a dispute 
with a local landowner, that gelignite fotmd in his possession 
had been taken home from a quarry rather than left for children 
to find, and that the internee could not remember being in any 
brawls in Tennant Creek. His "communistic literature" con-
sisted of some anti-Fascist books from the Left Book Club. A 
timber merchant, a motor dealer and a Justice of the Peace from 
St Arnaud (Vic.) swore that fri nine years of deaUng with the 
internee they had always heard Zammarchi speak against Mus-
solini. A Melbourne friend declared he was anti-Fascist, havfrig 
been a member of the Mateotti Club. Zammarchi admitted he 
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had collected five pounds for the relief of children in Republi-
can Spain for the Victorian Council Against War and Fasdsm, 
and that in 1937 he gave a 2s 6d donation to a Labor Party 
member, which entitled him to membership for that year. 
The Tribunal recommended Zammarchi's release after assur-
ing him that he had not been interned because of his quarrel 
with an influential landowner, or because of his trouble over 
the gelignite. They did not want anyone to assume that a desire 
for a greater equalisation of wealth, or membership of the 
Ausfralian Labor Party, were in any way grounds for intern-
ment. Zammarchi had been interned because he was an enemy 
alien living in a remote part of Australia, and the Minister for 
Defence's only consideration was the security of Australia. 
Zammarchi's case vindicated the government's decision to al-
low internees to explain their position. 
Ernst Flegenheimer was another internee who impressed a 
fribunal favourably'''* He was a Jewish refugee whose father 
had died of typhus in an overcrowded camp at the foot of the 
Pyrenees. His elderly mother, "hungry and freezing", remained 
in the camp hut with no windows or furniture. Flegenheimer 
stated that he had been "hurt too much" ever to return to 
Germany, that he was willing to fight for Australia because if 
the British did not win the war he could "buy a rope". He 
arrived in Australia in January 1939, having a brother in busi-
ness in Sydney, and was interned in June 1940. In reply to a 
question by the fribunal chairman, he said that he was not taken 
in during the September 1939 round-up because of his brother 
and the persecution his family had suffered. So although the 
miUtary was aware of Flegenheimer's background he was in-
terned on nationality, age and "newly arrived" criteria during 
the crisis of June 1940. The army representative did not object 
to his release in 1941. 
Wilhelm Alexander von Keudell was a Protestant married to 
a Jew whom he refused to divorce. His father had been a 
Lord-in-Waiting to the Kaiser and his mother an Austrian 
countess. Despite his service in World War I, his factory was 
resumed by the Nazi government because non-Aryans were 
employed there. Von Keudell had tried to have his children 
born outside Germany and eventually sent them away while 
pretending to remain himself, fri a subterfuge reminiscent of the 
escape of the Trapp family portrayed in "The Sound of Music", 
Keudell left his car parked in the drive, engaged his house-
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keeper for a further term and abandoning all claim to the family 
fortune, headed for the frontier. Hans Dorn on the other hand 
was a teacher of Occult religion, having lost his Lutheran faith 
in World War I. He had sheltered a Jewish mother and child for 
some months in 1935-6, and was arraigned before a special Nazi 
court in 1937 on the charge of having said that Goering Ut the 
Reichstag fire. The Gestapo forbade Dorn to teach, and he 
migrated to Australia. 
Johannes Eckhardt had Uved in Australia since 1912 and had 
been employed as a wool buyer for many years. Although he 
admitted an "affection for his bfrthplace", and regarded the war 
between his native and adopted land as the "fragedy of his Ufe", 
he had decided not to become naturalised because in 1916 the 
naturaUsed Germans had lost their jobs just as he and other 
unnaturaUsed men had done. He admitted making donations 
to the German Labour Front "to help the poor", and his wife 
had done some sewing for a group he took to be a church charity 
group, although the military said the group was a German 
Women's Club run by Mrs Asmis, the wife of the German 
consul. He wanted desperately to be released so he could help 
his wife look after thefr sick daughter, and to halt the erosion of 
the family's capital. He said he had signed statements three 
times, promising not to harm the British Empire, and he knew 
army personnel who would vouch for him. 
Paul J.W Bauer deserted his ship in 1928 and had worked as 
an itinerant labourer from Townsville to Port Pirie. He had 
fravelled with a mate at first, but his companion had "fallen off 
the rattler". Bauer admitted that he had "neglected" to become 
naturaUsed. He stated that he had no sympathy for Nazism and 
"very Uttle" for Communism. He was willing to pick grapes to 
support himself. While Bauer and the few were recommended 
for release, the lack of access to the cases of those refused release 
make it impossible to compare situations. Hasluck's conclusion 
that the rest were held "for a good reason"^^ should be freated 
cautiously until a complete analysis can be done. 
Oswald Bonutto came before the Queensland fribunal 
headed by Mr Justice Philp; and E.B. Maher, the leader of the 
State Opposition, was a witness. Maher had known Bonutto in 
connection with the tobacco industry and regarded him "as 
enterprising and indusfrious", and "a loyal Australian held in 
high esteem by both Italians and Australians". Bonutto was 
proud of his ancestry but Maher did not regard this as conflict-
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ing vdth his loyalty to Australia. Bonutto admitted sending 
money to Italy, but protested that it had gone to his pensionless 
old mother. He defended Italy's armexation of Ethiopia, seeing 
it as no different from the imperiaUstic actions of other Euro-
pean powers. Bonutto was released, but a campaign was waged 
against Maher's support of htm and in six months he was 
re-arrested. He again came before the tribimal and this time 
Stan Craves, a vice-president of the Texas (Qld) RSL, insisted 
that Bonutto had been upset about the prospect of a war be-
tween Britain and Italy. Bonutto had written to an Italian-
language newspaper urging migrants to disregard any Consul 
who advised an anti-British attitude. The judge took into ac-
count the enmity Bonutto had incurred in the Texas area and 
recommended his release on condition he sever his business 
connections there and go to live in another part of Australia. 
The "good reason" Bonutto was still interned in November 
1941 was because he refused to sell his hotel and farm in Texas 
at the low forced-sale price.''* 
Seven reports to the GOC Southern Command from AUens 
Tribunals No. 4 exist and show something of this fribunals's 
thinking.''^ All the objectors recommended for release had made 
their permanent home in Australia, were wilUng workers and 
had no suspect poUtical associations. Two had served in the 
Axis forces in World War I; one arrived a few days after the 
outbreak of war; three were alleged to have made suspect 
remarks; one had remote connections with German Club adivi-
ties. Once the objectors had explafried their positions, the fribu-
nal assessed them as not warranting continued internment. But 
their cases did not rest on their own evidence. Six had sfrong 
ties with Ausfralians who vouched for them; two were married 
and one engaged to Australians; one had his family established 
here since 1927; one had a nephew in the AIF and shared a house 
with a returned soldier; and another had a long-term friendship 
with an established refugee Jewish family. How important 
these ties with Australians were in persuading the fribunal is 
obvious from the prominence they receive in the reports to the 
GOC. 
Lack of an Australian cormection or a steady job were com-
mon grounds for army protests against tribunal's recommen-
dations for release.78 One objector "had extensive knowledge of 
the road system of Queensland", and Northern Command 
considered it a bad poUcy to have semi-vagrant enemy nation-
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als in the community because they caused "alarm to the neigh-
bourhood" and had "quarrels thrust upon them". The army 
also considered that pubUc sentiment was sfrongly against 
releases and that the lack of "war enthusiasm" was due to the 
government "not exercising sfricter control over the enemy 
population". It is not known how long some of the Army 
protests took to process, but it involved the fribunals in further 
justifications of their dedsions. Delays also occurred when 
fribunals went into recess. A naturalised internee of German 
origin was arrested at MilUcent (SA) in November 1940. His 
appeal was not heard untU the following March because of 
"mishaps to members of the fribunal".''^ Nor was his case 
unique. In August 1940 a Sydney solidtor wrote to Menzies 
complaming that his cUent had been interned for four months, 
and there were stiU nearly 40 cases before his. The solicitor 
urged the appointment of additional fribunals to fadlitate "the 
British prindple of bringing a man to a speedy frial".^° On 17 
February 1941, there were 82 appeals outstanding, so Percy 
Spender asked Sfr George Knowles to suggest suitable men to 
form a second Advisory Committee in New South Wales.^^ 
Releases were also slow. Zammarchi was brought from Tatura 
to Broadmeadows for his hearing but had to wait there a month. 
He was heard on 6 and 7 May 1941, but was not released until 
September.^ •^  Given the degree of proof required by tribunals, 
and the long delay in effecting releases, there is serious doubt 
about Hasluck's assertion that aU the 2,231 local internees who 
were still locked up in November 1941 were there for a "good 
reason". It could equally well be argued that the 145 released 
were a most conservative adjustment to the general intern-
ments in the middle of 1940.^ ^ Even the automatic rejection of 
appeals where membership of the Fasdst party was involved 
had begun to be questioned. 
The New South Wales Advisory Committee chaired by Mr 
Justice Davidson heard a number of cases of naturalised citi-
zens of ItaUan origin and he was told to keep three principles 
in mind: the onus of proof rested with the objector, party mem-
bership provided prime facie grounds and, where evidence was 
"unreliable or unconvincing" or failed to remove the suspidon 
arising from membership, no release was to be recommended. 
While many failed to convince the fribunal, Davidson ques-
tioned whether this class of internee actuaUy constituted "a 
menace in the real sense". On the whole, these men were 
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fruiterers and others who had "a very humble station in life". 
Many had wives and small children dependent on them. They 
were industrious and law abiding and, although they made a 
success of their small businesses, few "exhibited much mental 
acumen". Many had joined the Fascio several years before the 
contingency of a war between the British Empire and Italy 
arose. They had not gone to meetings or paid their subscriptions 
for years, but in their efforts "to exculpate themselves" they 
gave unbelievable evidence, claiming that they never knew the 
party was in any way political, and insisting that they regarded 
it "solely as a social and cultural society", thus ensuring the 
rejection of their appeals. In Davidson's opinion some of these 
men, if required to report regularly, would be "no real risk" and 
the public could be spared the expense of both the man's 
internment and the maintenance of his family^^ 
Reaction to events overseas 
However, while releases in 1941 were few, so too were new 
internments before the enfry of Japan into the war in December 
It had been projected "that 2,085 additional Italians were likely 
to be interned in the event of the AIF becoming engaged in 
active operations against the ItaUans", but very few had been 
detained.^5 The original estimate had been based on the possi-
bility that the contest would result in heavy Ausfralian casual-
ties, but with the first shock of the fighting over and with 
comparatively small casualty figures, there was a calm public 
attitude towards Italians in Australia. This faU in demand for 
accommodation for local Italian internees led to the cancella-
tion of a proposed camp for 1,000 in Queensland. The military's 
decisions on internment were strongly influenced by battle 
victories and losses and the anticipated pubUc reaction to casu-
alties. 
After thefr dramatic success in North Africa, portions of the 
AIF went into Greece and Crete but this campaign led to the 
loss of 6,000 Australians, many of them taken prisoner, fri June, 
however, the 7th Division went into Syria against the Vichy 
French. Soon after the entry of Russia frito the war, in June 1941, 
the Iranian oilfields had to be secured and the AusfraUan-
manned HMS Manimbla and HMAS Yarra were involved in an 
action tiiat captured Axis merchantmen. These internees to-
gether with civilian internees, many of whom had been em-
IMPLEMENTATION DEBATES 129 
ployees of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, were later brought 
to Australia. The first group arrived in August 1941 on the 
Queen Elizabeth and the second group came on the Rangitiki on 
19 November.^ 
The need to replace the casualties and prisoners in the fight-
ing divisions, the pressure to increase munitions production 
and the increasingly dangerous situation in the Pacific led the 
Prime Minister to broadcast a national appeal for an "unlimited 
war effort" on 17 June 1941. He said: 
We have in fact reached a point where your alleged rights and mine 
don't matter... The only way we can lose either permanentiy is by 
losing this war. The only way in which we can win this war is being 
prepared to put into pawn every right that we have until victory is 
attained. If every man is to go on working where he Ukes . . . if we 
are to Uve as usual and largely leave the war to others, we cannot 
deserve to win and the perfect equipping of our men overseas must 
be left largely to others.87 
Lists of reserved occupations were to be overhauled, civil 
produdion reviewed, and the labour of men and women di-
rected. For much of 1941 the AIF fought in North Africa and 
part of the 9th Division dug in to defend Tobruk. The 8th 
Division went to reinforce Malaya and Singapore and the Japa-
nese occupied Indo-China. Menzies was unseated as Prime 
Minister on 29 August. His successor, Arthur Fadden, lost the 
support of two Independents and the UAP/Country Party 
government was replaced by Labor on 7 October 1941. But 
while the war was real enough to the men in the armed forces, 
some of the civiUan population showed such little awareness of 
the seriousness of Australia's situation, that General Blarney, on 
a short visit in November, said they reminded him of "a lot of 
gazelles in a dell on the edge of a jungle".^^ Their two great 
allies, Britain and America had agreed on a strategy of beating 
Germany first even if Japan entered the war.^^ Although Can-
berra had been warned of this as early as February 1941, "its 
full import does not seem to have seeped through the govern-
mental structure until 1942".^° On 7 December 1941 Japan 
attacked Pearl Harbour and an all-out war in the Pacific began. 
The plans to intern all Japanese in Australia were immediately 
put into action. 
Chapter Six 
THE JAPANESE 
Ausfralians had a deep seated fear of Asiatics,^ and Japan's 
involvement with the Axis powers and her incursions deep into 
China during the early part of the war agitated this fear. The 
AusfraUan government asked both Britain and the United 
States for assurances of extra military support in the event of 
further Japanese expansion. In the event of war, it was decided 
that aU Japanese within Australia would be interned.^ 
Policy considerations 
This decision was based on four propositions.^ There was no 
Japanese equivalent to the Fascist organisations which gave "a 
guide" to an individual's sentiments, nor were the Japanese 
absorbed in Ausfralian life as many Germans and ItaUans were. 
Japanese sentiment was held to be strongly nationalistic and 
this could lead to sabotage attempts, and finally, male Japanese 
could become the "object of demonstrations". The few Japanese 
women in Australia were not held to be dangerous but they 
were "Ukely to suffer hardships" and might best be interned 
with their men or allowed to depart with the diplomatic staff 
Every person born in Japan, or holding Japanese citizenship, or 
of Japanese descent, was listed.'* There were over one thousand, 
including Formosans who bore a similar relationship to Japan 
as the Austrians did to Germany: they were citizens by con-
quest. Most long-term Japanese residents lived fri the northern 
areas of Australia and worked in the fishing and pearling 
indusfries based on Broome, Darwin and Thursday Island. In 
other areas they tended to be farmers, market gardeners and 
operators of laundries. Most short-term residents who were 
Japanese nationals were members of the consular staff or em-
ployees of Japanese firms. Because so many Japanese worked 
off boats, and because the military were convinced there was a 
weU-organised spying operation among the Japanese in the 
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north,^  the authorities predicted that some would escape by sea 
and not have to be catered for in Australia.^ 
Although children were not mentioned, they obviously had 
to stay with one partner or the other when aU males over 16 and 
aU women were to be taken in. The only exceptions were 
Japanese with diplomatic or consular privileges. The legation 
archives were to "be regarded as inviolable", and consular 
premises were not to be searched, "as this would set an unde-
sirable precedent for the freatment of British" diplomatic staff 
and offices overseas.^ The Minister for External Affairs, Dr H.V. 
Evatt, was annoyed when he found that the quarters of the 
Japanese representative in Melbourne had been "bugged".^ A 
desire for favourable reciprocal treatment was also the probable 
motive for cabinet's decision that Japanese women were only 
to be interned until they could be "fransfered out of the coun-
fry", and an exchange of internees negotiated.^ Australia only 
wanted to hold the men who might be useful to the enemy. On 
the other hand, to assist the Free French in New Caledonia, and 
the British colonial adminisfration in the Gilbert and EUice 
Islands, the Solomons and the New Hebrides, the War Cabinet 
agreed to accept their Japanese internees.^° 
Oganisation and implementation 
In Northern Command individual warrants were prepared for 
the Japanese living in Brisbane, but for other areas of the state 
and for Thursday Island blanket warrants, based on the serial 
numbers of all the Japanese registered, were organised and 
paired with search warrants. ^ ^ Military IntelUgence were to 
make the arrests in Brisbane but elsewhere the poUce were 
responsible. Once the GOC had signed the warrants, men and 
fransports were to assemble at Victoria Barracks and then be 
allocated to the round-up parties. The warrants to be executed 
by the police went to the Police Commissioner. Those respon-
sible for collecting the Japanese were reminded to arrange for 
the disconnection of phones belonging to internees, to have a 
fruck handy for fransporting gear, to procure utensils such as 
bowls and chopsticks, and to make proper arrangements for 
searching females. 
A detailed operation order for the internment of Japanese on 
Thursday Island was issued before Pearl Harbour was at-
tacked.^ 2 •j^g town sfreet plan was divided into four collection 
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areas, and homes and boarding houses where Japanese resided 
were marked. Immediately the news of war with Japan was 
telegraphed, the 49th Battalion Details at Links Barracks were 
to turn out "in battle order " and the police sergeant telephoned. 
While one party prepared the concenfration area - a friangular 
block between Millman and Hargrave Sfreets and the sea — the 
other parties were to guard places such as the Post Office and 
to proceed to collect the Japanese. The commandant of the 
internment compound was to be the 21/C of the 49th BattaUon, 
and his next ranking officer the commander of the VDC. The 
commandant was required to prepare standing orders to cover 
medical examinations, separation of contagious cases, prepara-
tion of rolls and issue of numbers, body searches and collection 
and receipting of articles not allowed in camp. He had to 
establish routines for ordering supplies and rations, sick pa-
rades, camp inspections, censorship of mails, sanitation serv-
ices, guard rosters, paymaster services and the hearing of 
internees complaints. Instructions to internees warning them 
not to disobey or be disrespectful to guards, not to keep more 
than 10 shillings, not to attempt to escape or go closer than three 
yards from the boundaries, had to be issued in Japanese. Over-
all the commandant had to see to the "general well-being of all 
internees". 
A fence was to be built and guard posts set up to cover the 
boundaries. Ammunition, coils of barbed wire and pickets were 
stored in preparation. The guards were to come from 49th 
Battalion and the Torres Straits Infanfry alternately, until the 
VDC was able to assume confrol. The compound was to be 
rationed by the 49th's quartermaster and an Intelligence Officer 
from Northern Command was to be responsible for interpret-
ers, supervision of camp suppliers and visitors, liaison with 
police and the coUection of internees' documents. 
When the collection of Japanese began, those service person-
nel on leave in the town area were to be ordered back to their 
units. A mobile army patrol was to keep "vigilant watch to 
ensure against any pillaging or destruction of public or private 
property", especially of Japanese shops. At the jetty, the navy 
would land Japanese from the luggers in the harbour. About 
340 Japanese were thought to be hi the Thursday Island area, 
but 200 of these were out to sea on their luggers during the 
fishing season. They were to be collected as soon as they re-
turned to the harbour. The details of the preparations for the 
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internment of this group, the largest community of local Japa-
nese, show how the authorities implemented their policies. 
There were few possibilities overlooked, either from a security 
point of view or from the correct legal and International Con-
vention standpoint. 
All went well with the round up on Thursday Island on 8 
December 1942 and 110 internees were settled frito the com-
pound. In the mainland centres of Mackay, Maryborough and 
Townsville, 29 other Japanese were arrested and arrangements 
made for their fransport to Brisbane by frain.^^ Internees from 
New Guinea were sent from Rabaul and Kieta on the MV 
Malaita and those from Papua joined the ship at Samarai late in 
January 1942.^ ^ With the advent of war in New Guinea the SS 
Marella brought the last internees from Port Moresby and 
Thursday Island to the mainland.^^ 
Many of the Japanese internees were poor indentured la-
bourers, and the lists of personal effects show a few lugger 
captains and merchants with yen, pearls, rings and watches 
among the many others who only had one razor. ^ ^ The inden-
tured labourers induded young men from Wakayama, Japan, 
who followed the fradition, going back to the 1890s, of diving 
for AusfraUan-based pearlers.^'' About 400 of these men were 
interned, and today they recall their four years of sitting out the 
war in Hay with a philosophic gratitude for the fate that sent 
them a less demanding role than their brothers who went into 
the Japanese Imperial Army. Men like these did not contest their 
internment, and thefr behaviour in the Thursday Island com-
pound was described as "exemplary". ^ ^ A similar comment was 
made by the Japanese internees' guards at Camp 14, Loveday. 
They were subservient and model prisoners because their "fa-
natical desire to maintain "face" made them easy to handle in 
their eagerness to obey all orders and instructions to the let-
ter".i5 They rarely complained to the Official Visitor and 
worked on the farming projects at Loveday and Hay. Their 
behaviour contrasted sharply to that of Japanese POWs who on 
the night of 4/5 August 1944 rioted and broke out of their 
compound at Cowra.^o Five hundred were pirmed down in the 
broadway between the compounds, and the escapees had to be 
rounded up around the counfryside. As a result 321 Japanese 
soldiers and 4 Australian guards were kiUed and 108 Japanese 
and 4 Australians wounded. When the Japanese at Loveday 
found out about the Cowra uprising they assured the camp 
134 BEHIND BARBED WIRE 
authorities they were not gofrig to follow suit.^i They were 
labourers, not Samuri, and they were not required to follow the 
soldiers' code. 
At the Japanese family camp at Tatura a school was estab-
lished and Ethel Punshon, who had learnt Japanese as a hobby 
was sent to teach the children there.^ She described the camp 
as being on the slope of a hill, with Major F.W.C. Scurty in 
charge. There was only one little gaol and she could only recall 
one internee ever being put in "to calm dov^m". Punshon's main 
responsibilities besides the school were to help supervise the 
women's sewing fadory (which turned old clothes), take roll 
caUs and make regular inspections of cooking areas and dormi-
tories. The greatest problem was to prevent the internees run-
ning heaters in their wooden huts at night. The duty hours were 
long and if a warden had to accompany the nurse to take a 
pregnant internee to hospital at night the warden would not get 
any sleep until the following night. Children were being born 
at what Major Scurry regarded as an alarming rate and Punshon 
remembered the Major "laying down the law to the compound 
leader" that there were to be no more babies, but to no effect. 
While the large majority of Japanese were content in camp, it 
was not acceptable to a minority who were long-term residents 
or Australian-born. Punshon remembered one inddent when 
the compound leader expected everyone to bow in the direction 
of the Emperor in Japan but a girl, who was the daughter of a 
mixed marriage, refused. When the compound leader pushed 
her head down she slapped his face, but was reprimanded by 
the officer fri charge because it undermined the compound 
leader's authority to be hit by a girl. 
Japanese objectors 
Many Japanese lodged objections to their uiternment, but there 
was debate over whether these should be heard. Nationality 
alone was the criterion for internment and theoretically, it could 
not be challenged except on the grounds of incorrectly desig-
nated nationality. It was also the practice of the United States 
and Canada to intern all their Japanese.23 The War Cabinet 
seriously considered not allowing any Japanese to appeal but 
"such open discrimination" might "read to the disadvantage 
of British subjects in Japan" and be "poUticaUy embarrassing 
after the war " .24 it was hoped that in cross-examinations during 
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appeals some useful IntelUgence information might be eUcited. 
After discussing the matter at its meeting on 27 January 1942, 
War Cabinet agreed that District Commandants refer any re-
lease recommendations to the Minister who would reject them 
aU except if the internee was of use to the Defence authorities, 
or where age, long residence in AustraUa and family considera-
tions convinced MiUtary Intelligence that the internee repre-
sented "no security risk''.^^ In addition, the censorship covering 
all aspects of appeals was tightened. The camp authorities 
allowed all local internees to appeal, but most withdrew their 
objedion when it was explained to them that they were not 
obliged to appeal. 
The few persevering objectors were heard in February and 
May 1942, and the appeals followed the pattern set in the earlier 
hearings of Germans and ItaUans. A comprehensive report on 
Japanese associations and activities in NSW was prepared by 
W.H. BarnweU on behalf of the CIB and at the request of the 
office of the Deputy Crown Solicitor and the Army Legal 
Branch.^ ^The report was designed so Judge Pike and members 
of the Aliens Tribunal could acquire a knowledge of Japanese 
activities before appeals were heard. As in his earlier reports, 
Barnwell covered the Consular activities, the cultural, social 
and commerdal clubs and the individuals assodated with 
them. He pointed out that before the war there had been 
friendly contact between the Japanese and German consulates 
and between the Japanese press agency and some members of 
the AustraUa First Movement, particularly the Walsh family.^^ 
Relations between the Japanese and Italians were less cordial, 
and the opportunity to cultivate Italians, when ItaUan interests 
passed to the care of the Japanese Consulate after June 1940, 
was not taken up. The published Ust of the Japanese Society 
included the "better dass people", the white-collar employees 
of the Japanese frading and woolbuying firms, but not the 
laimdrymen or domestic workers. The Nippon Club was incor-
porated in 1939 by a prominent woolbuyer with the Mitsui 
Company to cater for the sodal needs of the Japanese commu-
nity in Sydney and to keep the young men "out of trouble". The 
lease was drawn up in the name of Denzo Kuringu, a laundry-
man of Chatswood.28 Meetings of the Athletics Club, the Japa-
nese Chamber of Commerce and the Japanese Wool Importers' 
Assodation were held in the Nippon Club in Bond Sfreet. The 
Dotnei News Agency was established in May 1939 to send news 
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from Ausfralian newspapers and to make Japan independent 
of Reuters. Barnwell pointed out that most of the businessmen 
working for Japanese firms left AusfraUa with their families on 
the Kasinm Maru on 15 August 1941. 
An assodation not dfrectly connected with the consulate was 
the Japan-Australia Sodety, formed in 1929 to promote cultural 
relations between Japan and Australia, and having a distin-
guished membership of Australians and Japanese engaged in 
frade and commerce.^^ While Barnwell considered this group 
to be non-poUtical and devoted to frade and cultural activities, 
he felt it was established as part of Japanese policy to forge links 
in counfries where they fraded. At a different social level, the 
Japanese Laundrymen's Club, controUed by Kuringu, catered 
for the sodal, cultural and commercial interests of Sydney 
laundrymen and their families, including a number of young 
people whose mothers were Australian and fathers Japanese. '^' 
OveraU, the Japanese in Sydney comprised four main groups 
— the consular staft, the employees of the Japanese firms, the 
long-term residents and the chUdren of long-term residents. In 
Barnwell's words: 
Japanese domicUed in New South Wales were mainly of the mer-
chant and diplomatic class. Others, comprising laundrymen and 
gardeners, were admitted to AustraUa prior to the Immigration Act 
of 1902 and consequentiy were permanent residents. In some cases 
these Japanese had married Europeans, and thefr children (half 
caste) with features predominantiy Japanese, acqufred [an] Austra-
Uan outiook and ideals of life.3i 
Barnwell listed 80 Japanese nationals who had left Sydney 
on the Kasima Maru, and about the same number of residents. 
Those who had left belonged to the Japanese firms and those 
remaining included the long-term residents and their families. 
Despite the differences in the background of the Japanese, 
Barnwell concluded that behind aU their activities was a total 
commitment to Japan, and that, in the interests of Australia's 
national security, all members of a race so "fanatically deter-
mined to serve their counfry's cause" must remain under 
guard.32 Some long-term residents contested this view. 
Appeals were heard by Aliens Tribunal No. 4. The Chairman, 
W.H. Sharwood, and members, J.W.K. Freeman and F.J. Quin-
land, were assisted by CaptaUi O.J. GiUard, who was insfruded 
by the Commonwealth Crown SoUcitor to appear for the Min-
ister for the Army33 Objectors were questioned about their 
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assodation with anything Japanese, includfrig cultural and 
social organisations such as the Kokusai Bunka Shfrikakai 
(KBS), a cultural exchange program; the Nippon Kinkwai, the 
Japanese Athletic Club; and the Nipponshokuda, the Japanese 
Club in Bond Sfreet, Sydney. They were asked if they attended 
the Emperor's birthday party at the consulate, whether they 
had confributed to the Comforts Fund of the Japanese Army 
during the Chinese War, and whether they had bought any of 
the China Inddent 50-yen bonds collected from loyal Japanese 
when relations with China worsened in 1937. Buy frig bonds 
was viewed by Australian security in a similar way to the 
sending of wedding rings by Italians to support the Ethiopian 
campaign, that is, as proof of exfreme pro-nationalist feelings. 
Another analogy was drawn with the German situation. When 
a Japanase military information collector. Major Haishida, came 
to Australia on 13 January 1941 and travelled around the coun-
try as a tourist accompanied by the Vice Consul, K. Otabe, the 
Newcastle Trades HaU protested, describing him as the "Von 
Luckner of Japan". Security took note of his contacts.^ 
Few objectors could answer the questions of the Tribunal on 
matters of international affairs or current Japanese politics. 
Most had left Japan over 50 years before. One local Japanese 
association they were familiar with was the Laundryman's 
Club, the Doshikwai. It was estabUshed in Sydney in the early 
thirties by the Consul-General, Mr Takewaga, and had origi-
nally been formed to settle quarrels between the 40 competfrig 
small Japanese laundries. It later developed regular gambling 
activities, particularly on cards and horses. Some objectors were 
quite knowlegeable about the local racing scene. Some objectors 
decided to withdraw their application when the fribunal 
pressed upon them the safety aspect. The people who knew 
them might well accept them, but there was so much feeling 
against Japan that "larrikins" and soldiers from out of town 
might attack any Japanese person. 
A significant number who carried on with their appeal, did 
so with the express desire to be reunited with their wives whose 
British, frish, Chinese or Australian nationality precluded their 
internment. There are glimpses of very tender relationships. A 
Japanese man aged 73 told the tribunal that he only wrote nice 
things in his letters to his 66-year-old wife because there was 
"no need to worry an old woman". Consequently she jokingly 
refened to the camp as "your Hotel Tokio", (sic) and when she 
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gave away his Sunday shoes to someone who badly needed 
them, she told her husband that he should go into Hay and buy 
another pafr. When people were "old enough to be dead", the 
old man said, there was no point in writing gloomy letters.^ s 
Another internee, when pressed to agree that he would be safer 
inside, said that he would in "one way" because there was 
"protection", but he had been married for 28 years and had 
never been parted from his wife for one day. "She could defend 
herself, but I would rather be with her to try to help her in every 
way" .36 
A few objections were supported by letters from their family 
and from church, school or business associates. The fribunal 
succeeded in persuading even some of these that, with the war 
so close and feelings so high, they would better off fri camp. 
When an old laundryman from Rockhampton remained ada-
mant that every day he had served Australian soldiers, the 
fribunal raised the spectre of the newly arrived American army 
hot to revenge its defeats.^^ He lost his appeal on a variation of 
the danger theme. Concern for the safety of objectors encom-
passed not only the danger from other residents, but the danger 
of being kUled in a war zone, so the strategic position of the 
Queensland coastal towns ensued that no Japanese Uving north 
of Brisbane would be released. The Rockhampton laundryman 
was acknowledged to be honest, indusfrious and popular with 
the local people, and he had a son with the 8th Division in 
Malaya, but he was considered to be in danger if an invasion 
took place as Rockhampton was Ukely to be "a cenfre of adive 
operations". 
A similar conclusion was reached in the case of a cane farmer 
from outside Mackay.^s Although he was 65 and the sole sup-
port of a de-facto wife, and "there was no suggestion he was 
dishonest, associated with other Japanese or displayed any 
anti-British, anti-Australian or subversive sentiments", the 
threat of invasion decided the fribunal agafrist release. Another 
old man from Maryborough was "of irreproachable character", 
had many letters of recommendation, and normally it would 
have been "a grave injustice" to keep him interned, but condi-
tions were "anything but normal".3^ In these cases the fribunal 
recommended favourable reassessment if the international 
situation improved. So with the long-term Japanese residents, 
considerations of civil rights, common fairness, impeccable 
character, family loyalty and local public acceptance, seldom 
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overrode the fribunal's concern about the dangerous state of the 
war and the consequential general agitation. 
Only in a very few cases did the fribunal aUow an objection. 
This meant that a full-scale frial was possible, but the Crown 
representative insisted that, unlike other groups, the Japanese 
were interned on nationality grounds alone. The case most 
favoured by the fribunal was a young man who defied his 
step-father to join the AIF early in the war.*° Although he had 
been only three months old when he landed in AusfraUa, he 
was discharged from the AIF "purely on racial grounds". He 
spoke only English and volunteered to serve in a labour battal-
ion. The chairman was of the opfriion that "he was a half-caste 
at the worst", and there was no real case against him. Captain 
Gillard stated that he could be described as "a person havfrig 
Japanese parentage", but admitted that this objedor "possibly 
had the strongest case for release from internment that one 
could conceive". 
The chairman of Aliens Tribunal No. 4, Mr Sharwood, and 
Captain GUlard were in disagreement over a number of cases 
and the matter came to a head fri the case of a little old lady from 
East Prahran, Victoria.^^ The army argued that she should re-
main interned because she would have to shift 15 miles away 
from the coast if she were released. The chairman argued that 
the proper function of his members was to dedde whether the 
release of any person would interfere with "the efficient prose-
cution of the war and the defence of the Commonwealth", and 
not to go beyond that. If all the Japanese were to be automat-
icaUy refused release, why were they given the right to object? 
Gillard replied that although all the evidence was in the old 
lady's favour even the "philosophical debate on the policy 
which should be adopted" expounded by Professor Bailey's 
earUer fribunal team conceded the need for policy to be elastic 
and to move with the international situation. Gillard explained 
that "the international condition has reached such a stage that 
you have to look at these things in a different light from what 
you did when dealing with the Germans at the beginning of 
1940, particularly from the point of view of the home front". The 
tribunal would be surprised at the amount of correspondence 
about "the apparent laxity — that is what the public think it is 
— shown by the adminisfration to foreigners". Gillard main-
tained that allowing aliens freedom had a defrimental effect on 
recruiting. There were a great many complaints from mothers 
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of soldiers about the number of foreigners movfrig around the 
country, free to carry on their work and make money, while 
Ausfralian sons were in camp or abroad. The chairman objected 
that this could not apply to the woman from East Prahran, who 
could support herself and who could not compete for anyone's 
job. But the problem, Gillard insisted, was that the woman's 
release to live anywhere in the counfry would have a "psycho-
logical" effect on morale. She could not disguise the fact that 
she was Japanese. It would not matter to the individual who 
met her that she had been here nearly 50 years and knew very 
little about Japan. Gillard claimed that it was the aggregate of 
all cases and not the isolated case that went to make up the 
psychological reaction. He said: 
It is the number of individuals moving round with whom the 
particular person in the community comes in contact. He says, 
"There is a dago B . . . who should have been in six months ago. I 
know he is a Fascist", and he probably does not know at all; "There 
is Schmidt", who has probably been in the town for 50 years, "a 
German; why is not he interned?" "A woman got off the train here 
last night, going to stay at the local hotel, a Japanese; what a great 
administration we have. 
That is the way people talk, and they do not take the isolated case. 
They take the whole coUection of individuals they have probably 
met, and then they start, and that is how fifth column activity really 
begins, because you are breaking down amongst your own people 
the faith that they should have in the administration both at home 
and in the Army. 
Thus with the criterion for release being that no unrest would 
be created in any Australian community at a time when feelings 
were highly agitated, especially against any person with orien-
tal features, the chances of release for Japanese were slight. 
Lamidey's figures show that 97.83 per cent of aU Japanese were 
interned, that is 587 in 600, and that 4 were released in 1942 and 
a further 10 by August 1943.^ By December 1944 anotiier 45 
were released, but most were still subject to resfrictions. 
One of the four released fri 1942 was Sho Takasuka, who had 
come to AusfraUa in 1905, aged 5 years. He and his brotiier later 
grew tomatoes at FostervUle in Victoria, but while his brother 
joined the 3rd Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Abroad, Takasuka 
was ineligible for naturalisation "on account of his race" and 
havfrig arrived after 1902, so he jofried the VDC. The brotiiers 
were regarded "as respectable and energetic members of the 
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community, and were never known to engage in any political 
discussions or subversive activities". Takasuka was interned 
because of the army instruction of 26 May 1941 that made it 
"mandatory on aU Commands to intern all Japanese nationals 
over 16 years of age". Takasuka appealed, and the Aliens Tribu-
nal No. 4 recommended his release, and the Minister for the 
Army confirmed the decision on 4 June 1942. While Takasuka's 
political circumspection, his brother's active service, his com-
munity acceptance and Victoria's distance from the fighting 
zone made a sfrong case, there is another possible contributing 
factor in Takasuka's favour. Flis tomato farm was described as 
a "plantation" and 20 pickers were employed there at harvest 
time. Takasuka was obviously a useful primary producer, and 
the build up of Australian forces and the arrival of American 
froops made a great demand on food production. Just as Dur-
rant had released a few Italian tomato farmers to return to 
Geraldton after his extensive internment of Italians in Western 
AusfraUa in June 1940, so the Victorian military authorities may 
have assessed Takasuka as more valuable back on the farm. It 
was made a condition of Takasuka's parole, however, that he 
not go beyond a radius of ten miles from his farm, and that 
resfriction was still in force in June 1946.^ '^  
A more typical local case was that of Michael Joseph Tenin. 
Tenin was an AusfraUan-born subjed of Japanese origin who 
worked in a shop in Broome, WA. He was interned in accord-
ance with the AHQ instruction that all Japanese descendants be 
taken in. The case agafrist him, as summarised in his dossier, 
was that he was of the Japanese race because both his parents 
were Japanese, and that three years earlier he had gone on a 
tour of Japan and brought back a Japanese wife.^ The Minister 
for Lands and Agriculture in WA wrote to Intelligence about 
Tenin saying that he had been educated at "one of Perth's best 
colleges" and was "an excellent citizen" and "a good Ausfra-
lian". He asked that Tenin's case be reviewed because he had 
no doubt whatever of the man's loyalty. Inquiries were made, 
but InteUigence Report No. 117 from Tatura showed that Tenin 
had decided to stay interned because he felt "pubUc feeling 
would be agauist him". The Intelligence Report described Tenin 
as having only one leg, being "pro-AUy" and a quiet person 
who spoke the best English in the compound and an efficient 
teacher at the camp school. He had formerly been in partner-
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ship in a Carnarvon shop, but his wife had died and he hoped 
to start afresh after the war in another location.*^ 
Tenin's assessment of the situation of people with Japanese 
connections was a realistic one, as is shov^m by the cases of the 
son and AusfraUan wife of Denzo Kuringu, the Sydney laun-
dryman, and of the Inagaki family of Melbourne. Kuringu's 
son, Douglas, was Uiterned and appealed agafrist his intern-
ment. He heard nothing by February 1943, so he wrote to the 
Official Visitor, complaining that he should not be in the camp 
as if he were an enemy alien and demgerous to the country.^^He 
had been born in Australia and gone to the local high school 
and to business coUege. He had never visited any countries 
overseas or "taken any great interest in them". Apart from 
EngUsh, the only other language he knew something of was 
French. He wanted to finish his education and live in Ausfralia 
and nowhere else. He protested that he was not an alien but had 
been freated Uke one. But Douglas's pleas were in vam, for he 
and his father were fransfered to South AusfraUa by June 1943 
and were stiU interned in December 1944. Douglas' mother only 
escaped internment by going to Uve 200 miles from the coast. 
The case against the mother appears to rest on her high regard 
for her husband and an assessment made by a friend of her son, 
under Military IntelUgence questioning, that she would follow 
any instructions her husband had left her."*^  The informant 
would not appear before a fribunal, nevertheless Mrs Kuringu 
was ordered to reside at West Wyalong, NSW, report to police 
each week and not associate with enemy aliens or naturalised 
persons of enemy origin. When an influential person with a title 
discovered her pUght, he rang W.J. Mackay, then the Diredor-
General of Security, and asked that she be given more time to 
make arrangements for her dry cleaning business. Mackay 
flatly refused. The conditions had been frnposed "after careful 
consideration by MiUtary Officers" and "if anything happened, 
someone would have to take the responsibiUty", and Mackay 
had "no desfre to be the person at whom criticism would be 
leveUed".^^ Although Mrs Kurfrigu wrote regularly from her 
hotel room in West Wyalong askkig for her resfridions to be 
eased, the facts that she and her son were registered in Japan,^ ' 
and she had her name on a list of donors to the Japanese forces 
Comforts Fund, told against her. By August 1944 security de-
cided that in "view of the present war position" Mrs Kuringu 
could be allowed back to Sydney. In December 1944 the owner 
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of her business prenuses, who had the family as tenants for over 
20 years, supported her request for the release of her son. On 11 
August 1945 the resfriction on the mother associating with 
enemy aliens or naturalised people of enemy origin, was re-
voked by W.B. Simpson, who succeeded Mackay as Director-
General of Security. In October 1946 Mrs Kuringu received the 
news that her husband was going to be deported, but either 
through her representations to Jessie Street or through the 
"good soUcitor" hfred by her husband for two hundred 
pounds, Kurfrigu was finally released. 
While the Kuringu family suffered financially and emotion-
aUy, they were eventuaUy reunited but the Inagaki famUy paid 
a greater price for the "crime" of a mixed marriage. Rose and 
Moshi Inagaki were married in 1907. Rose had thereby lost her 
British status, been required to register as an alien in World War 
I. Furious when the police demanded her fingerprints and 
photograph for alien regisfration in early 1940, Rose Inagaki 
discovered she could apply for the return of her British nation-
aUty under Section 18A of the Nationality Act and immediately 
did so. Her husband, a teacher of the Japanese language at 
Melbourne University, was interned. At his objection hearing 
on 24 February 1942, Inagaki's counsel argued that not only 
would his cUent not want to do anything anti-British but his 
sfrong-minded pro-British wife would not tolerate any such 
"adivities". Mrs Inagaki had been a school teacher and her 
financial support allowed her husband to continue the work he 
loved, teaching Japanese at Melbourne University, where he 
was never given a tenured position. When Rose appealed to the 
university for moral support and for the opportunity to take 
over Inagaki's students, the registrar was evasive and ex-
pressed confidence in the security authorities. The fribunal felt 
Inagaki's interests and sympathies were Japanese and he re-
mained interned for the whole of the war. Inagaki's assodation 
with the KBS cultural exchange program and a consequent frip 
to Japan were regarded as evidence of pro-Japanese loyalty. 
Rose died in August 1943 and her husband was deported. Their 
daughter married and remained in Ausfralia.^" 
Throughout agitation to get their resfrictions lifted and their 
families reunited, both wives argued on the grounds of civil 
rights, "common fairness" and economic viability. The Inagakis 
had always pooled resources and the Kuringu's famUy dry-
cleaning business built up together over many years. Mrs Kur-
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ingu was fortunate that her sister was able to help out, but other 
Japanese laundries met with less happy fates. Caring for the 
property of internees was a major headache for security, espe-
cially at times of major round-ups. The army preferred intern-
ees to sign over their establishments to a Britisher to manage. 
The laundryman from Fortitude Valley, Brisbane, arranged to 
sign over his business, furniture and plant to his misfress.^^ The 
woman looking after the property of another laundryman, NJ 
17055, sold his old washing machine for arovmd five pounds, 
and the shirt and collar machine and the old laundry iron for 
scrap. The money was supposed to go to the internee's account 
at the camp but the woman admitted she had spent it and could 
not repay it. The laundry of internee QJ 16053 at Gordonvale, 
Queensland, was taken over by the US army some months after 
his internment and by then the clothing had been taken by its 
owners and "a little was taken by people to whom money was 
owing" .52 xhe proprietor of the Townsville laundry, wrote to the 
local police in March 1942 asking for his personal clothes and 
news of his laundry but had no reply by April 1943, so he asked 
for an investigation .^ ^ The American army took over theTowns-
viUe laundry and it may have been part of the security screen 
surrounding the deployment of US troops that prevented this 
information being conveyed to the Japanese laundryman. Cen-
sorship was in full operation and sfrictly enforced on letters in 
and out of camp. Yet some hint of Japanese property owners 
may have leaked out, for Lt-Col. J. McCahon wrote to all states 
holding Japanese, telling them that allegations had been made 
by Japanese officials that internees' property had been sold at 
auction for low prices. McCahon wanted Allied Land Forces 
Headquarters informed "urgently" of any "such incidents". 
The matter was important because it related to "negotiations 
relative to the disposal of the property of British persons in 
Japan and Japanese-confrolled territory".^ 
Reciprocity in handling internees was always a considera-
tion in the policy and practice of internment, and the Australian 
garrison officers and men were weU aware of thefr responsibili-
ties in this regard. The Loveday group history states that "Camp 
Admfriisfrators kept in mind the fact that many" AusfraUans 
were held as prisoners of war by Axis Powers.^^ It "therefore 
became incumbent on all ranks to treat their charges in the 
correct manner in an endeavour to prevent reprisals". With the 
Japanese there was a heightened anxiety. Unlike the Germans 
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and ItaUans, the Japanese had not signed the International 
Convention for the freatment of prisoners, and with 21,649 
AusfraUans in their hands^^ the government was worried about 
their "normal" treatment let alone if any misconduct should be 
proven against Australian guards or officials. An argument 
between the British and Germans over the shackUng of prison-
ers began after the Dieppe raid, when Germans had been 
temporarUy handcuffed, and the Germans consequently began 
a campaign of shackling British POWs for extended periods. 
Among those who suffered were Australians and Canadians in 
the German camps Oflag VIIB and IHC and Stalag VEIB. The 
British wished to pursue the matter by increasing the number 
of German POWs in AUied hands being similarly freated, but 
Curtin had "little faith fri the value of reprisals" especially 
where the burden would "fall on helpless captives on both 
sides". A "competition in cruelty" could be "carried on indefi-
nitely with far more embarrassment to us than to the enemy" 
and the Japanese-held prisoners were most vulnerable.^'^ 
It should not be thought that Australia's treatment of the 
Japanese or other internees was solely motivated by desire of 
reciprodty. The Offidal Visitors, the camp commandants and 
all those responsible had a high regard for the country's honour, 
legal process and humanitarian behaviour. When some Ausfra-
lians expressed annoyance that Japanese POWs were to be 
buried in the Lutwyche Cemetery in Brisbane near Allied 
graves, the Minister for the Army, Frank Forde answered the 
complaints in terms of both reciprocity and regard for interna-
tional law. "It is only by the observance of this convention that 
we may expect reciprocal action from the Japanese", Forde 
wrote, and in addition, while Australia remained a signatory to 
tiie convention "we are bound by its terms".^^ During 1942 
there were negotiations with Japan about redprocal arrange-
ments and the possible exchange of prisoners. Most of this work 
was done at a high level by the British, and prisoners were to 
some extent pawns in a bargaining game. 
A major shuffling of Japanese prisoners from Australia oc-
curred in August 1942 and was something of a mystery to camp 
autiiorities at the time. When the faU of the Netherlands East 
Indies (NEI) was imminent the Dutch authorities had moved 
almost 2,000 prisoners, mainly Japanese, to AustraUa.^^ They 
were interned in Loveday if they were single men, or at Tatura 
if they were in famUy groups. On 30 January 1942 Major A.W. 
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Lott of Loveday's Compound 14C received 536 Japanese from 
the NEI. Surprisingly, given the state of the war, 528 Japanese 
internees were enfrafried for Melbourne on 15 August 1942, on 
their way to Japan as part of a repafriation exchange. It seems 
confradictory that Australia, with aU its own local Japanese 
interned, should aUow this large group to be returned, particu-
larly as they had knowledge of the near North from which the 
Japanese military forces were at that very moment basing their 
attacks on AusfraUa. Most of those repatriated were nominated 
by name from Japan, and Loveday officers believed that "they 
were all cormected with the production of rubber in Malaya and 
other islands". Many others with similar occupations were also 
rep afr iated from Tatura, but not all those described as "rubber 
estate" employees were induded.^ Most of the men conneded 
with Japanese firms such as Mitsui and the Yokohama Spede 
Bank were early repafriates. Women and families with many 
children tended to be included for repatriation from Tatura.*^ 
Most of the repatriates were described as Buddhist, but if there 
is one common factor it is that the next of kin were recorded as 
being residents of Japan. Those internees whose next of kin 
lived in Indonesia or the islands were not repatriated untU after 
the war.^^The early NEI expafriates saUed on the exchange ship 
City of Canterbury, which left Melbourne on 18 August 1942^ ^ 
and took the former Japanese consul, Tatsuo Kawai, and the 
ashes of the Japanese submariners, whose bodies were recov-
ered from the bottom of Sydney Harbotir,^ to Yorktown m East 
Africa to meet the Kamakura Maru. 
While the consular staff and the servicemen's ashes went in 
conformity to international law, the internees would logically 
be exchanged for some valuable consideration, but little of 
value came to Australia. Whether the economic value of these 
Japanese internees to the enemy outweighed the manpower 
and related costs in keeping them, is hard to assess, but Ausfra-
lia had tended to keep Germans with "skiUs likely to be useful 
to the enemy". When the Dutch dedded that thefr internees 
were to be exchanged they would have had their ov^ m interests 
in mind. The NEI authorities could well have been pressed by 
considerations of treatment of Dutch in both Japanese and 
German confrol. The British were afraid in December 1941 tiiat 
under such pressure the NEI authorities would repafriate 400 
dangerous Germans from a camp fri Sumafra, and arranged for 
tiiem to be sent to India.^^ Australia tried very hard to have its 
Dr J.H. Becker, first leader of the Nazi Party 
in Australia, was interned as soon as war 
began, held until after it ended and forcibly 
deported in January 1947. Seen here between 
two detectives after trying to escape by 
stowing away on a freighter to Panama. 
(F.J. Halmarick, Sydney Morning Herald) 
Oswald Bonutto migrated to Australia in 
1926 and worked as a labourer, cane cutter, 
tobacco farmer and hotel keeper until his 
arrest in June 1940. After a successful appeal 
he was released only to be reintemed and 
eventually sent to Loveday. In his 
autobiography, A Migrant's Story, he says 
internees were the scapegoats for the Allies' 
early military defeats. 
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All Japanese were interned 
immediately after Pearl Harbour. This 
cartoon is one of a series published in 
March and April 1942. The language is 
unequivocal. Every Japanese was 
vicious and deceitful and bent on 
enslaving Australians. Unlike 
European internees, the huge majority 
of Japanese were held in custody for 
the duration of the war. 
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Emery Bares gazes whimsically from 
the back cover of the autobiographical 
account of his war years. Backyard of 
Mars. Expelled from Italy because of 
his anti-fascist views, he was interned 
in Australia on 8 December 1941 when 
his native Hungary entered the war. 
He was released in February 1942 and 
called up into the 3rd Employment 
Company of the CMP in July. 
No. 14 Internment Camp, Loveday, held many Japanese. Here two internees use a crosscut saw 
to cut firewood. In contrast to Japanese prisoners-of-war, internees cooperated with authorities 
inside camp and on work projects. (AWM Neg no. 64826) 
USE THE FINE COMB urged this cartoon. Officials were encouraged not to miss any Fifth 
Columnists in Australia as the Fifth Column was credited with aiding the Japanese in the battles 
for Malaya, Singapore and New Guinea. {Courier-Mail, 21 March 1942) 
Total Internments of persons resident in Australia. Major-General Durrant was GOC 
Western Command when Italy 
entered the war and was GOC 
Northern Command when the 
Japanese approached. Here he 
addresses his staff and unit 
commanders in Brisbane on 9 
January 1942. With the Premier 
and Police Commissioner he urged 
mass internments and he and his 
assistant officer signed warrants 
for hundreds of residents on the 
Queensland coast. {Courier-Mail, 10 
January 1942) 
These figures are a compilation 
from a variety of sources with a 
basis on Noel Lamidey's Aliens 
Control in Australia, 1939-46. The 
bulk of internees were scooped up 
from the coastal areas of 
Queensland at the height of fear of 
an invasion. They were released to 
work in food production or other 
war related industries when the 
fighting receded from our shores 
and political stability was ensured 
in the 1943 election. 
No. 10 Compound, Loveday, near Barmera, South Australia. The huge all male internment group 
at Loveday held a peak of 5,382 internees in May 1943. Here two internees play on a tennis court 
between the barbed wire fences and the main hut. (AWM Neg no. 64844) 
Captain J.F. Winton, Guard officer of No. 10 Compound chats with some internees during his 
inspection tour. There was regular interaction between the guard officers and the camp leaders. 
(AWM Neg n. 64878) 
Officers of the 25/33rd Garrison Battalion, Loveday POW and Internment Group near Barmera, 
South Australia in March 1943. Seated from left: Major L. von Bertouch, Major C.E. Hunkin, Lt-Col 
E.T. Dean DSO,VD (Commanding Officer), Major A. Dick, and Major D.W. Shepherd. (AWM Neg 
no. 64894) 
Interior of the workshops at No. 9 Camp, Loveday Internment Group. German internees are 
making furniture for the various camps of the group. (AWM Neg no. 30198/7) 
Women Wardens at No. 3 
Internment Camp, Tatura on 
15 March 1945. The Tatura 
Internment Group in Victoria 
included the family camp. 
Front left: Wardens L. Moody, 
Senior Warden L. Murton, J. 
Watson. Back left: R Jack, R 
McLeod and M. Thompson. 
(AWM Neg no. 30250/11) 
As the danger of invasion 
passed internees worked on 
projects to boost the war 
effort. Here Japanese at 
Loveday are harvesting 
pyrethrum daisies — an oil 
painting by Max Ragless. 
Pyrethrum was a basic 
element in insecticides used 
by the AMF (AWM Neg no. 
38870) 
The children of overseas internees and their 
teacher in a class photo at No. 3 CAmp, 
Tatura 1945. Twenty-four children under 
ten were among 304 former internees who 
returned to Europe on 1 December 1947. 
Many other overseas internees and their 
children remained in Australia and became 
citizens. (AWM Neg no. 30245/8) 
Noel W. Lamidey, secretary of the Aliens 
Classification and Advisory Committee, 
photographed here in his role as Chief 
Migration Officer in London overseeing 
Calwell's post-war immigration policy. In 
1991, aged 96, Lamidey recalled his own 
experiences as an impoverished migrant 
and recounted with amusement the scrapes 
he got in to in Britain after the war dealing 
with the backlash of Calwell's enthusiastic 
style of operating. 
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officials from Singapore and Timor included in the group sent 
in return but the Japanese would not agree.^^ Seven other 
Austialian diplomats and 23 civilians were among the 105 
Allied people exchanged. When the UK wanted to begin nego-
tiations on a second exchange soon afterwards, Australia un-
derstandably resisted, considering the Japanese to have got the 
best of the first exchange. 
Nor was this the end of Australia's problems with the Dutch 
over their internees on Australian soil. In 1943 Dr Charles Van 
Der Plas, head of the NEI Commission in Australia, transfered 
507 political prisoners from their camp at Tanah Merah, on the 
Digul River in western New Guinea, to Bowen in North 
Queensland, on the ship Both.^'^ Travelling south by rail the 
prisoners passed a note to fettlers, and the trade unions became 
interested in the plight of this group committed to Indonesian 
independence. The Tanah Merah prisoners were placed in the 
Liverpool camp and in Compound D at Cowra. Rupert Lock-
wood, in his study of the Indonesians in Australia during the 
war and immediately afterwards, claims that the Netherlands 
Indies government had described the Tanah Merah prisoners 
as enemies of the Allied cause who should be treated as prison-
ers of war, and the Curtin government had accepted them on 
this basis.^^ In fact they were political prisoners. Some families 
had been detained since the republican uprising in 1926. Lock-
wood charges the Australian government with negligence in 
accepting this group with the status assigned them by the 
Dutch, and it might seem surprising that the Dunera experience 
did not alert Australian authorities to the possibility of a false 
label. 
Lockwood berates Curtin for embracing the NEI govern-
ment-in-exile at all, and for taking 15 months to release the 
Tanah Merah political prisoners, but Australia in March 1942 
was desperate for allies and the circumstances of the arrival of 
NEI Dutch refugees in Broome, pursued by Japanese Zeros, 
ensured them of a welcome. Australia had no immediate reason 
to think the Both internees were other than similar to the Japa-
nese internees brought by the Cremer in January 1942. Mrs 
Laura Gapp, of the NSW Civil Rights League, pursued the 
matter, and Dr Evatt persuaded the cabinet to force the Dutch 
to take the tuberculosis sufferers into the Princess Juliana Hos-
pital at Turramurra and to free the others from Cowra on 7 
December 1943.^ ^ The NEI government-in-exile had to rely on 
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these Indonesians in their civil service and technical support 
areas and benefiting from Australian rates of pay and experi-
encing a freer political system, they became even more deter-
mined to achieve independence for Indonesia after the war.^ " 
Taken at the same time 
Interned at the same time as the Japanese, were a selection of 
Hungarians, Roumanians and Finns. Australia had considered 
declaring war on these countries since October 1941, when the 
United Kingdom was pressed to do so by the Soviet Union. '^ 
The newly-installed Labor government felt it would damage 
Russian morale, and be hard to justify publicly not to declare 
war on the three countries who were fighting against Russia. 
The date pre-ordained for the declaration was 7 December 1941. 
Dr Evatt considered the procedure for making a separate dec-
laration by Australia, not wanting to follow the style of 
Menzies' announcement at the outbreak of war with Germany, 
that Australia was at war because Britain was.^^ The Labor 
cabinet considered its internment policy in relation to the na-
tionals of the new enemy countries and the British informed 
Australia of its policy. In Britain, civilians were to be detained 
if there was some element of suspicion attached to them on 
personal grounds", or if "by reason of their knowledge" they 
were "in a position to damage national interests". In these 
categories the British expected to take 10 Finns, 10 Roumanians 
"and about 100 Hungarians". All seamen were to be taken 
"automatically" and this was expected to net "about 200" Finns 
and a few otiiers. The persons not interned were to be re-
stricted.''^ 
Australia interned 33 Hungarians, 42 Roumanians and 142 
Finns.''^ The Hungarians interned in New South Wales elected 
Dr Emery Bares to be their spokesman in the Liverpool camp. 
He calcitiated that two-thirds of his group had university de-
grees, and their average age was 32.^ 5 jj^gy spent a lot of time 
trying to puzzle out why their 30 had been selected from the 
300 Hungarian adult males in Sydney, not realising that it was 
as simple as their being fit, young, intelligent and knowledga-
ble enough "to damage national interests" if they felt so in-
clined. Bares was particularly vulnerable. Beside being young 
and newly arrived, he was a journalist who specialised in 
international affairs; he was preparing a "Notes on the News" 
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talk for the ABC on the attack on Pearl Harbour when he was 
arrested .^ ^ But he had come to the notice of the Military Intelli-
gence Branch, Phillip Street, Sydney because in July 1940 he 
wrote an article to a Swiss newspaper in German. It contained 
some well-known facts about Australia and the war. The mili-
tary intercepted the article in the mail and warned Bares not to 
send anything to Europe written in German, "especially about 
war and defence".''''Because of his job at the Telegraph Bares was 
regarded by his fellow countiymen as something of an expert 
and was often asked what he thought would happen next. 
When the Hungarian Prime Minister shot himself, and the 
pro-Axis group gained power, many Hungarians rang Bares for 
his opinion on what would happen if they became enemy 
aliens. He realised his phone was tapped when the telephonist 
interrupted one of his callers with the demand that he speak up 
and speak English.''^ No doubt checks on Bares showed that he 
had been a war correspondent in Abyssinia, and had inter-
viewed Mussolini's son-in-law. Count Ciano. Bares was aware 
that his local Italian fruiterer's brother had been interned, al-
though he had been naturalised for ten years. This "disquiet-
ing" information, and a warning from a fellow journalist that 
"people do stiange things when they are frightened" and that 
the journalist felt Australians were "very frightened", prepared 
Bares for his midnight call from the police on 8 December 1941 .''^  
The fact that Bares had been expelled from Italy because of his 
critidsm of the Rome-Berlin axis was insufficient to outweigh 
the combination of other factors. Across the road from the area 
where the Roumanians, Hungarians and Finns were held was 
"a small cottage behind barbed wire", holding Japanese intern-
ees. The night before, at the police station where Bares had been 
taken after his arrest, he had heard the detective tell the police-
man on the desk that he had been out arresting Japanese from 
seven that morning and 250 had been rounded up. 
Bares and his fellow Hungarians spent about six months in 
captivity, and the Indonesian independence seekers were freed 
after eighteen months. The Roumanians were released before 
the rest of those taken in this roundup were moved on to Tatura. 
Bares and his friend heard rumours that the Roumanians re-
leases were due to the intervention of the Greek Consul-Gen-
eral, whose wife was Roumanian, or alternatively, to that of 
expensive lawyers. It was even said that the Roumanians' wives 
went down "to Victoria Barracks and made a tearful appeal to 
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the officers of Eastern Command".^° In fact. Eastern Command 
had again moved beyond what higher authority considered 
appropriate. Roumanians "against whom no evidence existed" 
had been interned. As a result the GOC, Eastern Command had 
his authority to intern enemy aliens withdrawn for three 
months, and Ministerial approval was to be obtained before 
enemy aliens could be interned in New South Wales.^^ 
However the major group interned in late 1941, the Japanese, 
began a long period in camp. The local Japanese, and the 
overseas Japanese not repafriated in late 1942, remained in-
terned in Australia until they departed on the Yoizuki or the Koei 
Maru in 1946. Over 100 Japanese internees never saw their 
homes again. They died of malaria, tuberculosis or the diseases 
of old age.^2 They were initially buried at Barmera or Tatura, 
but were later moved to the Japanese cemetery at Cowra, NSW, 
where they lie with their countrymen of more warlike disposi-
tion.^3 Generally, the Japanese were among the most placid of 
the internees, and recorded against most of their names are only 
the dates of their arrival and departure even after almost five 
years of internment. Many were not security risks as such, 
although some were of marginal economic value to the enemy 
It was the sfrength of Australian antipathy to the Japanese race 
as a whole that made it necessary in the interests of law and 
order, and of morale, to keep them interned for the whole of 
their time in Ausfralia or for the duration of the war. 
Chapter Seven 
THE BIG ROUND UP 
In the year 1942 Australian morale was under great sfrain. 
While the fighting had remained "over there", Ausfralians at 
home were remote spectators but the attack on Pearl Harbour 
and the fall of Singapore, the Philippines, and Java threw the 
Austialian population into the fighting ring. During 1942, Port 
Moresby, Darwin, Broome, Katherine and Townsville were 
bombed and midget submarines were discovered in Sydney 
Harbour. 
So, suddenly, a very old Australian nightmare came to life. 
Throughout their history Australians had been given to bouts of 
fear that their remote, underpopulated coastUne would tempt a 
foreign aggressor, probably Oriental, but this terror had been kept 
at bay by the naval supremacy of the British Empire. After Decem-
ber 1941 that supremacy was no more.^  
The Australian and New Zealand Chiefs of Staff reported on 
26 February 1942 that Australia and New Zealand were in 
danger of attack.^ When Singapore fell the "17,000 Ausfralians 
of the 8th Division were lost to Ausfralia's defence and this 
shattered any delusion that Australia was safe under the British 
umbrella. Curtin faced these realities and sought to achieve 
three things: the safe return of the Second AIF Divisions to 
Ausfralia; as close a relationship as possible with the United 
States; and a more stringent gearing of Australia to the war 
effort.3 
In the meantime the miUtia met the challenge in New Guinea, 
but plans for the defence of Ausfralia revealed that the whole 
continent could not be defended by the forces available.^ To 
secure the area from Brisbane, where a large US base was to be 
developed, through the industrial heartland of Port Kembla, 
Sydney, Newcastle and Lithgow, and south to Melbourne, other 
parts of Australia might have to be abandoned. The commander 
of the home forces did not recommend the removal of garrisons 
from places like Townsville or Tasmania for reasons of morale 
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but he insisted that any weakening of the forces in the vital 
1,000-mile south-eastern zone by reinforcing "isolated" parts 
would lead to the defeat of the Austialian army and the likeli-
hood of the complete occupation of Australia. 
Public reaction 
Frank Forde, the Minister for the Army and member for Capri-
cornia, based on Rockhampton, found these arguments dis-
turbing and people in outlying areas clearly felt vulnerable.^ 
Many of them wrote to inform the military how unprotected 
their railway bridges, harbours, power stations and water sup-
plies were. To what degree Australia's nerve was shaken is 
difficult to assess. According to G.C. Bolton "civilian morale 
remained on the whole resolute",^ but Hasluck claims that in 
the two months leading to the fall of Singapore Australians had 
come "from complacency or confidence to the threshold of fear 
for their own survival".'' 
George Johnston wrote in his autobiographical novel My 
Brother Jack, that Port Moresby was undermanned and poorly 
equipped and a "brooding sense of hopelessness prevailed 
everywhere". Johnston claims that the picture sent back to the 
Ausfralian public did not match the reality, but that the dishon-
esty was "desperately necessary" because the mood at home 
"was darkened by the realisation that the country's best fight-
ing men were "ten thousand miles away".^ Lloyd Ross, in his 
biography of Curtin, describes Canberra in December 1941 as 
being "in jitters", and he cites one observer as saying that the 
Australian troops in Brisbane were demoralised, often drunk, 
and that the whole country was "in the dumps with them".^  
Doubtless all these pictures were partly frue, but there is an 
equally verifiable picture of increased volunteering by women 
for the services and by men in primary production for the 
Volunteer Defence Corps which was increased to 80,000 in 
February and an establishment of 100,000 by the end of 1942.^ " 
The Army raised a special force to watch for and report any 
enemy landings between Normanton, Qld and Yampi Sound, 
WA and many experienced bushmen volunteered." Many 
thousands of other Australians became active in Civil Defence 
Organisations and the Red Cross. 
The evacuation of the civilian population was included in 
War Book planning and in a few areas, such as New Guinea and 
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Darwin, women and children were ordered to leave for defence 
reasons. Within Ausfralia there were perceptible but unofficial 
moves to the south or inland, but it was officially decided that 
there would be only "limited evacuation" from areas near 
possible targets and of young children from congested areas to 
a safer place in the same city.^ ^ Some people on the North 
Queensland coast considered themselves to be in a likely target 
area and decided to evacuate their families. The evacuation 
mentality increased when state schools were not allowed to 
open in February, and the atmosphere of a battle zone increased 
when rifles, cars and bicycles were impressed, and farmers had 
their "crawler" tractors taken to help construct aerodromes.^•^ 
Queensland police were directed by their Commissioner, C.J. 
Carroll, to take statistics from the residents of the coastal towns 
as a preliminary measure, but this had the effect of unsettling 
some people.^* 
Disorderly mass movement was dangerous and citizens 
were told to move only when ordered to "by responsible offi-
cials".^ ^ The VDC were trained to dismantle local machinery, 
bridges were mined and the volunteers were expected to stay 
behind and act as a guerilla group in the manner that had been 
successful in Russia. In the event of a civilian population being 
trapped behind enemy lines the police were instructed to re-
main with the people and act as intermediaries between the 
enemy and the civilians. ^ ^ Hasluck criticises the nation's leaders 
for their lack of faith in ordinary Ausfralians, thefr preoccupa-
tion with plans to "destroy and withdraw" and thefr keeping 
details of the full extent of casualties suffered in the Darwin 
raids from the public "for fear that the fruth might cause panic". 
He suggests that Canberra appeared "to have been more badly 
scared than any other part of the continent" and that "undue 
excitement" was "more evident in political circles" over intern-
ment than was shown by the general public. But is Hasluck too 
severe? Governments are responsible for the safety of the peo-
ple. If pockets of the population, who could have been saved 
from enemy hands by quick and pre-plarmed action, were 
allowed to be captured, the authorities would have been truly 
culpable. And, as Hasluck knows, censorship of mail revealed 
a general and understandable disquiet among the people about 
the series of military defeats, and the possible disloyalty of 
aliens.^ ^ 
Many citizens wrote to the Prime Minister and these letters 
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reveal some of the attitudes of the general public at this time.^* 
The writers stressed that they were determined to resist the 
enemy but there were things that should be done to fadlitate 
success. The problem of aliens was mentioned often. ^ ' Some 
writers complained that aliens were taking advantage of the 
labour shortage created when men were called up for military 
service. The Deputy Director-General of Manpower in Perth 
reported that there was "a good deal of irritation in country 
districts over aliens" who were adopting "an extremely inde-
pendent manner" and refusing to work "except at exorbitant 
rates". This "open and unashamed exploitation" of the labour 
shortage by foreigners caused "deep resentment" among those 
settlers with sons and brothers in the forces. Curtin replied that 
it would be necessary for everyone "to readjust" their working 
conditions in order "to fight desperately to stem the tide of 
aggression now menacing Australia".^° 
Naturalised subjects of enemy origin were also regarded as 
a threat because they had built up assets and had the local 
knowledge that could be useful to the enemy. The Independent 
member for the South Coast in the NSW parliament, R.N. Beale 
felt a local German-born man was "hiding under his naturali-
sation papers" and would harm "our cause" at "the first oppor-
tunity". Local Italian fishermen had "been going out to sea in 
their boats to celebrate" Axis victories, and some young men 
whose parents were interned were both clever and bitter and 
"ready to blow up bridges". Basically, "when our sons and 
daughters" were "risking their lives overseas and on our own 
shores", and given "the exfremely critical position", Australian 
authorities should not risk leaving foreigners "naturalised or 
otherwise", at large.^^ 
The Shire Council of Mulgrave, Vic, wrote to other Munici-
pal Councils urging them to express their disapproval of enemy 
aliens having unresfricted liberty. The wholesale and retail fruit 
and vegetable frade was "almost exclusively confrolled by 
enemy or naturalised aliens" who were benefiting from the call 
up of Ausfralians, not only by getting higher prices, but by 
being able to extend "their productive holdings". Mulgrave 
Coxmdl described the situation where some Australians were 
fighting and dying, where other AustraUans were being forced 
off thefr properties and where Ausfralian housewives had "to 
pour unwarranted profits into the pockets of freedom-given 
aliens", as nothing short of "sinister ".22 After noting "the in-
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formed views", the Secretary of the Prime Minister's Depart-
ment sometimes had the letter copied and sent to the Minister 
and Department of the Army and to the Dfrector of Security 
Services. Sometimes the writers dealt with particular local situ-
ations, but many letters were couched in general terms of 
prindple. The justification for interning all enemy aliens given 
by the 3,000 petitioners from Ballina, NSW, was fairly typical: a 
feeling of greater security would exist; loyal women, cidldren 
and the aged deserved protection; and allowing enemy aliens 
their freedom gave them the opportunity to endanger life and 
property and to assist any invaders. The Ballina petitioners felt 
that there was no certainty that enemy aliens did not have 
concealed stores of arms and ammunition, so their internment 
would be for the greater security of Australia. Finally the peti-
tioners pointed out that, with the strength of feeling against 
enemy aliens rising, they would be safer interned.^^ Hasluck's 
assessment that poUticians got more exdted about internment 
than the general public is doubtful in the light of the enormous 
correspondence from the public on internment. They wrote in 
their hundreds and signed petitions in their thousands. The caU 
for greater internment was not combined with a lack of faith in 
an eventual victory. It was similar to the British reaction to 
Dunkirk in June 1940, combining a desire to be part of a cohe-
sive, homogeneous group when facing the enemy with a clear-
the-decks mentality before battle. The fight was perceived as 
being between the Anglo-Saxon and Celtic AusfraUans and the 
Japanese, and potential sympathisers with Japan were best out 
of the way. The exact degrees to which this "fribal" urge sur-
faced in the politicians, public, police and the military is specu-
lative, but the urge itself was sufficiently widespread to make 
community sentiment the basis of internment in the ffrst half of 
1942. 
On this broad base of concern certain politidans, military 
leaders and poUce commissioners were more active in their 
agitation for something to be done than others. In particular 
Alexander Mafr, who by 1942 was leader of the Opposition in 
New South Wales, continued to speak against federal policy. On 
11 February the newspapers reported that a Japanese controlled 
radio had broadcast material not made public in Australia, and 
Mair blamed this on aliens being allowed to remain at large.^^ 
The theory was that a spy network existed, with a secret radio 
capable of sending messages to off-shore submarines, thus 
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jeopardising troopships. Mair was also totally opposed to the 
government's proposal to allow friendly aliens to enlist. The 
government had made men from Greece, Poland, Czechoslova-
kia, Holland, the United States and China eligible to join the 
AIF, and created schemes to use enemy aliens and refugee 
internees in a civilian corps to work on defence construction. 
Mair considered the inclusion of non-Britishers in the war effort 
constituted a grave security risk, and he was supported by the 
RSL. 
The RSL had been active in the campaign to have aliens 
interned during the crisis of June 1940, but in 1942 it entered 
into a more aggressive-eampaign, proportional to the greater 
depth of the crisis. The 25th Annual Federal Congress consid-
ered earUer government response "unsatisfactory" and 
couched resolution 210 in stronger terms.^s Because of "wide-
spread public unrest and feeUng of insecurity" the congress 
wanted immediate and more drastic action on internment to-
gether with the re- internment of released internees and no 
more releases. In Queensland, where there was a large concen-
tration of enemy aliens in northern coastal areas and a relatively 
close proximity to New Guinea, the League's branches sfrongly 
supported a call for the internment of all enemy aliens.^ ^ 
Queensland's political and military leaders agreed. A confer-
ence attended by the Premier, W Forgan-Smith, the GOC 
Northern Command, Major-General J.M.A. Durrant, the State 
Minister for Civil Defence, and Commonwealth and State offi-
cers, held in Brisbane on 27 January 1942, recommended that 
the 13,000 persons of enemy origin in North Queensland all be 
interned as a matter of urgency^^ Early in February Arthur 
Fadden was on a tour of the north, and the North Queensland 
branch of the RSL asked him, as Leader of the Federal Opposi-
tion and as a member of the Advisory War Council, to intern all 
enemy aliens. On Thursday 12 February, he replied that "results 
would be apparent in the near future''.^^ 
Official response 
On the next night and into Saturday morning, what was de-
scribed as "the most intense round up in Australia since the war 
began" took place on the coastal areas of Queensland; 2,000 
aliens were questioned and "appropriate action was taken by 
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the authorities". The drive extended as far south as the New 
South Wales border. The Sydney Morning Herald reported: 
It is hoped that [this roundup] wiU help to clear up the spy radio 
service which has been giving information to Japan. The police 
forces in the north have been strengthened lately by the promotion 
of men with an intimate knowledge of the north and the drafting 
of spedal men to assist in a possible drive against suspected fifth 
columnists. The situation in the north has been causing the State 
authorities much concern, particularly in areas where Italians pre-
dominate. Strong pressure has been brought to bear by returned 
soldiers, who have insisted that appropriate action be taken. 
At the same time the Army Minister, Frank Forde, signed 
an order placing a curfew on all enemy aliens in Queensland, 
forbidding them to be out of their homes between 8 pm and 
5 am. This "drastic action" by Forde was motivated, according 
to the newspaper, by "the high percentage of aUen residents" 
who often congregated "in colonies", and because Queensland 
appeared to be in immediate danger of attack. 
Although this round-up was described by the paper as "in-
tense" and the largest since the war began, it is probable that 
the actual number interned was around 200, including 163 
listed on a Master Warrant issued at the time.^^The explanation 
of the difference between the dramatic tone of the newspaper 
report and the actual number taken, probably lies in the fact that 
newspapers were becoming propaganda agents used to boost 
morale by highlighting positive action and minimising losses.'^ ^ 
The newspaper did not say to what degree "appropriate action" 
had been taken. Readers could have gained the impression that 
1,000 had been interned. Certainly the number questioned was 
large, and it was obvious that everyone of enemy origin was 
under suspidon and that further losses would precipitate fur-
ther arrests. 
The RSL, encouraged by the government's action, stepped 
up its campaign to get all enemy aliens interned and to give the 
military confrol over naturalised persons. The league urged 
other groups to express their views. Allied organisations such 
as the Diggers' Association presented a petition with well over 
1,000 signatures. Petitions also came from towns in southern 
Queensland and northern New South Wales, and some trade 
unions sent telegrams urging more direct action against aliens. 
The Shire Council of Moree, NSW, urged other local authorities 
to call for total internment. Other pressure groups included the 
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Orange Lodge of Leichhardt, NSW (which particularly wanted 
CathoUc priests interned), the Anti-Enemy AUen Association of 
Punchbowl, NSW, War Pafriotic Committees, and branches of 
the Australian Natives' Assodation and the Royal Sodety of St 
George.''^ 
On 15 February 1942 Singapore surrendered and the next day 
the Sydney Morning Herald said that more internments in the 
north were expected. These would "take out of circulation 
'firebrands' among the cane cutters". The cutters were de-
scribed as a fravelling population, largely ItaUan and thousands 
sfrong.'^ ^ According to the newspaper, "the settied Italian com-
munity" had taken the raids qiuetly, but they were worried that 
the newly imposed curfew might be extended to them, and at 
the loss of cane cutters who would be needed in June. On 25 
February another 93 persons were named on a Master War-
rant.33 Although the trauma to the individuals should not be 
understated, the newspaper was misleading its readers about 
the number and nature of these internees. Actually the men 
taken at this time included some naturaUsed Germans who had 
previously come to the attention of the security services and 
those who had failed to register for service under the govern-
ment's AUens Service regulations. 
The government had infroduced the regulations early in 
February, giving aUen men a fortnight to register for service 
with Labour Battalions. The regulations were designed to stop 
aliens getting the higher paid jobs that Australians had left for 
miUtary service, and to ensure that alien residents made their 
contribution to the war effort. Aliens who were eligible but had 
not registered were the main target in the second set of raids in 
February.34 On 21 February the Sydney Morning Herald con-
tained a report by Major Cameron, that the remarks of the 
Minister for Munitions, that broomsticks would have to be used 
for tiraining because of the lack of rifles, had not been broadcast 
in Australia but appeared in a Japanese radio text a few hours 
later, was placed next to the item reporting the hunt for Fifth 
Columnists in Queensland. It was claimed that hundreds of 
enemy aliens or "naturaUsed foreigners" suspected of Axis 
sympathies were being sought by police.^s To the general reader 
these two consecutive items indicated that the government felt 
that spies were sending information to the enemy and that these 
spies were to be found among the naturaUsed Italians and 
Germans in Queensland, fri reality, as the news from the war 
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front worsened, the difference between a spy, a Fifth Columnist 
and a person who was not prepared to work for the war effort 
began to disappear. And news from the front did get worse. 
On 28 February the cruiser Perth was sunk in the Sunda Strait 
with 682 men either drowned or taken prisoner.^^ Refugees 
poured into Australia from the Netherlands East Indies, and on 
3 March, Japanese Zeros sfrafed Broome, killing 30 people, 
mainly refugees in the flying boats on Roebuck Bay. '^' If the 
resources of Java were added to those already captured in 
Malaya, and if New Guinea were to become an enemy base, a 
dfrect assault on the northern portion of the Australian conti-
nent was a distinct possibility. The request of the Queensland 
political and miUtary leaders that the 13,000 persons of enemy 
origin in the state be interned, whether naturalised or not, had 
not been agreed to by authorities at the federal level, but on 5 
March the Argus reported that some hundreds of naturalised 
and enemy aliens, particularly Italians and Germans, were 
rounded up in various parts of Queensland by state police "in 
co-operation with military authorities". Many of these intern-
ees had been listed earlier as people suspected of not being 
completely loyal to the British Empire. They were considered 
loyal enough to Ausfralia when the war front was remote, but 
it was felt that their loyalty was basicaUy to the plot of earth 
they cultivated and not to the democratic process, the govern-
ment elected by that process, or the British crown, ff an invasion 
came, these successful migrants might be prepared to exchange 
governments if they could keep their land.^ 
Tension mounted further when the Japanese captured Ra-
baul and landed at Lae and Salamaua in New Guinea on 8 
March 1942. In response, Curtin's government again revised the 
schedule of reserved occupations, limiting exemptions for men 
of miUtary age to those doing essential work in food and 
indusfrial production and those providing services directly 
related to the war effort. On 6 March two additional classes of 
men were called up, and compulsory service was also intro-
duced for the CivU Construction Corps. Cabinet decided to 
send Dr Evatt to Washington to impress President Roosevelt 
with the need for more equipment and froops in the Pacific area, 
and to take part in sfrategic planning. Evatt was to argue that 
AusfraUa was in danger of being lost as the best base from 
which the thrust against the Japanese could be launched. He 
also went to London, where he persuaded ChurchiU to send a 
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squadron of Spitfires and their crews to supplement the meagre 
Australian aerial reserves.''^ 
Just as the nation was steeling itself for a terrible struggle 
with an enemy that seemed to be sweeping everything before 
it, a most dramatic act of disloyalty was revealed. On the night 
of 9/10 March, four Western Australians were arrested for 
planning to receive the Japanese when they landed. One of the 
group had once written to the Australia First Movement in 
Sydney asking for information, so sixteen members of the 
movement there were arrested .^ ° The Sydney branch of the 
Security Service flashed the message to all states. It seemed that 
20 people of British descent had been prepared to act as traitors. 
F.A. Cooper, acting Premier of Queensland, responded to the 
news of the Australia First arrests by asking that "all naturalised 
British subjects suspected of subversive activites" in Queens-
land be arrested .^ ^ He believed there had been some activity by 
Australia First in Queensland. There was no evidence of any 
connection between naturalised Queensland residents and the 
Australia First movement, and in later, calmer times, it would 
be shown that there was no connection between the men from 
Australia First arrested in Sydney, and the four conspirators in 
Perth, but in the hectic month of March 1942 circumstances gave 
security a specially high priority. 
On 12 March the allied forces on Java surrendered, and a 
further 2,000 Australian troops were captured. Evatt, the cabi-
net minister with the highest reputation for protecting civil 
liberties and legal process, had already left Australia and, on 
the day after the fall of Java, a further 102 persons were named 
on Master Warrants in Brisbane. It is fascinating to speculate 
whether Evatt knew of the Australia First arrests or of the 
Master Warrants issued at this time. Power to detain any person 
for ten days without Ministerial approval existed in the original 
National Sectirity regulations. All the Master Warrants and the 
Australia First detentions were signed by Forde or his dele-
gated military commander. J.A. Beasley, acting as Attorney-
General in Evatt's absence, "twice denied knowledge of the 
whole affair in Parliament". Whether Evatt would have acted 
differently is speculation also, for as Craig Munro in his recent 
biography of P.R. Stephensen points out, "all the various intel-
ligence services, civilian and military" had recommended ac-
tion be taken against the Australia First Movement.*^ 
On 17 March 1942, General Douglas Mac Arthur arrived in 
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AusfraUa to a hero's welcome at Spencer Street station, Mel-
bourne. For the next few weeks Curtin and Forde were fully 
occupied re-organising the military structure with MacArthur 
as Supreme Commander of the South West Pacific Area, and 
General Lavarack as head of the AustraUan forces until Blarney 
returned. This concrete evidence of a fighting aUiance with the 
United States, together with the relief provided by the arrival 
of the giant ships, the Queen Mary and the Aquitania, bearfrig 
home the first contingent of the 7th Division, AIF, temporarily 
heartened both the leaders and the people of Australia.*^ On 23 
March the Sydney Morning Herald reported that Arthur Fadden 
found the people of North Queensland showing a spirit com-
parable with that of Londoners at the start of the Battle of 
Britain. Under way were Curtin's three sfrategies: the return of 
the Australian divisions, the alliance with the United States, 
and the intensification of Ausfralia's own war effort. 
Australia First debate 
Throughout these threatening months the total number of peo-
ple interned had doubled.^ Frank Forde and John Curtin used 
this fart as evidence of the government's determination to 
protert the security of Ausfralia in the debate that foUowed 
Forde's dramatic announcement in parliament, on 26 March 
1942, that 20 people connected with the Ausfralia Ffrst Move-
ment had been arrested and interned, and that documents had 
been seized, showing that some people had intended to make 
contact with the Japanese army as soon as it landed, setting out 
plans for sabotage, and for assassinating prominent people. The 
morning after this astonishing revelation the Canberra Times 
reported that Curtin had declined to "indicate what punish-
ment, if cmy," would be inflicted on the people who had com-
mitted these "freasonable practices". He did say that the 
miUtary authorities "might contemplate further action", but 
reminded reporters that those who had been interned could 
appeal against their interrunent.^^ 
The Opposition Leader expressed his shock at such a casual 
response.^ Fadden demanded that the Australia First internees 
be put on frial for treason, then quickly moved to a general 
attack on aliens.^'' In his view public opinion was stirred up 
because of the number of aliens in Ausfralia whose aUegiance 
was "openly questioned". Since the outbreak of war the han-
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dling of the alien question had been "characterised by the usual 
British consideration for the individual", but this could no 
longer be tolerated "in view of the success which" had "unfor-
tunately attended the Japanese drive southwards". Fadden 
linked the disclosures about the Australia First arrests with the 
position of aliens in Australia very simply. "The necessity to 
control our alien population becomes greater when we learn 
that it has been found necessary to arrest and intern twenty of 
our own people", he declared. 
Fadden's caU to intern all enemy aliens was challenged by 
Frank Brennan, who pofrited out that the internment camps 
were full, and by G.W Martens, the Labor member for Herbert 
in North Queensland, who reminded Fadden that 600 people 
had recently been taken from two North Queensland districts.^^ 
Fadden said that where there was an aggregation of enemy 
aliens in coastal areas, there was danger that they "would be an 
army to help the Japanese if they landed".^^ He proposed that 
enemy aliens should be considered "in parallel with" the Aus-
fraUa First Movement. In his opinion the men should be in-
terned, the women investigated and resfricted, those 
naturalised within the previous five years should be reported 
on, and any suspidous person interned. 
Maurice Blackburn considered that Fadden had gone "far-
ther than he really intended to go" and sfressed that refugee 
Jews were even more afraid of enemy conquests than Ausfra-
lians.^° Blackburn believed that the Labor government, its 
predecessor and the Ausfralian people as a whole, were "ani-
mated by a liberal spirit" and did not assume a man "guilty of 
conspiracy merely because of his race or associations". The 
member for Moreton, Josiah Francis paid tribute to the authori-
ties who had caught the perpefrators of "one of the most 
striking examples of fifth column activity ever revealed in 
Ausfralian history". He urged that the personnel of the Inves-
tigation Branch, which "in most instances" had done "exfraor-
dinarily good work", be increased to keep watch for more fifth 
columnists. Francis said that at a Grand Fasdst CouncU meeting 
in Mussolini's presence fri San Remo, Italy, a speaker had 
claimed that Italians in Oceania had been "migrated to the 
south seas to prepare the way for Japan, as Japan is the natural 
country to drive everything British out of the Pacific".5i 
Curtin repUed that two considerations had to be given atten-
tion at the same time — the safety of the Commonwealth and 
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the preservation of the essential principles of British justice and 
fafr dealing.52 Because of the statement made at the Fascist 
Grand Council, the government "must watch very closely the 
conduct of Italians in Australia", but investigations by "Mili-
tary InteUigence, home security officers, and officials of both 
Commonwealth and State departments' showed "the irre-
proachable condurt in this crisis of great numbers of persons" 
who could technicaUy be described as enemy aliens. Curtin 
reminded parliament that the persons of whom Forde had 
spoken were not enemy aliens, but British, and they were being 
dealt with because Intelligence did have some evidence of their 
subversive activities. Curtin spelt out the role of the govern-
ment as he saw it. The government's first obligation was not to 
judge the evidence or to decide if people were guilty or not, but 
"to take the elementary precaution of removing them from any 
possibiUty of carrying on their activities, until such time as the 
evidence was examined". The evidence in relation to the 20 
people mentioned by Forde was being examined by the Solici-
tor-General, and there would be "no political interference with 
the ordinary processes of law". In response to the Opposition's 
call to intern more enemy aliens, Curtin pointed out that the 
number interned had doubled in the last four months, indicat-
ing that the government did "not need any spur from the 
Opposition" to know its duty. Curtin concluded that "surely" 
no member wanted mass internment, and that selective intern-
ment necessitated investigation by properly appointed officers, 
and this was what was happening. The Chief Commissioner of 
Police in New South Wales, W.J. Mackay, had been appointed 
Dirertor of the Security department, and whUe army officers 
worked under his direction, it was this civilian, "accustomed to 
the detection of crime and to the preservation of law and 
order", who was in charge. 
Arthur Calwell, the recently elerted Labor member for Mel-
bourne, had an antipathy for W.J. Mackay. In Calwell's opinion 
Mackay was "fascist-minded" and simUar to the French police 
chief, Fouche, "who, during the French Revolution and later, 
served every government to his own advantage" .^ •^  Nor was 
Mackay the army's choice. The first dfrector of the Security 
Service was E.E. Longfield-Lloyd, appointed on 5 March 1941. 
Other surveillance authorities were not wiUing to share their 
resources with the new Security Service. The army was not 
willing to give it direct access to censorship facilities nor was 
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the Investigation Branch willing to hand over the MIS cipher 
code. On 4 July W.M. Hughes asked cabinet for an investigation 
of the organisation of the Security Service and Percy Spender 
sought to have MiUtary Intelligence looked at also. The sug-
gested investigator, Lt-Col. J.G. Mawhood of the British army 
and MIS was so unacceptable to the Australian Army that 
cabinet asked A.M. Dvmcan, the Chief Commissioner of Police 
for Victoria, formerly of the Special Branch of Scotland Yard, to 
investigate the Security Service only. Duncan reported to Evatt 
on 7 January 1942 and Mackay was Duncan's suggestion. The 
army wanted Brigadier B. Combes who had headed Military 
Intelligence before the war. Curtin stood by Duncan's advice 
and told Calwell he could argue untU he was "black in the face", 
but the appointment of Mackay was fixed .^ Curtin assured the 
House that the Ausfralia First Movement had been under ob-
servation for some time by both the present and previous 
governments, that a prima facie case had been estabUshed by 
Military Intelligence against those arrested, and that civil 
authorities would be formulating charges for their tiial. The 
debate was continued by two ideological adversaries: W.M. 
Hughes, who predictably emphasised the need for tighter se 
curity and less "blitherfrig about the Bill of Rights and habeas 
corpus and things of that kind"; and Frank Brennan, who de-
plored the baiting of aliens, many of whom were "acknow-
ledged to be exemplary citizens". 
At a less ideological level, G.W. Martens, who represented 
the Herbert electorate from which the majority of recently 
interned men had come, expressed reservations based on per-
sonal knowledge. There were men in internment for whom 
Martens had "a great regard", one being "a very good friend" 
who had contributed to war loans. Martens would continue to 
hold such men "fri esteem" until it had "been proven" that they 
had "done wrong". Martens stated that he had been critidsed 
by people in his own electorate for interceding with the Minis-
ter on behalf of internees, but his enquiries were basically to ask 
that certain cases be investigated. Martens had received resolu-
tions passed at many public meetings requesting him to sup-
port the wholesale internment of enemy aUens, naturalised or 
not, but what he knew of many Italians in North Queensland 
led him "to the opinion that the wholesale internment of aliens, 
and even of so-called enemy aliens", was "not a proper proce-
dure".^^ 
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H.L. Anthony, tiie Country Party member for Richmond, 
based his support for tighter security measures on his conver-
sations with women who had left the TownsviUe, Cairns and 
Irmisfail districts for his northern rivers electorate in New South 
Wales. These people from North Queensland showed "dis-
quiet" about "the colonies of aliens established within easy 
distance of a landing place". Anthony had no faith in naturali-
sation as a guarantee of loyalty; he invoked the poem by Sir 
Walter Scott beginning, "Breathes there the man, with soul so 
dead. Who never to himself hath said. This is my own, my 
native land?" Anthony conceded that wholesale internment 
was "unreasonable and unnecessary", but he felt the govern-
ment should disperse the congregation of people who might 
reasonably be suspected of being wUling to give the enemy aid. 
Anthony was supported by John McEwen, the Country Party 
member for Indi, who said that whUe in peace-time he would 
"fight for the personal freedom and security of the individual", 
in time of perU he had "no hesitation in pladng the security of 
the community above that of the individual".^^ The debate 
eventuaUy ran out of time and most members were satisfied 
that Curtin was arting properly. A debate that had been trig-
gered by the public announcement of the arrest of sixteen 
members of the Ausfralia Ffrst Movement in Sydney and four 
conspfrators in Perth, had much more to say about the attitude 
of Ausfralians to people of Italian origin living on the North 
Queensland coast. It was not disclosed in the debate that, at the 
War Cabinet meeting held on 22 March 1942, there had been an 
extensive discussion on whether there should be total intern-
ments in North Queensland, and that the Advisory War CouncU 
had also debated the matter. 
Coastal Queensland 
In the War Cabinet debate the Minister for the Army explained 
that, as policy stood, people were interned "who were engaged 
in subversive activities" or in regard to whom there were 
grounds for suspidon, and the balance of aliens were called up 
to serve in Labour Units.^^ However, because of the danger of 
possible invasion, Forde had asked the Dfrertor of Military 
InteUigence for his recommendations "in regard to enemy ali-
ens in the vulnerable area in the north-eastern coastal regions 
of AusfraUa". It had been suggested to Forde that all naturalised 
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British subjects of enemy origin should be removed from their 
homes and compelled to live at least 100 miles from the coast. 
The men in this group were "of the farmer type" and were 
alleged to have "nothing less than 3 months supply of food in 
their homes, which might be used for enemy purposes". North-
em Command held the view that everyone of enemy origin — 
men, women and children, naturalised and unnaturalised — 
should be removed despite dislocatior\s, accorrunodation prob-
lems and other difficulties.^^ Roughly 7,500 adult males and 
15,000 women and children would be involved. 
The Chief Commissioner of Police for Queensland, C.J. Car-
roll, made representations through the Director General of 
Security in support of the total evacuation of aliens. Carroll put 
his case "vehemently and passionately", brushing aside any 
doubts.^^ It did not matter that some naturalised North Queen-
slanders had sons in the army. From his long years of study of 
the alien problem, Carroll felt "that everyone of them should 
come out and come out immediately", and "every naturalised 
British subject of enemy origin should be given time to get out". 
In his covering letter Mackay wrote that if removal was ordered, 
Carroll had intimated that "the Queensland Police would be in 
a position to give it immediate effect". 
In the cabinet debate, the army disagreed with Carroll's 
view.^ ° The difficulties of moving over 22,000 people and pro-
viding them with accommodation elsewhere, were too great. 
Lt-Col. C.G. Roberts, Director of Military Intelligence, pointed 
out that Italy was the weakest member of the Axis and that the 
United Kingdom authorities were engaged in a propaganda 
campaign trying to promote "sympathy between the Italian 
peop)le and the British Empire". For this reason "and on hu-
manitarian grounds", Roberts felt that Italian women and chil-
dren should not be "deprived of the protection of their 
merifolk" and left in an area that might be over-run by the 
Japanese. Another major consideration was the panic that 
might develop among other Australians.^^ The vulnerable area 
could be placed imder martial law "when invasion is irrunedi-
ately imminent". This would allow the GOC to "take drastic 
action against any section of the people hindering operations, 
including, if necessary, the execution of participants". For the 
present time, small detachments of a Security Battalion would 
act as a deterrent to aliens and restore the confidence of North 
Queer\sland residents. 
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The Minister's recommendations to War Cabinet were closer 
to those of MUitary Intelligence than to those of Northern 
Command and Inspector CarroU. WhUe Cabinet agreed that so 
many people could not be shifted, it decided that as many of 
the 7,500 adult males as possible were to be caught up immedi-
ately for civilian auxiUary service or for miUtary labour units; 
exfra steps were to be taken to remove as many Germans, male 
or female, as possible; and all sfrategic areas such as aerodromes 
and ports, particularly where American supplies were befrig 
unloaded, were to be cleared of aU alien elements. "Alien 
elements" in this context included Jehovah's Witnesses. Forde 
also recommended that the authorities should "filter through 
in devious official or unofficial ways" to the remaining alien 
elements "that the males so caught up" would be held "as 
guarantees for their good behaviour". He felt that the family 
sentiment of ItaUans was sfrong and would prove "a powerful 
deterrent against hostile artivity". When the military passed 
over the internment poUcy file to the newly expanded Security 
Service in September 1942, the covering letter said that the 
Aliens Service Regulations removed the need for any intensifi-
cation of the army's internment policy.^^ 
The Advisory War Coundl also debated the matter having 
been alarmed by press reports on 8 February 1942 that aliens in 
Queensland had rifles hidden in the cane fields but when the 
CIB interviewed the reporter, he would not be specific. The 
police had coUected arms and ammunition from aliens, and the 
Coundl decided to wait for a report from Lt-Col. Wake as to 
whether mass or selective internment was preferable in North 
Queensland. They also considered the United Kingdom proce-
dure of clearing the vulnerable coastal areas and this would 
have made the coast from Cooktowni to Rockhampton a "pro-
tected area", from which aUens were removed.^ After the War 
Cabinet meeting had dedded on a selective internment policy 
the explanation of the reasons were passed on to the Advisory 
War Coundl. The first two reasons given were the dislocation 
to economic and social life and the effect on public morale. Mass 
internment suggested "something approaching a state of 
panic". The strafri on manpower and material in the exfra 
guards and camps needed, and the fact that even the one disfrict 
that was "critical" enough to warrant mass internment had not 
been recommended for it by the military, were the other two 
reasons. Other measures were being used to deal with the alien 
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problem, including a prohibition on aliens having fishfrig ves-
sels and maps. Internments in Queensland had increased mark-
edly and early in March the Minister's powers over naturalised 
persons had been delegated to the mUitary authorities in West-
ern Australia and on the 17 AprU to the Commandant, 1 MD, in 
order to have any suspert person removed from the vidnity of 
aerodromes, railway junrtions and particularly from ports 
where American suppUes were being unloaded.^ 
Nevertheless, between the cabinet and parliamentary de-
bates in March and the victory in the Battle of the Coral Sea early 
in May, "Omnibus" warrants were used at least twice more in 
Queensland. On 3 April, 68 persons were interned, and six days 
later, 208 were arrested. Many of these internees were detained 
by order of Brigadier A.M. Forbes.^^ There were plans to extend 
internment to all commands "fri accordance with the policy 
now in force in Northern Command", and the Deputy Chief of 
the General Staff, Major-General G.A. Vasey asked each disfrict 
to indicate what internments would follow if they were given 
the same powers. The GOC Western Command could already 
"shape his own internment policy".^^ The Eastern Command 
area quoted the highest numbers, asking to intern 400 immedi-
ately and 2,000 in the event of hostilities on the mainland. 
Southern Command, through Major-General W A. Beevor 
Steele, refused to recommend more than 24 for immediate 
internment and 200 if hostilities came closer. Steele wrote that 
every effort was made "to investigate and intern the more 
suspidous members of the community, whether aUens or oth-
erwise", and while the security position could never be re-
garded "as being entfrely satisfactory" it would be improved 
when the eligible aliens were "drafted into service". There was 
"no evidence to show that the number of aliens at liberty in 3 
MD" had "an adverse effert on public morale". Major-General 
A.C. Fewfrell, Base Commandant, Eastern Command had 
originally recommended 3,000 persons be moved from the area 
within 100 miles of the New South Wales coast but reduced this 
to 2,000 from a 50 mile danger area.^^ Without Southern Com-
mand's support the proposal foundered. There was a higher 
level of concern about aliens and people of enemy origin in 
some states than others. 
In the states where anxiety was highest, released internees 
were reinterned, and others who had not been interned earlier, 
but who had peripheral associations with fascists, were now 
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interned. The secretary of the Queensland German Club was 
arrested early in the mornfrig of 21 February 1942. The only 
additional information against him was a statement by his 
greengrocer, made nine months earlier, that he had made a 
pro-Nazi and anti-British remark.^^ 
A persistent questioner of internment, G.W Martens, wrote 
to Curtin protesting that he had been "astounded to see what 
was taking place in regard to internments" in North Queens-
land. The policy of the government was not supposed to be 
"wholesale internment" but Martens considered that in effect 
it was. He listed about fifteen residents of the Ingham district 
whom he could not understand being interned.^^ Some had 
sons in the AIF and others were young men who had arrived in 
AusfraUa as babies. Afew were membersof the VDC. Some had 
coUerted and given money for pafriotic funds. One had been in 
AusfraUa sfrice 1907. Naturalised and unnaturalised had been 
interned "willy-niUy", and their wives and children left to look 
after the farms. Martens aUeged, that "without charge or inves-
tigation" these men "were put into carriages with barred win-
dows and taken away for God knows why". He told Curtin that 
the local police claimed they did not report these men. They 
said there were some "good Torys (sic)", whom they "would 
very gladly see taken away", still at large. To a radical Labor 
man a "Tory" was a right-wing conservative or quasi-fascist. 
Martens believed the internments to be "nothing short of a 
criminal thing". He assured Curtin that he would not let the 
matter rest and concluded that there were people in the north 
who said all enemy aliens should be interned and "apparently 
they cut more ice with the Brass Hats and the Military Forces 
than any other Power". 
Martens requested the fUes of the men on his list from the 
army.^ o Forde replied that the police had concurred in the 
internments and the Labor government had "consistently op-
posed the poUcy of mass friternments" which so many Queen-
slanders had urged when there was an actual invasion threat.''^ 
The secretary for the Army recommended that the file not be 
made available since it dealt with several hundred internees, 
and would be "of Uttle use", because there were "no particulars 
furnished in regard to the individual internees". Most of the 
men were friterned on bulk orders on the recommendation of 
the GOC, Northern Command. Colonel J.D. Rogers reported 
that the dossiers on the men had been tiransfered to the Security 
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Service but in any case it was considered to be undesirable to 
hand "confidential Army files to Members of Parliament at 
their request".^^ Martens was then referred to the Attorney-
General's Department as it was responsible for the Security 
Service, and Forde passed the problem over to Dr Evatt.^^ 
Who then were the people interned in this period? When war 
began the most dangerous people were taken immediately — 
people such as Nazi Party members, suspected saboteurs, 
members of the enemy's armed forces and criminals. The sec-
ond group of lists comprised those with access to vital installa-
tions and to harbours. These people had been sifted and dealt 
with by internment or restriction if there was any suspicion 
attached to them. There were three more lists, loosely labelled 
C, D and 07'^ The category C lists contained the names of "all 
leaders and people of influence", category D listed all males of 
military age, capable of bearing arms, and category O listed the 
"ordinary harmless people". There were divisions within the 
category C list; List C-3 contained those judged to have an 
"anti-British" history and a capacity to influence others. What 
constituted "anti-British" is unclear. On whatever grovinds 
these people were included as being "anti-British", it had not 
been convincing enough to persuade Menzies' Army Minister, 
Percy Spender, or Labor's Attorney-General, Dr Evatt, before 
his departure overseas, to sign for their internment. During the 
crisis of June 1940 some category C men were interned but, with 
Menzies' intervention and the great military victories over the 
Italian army, internment then ceased. But the lists remained and 
were reactivated when the "barrier " of Singapore fell. After the 
enemy aliens who had failed to register were rounded up in 
February 1942, people from category C and D were collected 
from the northern coastal districts. The category of "leader" or 
"person of influence" inevitably involved many naturalised 
people. They owned land, voted and gave advice to newcom-
ers. They may not have perceived themselves as influential, but 
the very fact that they knew English and translated for others 
made them appear influential to observers. 
Suggesting names for category C was originally the respon-
sibility of the local police but, as the resources of military 
intelligence grew, certain men in the northern areas were re-
cruited as military reporting officers.^^ These men were often 
chosen because their employment made them very knowledge-
able about the district and they frequently met the locals in the 
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course of their work. Men such as cane or stock inspectors, fuel 
agents, carters and businessmen were suitable because their 
work took them around naturaUy. They "kept thefr eyes and 
ears open" and sometimes actively encouraged the alien-born 
to discuss poUtics and the war with them. It became known in 
some communities that these MRO's would be happy to receive 
information, and that the friformant would have complete pro-
tection. In such a situation the opportunity for reports based on 
malice or self-friterest are obvious. In comparison with the 
Vidorian MRO's, there seemed less emphasis on having been 
a World War I officer and there was a committee approach with 
a team of MROs and the local police sergeant. 
When in February 1942, the Army Minister, Frank Forde, 
granted the GOC Northern Command the power to intern at 
his discretion all enemy aliens susperted of "anti-British senti-
ments", and those having "any degree of influence in the 
community", he also agreed that detention orders for natural-
ised people could be held in Northern Command and action 
could be taken without reference to AHQ in an emergency. 
Northern Command did not have to make "separate recom-
mendations" for each person, but could merely send "classified 
lists". This removed the ministerial oversight of orders to intern 
naturaUsed or native AusfraUans in Queensland.''^ 
A naturalised British subject listed in Category C was 
Augusto Orlandi.'^'' He arrived in AusfraUa to cut cane in the 
1925-6 migration boom. After years of work, he and two others 
from the same area in Italy threw in thefr lot together to raise 
the one thousand poimds deposit on a farm. Each man returned 
to Italy to marry, and later had a farruly in Australia. They were 
committed to working together until each famUy was estab-
lished, fri 1940 their farm was flooded and the son of a neigh-
bour was born in Orlandi's bed because no one was able to get 
to town. On the night of 4 AprU 1942, about 9.30 pm, three 
policemen, one of whom Orlandi recognised, came to his house 
and told him he had to go. Although Orlandi was concerned for 
his wife, who had been home only ten days since the birth of 
his own second son, he packed and went, fri the gaol were two 
other locals of Italian origin with whom he had no common 
interest. He never considered that the criterion of having "a 
degree of frifluence fri the community" might have been ap-
plied. Afrnost forty years later his only suggestion as to the 
reason for his internment was his recollection of a conversation 
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with a well-established businessman in the grounds of a local 
hotel. The local plan in the event of invasion was to move inland 
and the busfriessman asked him his views. Orlandi answered, 
"But how far do you want to go? WUl ten miles be safe? Will 
twenty miles?" Personally he did not want to leave his farm. 
Other farmers he knew who came from Northern Italy had 
survived the Austro-German invasion during the Great War 
Orlandi felt it would be better for the family to take its chances 
and remain on the farm rather than to go rushing off into the 
bush with a limited food supply''^ 
The files show that Augusto Orlandi was listed as suspicious 
because a relative in Italy had enquired through the Red Cross 
about a cousin of Orlandi's in Innisfail who had been interned 
early in the war. Orlandi had worked for this cousin when he 
first arrived in Ausfralia, and he insisted that the man was 
anti-Fascist. He also protested in a conversation with a local 
policeman that he had resented his freatment by fascist offidals 
on his frip to Italy. The police were not convinced. His cousin 
must have been under some suspidon to be interned and 
Orlandi's experiences had not put his two partners off return-
ing and marrying Italians. Although the local police said they 
had no evidence of anti-British sentiments or activities, they felt 
that "in common with the greater majority of Italian Nationals 
residing in the district", Orlandi was "an Italian at heart, and 
his sentiments, although not openly expressed" were "defi-
nitely with his native land".''^ Orlandi was unaware that he was 
also reported on by MiUtary Intelligence's informant TR39. 
According to TR39 Orlandi was not "suffidently open" in his 
anti-British sentiments for any one to declare against him. TR39 
understood that a group induding Orlandi had been overheard 
to say that TR39 "would be fixed up if ever their side came out 
on top", but TR39 could not "get even ffrst hand knowledge of 
the exact truth of this statement". 
Ex-internees from other sugar districts also have their theo-
ries about why they were interned. Some feel there was a 
boundary, that is, all the farmers up to a certain creek were 
taken, or those in sfrategic areas such as near sugar mills or on 
evacuation routes. Some talk of photographs taken when an 
Italian warship had visited Cairns some years before. Farmers 
susperted neighbours hoping to take over abandoned farms, 
while local returned soldiers and freemasons were most widely 
suspected by ex-internees of making reports against them. A 
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few cane cutters put their inclusion down to attending a meet-
ing protesting against the introdurtion of labour conscription. 
Other internees speak of more personal reasons, such as com-
petition with a local policeman over a particular woman, dis-
putes with authorities over other matters, and personaUty 
clashes.^ Some internees after forty years reflection beUeve that 
powerftil pressure groups forced the government's hand untU 
it became "politically desirable" to fritern a significant num-
ber.s^  Senator J.I. Armstrong expressed the view in 1950 that, 
"We all know how the security service worked in North 
Queensland. My opinion is that a Ust of Italian canegrowers was 
compiled and almost every second man named on it was in-
terned".^2 AusfraUan neighbours and townspeople also have 
views as to why these internees were taken. A number of 
AusfraUans accept that their neighbours were taken because 
tiiey were enemy aliens and there was a war on. The issue of 
naturaUsation is rejected as irrelevant. Many thought it was a 
good thing in principle, but were surprised at their particular 
neighbour being taken.^^ 
Fred Paterson, the Communist member for the Queensland 
seat of Bowen, that covered the area including Ingham, Home 
Hill and Ayr, pushed the point of biased friternment at the end 
of the war. In November 1945 he expressed dissatisfartion with 
the way poUce had reported on Italians applying for naturali-
sation and claimed these reports were later used to determine 
whether men were interned. Paterson referred to the case of the 
Ingham bootmaker who had left Italy because he was a bitter 
opponent of Fascism and yet who was interned when some 
pro-fascists were not. Another Italian, Tardiani was charged in 
1931 with assaulting the Italian consul and stealing his Fascist 
badge. In his evidence the Consul had sworn that Tardiani was 
an anti-fascist, but Tardiani was one of the first Italians to be 
interned. Paterson wanted an inquiry into whether any mem-
ber of the police force had favoured Fascists in recommenda-
tions for naturalisation and internments.^ Paterson could have 
been correct in suggestfrig that conservative Italians were more 
acceptable to the police than radicals, but when Italy first 
entered the war the Soviet Union had a pact with Germany and 
active communists were regarded as subversive, and the differ-
ence between an active anti-fascist and a communist were not 
always understood. In any case any history of violence or a 
police record was a sfrong contribution to a case for friternment. 
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Many of the men Martens had enqufred about, and otiiers such 
as Orlandi, were friterned "on bulk orders signed by tiie Minis-
ter" and these Usts were concurred in and sometimes even 
suppUed by the poUce. On 14 March 1942, MUitary fritelUgence, 
Brisbane received a letter from Commissioner Carroll enclosing 
a list supplied by the Inspector of Police, TownsvUle, giving the 
names of naturaUsed British subjects of enemy origin in his 
disfrict and recommendfrig some for interrunent.^^ The Inspec-
tor of Police at Townsville had sent this list in response to a 
request from CarroU. The men marked for internment were 
those it was considered would assist the enemy "if a favourable 
opportunity offered". 
In the early stages of the war the local police had been far 
from arbifrary in their recommendations for internment but 
this changed in 1942. Even policemen were afferted by the 
pressures of a war coming closer and closer to the Australian 
mainland. On 22 February 1942 the sub-Inspector of PoUce at 
Innisfail compiled a Ust of 24 naturalised British subjerts and 
five others and transmitted it south, urging that those listed be 
interned. He acknowledged that this list differed from previous 
lists because it included nineteen who had never had a report 
made about them. They were living at Daradee, Garradunga 
and Innisfail and despite the fact that no report existed on them, 
they were now "under strong suspicion regarding their loy-
alty". Now that the war had "definitely reached AusfraUa" the 
policeman considered that these men were "more than Ukely to 
be a danger to the prosecution of the war", and were "a definite 
danger to be at large, particularly in North Queensland". Be-
cause of the war position, he recommended their immediate 
internment.^ Five naturalised British subjects of Italian origin 
and one of German origin on the list were marked as having 
been "kept under particular observation" and having had their 
premises searched. Nothing incriminating had been found or 
observed. Two-thirds of those on the list had neither been 
reported on, nor observed nor searched and the majority were 
naturaUsed. When the earlier strirt adherence to ministerial 
oversight was practised it would have needed some evidence 
before these men would have had detention orders signed 
against them, but now this policeman was recommendfrig that 
men be interned on suspicion unsupported by evidence. His 
superiors and the minister concurred. 
As internment escalated, even lower levels of security risk 
THE BIG ROUND UP 175 
were scooped up. The war situation was critical as Japanese 
troopships rounded New Gmnea just prior to the Battie of the 
Coral Sea. Inspertor CarroU recommended friternment for the 
remafrider of men on the list sent from Townsville, that is, even 
those not marked as being prepared to help the enemy^^ At the 
same time he telegraphed that all men of enemy origin aged 
between 20 and 60 years and living in the Cafrns disfrict, were 
to be interned. AU persons of German nationality were also 
removed. With the extension of internment into the category D 
Italian group, and with most Germans and all Japanese taken, 
a state of total internment was approached. Arrested at 
Mourilyan when this category D "men of mUitary age" list was 
implemented, was Bruno Agricola.^^ Bruno had come to Aus-
tiaUa as a child and his father was naturaUsed and a cane farm 
ovmer. When Bruno turned 21 he registered for the electoral 
roll, was accepted and voted. His father died just at the outbreak 
of war, and in the process of executing the will that left the farm 
equally to Bruno, his sister and his mother, some question arose 
about the nationaUty status of the family. When the mother 
wrote away about it, the official verdict was that the mother was 
deemed to be naturalised by vfrtue of the father's naturalisation 
certificate. His sister was now married to a naturalised man and 
was covered by her husband's certificate, but Bruno was not 
covered. He immediately began proceedings for his own natu-
ralisation but was told that there was a moratorium on natural-
ising people of enemy origfri for the time befrig. Thus Bruno, 
who for 20 years had considered himself an Australian, and as 
a primary producer was in a reserved occupation, became an 
enemy aUen Uving in a coastal area towards which the Japanese 
could weU be heading. 
By the time the Allies confirmed that they had won a sfrategic 
victory in the Battle of the Coral Sea, over 3,000 of the 6,968 male 
aliens registered fri Queensland, or 43 per cent,^^ were interned 
and thousands of others were incorporated into the labour 
battaUons. Jessie Sfreet, Richard HaU and G.W. Martens could 
find plenty of evidence for thefr claims of unreasonable and 
arbitiary internments at this time, but Mr Justice Reed from 
South AustraUa was of the opinion that when an invasion "was 
very much feared, prudence dictated that many men should be 
interned on what was more or less a remote possibiUty that they 
might do some damage or act in a subversive way".'o It was 
impossible to know. Reed concluded, if this fear had any basis. 
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as "the friternment of large numbers, particularly in Queens-
land, in any event prevented attempts on a large scale". In 
Reed's view the precautionary internments during this crisis 
time was justified even if only on the grounds of removing a 
potentially cooperative workforce from the enemy. If the Axis 
forces had landed, and the Italians had an opportunity of 
joining up with them, the position might have been very seri-
ous, in Reed's opinion, for the chief risk about the majority of 
Italians was that, when "in numbers" and "not Ukely to have 
to do any real fightfrig", they would do as they were told by 
anyone in authority over them. 
Such a justification was precisely the view of those in contiol 
of friternment in Queensland during the crisis period. The 
Premier, W Forgan-Smith, the GOC Northern Command, Ma-
jor-General J.M.A. Durrant, and the Police Commissioner, In-
spector C.J. Carroll, had asked in January 1942 for a policy that 
would remove those of enemy origin from the north-east coast 
of their state. This poUcy was also demanded by a large number 
of Queensland citizens and was allowed to happen by a Minis-
ter for the Army, who saw his role as acting on the advice of 
those responsible for IntelUgence and not of judging the evi-
dence. Perceptions of security reached to a level where "non-
British" virtually equated "potential enemy labourer" and an 
unacceptable risk. 
Chapter Eight 
CAMP LIFE 
In January 1943 a total of 16,830 prisoners-of-war and internees 
were detained in AustraUa. Of these 9,000 were civilians and 
the remainder predominantly Italian soldiers captured in 
North Africa. When Rommel's advance in the western desert 
in 1941 posed a threat to Egypt, the Australian War Cabinet 
agreed to take 2,000 of the POWs then held there, raising the 
offer to 50,000 in May 1941, when the situation became desper-
ate, but shipping difficulties kept the number well below this 
figure. The first group of Italian POWs were sent to Camps 7 
and 8 at Hay, and the Dunera internees were moved to Tatura 
and Loveday to make room for them. To accommodate the army 
of POWs who were to follow, further camps were planned for 
Murchison and Myrtleford in Victoria, and Hay and Cowra in 
New South Wales. These camps cost the British government 
£666,000 in capital outlay and 7s a day per prisoner. In July 1941 
the Queen Mary brought Italian POWs to Sydney, via Colombo 
and Fremantle, and from Sydney they fravelled by train to 
Murchison where they lived under tents for some months.^ 
Almost one thousand locally interned Italians were also 
moved from Hay to Loveday to clear the camps for the POWs, 
and they arrived there on 11 and 12 June 1941. They were placed 
in Camp 9 and became the responsibility of Major A. Dick, six 
officers and 116 guards from the 4th Garrison Battalion.^ Many 
of the Dunera internees sent to Loveday were soon returned to 
the eastern states "as most had volunteered for and been ac-
cepted as members of British Pioneer Battalions".^ Major Lay-
ton had embarked the first large group of British internees on 
the Largs Bay in May 1941 and the last large group left in July 
1942.4 By the end of 1943 Layton had arranged for 1,148 to 
return to the UK. The camp they had occupied. No. 10, re-
mained a German-speaking one with Germans from Tatura, 
and a mixture of locaUy interned and overseas internees, in-
cluding men from the Persian Gulf campaign, being housed 
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tiiere. Camps 9 and 10 werebuilt fri the rectangular pattern used 
for the early camps, but the authorities were convinced tiiat the 
new octagonal design with four compounds would be more 
appropriate for the Japanese internees.^ Thus Camp 14 was 
buUt with a large broadway dividing the compounds each of 
which had a capacity to hold one thousand and a guard estab-
lishment four times that of Camp 9. 
Compound 14B was first occupied when 50 Japanese from 
Adelaide River fri the Northern Territory came in on 5 January 
1942. Germans and ItaUans went into Compound 14D, and 
Compound 14C took the NEI Japanese, many of whom were 
inexplicably repafriated in an exchange in August the same 
year. By the end of February, 115 ItaUan internees from 
Gaythorne had moved into Compound 14A and altogether the 
Loveday group held almost 4,000 internees.^ In the first part of 
1942 the atmosphere was tense, and the guards were doubled 
because of fog and the restlessness of some internees buoyed 
up by the Japanese military successes. On 30 April a tunnel was 
discovered in Camp 10. The German-speaking internees had 
dug it from within the compound to under the perfrneter wire 
and its discovery prevented a mass escape. In the exdtement a 
few internees were bayoneted.'' No one was seriously hurt and 
the Official "S s^itor considered that a show of force was necessary 
to convince some internees that the gucirds meant business. 
Throughout the year of large round ups, locally interned 
Italians and Germans moved through the staging camps to 
Loveday. As the numbers grew, two wood-camps, Moorook 
West and Woolenook, were opened up.^ Here internees 
chopped wood for camp use and for sale to the Murray River 
pumping stations. The Group headquarters were originally in 
Camp 9 but by June 1942 the Camp Commandant, Lieutenant-
Colonel E.T. E)ean and the adminisfrative staff moved to a new 
site between Camps 9 and 10. Dean, like tiie Tatura and Hay 
commandants, Tackaberry and Thane, was a World War 1 vet-
eran.9 Born in 1884, Dean joined the First AIF fri September 1915. 
He commanded the 1st Australian Field Artillery Brigade. 
Wounded in June 1917, he rejoined after three months and was 
promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel soon after. He had to be evacu-
ated with influenza and debility in June 1918 but rejofried from 
hospital fri the crudal month of August. At war's end, he 
returned to his home on Karinga Station, near Angaston, SA. At 
the age of 56, this pastoralist had been recalled to take charge 
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of the internment complex near the Murray. Internee numbers 
continued to increase until in November it was dedded to form 
the 33rd Garrison BattaUon, and house it in tents at the western 
end of Camp 14.i°Lt-Col. Dean remained Group Commandant, 
and Lt-Col. R. Soden took charge of the 33rd Battalion and the 
administiation of the four Camp 14 compounds just as almost 
500 ItaUans from Western Command arrived and moved into 
compounds 14A and 14D. 
Fantin's death 
The sudden uprooting of Western AusfraUan internees from 
Harvey was due to the discovery of large numbers of weapons 
concealed fri the camp. Razors, sticks, knives, tomahawks and 
a cUp of bullets were among the collection. ^ ^ A Court of Enquiry 
was held into the adminisfration of Harvey and it considered 
the Commandant had neglected to carry out the stipulated 
security measures.^^ He was removed from command and 
placed on the Reserve of Officers and the internees were moved 
first to Parkeston, near Kalgoorlie, and then to Loveday. Their 
arrival precipitated a politically motivated murder. Political 
divisions between internees had increased with the injection of 
the mass round-up friternees, and compound 14D in particular 
was a very mixed camp with almost thfrty nationalities de-
tained at various times.^ -^ It held some of Britain's anti-Nazi 
internees, some Jews and some Italian anti-Fascists, as well as 
pro-German loyalists and others. The anti-Fascists began a 
subscription list to send aid to Russia,^^ and when the news of 
the group's collertion reached 14A the tensions between intern-
ees peaked. On 16 November Francesco Fantin, an Anarchist, 
who had been the subject of earlier attacks, was set upon by 
Giovanni Casotti, a WA. friternee. Casotti claimed that he 
pushed Fantin in the course of an argument and he fell and hit 
his head on the wooden upright supporting the water tap, but 
some witnesses said Casotti hit Fantin with a wooden stick and 
kicked him when he was on the ground. Casotti did not admit 
his involvement until three days after Fantin's death, and 
pleaded it was an accident. He was charged with murder but 
such a charge raised potentially embarrassing questions about 
the competence of the army's adminisfration of camps, and of 
an internment policy that forced Fascists and anti-Fascists to be 
put in the same camp.^^ 
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The charge was reduced to manslaughter and the trial was 
held in Adelaide on 19 March 1943 before Mr Justice Richards. 
Casotti was found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to two 
years hard labour in a civilian prison. Fantin's death was un-
doubtedly an embarrassment to the camp admfriisfration. It is 
ignored altogether in the published history of Loveday, which 
only mentions the arrival of the Western Australian internees 
on 3 November 1942 and the baking of the first loaves of bread 
in the group's new bakery on 18 November. But mentioned, 
without explanation, is the fact that on 6 January 1943 the 33rd 
Garrison Battalion ceased to function as a separate unit, and 
"the complete control of all camps" came back to Dean.^ ^ 
Fantin had been interned in November 1940 on the basis of 
a police report that he was "a very militant Fascist". An inform-
ant, a British subjert, had stated that Fantfri "had openly ex-
pressed hatred for the British and England", having aUegedly 
said he would rather employ a Hfridu or Afghan "than a bloody 
Britisher". The Brisbane security officer. Commander J.C. 
McFarlane was incUned to beUeve the informant because he 
had given information on several other people that had proved 
correct. Fantin's objection was heard in Brisbane on 20 March 
1942 and leave to appeal was refused. McFarlane conceded on 
8 December that the evidence on Fantin's political opinions was 
conflirting. Fantin was anti-Fascist but he was also an anarchist. 
Anarchists were regarded as being as opposed to democracy, as 
they were to totalitarianism, and if Fantin were to be released 
McFarlane wanted him restricted to the southern states.^^ While 
Brigadier Simpson was reviewing his case, Fantin was killed. 
The Labor government received many protests about Fantin's 
death and the holding of left-wing internees as an apparently 
unprotectable minority in camps with Fascists.^^ The solution, 
segregated camps, was not possible because on 15 May 1943 
Loveday held its maximum number of 5,382 internees.^' Nor 
were the national loyalists or politically neufral internees satis-
fied with the camp arrangement; fri December 1942 a German 
national complafried to the Swiss Consul that loyal Germans 
were compeUed to share the camp with hostile elements such 
as "communists, Jews, half-Jews and others" who gave aid to 
Russia. In the confined space, confrontations could flare up and 
bystanders easUy hurt. A number of North Queensland intern-
ees remembered that old scores were settied in camp with 
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unscrupulous real estate agents and unsympathetic money 
lenders being prime targets.^^ 
Pressures 
It was almost impossible to find solitude and tranquilUty in the 
crowded camps. All camp life was rough and uncomfortable 
even for the young and fit, and it was considerably less palat-
able for the middle-aged. It may be lonely for soldiers joining 
their first units, but the discipline, training and belief in a 
common cause usually create bonds of purpose and comrade-
ship, and there are periods of home and recreational leave. Life 
in an internment camp lacked all these compensations, and 
individual stress often developed into depression. Dortors in-
terned at Hay wrote in late 1940 that there was a growing 
danger of mental breakdowns.^^ Internees had, within a few 
years, "suffered shock after shock, starting with their persecu-
tion in and their expulsion from Nazi-Germany, followed by 
their sudden internment in England, the separation from their 
families, the unexperted shock of the Dunera experience, and 
culminating in the seclusion behind barbed wires in this remote 
disfrict". Some had, "from sheer desperation", fallen prey to 
mental diseases. Others were "on the verge of a mental col-
lapse". 
Emery Bares observed that when his group received news 
that one of them was to be denied the right to appeal, some 
"seemed to be heading for a nervous breakdown". They banged 
the table, screamed and shouted untU they discovered they 
were not the person concerned and then they beceime rational 
and lucid again, but the one actuaUy involved was so close to 
madness that the group felt it lUcely he would kiU himself .^ ^ In 
his report on the Tatura camps fri April 1941, the representative 
of the International Red Cross, Dr G. Morel, mentioned that the 
internees of Section D of Camp 3 wanted regular paid work for 
it would have "a great medical effect" as "an antidote for 
nervous depression, mental sickness and sexual perversity". 
The Loveday OVs received a complaint that there was homo-
sexuaUty in the camp, but felt there was "very Uttle, if any-
thing," that could be done about it.^ ^ 
The only common bond among internees was the fact of 
incarceration. Apart from a few hours spent on rostered camp 
duties, the remainder of the day was broken only by the two 
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roll-calls. There was Uttle space between tiie huts, and even less 
within them, for activities. Men spent hours talking, but con-
versations were often guarded for fear of informers who would 
convey comments to the internal camp power clique or to the 
AustiaUan autiiorities. Charles Willyan, a 64-year-old Ausfra-
lian of Welsh parents, interned in 1942, wrote that he was 
approached shortly after his arrival at Camp lA Tatura "by a 
very cordial AusfraUan internee with a disarming 'comrades in 
adversity' air, and a line of patter inviting redprocal confi-
dences".24 He fUled the man's head with sudi fabrications that 
camp InteUigence called him in. Later he saw an friternee leader 
demand the removal of a detected spy within an hour, backed 
by the threat that otherwise "he would be thrown over the fence 
in pieces". Gus Orlandi told a chatty man standing beside him 
as they were watching the Italian internees playing a hard game 
of soccer that it was ridiculous to have "the best workers in the 
world" spending their energies in camp with the country des-
perately short of manpower, only to discover later that he was 
talking to an InteUigence Officer.^ The Australia First leader, 
Stephensen, refused to speak to von Skerst at Liverpool for 21 
months, even though they sat at the same table, because he 
suspected the authorities were using Skerst in the hope of 
obtaining information. Stephensen was confronted by Major 
Hill at Loveday, the morning after an internees' meeting, with 
quotes from his own speech.^^ The crashing bores who desper-
ately regaled anyone who would listen with a catechism of their 
woes were also to be avoided. 
Each man suffered his own private hell. Tensions, frusfra-
tions and worries had untold hours to build up and personaUty 
clashes and petty frritations were inevitable. On rare occasions 
internees attempted suicide. The first successful suidde among 
the ItaUans at Loveday occurred on 1 January 1942. Those who 
suffered nervous breakdowns were sent to mental institii-
tions.27 Most internee anxieties centred on concern for their 
families' economic vulnerability, conjugal fidelity or physical 
safety. For a long time money could not be transfered to Italy 
and enquiries about a restoration of financial fransactions with 
ftaly were constantiy directed to the Swiss Consul and to Aus-
fraUan authorities.28 Dependent wives and chUdren living in 
AustraUa were eligible for sustenance from the beginnmg of the 
war. On 29 AprU 1941 de facto wives, other dependents, female 
crew members and other enemy aliens whose employment or 
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business disappeared because of National Security regulations, 
became eUgible for sustenance also. The Army Pay office in 
Brisbane recorded that five and a half thousand pounds were 
paid to the Queensland government for the period 1 AprU to 30 
June 1942. This went to 523 dependent wives and 877 children 
of internees.2^ 
A sfrong element in a few breakdowms was the psychological 
inabiUty to accept prisoner status and its dehumanising treat-
ment, lack of individual consideration and above all, its conno-
tations of criminality. The overwhelming majority of internees 
had never been in gaol before. The first rught they spent in the 
local cell was a fraumatic experience. Most country gaols sel-
dom housed anyone but local drunks. Oswald Bonutto wrote 
of his experience in the Warwick watch-house with five other 
men arrested at the same time: 
There were no mattresses, paUiasses or beds of any description, 
only some straw and two filthy blankets each, which undoubtedly 
had been used by drunks and had not been washed afterwards. 
They had a foul smeU of stale Uquor and something worse . . . That 
particular night the temperature was weU below freezing point. We 
spread the straw on the cement floor as evenly as we could . . . and 
there we spent our first night in jaU Uke drunks or ordinary felons, 
punished before we were even charged or convicted. Sleep would 
not come, so we kept talking and tossing about aU night. I could 
hear the Warwick Towm HaU dock stiUdng every hour. The night 
was an eternity. 
When Bonutto complained about the "pigsty" of a cell the 
poUce sergeant protested that there was nothing better to 
hand as "this situation was so unexpected". He was able to 
find some clean blankets and some more straw for the second 
night.30 
In the summer of 1941-2 Emery Bares found the small police 
cell at Kfrigsford Police Station, Sydney no better: 
The whitewashed waUs and the cement floor looked clean enough, 
but a penetrating smeU poUuted the afr. Behind a low brick partition 
a WC out of order explained the stench. Acouple of small bedboards 
stood propped against the waU. I laid one down, sat on it, lit my 
pipe, and laughed nervously. 
I sat there for perhaps half-an-hour, when the door creaked and a 
young man . . . entered. He glanced at me apprehensively . . . 
He takes me for a pickpocket I thought... two middle-aged men 
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joined us and a poHceman tiirew us a bundle of blankets. We didn't 
need them, for the animal warmth of five bodies turned tiie small, 
airless ceU into a suffocating hot-box . . . 
Soon the fleas which inhabited the blankets were feasting on our 
blood and, as there was no chance of sleeping, we taUced.3i 
On the journey to camp men were confused and anxious and, 
once at camp, the regimentation began. All their correspon-
dence was prefixed with their number, and sometimes even 
their huts were allocated by their number. Camp rules were 
explained as soon as they arrived, and they and their luggage 
were searched. The most contentious item removed from in-
ternees were razor blades and arguments over whether they 
should be allowed were conducted through the International 
Red Cross.32 After the first meal the camp commandant often 
spoke to large groups explaining the rules and assuring the 
intake of corrert freatment and requiring the friternees' coop-
eration. When individuals joined estabUshed camps they were 
handed over to the internal camp leader for allocation of huts 
and infroduction to rules and regvdations. The commandant's 
speech was often translated by the camp interpreters and in-
cluded the standard warning to keep three yards back from the 
wfre or the guards would have no option but to shoot.^^ How-
ever, no internee was shot by guards and those who died in 
camps were mainly Japanese with malaria or the complaints of 
old age.34 Bares found his induction speech at Liverpool most 
candid: "Captain B. delivered a short and (to us) surprising 
speech. He pointed out that things might not be up to standard, 
the food could be better and more plentiful, but we newcomers 
had arrived unexpectedly and the miUtary authorities had no 
time to supply additional rations. He asked us to be patient, for 
in a few days the situation would improve. Then he warned us 
not to pUfer the new tomatoes from the vegetable garden at the 
end of the camp, because 'everyone would receive some' ".^ 
Shortly after arrival at camp friternees were usually given the 
form on which they could lodge their objection.^^ Some only 
appealed when prompted,37a few claim they never knew they 
could^s and merchant seamen, who were interned because they 
refused to work ships, did not tiy to obtain release.^^ Most 
internees did make some attempt to get released and while 
hopes of an early release were high, camp Ufe was tolerated 
frnpatiently and many refused to join in the activities estab-
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lished to relieve the boredom. But when delay followed delay 
it became harder to ignore the fact that the weekly letter, the 
occasional parcel, and elementary camp routine were going to 
be the whole of one's life for longer than expected. Men coped 
with this realisation and came to terms with thefr environment 
and their fellow internees in a variety of ways. Some men gave 
loyal and professional service to the camp school, and buUt it 
up to a high standard from which urdversity entrance was 
possible, whUe others worked consistently on musical activities 
and entertainments. Two notable camp teachers were Hans 
Lindau and Father Konig.^° 
Another busy minority were the camp "executives". Each 
compound had a camp executive group comprising a Camp 
Leader and a Deputy, a Secretary, Quartermaster, Banker, Li-
brarian, Canteen Supervisor, Works Manager and one Hut 
Leader from each sleeping hut. They met frequently to admin-
ister the compound's affafrs. It was this group's "ready co-op-
eration" that made the smooth running of the compound 
possible.'^ ^ WhUe these were full time jobs, and sought for this 
reason and for the status they gave,^ they were avaUable only 
to a fraction of the inmates. Those internees with special knowl-
edge or skill gave occasional lectures and those with a good 
command of English tutored the many internees anxious to 
improve their own. Many men also used the opportunity to 
improve their literacy in thefr own language. But while time 
hung heavily, many men could not settle to serious study. Sports 
were organised and were a usefiU temporary outlet. The fact 
was that many internees reaUy missed steady work. Lt-Col. 
Dean at Loveday saw the need to satisfy this lack, as crudal to 
camp harmony and morale.'*^ The question of payment was a 
problem, but even before the one shilling a day rate was agreed 
to. Dean found enough Italian internees at No. 9 Camp on 16 
June 1941 to begin work without payment on projects outside 
the compound.'^ Payment of a shilling a day was sanctioned a 
month later. 
Some Italians took the view that any work was indirectly 
giving assistance to the national enemy and refused to take part, 
but, after the military collapse of Italy in 1943, there was a rush 
to volunteer for work. The few who stiU considered it unpatri-
otic formed a "True Italian Movement", but it folded when the 
commandant gave insfructions that it was to cease operation, 
altiiough for some months afterwards security was convfriced 
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that the group in one hut were actively dissuading Italians from 
joining the Allied Works Council.^^ x^g threat that they were 
alleged to use was that they would tell the Swiss Consul that 
the volunteer was not a loyal Italian and recommend that he 
not be allowed back into Italy after the war. The Swiss Consul 
refused to co-operate, and his representative to Loveday, Mr E. 
Brack, offered his opinion that internees should work to fit 
themselves for earning a living outside and that while they did 
not work on munitions, fortifications or transport, they would 
not be acting against Italy's national interest.*^ The hard-liners 
still refused to work, but they were so few that their influence 
was minimal. 
Some nattiralised Italians felt it was undignified to work 
because it meant identification with foreign nationals and be-
cause there were so many indigent internees who needed the 
money desperately. Gus Orlandi did not work for this reason. 
Like many naturalised citizens with some means he was sent 
the maximum allowed, five pounds per week, from home. The 
majority of Italians did labour within the compound on their 
own vegetable plots; they also worked outside the compound 
on camp projects, and when the opportunity to join the Allied 
Works Council arrived, they enlisted. Thane and Dean correctly 
assessed that the need to work was almost integrated into the 
personality of the recently-arrived Italians who formed the bulk 
of the early Hay and Loveday camps, and that farming in 
particular appealed to them.^'' 
The Germans were regarded as too great a security risk to be 
offered work outside the camp until very late in the war, but 
even then many Germans felt it was totally unacceptable as a 
matter of principle.'^ The delay in offering work to Germans 
meant that destitute internees who might have wanted to stay 
neufral were forced by economic necessity to accept the Ger-
man government's Reichgulde pocket money which carried the 
understanding that the recipient would be loyal to Germany 
and seek repatriation to no other country at the end of the war.^ ^ 
As the earliest German internees were those aligned with the 
Nazi Party and who had established themselves as the internal 
power clique of Camp 1, Tatura, and Camp 10, Loveday,^ it 
took a sfrong-minded individual to reject the pocket money and 
the commitment to Hitler's Germany that went with it.^ ^ For 
those who found the prospect of social ostracism — or worse 
— too daunting, the safest thing was to go along with the 
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established group. Welfare workers who visited a youth re-
ferred to them by the Student Christian Movement, found him 
delighted to see them on their first visit. He was much more 
reserved on their second visit, and refused to see them at all 
when they came the third time. The visitors were surprised,^^ 
but the youth had to make his own judgement as to whether his 
best interests were served by a one-hour visit a month from 
people regarded as enemies by his fellow internees, with whom 
he had to interact every day 
Camp organisation 
The style of camp organisation adopted by the miUtary tended 
at times to assist the more extreme political activists to gain 
power,^ 3but some form of a hierarchical system had to operate. 
It was the practice in prisoner-of-war camps to leave internal 
organisation and disdpline to the ranking officers, and with the 
shortage of staff in the Garrison there was practically no alter-
native for internment camps. Camp leaders, chosen by various 
methods ranging from a quick show of hands to a full-scale 
election, had more and more adminisfrative work devolved on 
them. The choice mainly fell on those who were sodally and 
inteUectually prominent, because they were willing to stand 
and because the elertorate chose to reproduce the external 
social structures with which they were famiUar. Men Uke Prince 
del Drago, who was camp leader of the Italians at Hay and 
Camp 9, Loveday, and von Graf, a German leader at Loveday, 
exempUfy the deference to social status. Doctors, such as J.H. 
Becker and M. PisciteUi were compound leaders, and lawyers 
were also frequently chosen. The articulate Oswald Bonutto 
was a compound leader, and the journalist Emery Bares was the 
first spokesman for the Hungarians. Men with good educa-
tional background had the advantage of being able to perform 
the administrative tasks and were frequently literate in more 
than one language, so negotiations with camp authorities could 
be carried on dfrertly. This pattern of deference to higher status 
men was similar in Canada where the grandson of Kaiser 
Wilhelm II was the camp leader at Farnham, Quebec, and the 
inteUectual, Hefriz Arnt, was his deputy^ 
The compound leaders reported to the orderly room every 
day They met camp commandants when specific problems 
arose, and some camps had scheduled meetings. The Official 
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Visitor, and the representatives of the Protecting Power and the 
Red Cross dealt directly with camp leaders, as did the welfare 
officers appointed by the YMCA, the refugee organisations and 
the Society of Friends. Often camp leaders wrote letters on 
behalf of internees and they were frequently asked for advice. 
They wrote references for those seeking work outside. A few 
naturalised Australians who were Justices of the Peace also 
assisted by witnessing documents until the authorities decided 
this was inappropriate and had their commissions with-
drawn.^^ 
Outward mail for censorship and inward mail and parcels 
passed through the camp leader's office. At Gaythome the 
practice of hut leaders collecting mail and delivering it to the 
sergeant of the Guard led to a complaint that some internees 
were being intimidated by having their mail held and read by 
camp leaders.^^ Although the GOC, Northern Command, con-
sidered there was no opportunity for abuse, the system was 
frowned on by AHQ. Other responsibilities of the camp leader, 
such as rostering camp duties, allocating huts and negotiating 
with outside representatives gave the camp leader considerable 
authority and this was usually backed by Australian authori-
ties. Camp leaders could punish internees who offended 
against camp rules, failed to perform their duties or who were 
insolent to the camp leader. In one case, at Harvey Camp, the 
commandant sanctioned a more severe punishment for an 
internee who was insolent to the camp leader than to one who 
insulted a guard.^''All punishments issued by the camp leader 
were supposed to be reported to the guard officer but this could 
not be guaranteed. In exchange for this delegated authority, the 
camp leader had to run an orderly camp. 
While it is obvious that the camp leaders had the opportimity 
to use political influence and to indulge in personal discrimi-
nation, they also had to spend a lot of time on paperwork and 
in enforcing hygiene rules. Because cleanliness was so impor-
tant, the cook and the sanitary workers were always paid. All 
other camp work was not paid and was rostered. Loewald 
recorded his camp duties: 
The highest salary was 3s 6d a week earned by the greasetrap 
cleaners and the latrine party members . . . I held a variety of posi-
tions, beginning as a night watchman . . . it was our duty to prevent 
the elderly whom the weakness of their bladders drove out of bed 
at night from emptying ihem against the huts, to watch for possible 
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fires, and to wake ffrst the stokers and kitchen staff, and then at 6.15 
the entke camp for the ffrst roU-caU. We ran two-man, two-hour 
shifts beginning at 11 p.m. and obtained small extra rations for them 
from the kitchen.58 
This was the more typical experience of the majority of 
internees for, while camps did have some "quality" dramatic 
and musical performances and some calming religious influ-
ences, camps were basically rough and ready places where 
good order had to be enforced. 
Order was not as hard to mafritain in some camps as in 
others. The Japanese were orderly, even submissive, and in the 
Tatura family camps friternees tried to reproduce suburbia by 
planting flowers around the front steps, providfrig a good 
school and keepfrig up cultural and reUgious observances. 
Many internees were not reunited with their families until later 
in their internment, and then the threat of being returned to the 
all-male camps in the outback was a powerful one. One of the 
stiongest complaints from the family camp came when the 
authorities decided to withdraw hygienic towel pads from the 
free-supply list and put them in the canteen.^^ This is not to 
suggest that the family camps were politically neutial or indif-
ferent; they were frequently blatantly pafriotic in an effort to 
maintain the children's affiruty with the homeland and culture. 
They were orderly because they were a more sedate group than 
some of the single-sex compounds. By confrast many of the men 
in the Loveday camps were from occupations characterised by 
hard work and hard living. Seamen, charcoal burners, fisher-
men and miners were used to settling their arguments with 
their fists, and mothers of boys in the family camps were fearful 
when their sons became too old to stay and were transfered to 
Loveday.^ ° The roughness did not develop at the family camp, 
where Ethel Punshon took the Japanese women and children to 
picnics at the Waranga Dam. Because they would spread out 
and were slow to hear her shouts when it was time to pack up, 
one of the guards made her a tin whistle at the camp workshop, 
and its piercing summons could not be ignored. The interned 
Japanese acrobats from Wirth's Circus always provided a pro-
fessional finale to camp concerts.^^ 
The rough and ready atmosphere at Loveday was exacer-
bated when the ItaUans went out to pick grapes and illicit stills 
began to operate, and as the older "Digger" guards were re-
placed by less responsible yoimger men who were not averse 
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to smuggling in contraband. Gambling was a more popular 
recreation among the hard-nosed inmates of Loveday than the 
callisthenics, libraries and concerts of the earlier camps. Fortu-
nately, Dean's persistence against "political indifference which 
amounted almost to opposition" resulted in the first 2-acre 
vegetable plot being expanded into 440 acres of cultivated land. 
Loveday had an initial advantage because it stood in an area 
that had been a World War I soldier settlement and was reticu-
lated with underground pipes which were fully maintained. 
Development was never extensive until the cheap labour of the 
internees made possible a variety of projects, including grow-
ing experimental crops of opium poppies for morphine, p5nre-
thrum for insecticides and the Mexican guayule shrub for the 
production of rubber. In establishing these projects and the 
internal workshops which were eventually to produce one 
hundred thousand pounds worth of produce and forty-one 
thousand povmds in net accumulated profit. Dean's problems 
paralleled Thane's in the early days of Hay.^^ 
At first supplies of stores and equipment for Loveday were 
difficult to obtain in sufficient quantities to fulfil initial entitle-
ments and replacements were equally hard to get. Clothing and 
necessaries for average-sized men eventually became adequate 
but non-standard sizes were always in short supply. There was 
great difficulty obtaining bread from local contractors as the 
camp numbers grew, so two large ovens, each capable of hold-
ing 380 loaves, were installed in a field bakery, at which yoimg 
army bakers were trained.^ The huts in Camps 9 and 10 were 
originally built with bunks down the cenfre but these were 
unsatisfactory "and were replaced by beds". These wooden 
beds were made by internees in the workshops and provided 
to all "Europeans". The huge hot-water systems that serviced 
the ablution blocks were fired by wood cut by internees. 
The Official Visitors to Loveday were K.V.F. Sanderson, KC, 
and W.V. Ray. Sanderson, in particvilar, took his role very seri-
ously. He warned that the influx of Western Australians into 
camp 14D Loveday had caused "turmoil" and predicted blood-
shed if the different groups were not segregated.^"* He also 
scrutinised the physical condition of the camps and listened to 
individual internees problems. He sfrongly criticised anything 
he felt was not up to standard or showed a lack of humanity. 
The lack of fly-proofing in the kitchen and mess huts in Camp 
9 brought a protest. When the Group Engineer replied that the 
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fUes could be dealt with by "liberal applications of fly spray and 
swats", Sanderson retorted that using large quantities of kero-
sene-based spray near food was wasteful and impractical and 
"would probably lead to contamfriation".^ Sanderson also crit-
idsed the camp administration for some things over which they 
had Uttle control. One friternee had gone bUnd and, in aU 
humanity, it seemed reasonable to release him, but these deci-
sions were for tribunals or the Security Service, which in late 
1941 was only a minuscule organisation, newly given the re-
sponsibility for internment. Another major complaint was mis-
placement of internees' property and long delays in transfering 
their money. The property confiscated from the Romolo's crew 
in June 1940 had not been accounted for by October 1941, and 
an internee arrested in Tangool, Qld, on 11 June 1940 had no 
word of two frunks of clothing and tools taken from him at the 
police station, despite 15 months having elapsed and Mr Justice 
Davidson's enquiries in March 1941 when the friternee was at 
Hay. Sanderson gave examples of inordinate delays in transfer-
ing money from other camps to Loveday, and he was clearly 
sympathetic with the internees who had to go without the smaU 
comforts provided by the canteen, not because they coiUd not 
afford them, but because thefr money had not come through. 
He often punctuated his list of complaints by individuals with 
sarcastic comments of his own: if "the adminisfration of intern-
ees affairs could be raised to the standard of the average Gov-
ernment Department", it would not be asking much, most 
internees' complaints wotdd disappear and "it would save the 
Official Visitor a good deal of exasperation and wasted time".^^ 
Loveday officers defended themselves agafrist Sanderson's 
barbs. They were disappointed that the internees had not con-
fided their problems to the camp staff instead of bottling it up 
for the Offidal Visitor.^'' There appears to have been a degree of 
mistiust between the ItaUans and the original Camp 9 com-
mander. In May 1942 the Camp 9 internees were so bitter about 
the extieme and sudden censorship of newspapers that they 
went on sfrike and ceased working outside the compound.^^ 
The Camp Commandant also decided to ban the singfrig of the 
Italian National Anthem, and the organiser of a concert which 
ended with the singing of the "Giovinezza" was put fri the cells 
for 28 days, the maximum aUowed under the regulations. 
Brigadier Bundock, Commandant, SA L of C Area, made some 
fransfers^^ that apparently improved matters. When the OVs 
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made their final report fri 1942, they wrote that co-operation 
between the compound leader and the new commandant. Ma-
jor Hill, "appeared to be excellent".7° 
Sanderson did acknowledge later that many problems were 
the result of incompetence in "one or more camps in tiie eastern 
States" and tiiat the Loveday admfriish-ation had been "consci-
entious and painstaking". Most of the justifiable complaints 
were due to imderstaffing, particularly in the Paymaster's 
branch. Nevertheless, Sanderson never puUed his punches and 
he warned the mUitary that they could expect much more 
trouble from the Germans if their affairs were not handled more 
expeditiously than those of the Italians had been. For a time the 
Germans in camp 10 remained aloof from the Offidal Visitor, 
apparently content to use direct negotiations with the camp 
authorities and to deal with the Protecting Power and the Red 
Cross. In assessing the roles of the various authorities, Lt-Col. 
Dean was of the opinion that at times the Offidal Visitors and 
the International Red Cross usurped the prerogative of the 
Protecting Power," thereby causing dupUcation of work".^ ^ He 
may well have also wished for a less bitfrig Official Visitor 
Conditions at Camp 9 obviously improved. When Sanderson 
made a subsequent visit on 14 and 15 July 1942, the Internees' 
Representative had "no question of outstanding urgency or 
importance" and there were only the individual complaints. By 
this time the inmates of Camp 10 had dedded to accept visits 
from the Official Visitor, and the pattern of problems was simi-
lar. Internees had binoculars and cameras taken from them in 
February 1942, and they had no receipts for them or definite 
word of whether they had been impressed or not. A group of 18 
Hungarians brought to Australia from Basra on the Rohua had 
their money taken from them on board, and it had not arrived 
at Loveday, leaving the group destitute as the Hungarian gov-
ernment did not provide their nationals with pocket money 
Internees from Suez, Palestine, Egypt, and Iraq were stiU await-
ing the balance of their money. Tobacco supplies to the canteen 
were irregular. The transfer of two particular men beUeved to 
be anti-Fascists from Camp 14D to Camp 10 was brought up, 
and Sanderson "received the clearest possible warrung from the 
German Leader that these two men were likely to be ill-treated 
if they were left fri Camp 10". Sanderson spoke to Lt-Col. Dean 
and he arranged for one to return to 14D, but the other chose 
"to run the risk of stayfrig with the Nazis". Overall, Sanderson 
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was pleased with the situation in Camp 10. Morale was "excel-
lent" and, although the camp held the "most potentially trou-
blesome elements" in the Loveday group, there was 
"practicaUy no sign of Ul-wiU on the part of the internees, and 
a minimum of friction between them and the staff". Sanderson 
considered that it was Lt-Col. Soden's "exercise of tact and good 
sense" that had achieved this commendable state of affairs.''^ It 
was probably also the homogeneous grouping of the most 
pro-German friternees. 
The guards 
The critidsm of aspects of camp administration must be bal-
anced against the consistent comments of the critics that the 
men on the job were cooperative and sincere in dofrig their best 
for the internees and also against the situation in the overall 
AusfraUan community, fri February bicycles, guns, bfrioculars 
and cameras were impressed from everyone who could not 
show why they needed them in the national interest. In North 
Queensland, farmers had thefr crawler tractors taken, and even 
homes and schools were commandeered. Tobacco was rationed 
and supplies were unpredirtable everywhere, and petty theft 
was not unknown among postal and raUway staff.'''' Backlogs 
in paperwork were directly related to imderstaffing and un-
frained staff. The Garrison BattaUons were consistently under-
manned and ex-World War I diggers. Class B medical conscripts 
and the returned wounded did not easUy convert into paymas-
ters or typist-stenographers. In other military units the solution 
was to use women typists, many of whom flocked into uniform, 
but they were not considered a practical alternative in intern-
ment camps.''^ Two features of Australian internment camps 
must also be kept in mind when the legitimate criticisms of 
Official Visitors and others are considered. They are ffrstly that 
in their custodial role AustiaUan guards were tolerant but 
effective, and that secondly complaints were individual. There 
was no systematic theft by Australians like that committed by 
the Dunera guards; nor was there brutality or starvation as in 
concenfration camps run by the Japanese and Germans. 
It could be argued that the nature of the Australian country-
side made for effective imprisonment. There were few escapes 
from camps, and from Loveday no successful ones. The black 
fracker, Jfrnmy James, Uved in the River Murray district, and he 
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found escapees witiiin hours of thefr departure. The fact tiiat 
Austi-aUa is an island also made total escape difficult and 
consequentiy few tried .^ ^ Qnly tiie ItaUan POW Lt Edgardo 
Simoni made consistent "successful" escapes. Thus the Garri-
son's real achievement lay fri keeping up the morale and health 
of their prisoners confined for so long fri a dusty camp of huts 
and flies. The overall lack of epidemics coiUd be partly credited 
to the internees themselves, but constant regular supervision 
by the guards was crucial. Food was also more plentiful in 
Australia than in the war-torn counfries, but what continually 
impressed internees was the fart that they received the same 
rations as their guards, and that they were similarly housed. It 
was the Garrison's adherence to the letter and spirit of the 
Geneva Convention, this sense of fair play, that maintained the 
internees' morale; it gave them physical security and freedom 
from fear of their captors. 
It must be credited to the Garrison froops that they were able 
to achieve this success agafrist the odds. Their needs were 
accorded a low priority, they had few recreational outlets and 
they were sometimes punished in the same ceU blocks as the 
prisoners. It was not easy to remain enthusiastic, given the 
isolation, work sfress and low status they suffered. In some 
ways they were as isolated and as much the victim of war's 
fortune as the prisoners were. When Margaret Pierce and Alf 
Clarke, from the Society of Friends, visited the Hay camp in 
January 1941 they talked to soldiers of all ranks. Pierce and 
Clark noticed among those of higher rank a resentment that the 
internees had visitors and well-wishers while "no one seemed 
to give a thought to the needs of the Garrison". When the two 
welfare workers enquired, they found that there was no Lord 
Mayor's Comfort Fund and no canteen except one run by 
volunteer women a mile away from camp. The recreation hut 
was "cheerless and ill-equipped". Most of the Garrison then at 
Hay were middle-aged "diggers" whose famiUes lived ki otiier 
parts of New South Wales. The leave roster took insufficient 
account of travellfrig time, so the men did not get home often.^ ^ 
Many internees specifically testified to the humanity of the 
AusfraUan guards. Konig wrote that when he and his feUow 
internees left Hay tiiey took leave of the "tough but good-na-
tured guards and the sergeant-major, a former trooper in India", 
whom he once saw sitting beside a crying boy trying to cheer 
hfrn up.77 Bares wrote that at no time had the internees in 
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Liverpool or Tatura reason to feel bitter toward the men whose 
duty it was to keep them there. When a group of Japanese nickel 
miners from New Caledonia suddenly arrived at Liverpool 
camp, they were left outside while the other internees went into 
lunch. Thfriking the Japanese would be forgotten, the first 
group fed them through the window. "No sooner had they 
finished our lunch". Bares wrote, "than they were ordered to 
queue up for their meal: rice with tomato sauce. Each man 
received huge helpings. "Did you think we wanted to starve 
the poor devils?" Lieutenant S. asked."''^ The wardress at Liv-
erpool, Mrs Samphia, was "enthusiasticaUy eulogised" by 
every woman internee Davidson had ever visited there.''^ In the 
newspaper reports of the Deportation trials, held at the end of 
the war, a commentator said that it spoke "volumes" for the 
AusfraUan guards that after fifty cases only one internee at the 
inquiry had critidsed the camps, and then only the food.^° 
Internees' complaints 
Internees' complaints were directed against policy and its ef-
fects on them as individuals. Camp Ufe was unacceptable to 
many because they felt they ought not to have been there at all, 
and because it endangered the economic security that migrants 
had worked hard to establish for themselves and their families. 
Being interned was particularly upsetting to the naturalised 
and long-term residents, and a survey of the Official \^sitor's 
reports on Loveday in 1942 reveals some amazing situations.^' 
There were 17 native-born internees from Queensland who 
petitioned the Prime Minister, only to have the camp comman-
dant invoke a regulation preventing communications with poli-
ticians.^2 A man born in Switzerland was naturalised and had 
lived in Australia for 32 years. His internment left his family 
destitute, 670 miles out in the bush and away from their home 
in Mackay. The Official Visitor felt it was "reasonably probable 
that he had been wrongly interned", and asked that his case be 
looked into. Another man was an Australian-born Chinese who 
had been mistaken for a Japanese but who had not been put in 
the Japanese compound for fear of violence to him. A "Loyal 
Free Norwegian" seaman was held under Regulation 14A, 
which stated that he would not be released until he had rejoined 
a ship, as he had always been willfrig to do from the day of his 
arrest in October 1941. Sanderson considered that British justice 
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had come "to a pretty pass" when a friendly alien could be so 
tireated. A naturalised AusfraUan of German origm, who had 
been told twice by InteUigence officers in Tatura tiiat his Uitern-
ment was a mistake, received his call up to report for duty with 
the RAAF, for he was on that force's reserve. 
Long-term residents, many of them naturalised, also became 
agitated about the danger to thefr livelihood. A fisherman's 
boats were left in tiie river at Tuncurry SA, fri the charge of his 
wife and his son, who was not in tiie AMF. When the boats were 
shifted, he wanted his boy to be allowed to continue looking 
after them because if they were not periodically hauled out, 
scrubbed and pafrited, the teredo worms would begin eating 
the planking. The thirteen fishermen from Port Pirie were wor-
ried about thefr boats for the same reason, and also because 
their Italian friends were afraid of being interned if they took 
care of them.^^The son of a tobacco farmer from Texas, Qld, had 
continued workfrig the family property and used the tractor for 
cultivating and pumping water, but was stopped from driving, 
presumably because he was under age. To prevent the crop 
faUing, the interned farmer asked that his son be given special 
permission to drive the fractor. Another Queenslamd internee 
had been forced to leave a bUnd wife, and his famUy were "in 
a pitiful condition". Another wfre needed the number of her 
husband's naturalisation certificate in order to get her clothing 
coupons but, although the certificate had been handed over to 
the army, it could not be foimd. The owner of a bicycle and 
gunsmith's shop in Hfridley Sfreet, Adelaide, had guns belong-
ing to his customers as well as his stock taken without a receipt. 
A farmer from Innisfail was trying to get his cane cut, but the 
only member of his family not interned was his 74-year-old 
wife. His seven-room home had been let out to a bank manager 
for 35s per week, but the manager unUateraUy reduced the rent 
to lOs a week.^ 
It might be thought that some internees unduly dweU on 
their material possessions, but fri most cases these friternees 
represented the pioneering generation of their famiUes. They 
had deliberately left their homeland to make a secure place for 
their children in a new land, and any economic progress tiiey 
had made was hard won. At the base of almost all individual 
complaints was concern for famiUes, and Sanderson was espe-
cially outspoken about cases where family ties were disre-
garded. One internee was friformed by his 12 year-old daughter 
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that her 17 year-old sister had been interned and neither he, nor 
his interned wife fri Tatura, had been able to discover her 
whereabouts. Sanderson wrote that when "the requirements of 
security have been met by the friternment of children, common 
decency" required that parents be informed immediately 
While the Official "Visitors had come to regard "a certain amount 
of stupidity as inevitable", they could not resign themselves "to 
conduct callous enough for the Gestapo". In another case a man 
was visited by his mother-fri-law and 3 year-old daughter who 
had come from Melbourne to Loveday. The interned man was 
not aUowed to take the child fri his arms. Sanderson asked that 
in cases like these the regulations be relaxed for this kind of 
"iron rigidity, backed by law, but not by common sense", made 
a "deplorable impression on the camp as a whole".^^ 
In one way, local-resident internees had an advantage: they 
had some authority to complain to. There were groups of over-
seas internees whose problems the Official Visitor was at a loss 
to know where to direct. Men interned in Teheran were brought 
via Bombay and told that thefr cases would be frivestigated. 
One claimed to be a member of the Free Austria Movement, had 
volunteered for a Labour Unit and been sent to pick fruit at 
Bendigo, before being separated from the unit and sent to Camp 
14D without explanation. Major Layton, the Liaison officer sent 
to deal with the Dunera internees, expressly repudiated any 
authority to deal with any other internees sent by British 
authorities to AustraUa.^^This dilemma also affected the intern-
ees from Malaya, Palestine and the British Pacific Islands. A 
man interned in Singapore had been deprived of his German 
nationality for writing an anti-Nazi book, and had been told by 
an Intelligence Officer in Singapore that if the island had not 
been a naval base, he would have been freed. His case could not 
be settied in Singapore, the officer told him, and he would have 
to go to Australia "where it would take only a short time for 
him to be free". Sanderson asked that some way be found to 
deal with the situation where an internee could not appeal in 
the country of detention because he was not there, or in Ausfra-
lia because he had not been detained here.^'' 
Those internees at Loveday who saw themselves as enemy 
nationals were to some degree, more content. They knew they 
would probably remain in camp until the end of the war. The 
Japanese were the most placid but the German-speaking Camp 
10 also settled to a well-organised routine and much energy put 
198 BEHIND BARBED WIRE 
into makfrig the place comfortable. Dr Morel considered it a 
model camp. They had "built schools, cafes, gardens and stii-
dios", sometimes usfrig their own money. Good roads had been 
established and a stage, a music pavilion, a large bakery oven, 
tennis coiurts and artists' studios built.^ When tiie friternees 
were notified that they would be transfered to Camp 14 as part 
of the rationaUsation of camps as Italian friternees were re-
leased, the Germans were upset. The camp leader, von Graf 
wrote to the Protecting Power, the Red Cross and the military 
authorities, complainfrig it was a collertive punishment. Bun-
dock assured the Germans the fransfer was a necessity and as 
the war continued everyone "outside the compound as well as 
within" was being compeUed "to give up one Uttle comfort after 
another ".^ 9 
It is very difficult to assess the personal suffering of individ-
ual internees, and even more difficult to make a guess at the 
collective misery internment frivolved. It can only be set in the 
communal situation in AusfraUa in 1942 and 1943. Many Aus-
fralian famUies were torn apart, men were being killed in the 
fighting, and lonely women were doing men's jobs, and disfress 
was widespread over the whole land. Yet one relevant question 
is whether the nation gained any advantage in taking natural-
ised and long-term residents from their jobs and homes, when 
nothing but the hysteria of fear suggested that they would do 
anything but go about their business. The exfra misery that the 
internment of these people added to the coUective misery of 
AusfraUans in their years of crisis, was the direct result of that 
general misery, but in no way lessened it. It threw in the faces 
of non-British-born citizens the slur that, in the eyes of their 
neighbours, they were the same as Fasdsts and foreigners. It is 
here, and not in any resentment of the rough camp Ufe,that the 
long-term scar remains. 
In addition to the compounded personal misery, there is the 
question of whether the national interest was best served by the 
holding of 7,000 "local" friternees. The need to raise battalions 
of guards, the administrative burden on camp commandants, 
security officers. Official Visitors and h-ibunals, the use of build-
ing materials for camps, the transport tied up, the welfare 
payments to families, tiie reduced production of sugar, tobacco 
arid vegetable farms and the severe under-usage of internee 
labour, were part of the increasfrig deficit of friternment. It was 
costing the Australian government approximately three 
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pounds per week to maintain each intemee.^o If it was a reason-
able precaution to intern the low risk groups when the threat of 
invasion was real, was it equally reasonable to release them 
once the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway stopped the 
Japanese advance? It would be the greatest security dilemma 
AusfraUan authorities faced. At what point did American aid 
and combined mUitary successes guarantee that a reversal 
would not occur and precipitate another round of internments? 
How soon after the shoeik of the faU of Sfrigapore and the 
bombing of Darwin would public morale accept the return to 
thefr communities of people bom in enemy counfries? A deci-
sion had to be made as to where the balance between the 
escalating costs and diminishing benefits of internment lay. 
Chapter Nine 
THE LONG WAY HOME 
On 21 June 1942 Dr H.V. Evatt returned from his mission to 
Washington and London. His ffrst responsibiUty was to inform 
the Prime Minister about his visit, but very soon thereafter the 
problem of the AusfraUa First arrests was brought to his atten-
tion. A few Labor MPs had raised the matter fritermittentiy with 
the new member for Melbourne, Arthur Calwell, being particu-
larly insistent.^ The more time passed after the Army Muiister's 
original dramatic announcement of 26 March that twenty trai-
tors had been caught, the more embarrassing it was for the 
government to state that only the four people apprehended in 
Perth would face the courts. The sixteen men associated with 
the Australia First Movement in Sydney had, fri fact, littie case 
to answer. The Perth four had used the name of the Sydney 
movement without its knowledge or consent. 
The most provoking aspect of the Australia First group for 
the authorities was the threat they posed to law and order. Their 
anti-semi tic, anti-Imperial and anti-Communist ideas annoyed 
a variety of people, and the communists in particular attended 
AusfraUa Ffrst meetings to disrupt them. Detective-Sergeant 
G.R. Richards, the confroUer of the agent Leonard Thomas, who 
had encouraged the Perth four to produce incriminating docu-
ments, knew about the riotous meetings of AustraUa First in 
Sydney. When the name Australia First was used by the Perth 
conspfrators, Richards and the military director of InteUigence 
in Perth, Lieutenant-Colonel H.D. Moseley, wired Eastern Com-
mand and recommended the arrest of the Sydney leaders of 
AustraUa First. Subsequent frivestigation showed the lack of 
connection between the Perth and Sydney groups, but the 
government could only suggest that they appeal against their 
interrunent to the relevant tribunal.^ 
Mrs Adela Pankhtust Walsh, a co-convenor of the Ausfralia 
First movement, was arrested shortiy after the male leaders and 
she brought a writ of habeas corpus before the Supreme Court of 
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New South Wales. The Chief Justice, Sir Frederick Jordan, crit-
idsed the legislation that made it so hard for a person to clear 
her name and aUowed for such extensive authority over civil-
ians.'^  While the Australia First cases were being reviewed by 
Evatt and the Attorney-General's department, the North 
Queensland internments queried by Martens were being scru-
tinised by W.J. Mackay, the second head of the Security Service. 
The coUective nature of the Master Warrants was becoming 
evident.* How would the Attorney-General untie this gargan-
tuan knot? The Solicitor-General, George Knowles, pointed out 
the contiadiction in the government's not formally charging the 
AusfraUa First internees when — as Opposition — they had 
been so outspokenly critical of the internment of Ratliff and 
Thomas without trial.^ Parliament rose on 4 June 1942 and did 
not sit again imtil 2 September and during this period Evatt 
undoubtedly made himself familiar with the relevant docu-
ments. He considered that some recommendations for intern-
ment appeared "to be unjustified or frivolous".^ His instinct 
was for open trials but the credibility of Frank Forde, the 
Minister for the Army, was at stake. Evatt was to be pursued to 
the end of his career by the stain of the continued incarceration 
of the AusfraUa First members on his civU libertarian image.'' 
His biographer, Kylie Tennant, places the blame squarely on 
Forde's naivete in being ready to beUeve "anything told to him 
by an officer".^ 
Policy change 
After reading the Australia Ffrst file, Evatt probably reached the 
same conclusion as Knowles and the Crown Solicitor, H.F.E. 
Whitlam, that nothing in the reports on Stephensen showed 
that he had contravened "any regulation made under the Na-
tional Security Art or of any other Commonwealth law".^ Has-
luck is somewhat critical of Forde for not applying the rule 
established by Spender that, before issuing a detention order, 
the Minister should be satisfied that the person had actually 
been engaged "in activities contrary to the interests of national 
security", and not merely a member of a suspect organisation 
or a holder of political beliefs. Hasluck does concede that every 
war "has its casualties" and that "under the sfrafri of wartime 
anxiety, the Curtin Government had not fully appreciated the 
nature of the artions taken in its name".^° It may also be relevant 
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tiiat the Curtin government held office by the narrowest of 
margins and tiie successive falls of Menzies and Fadden were 
fresh in cabinet's mind. To go out on a limb for a minute group 
of ideologically confused and wooUy talkers, who were anatii-
ema to both pro-British and pro-Russian elements Ui tiie com-
munity, at a time when Japanese submarines had penefrated 
Sydney Harbovu, was an unacceptable political risk. 
Another dilemma Evatt had to deal with was Curtin's public 
commitment to W.J. Mackay tiie police chief who then headed 
security.^i Mackay continued to function as chief of poUce in 
New South Wales, and preferred to work ui Sydney 12 His 
concept of using PoUce Commissioners as Deputy-Directors of 
Security was not acceptable to federal public servants. Accord-
ing to Noel Lamidey, who knew the Attorney-General's Depart-
ment weU, the Solicitor-General considered "that the property 
of the Commonwealth, could not be fransfered to an instrumen-
tality of a State" ,^ 3 but Mackay was convinced he was doing the 
best thing for Australia's security, and he was not unaware of 
the tensions over sharing information and files. Shortly after 
assuming office, Mackay wrote to the Service Chiefs and the 
Solicitor General declaring his attitude to Security. It was his 
intention to use "competent investigators" from all services and 
not just the poUce. He was grateful to the Army for the help 
GOCs and Base Commandants had offered and it was his desire 
to keep the experienced officers in the area to advise and assist 
him. He was arranging for all records of state branches of 
Commonwealth Security to be copied and sent to a cenfral 
bureau fri Canberra for access by the Attorney-General's De-
partment. All these records would "be avaUable and open to 
accredited representatives of the fighting services". Mackay 
said he wanted "to elimfriate any fear that Commonwealth 
rights or practices and Service requirements" would "be jeop-
ardised" by his adminisfration "or by the means of carrying out 
that administration through the State Police Forces".^* 
Two days later he wrote to General Blarney to congratulate 
him on the achievements of the AIF and to welcome him home. 
This letter is less formal. Mackay asked Blarney when he was 
in Sydney "to have a cha t . . . as an old PoHceman". Mackay told 
Blamey that there had been dissatisfaction with the Security 
Service's efforts to achieve "unanimity of purpose among four 
investigation organisations in the Commonwealth". As a result 
Mackay had been asked to become Director-General of Security 
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for the Commonwealth. But he had "met with a bit of tiouble" 
and felt some Departmental heads "did not realise what mutual 
effort means". Because of Blarney's experience as head of the 
Vidorian Police Force, Mackay felt he would understand that 
men who had a "long and practical experience in deaUng with 
the underworld, the slygrogger and the other excrescences on 
society, are the best qualified to form the backbone of the 
investigation side of Security Service". The police were also the 
best means of approaching people to gain confidence and in-
formation.^ ^ Mackay was rewarded with a warm reply. Blamey 
was happy to see the Security Service "put in the hands of those 
who can reaUy use it", agreefrig that the police were the only 
ones with "the skUl, expert knowledge and technical training 
and experience to handle the matter effectively".^^ But in the 
Attorney-General's Department considerable agitation was 
aroused and Sir George Knowles managed to head off the 
implementation of Mackay's plans.^'' Lamidey regarded 
Mackay's approach as "bull headed" and the man himself as 
"an authoritative bureaucrat who could not adapt himself with 
ease to the wider horizons of the Federal sphere". Mackay could 
have lost his army support when he ordered the relaxing of 
confrols over the movement of aliens, that had been imposed 
by the military^^ 
Nevertheless when Dr Evatt called a conference for 5 Sep-
tember 1942, Mackay was listed to attend as Director-General.^^ 
Shortly afterwards Mackay resigned. Lamidey noted that it did 
not take long before Evatt and Mackay clashed. Evatt was not 
"an easy man to work either with or under and in many ways 
Mackay and Evatt were not dissimUar". Both men "drove 
themselves hard and both would brook little or no interference 
or opposition to their ideas and plans" .2° So Curtin's choice was 
overturned and the Security Service was to be given a third 
leader The Security Service, created on 31 March 1941 and 
originally led by E.E. Longfield-Lloyd, had floundered along 
searching for direction and a defined sphere of operations. 
Lamidey described Longfield Lloyd as "a gentleman, a person 
of charm and social grace" who could not always "command 
tiie co-operation of some of his coUeagues" and who lacked the 
ability "to translate the spoken word into clear and concise 
language". Both he and Mackay "suffered the basic handicap 
of having no written charter of government policy''.^! Evatt 
chose Brigadier W.B. Simpson,^ a seruor army legal officer, who 
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had served on Eastern Command's commfrtee reviewing alien 
internments early fri the war. Simpson had been sent to Hay to 
investigate the clauns of brutality by the Dunera guards and had 
subsequently served as Judge Advocate-General of the Austia-
lian forces in the Middle East. Evatt also appofrited a committee 
to advise on internment matters, the Aliens Classification and 
Advisory Committee. 
While these shakeups were underway, the protests made by 
G.W. Martens over the North Queensland arrests were being 
processed. The army was concerned to keep the identity of 
miUtary reporting officers and informants secret.^^ -phe protec-
tion of sources is a basic prfriciple of security but the army's 
protest that, as a result of an MP perusing its files the enemy 
might get to know the extent and limitations of IntelUgence's 
knowledge of subversive activities, was an implied slur on 
parUamentarians. Forde decided that Mcirtens' representations 
and the army's protest were to be referred to Evatt.'^ * Thus Evatt 
read Martens' complaints that active Labor Party members in 
the Herbert elertorate were interned, together with men who 
had collected sums of money for pafriotic purposes; and that a 
man had travelled to internment camp on a frafri also carrying 
his son who had just returned from war service in Libya, Greece 
and Crete. Martens' interned friend FeUx Reitano had lived in 
the Herbert disfrirt for 40 years, was married to a Scot and had 
four sons, of whom one was in the AIF, one in the militia and 
one in the VDC, while the fourth worked the farm.^ 
Cases like these, coupled with Evatt's owm opinions of the 
AusfraUa First fiasco and his civil libertarian instincts, led him 
to lay down a firm principle to guide Calwell's committee and 
Simpson's Security Service. Internment was to be reserved only 
for those against whom there were "reasonable grounds for 
suspidon". The narrow policy originally laid down in the War 
Book was to be reestablished. Evatt announced in parliament on 
10 September 1942: 
The aim and sole justification of aU restrictions upon individual 
Uberty is to prevent injury to the war effort of the country not to 
punish the individual. In short, the objective is preventive rather 
than punitive. This object is clearly embodied in the existing regu-
lations . . . 
The second prindple is that.. . restrictions if imposed shoiUd be 
imposed only to an extent sufficient to prevent tiie evU, fuU intern-
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ment being reserved for cases where the possibiUty of injury to the 
nation is undeniable.26 
The change of policy was not universally popular. When 
Martens repeated his questions about people from his elector-
ate who were interned,^^ a North Queensland newspaper, the 
Sunday Australian, considered that the speech was motivated by 
party poUtical considerations such as had marred "successive 
Commonwealth adminisfrations" in dealing with the North 
Queensland alien question. The paper went on to protest that 
it was "inconceivable that the whole of the officers who were 
involved in the inqufries which preceded the internments were 
opposed to the Labor Party", and that "the great bulk of intern-
ments made in North Queensland were ordered after the Curtin 
Government had taken office". Any widespread releases would 
mean that British-born citizens would again become a minority 
in the north, and the sense of frusfration engendered by the 
return of the foreign born locals might result in "adverse reac-
tions" in the northern war effort.^^ 
Yet such talk from Anglo-Saxon North Queenslanders had 
lost its power. For one thing, the military situation in September 
was not as bad as it had been in February. The Japanese were 
being held in New Guinea and support from the United States 
was increasing every day. Secondly, manpower in Australia was 
too valuable to be kept locked up if it could be used produc-
tively. The sugar industry was most drasticaUy affected, with 
production steadily falling despite the efforts of the Queens-
land Sugar Board in organising labour for internees' farms.^^ 
Nevertheless, a miUtary situation that was holding, and man-
power needs that were pressfrig, do not wholly explain the 
drastic turn in friternment policy. Although the threat of inva-
sion was suspended, the war was still at its height. Rommel's 
thrust into Egypt was not halted until the Battle of El Alamein 
was won on 2 November 1942; nor was it sure the Russians were 
going to be able to defend Stalingrad. On 1 June 1942 the 
Japanese managed to get submarines into Sydney Harbour, and 
their army remained enfrenched in New Guinea. Their attack 
on Milne Bay was repulsed on 26 August, but Kokoda was not 
recaptured from them until 2 November 1942, whUe the long 
campaigns to retake Buna, Gona and Bougainville still lay 
ahead. Continued internments, especially in reaction to set-
backs such as the loss of the hospital ship Centaur in May 1943, 
would not have been out of keeping with the estabUshed pat-
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tern As for manpower, fr was always a secondary consideration 
to security. The change of poUtical leadership to a Labor gov-
ernment was the third factor that brought a return to a narrow 
internment policy. The influences of H.V. Evatt,30 and John 
Curtin^^ were significant. 
Evatt had toured the United States during the middle 
months of 1942, aimfrig to convince Americans that Ausfralia 
was totally committed to the war and offering every support to 
U.S. troops, which would have inclfried him to arguments for 
the most productive use of manpower. But, more significantiy 
he was against coUective internments, on prindple, and he 
noted that the United States did not institute them against its 
own dtizens born in Germany and Italy^^ Although Evatt was 
Attorney-General when internment in AusfraUa was at its peak, 
none of the arrests that took place between February and May 
1942 were authorised by Evatt, and soon after his return from 
America he began to reverse the process. It may even be more 
than coinddence, although its significance is indeterminate, 
that on 16 September 1942, between Evatt's announcement of a 
return to a narrow internment poUcy and his establishment of 
Calwell's committee, one of the sfrongest Labor supporters of 
a mass internment policy, W Forgan Smith, bowed out as 
premier of Queensland.^ 
The internment of the naturalised and lowest risk ItaUans in 
North Queensland and the Australia Ffrst roundup represented 
the pinnade of internment. After Evatt's return to Australia, 
internments were infrequent and involved individual cases. 
Only one other group, as such, was sent to camp, and they 
actively campaigned to get fri. These were the wives and fami-
lies of the Lutheran mission workers from New Guinea. In the 
face of the Japanese invasion, women and children, including 
those from the missions, had been evacuated from New 
Guinea.34 The Lutheran women were bUleted with famUies in 
South Australia, and after two years the women determined to 
join their menfolk by getting themselves interned by becoming 
blatanfly and provocatively pro-German. This was another 
burden for the Lutheran community to bear, as the women's 
behaviour naturally brought a reaction from many of the popu-
lation already stirred up by reports that Lutheran misssionaries 
had led, or at least tirained their natives to lead, the Japanese 
through the Markham VaUey Smith's Weekly, the Adelaide News 
and Advertiser, and the national radio all ran the story^s The 
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AusfraUan public were told of native chofrs singfrig the Horst 
Wessel song, a Nazi armband fartory, sfrategic aerodromes and 
high-powered wireless sets. Two German nationals attached to 
tiie Finschhafen mission — afrcraft pilot Werner Garms and 
mechanic Paul Rabe — took the first opportunity after the war 
started to fly the mission plane to Dutch New Guinea, from 
where they returned, via Japan, to Germany^^ Of the original 
twenty-six Germans arrested at the outbreak of war by the New 
Guinea Volunteer Rifles and taken by the Macdhui to Australia, 
sbcteen were attached to the Finschhafen Mission and were 
members of the Nazi Party Stuetpunkt led by the mission plan-
tation manager, Hubert Stuerzenhofecker. In Jtme 1940 more 
missionaries were interned and most of the remainder went in 
December 1941.37 jj seems that only three were left and the 
claims of pro-Japanese sentiment or action by them appear 
ill-founded.3^ Not to be pro-Japanese however, did not make 
the German members of the mission staff pro-ally. 
The former superintendent of Finschhafen expressed the 
views of the Lutheran missionaries who were German nation-
als when he said that they had never denied that thefr loyalty, 
allegiance and sympathies were with their government and the 
leader of their nation. Such an attitude towards a nation and its 
government, was "experted of every honourable Britisher as a 
matter of course", but the same attitude in a German was 
"branded as condemnable and disgraceful",'^^ he complained. 
The wives actions worried thefr church leaders. The Rev. J.J. 
Stolz wrote to the Rev. O. Theile that he had it "on good 
authority" that much of the church's "present froubles" were 
due to thefr cormections with the New Guinea missions. WhUe 
Stolz was sympathetic to the women's wish to be reunited with 
their husbands, he considered that the women's outspokenness 
"would make it all the harder for any one of the missionaries 
to return" to New Guinea.'*° The Army felt no one should be 
interned "for reasons other than those of security" because they 
could agitate at any time for their release. On humanitarian 
grounds children under 16 could accompany their parents into 
camp but wives "should not be permitted to voluntarily accom-
pany their interned husbands", nor should chUdren enter camp 
if one parent was at Uberty. The army secretary sttessed that if 
wives and chUdren were allowed into camp the expense of 
family accommodation, guard personnel, food, clothing and 
education would necessarily increase.*^ Mackay agreed with 
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the army's reluctance to expand family facilities but by the end 
of 1942 the wives had prevailed. 
These women were the exception and policy was movfrig to 
releases. Australian citizens were scrutinised first, and Evatt 
released the Communists, Ratliff and Thomas, on their under-
takfrig not to do anythfrig that might impede the war effort, and 
to "work for the victory of the British Commonwealth and her 
AUies".*2 Adela Pankhurst Walsh resorted to the suffragette 
tactic of hunger stiiking after her unsuccessful tribunal hearmg 
and thereby gained her release.*^ Seven of the AusfraUa First 
men had been released after their appeal to an Advisory Com-
mittee, and a further nine were investigated by senior Security 
and Intelligence personnel. Five were released under resfric-
tions.'^ Evatt had reversed policy, but he was too busy to attend 
to all cases, and analysis of the bulk of internments passed to 
the Department of Security, which had taken over confrol of 
enemy aliens from the army. 
Administering the Changed Policy 
In the changeover from army to the new Security Service there 
was a certain amount of friction before the lines of demarcation 
in powers and responsibilities were sorted out. The second 
Director of Security, W.J. Mackay, was authorised to absorb the 
existing security personnel from the three armed services but 
they were to continue to be paid by their own service. The army 
notified its people that after three months it would no longer 
accept any responsibility for them. Security risked losing 167 
experienced men. The 110 in the lower ranks were primarily 
concerned about the loss of medical and taxation benefits that 
a transfer to civilian status entailed, and the officers would not 
contemplate their loss of uniform and miUtary rank. Some 
chose to fransfer to other duties. Mackay appealed to Evatt, 
pointfrig out that after the war servicemen could be discharged, 
whereas if security personnel became Commonwealth public 
servants they would have to be found jobs after the war.'*^ 
As the army had been responsible for the great majority of 
internments, Mackay felt that it should remafri responsible for 
those so interned. The army had all the files on these friternees, 
and knew the cfrcumstances that had led to their friternment, 
which was also the friformation on which release would be 
determined. Mackay protested that the army had already re-
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ferred to him fifty matters related to army-friterned fridividuals, 
about whom he had no fUes, while the responsibility for over-
seas internees and for seamen interned under Regulation 14A, 
which he had experted, was being kept by the army. Mackay 
wanted the army to continue paying its staff during their sec-
ondment to security, and he wanted the army to sort out "its" 
internees while he dealt with the overseas group. The army, 
however, retained its control over overseas internees on the 
grounds that Major JuUan Layton, the Liaison Officer from the 
Home Office, had to stay in Melbourne to supervise the embar-
kation overseas of those returning to Britafri, and the clearance 
of those enlisting in the army.*^ On the other hand, the army 
refused to continue thefr involvement with the "locals" they 
had interned in Ausfralia. Colonel J.D. Rogers, Director of 
MUitary Intelligence, explained that it would take months to go 
through the files and a duplication of paper work was foolish.*'' 
Rogers stated that files outlining general policy and the files of 
all British-born and naturalised internees could be fransfered 
to Security from headquarters, and those of alien internees were 
being transfered to the respective State Deputy-Dirertors. As a 
final shot Rogers told Mackay that the army now did not have 
the staff to deal with internment matters. 
There was also a basic difference in attitudes to evidence and 
internment criteria. Mackay considered that recommendations 
going to the Minister should contain both the evidence backing 
the recommendation for internment and material favourable to 
the person under suspicion.*^ Colonel James A. Chapman, DML 
required that full dossiers should be kept containing "all the 
available information on a suspect", but the precis of the dossier 
submitted to the persons responsible for signing the detention 
order "should contain only the information relied upon in 
justification of the recommendation for detention", as that 
alone concerned the GOC or the Miruster.*^ Objecting to this 
unbalanced preds, Mackay approached Forde to have it al-
tered. Forde repUed that headquarters had told Commands that 
"any farts which would put a different complexion on an 
adverse report should be brought out", and fried to avoid 
making an issue of it by claiming there would be "very little 
difference in practice" between Mackay's proposal and the 
army method .5° 
The army's lack of co-operation forced Security Service (SS) 
to expand its own resources. When the Security Branch in 
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Brisbane asked tiie army for a report on a man from Monto, Qld, 
Major-General J.M.A. Durrant replied that the few InteUigence 
officers fri Brisbane were "fully occupied in military duties" and 
tiiat the control and investigation of subversive individuals 
were included in the responsibiUties taken over by the Depart-
ment of Security from the military on 26 June 1942.^ 1 The 
government acted to ensure staff for the expanding work of the 
Security Service. Commander J.C. McFarlane, the Queensland 
Deputy-Director requested branches for Townsville and Rock-
hampton, and when TownsvUle was bombed on 25 July the 
RAAF supported the call for "a good man" from security to be 
appointed there. The first suggestion had been for a corporal, 
who was to work from his own house. By August a lieutenant 
and a typist/clerk were ready to move into a three room office 
in Flinders Sheet. On 12 October Townsville was a divisional 
centie with Lt-Col. R.F.B. Wake fri charge of a staff of ten and 
with a one hundred pound establishment fund for secret 
agents.^2 
When the Security Service took over the running of fribunals 
it found that as a number had not met for so long, it was best to 
abandon them. The most active was the fribunal in South 
AustiaUa. It tiavelled up to Loveday to hear "13/14 appeals a 
day, sittfrig from 9.30 a.m. to 5.00 p.m. and spending 2 to 3 hours 
in the evening formulating their reports". The chairman, G.S. 
Reed, KC, used his own car to drive the members of the tribunal, 
together with Major MilUiouse, the army representative, and 
Captain Sexton of SS to Loveday. Unfortunately Sir Edward 
Lucas, one of the tribunal members, was 84 years of age and in 
poor health. The Adelaide Deputy Director, K.H. Kirkman, 
recommended that Lucas be replaced. The fribunal used Dr 
Barris, from the Censor's department, as an interpreter, and two 
sergeant stenographer/typists. Kirkman felt the basis of pay-
ment to the fribunal chairman needed revising, as it had been 
prescribed when sittfrigs were well spaced, but in this hectic 
period Reed's tribunal was sitting continuously and Reed was 
unable to devote "any attention to his own practice".^'' 
Much of the pressure on the South Australian fribunal came 
from friterstate internees who had moved through Gaythorne 
to Loveday, and there were sound financial reasons for havfrig 
this ttibunal operating efficientiy. On the last day of 1942 there 
were 5,228 locals held in internment, of whom 3,967 were aliens, 
1,097 naturalised British subjects and 164 native born. Since the 
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outbreak of war 7,103 persons had been interned and 1,875 
released by the Commonwealth.^^ There were also hundreds of 
overseas friternees from Britain, Malaya, Palestine and Persia, 
the Dutch East Indies, the Pacific Islands and New Guinea as 
weU as thousands of prisoners of war, being held in camps in 
AusfraUa. The sfrains on the Garrison and on the Directorate of 
Prisoners of War and Internees were enormous. Costs were 
runnfrig at three pounds per head per week, and on top of the 
cost of guards and adminisfration, this expense was another 
good reason for releasing low-risk locals in a less threatening 
miUtary situation.^s The Aliens Classification and Advisory 
Committee, chaired by Arthur Calwell, met soon after Dr Evatt 
announced the committee's establishment in late September 
1942. Members of the committee were Senator Walter Cooper 
(an exserviceman from World War I), Lt A.R. Cutler, VC 
(wounded in World War II), WR. Dovey KC (a Sydney lawyer), 
and J.V. Barry, KC (a Melbourne lawyer and office holder in the 
Coundl of CivU Liberties). Lt Cutler later became Assistant 
Deputy Director of Security for New South Wales and sub-
sequently Assistant Commissioner of Repatriation, and his 
place was taken by Mrs Jessie Sfreet, President of the United 
Assodations of Women. Noel W Lamidey, a public servant 
from the Attorney-General's Department, served as secretary 
to the committee.5^ The committee took evidence in Sydney, 
Melbourne and Canberra from the mUitary, the Security Serv-
ice, Professor Bailey and other interested parties. The most 
assiduous representation was on behalf of refugees.^^The com-
mittee accepted the argument that certain people had been 
designated as refugees before the war, and had been taken into 
AusfraUa as such. The committee agreed that it was "unjust and 
morally indefensible" that refugees should be treated as enemy 
aliens when the German government disowned them, yet they 
had a long struggle before a Refugee Class was legalised. The 
commfrtee made its Interim Report in March 1943, and most of 
this report deals with the status of refugee aliens.^^ Eventually 
6,500 former "enemy aliens" were reclassified under the Aliens 
Control regulations but remained "enemy aliens" under the 
Aliens Service Regulations and were subject to assignment to 
the CivU Alien Corps.^^ 
Dissatisfied because of tiie delays in instituting releases, 
Calwell appealed to the Prime Mfriister, but Curtin replied that 
tiie government was pursuing a policy of releasing internees to 
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Manpower or the Allied Works Coundl wherever it could 
"without endangerfrig national security".^" Almost aU Albani-
ans and Finns detained as "a precautionary measure" had 
already been released and "a systematic review of all internees 
of Italian origfri", commencing with Queensland internees lo-
cated in New South Wales, "many of whom had been detained 
by the Military Authorities with the primary object of removing 
them from vufrierable areas during a critical period", was under 
way. Several hundred internees had been released to work and 
some naturaUsed British subjects had been allowed to return to 
their farms "under restriction" or were given employment 
south of the Tropic of Capricorn. 
The Italians 
On 28 October 1943 at its twentieth meeting the committee 
considered the general question of Italian internees and the 
cases of particular Italian internees.^^ Pressure was being ap-
plied to release particular Italian internees by a number of 
groups including the "Italia Libra" orgarusation,^^ ^  coalition of 
Italian anti-Fascists and their AusfraUan supporters. G.W. Mar-
tens continued to seek information on internees from his own 
area, and Calwell was close to Archbishop Mannix, whose 
empathy with Victorian Italians as Roman Catholics was weU 
knowm. Leading Melbourne businessman, Gualtiero Vaccari, 
also took a special interest in Italian internees.^ At its twentieth 
meeting, Calwell's committee considered several cases submit-
ted by the Dirertor-General, and all were decided but one. Most 
Italian internees coming under review were being quickly re-
leased and put to the "more profitable employment of growfrig 
foodstuffs for the country" and providfrig labour for other 
essential areas of national work. 
In order to speed this process Mr Justice Reed, who had 
chaired the fribunal in South Australia since May 1941, was 
asked for his views on the "political sentiments of friternees of 
Italian origin, their attitude towards Australia and the British 
Empire, and the risks they represented from a security pouit of 
view", and also what "conception" he thought naturalised 
Italians had "of their duty towards the Empire". In the course 
of his fribunal and committee work. Reed interviewed over 
2,000 and concluded that most internees had "no real political 
outlook or opfriions at all". He felt tiiat they were only sUghtiy 
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interested "in tiie form of government of the country, or the 
institutions by which tiiat government is carried on''. They 
expressed the attfrude that it did not make any difference to 
them who ruled the country, as they would have to work just 
the same. Reed felt tiiat Italians had some interest fri "the 
personal aspect, for example the amount of taxation or wages 
and working conditions", and were "quite satisfied" that they 
had discharged their obligations to AustiaUa if they could say 
that they had always paid their taxes and respected the laws, 
and had never been fri trouble with the police. While Reed felt 
tiiat this lack of "real attachment for the land of their adoption" 
was "regrettable", and their "disinclfriation to fight anyone" 
made them a "deadweight of inertia" that could hinder the war 
effort, he considered that most of them were prepared to work 
outside the camp and this would involve virtuaUy no security 
risk.64 
Simpson was reviewfrig the internments from Queensland. 
By the end of January 1943 some 800 cases were yet to be 
considered and the progress was "unreasonably slow". Those 
who had been interned under Omnibus warrants had been 
detained "as a precautionary measure, and nothing of a subver-
sive nature" was recorded against them. Simpson was prepared 
to release the men in this category. He had made arrangements 
for them to be caUed up under the Aliens Service Regulations. 
They wotdd then "be employed at soldiers' rates of pay in States 
other than Queensland".^^ Because of "the serious manpower 
shortage", Simpson felt it was his responsibility to quickly 
release those who were not a security risk. Between 11 October 
and 22 November, 708 persons of ItaUan origin or descent were 
released.^^ 
So many who had been arrested in bulk under Omnibus 
warrants were released in bulk. To achieve a high rate of release 
Simpson requfred the Queensland security chief, J.A. 
MacFarlane, to read and summarise 40 personal fUes or dossiers 
a day and send the summaries and recommendations to Can-
berra. Among those released from Cowra was Bruno Agricola 
who went to work cutting wood in Victoria.^^ Augusto Orlandi 
returned to his farm for Christmas 1943. His wife had organised 
a petition signed by the town's doctor, local businessmen and 
neighbouring farmers. The local police pointed out that the 
petition only claimed that Orlandi was "an honest and fridus-
frious farmer" and there were stiU hostile feeUngs against 
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Italians in the distrirt.^^ But because he was naturalised, a 
prunary producer and the case agafrist him so slight, Orlandi 
was among the few early releases to be aUowed back north of 
the Tropic of Capricorn. Oswald Bonutto was released to work 
in Adelaide but was allowed back to grow tobacco at Inglewood 
in December 1943. When tiie usual "reUable sources" again 
protested against Bonutto's return, the reply from the Security 
Service tolerated no such chaUenge: those who saw the releases 
as an "apparent laxity" would, "on mature reflection", see tiiat 
the released internees were "helping our war effort on the 
production front".^^ 
Georg Edelmarm, the Austrian interned fri 1939 because of 
his employment by a company with Nazi dirertors, then re-
leased and refriterned fri June 1940, was finally released and 
employed by the AlUed Works Coundl at Alice Springs.^^ The 
journalist Emery Bares was heard in Sydney by Mr Justice Pike 
and released in February 1942; he became a member of the 
Third Employment Company working on the wharves in July''^  
In February 1944 Lt-Col. Wake reported that he had met the 
former secretary of the German Club in Queen Sfreet, Brisbane, 
and he had told Wake that he bore no iU-will over his intern-
ment, that he was employed and "doing his best to v\ripe out 
the memory of his internment".^^ 
As the war continued frito 1944 and members of the ACAC 
became harder to gather together because of thefr various com-
mitments,''^ Lamidey, the committee's secretary took a more 
direct role, and together with Flight-Lieutenant Claude A. Phil-
cox, visited Loveday to review the cases of the remaining sixty 
Italians.''* Over half were approved for release but Lanudey 
expressed concern that some internees were choosing to stay in 
camp, making a drain on the nation's resources, instead of 
takfrig the option to go out to work. He described them as 
"maUngerers" who adopted the role of pro-Fasdsts to ensure 
that tiiey remafried in camp and were thereby "relieved of the 
obligation imposed upon former releasees of being drafted out 
to work in the C.A.C'^s 
Work in the Civil Alien Corps certafrily had Uttle to recom-
mend it. On the whole it was labouring work of the roughest 
kind — wood cutting and charcoal burning, fruit picking, raU-
way fettlfrig and aerodrome maintenance. The camps were in 
isolated areas such as the Northern Territory and along the 
Commonwealth railway line on the NuUarbor Plain, fri addi-
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tion, the criterion for release — abUity to work — sometimes 
resulted in poUtical opponents being brought together, with 
consequent brawls rerruniscent of camp life.-^ ^ Disdpline was 
sfrid, the CAC supervisors often regarding with suspicion the 
newly released friternees with their foreign names and accents. 
Pay was poor, and letters back to camp were not encouraging. 
Indeed many friternees were as enfrapped by the CAC and 
Manpower as they had been when interned. C.G. Jesson, a 
member of the Queensland parUament, brought Calwell's at-
tention to the plight of ex-friternees from his state^^ and CalweU 
also knew of other cases where "harsh and overbearing tieat-
ment" was meted out to aUens in the corps. Calwell had found 
the Minister for the Interior, Senator J.S. ColUngs, who contiol-
led the CAC "utterly impossible to deal with on matters of this 
sort". ColUngs was "often very insulting when approached on 
behalf of unfortunate people" who were being pushed around 
by the ControUer of AUens in the Civil Construction Corps. 
Curtin was not as sympathetic as Calwell would have wished.''^ 
Calwell had a direct and sometimes abrasive manner and had 
not endeared himself to colleagues by his harsh criticism of 
them, including Curtin himself, who was a very sensitive 
man.''^  
A bitter wrangle took place, with Calwell and Vaccari (the 
Melbourne businessman) on the one side, and manpower 
authorities on the other, over Queensland ex-internees who 
were sent to work for Cheetham Salt at Laverton, Vic, after 
woodcutting at Werrimull. These internees, many of whom 
were naturalised, had been arrested in March and April 1942 
on precautionary grounds and after ten months in camp at 
Cowra, they volimteered to work outside the camp on the 
assurance they could return to their homes in Queensland 
earlier than those who did not volunteer. First they went to 
Laverton, to harvest salt and then to cut wood for the Victorian 
State Rivers and Water Supply Commission. By September they 
had achieved their quota and in October they saw the amended 
Resfriction Orders from the Director-General of Security, stat-
ing that aU naturaUsed farmers were to be repatriated to 
Queensland. Despite this and the fact tiiat others who had not 
volunteered early were going directly from camp to their home 
state, this group were re-transfered back to Laverton to shovel 
saU.80 The Victorian manpower authorities took the view tiiat 
the men could not be spared, and that the men's requests to be 
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returned to Queensland could not be reviewed before May 1944 
and were subject "to continued good behaviour ".Vaccari ar-
gued that the Ministerial statement of 19 October 1943 by E.J. 
HoUoway, Minister for Labour and National Service, provided 
that Queensland farmers should be returned to the indusfry in 
which they were experts because of the urgent need to produce 
food. This was not only a humane act but was "the best eco-
nomic use of the men to meet the needs of the counfry". Many 
sugar farms were being worked by female relatives and the 
tonnages befrig harvested had dropped dramaticaUy. Land had 
to be ploughed immediately in preparation for the planting 
season in March and April 1944 or there would be no crop at 
all. Calwell appealed to Evatt. He wrote: 
I am afraid there is stiU a lot of racial, and with some people 
reUgious, prejudices where Italian people are concerned particu-
larly amongst the minor offidals in the AUied Works Coundl and 
the Department of Labour and National Service. I do not know 
whether you can personaUy persuade our colleagues, the Minister 
for the Interior and the Minister for Labour and National Service 
that the farms of these ex-internees are even a greater asset to 
AustraUa than the vested interests of the Cheetham Salt Company 
which are being so stoutly defended by the officials in the Depart-
ments referred to. 
li you could do this, it should be easy to secure the return of men 
who should never have been interned at all. Residing in Queens-
land at the time of the threatened Japanese invasion, they became 
the victims of mass hysteria which resulted in arrests on omnibus 
warrants on aUeged precautionary grounds.^i 
Calwell's fears received further confirmation when he was 
given a report from the local priest at Burra, SA, about a group 
of 20 internees who were released from Loveday Camp 14D 
early in 1943 after about a year of internment. They were 
Queensland cane farmers who were assigned to work with a 
contractor on tank construction at Hanson, near Burra, SA. One 
by one, the priest reported, the men were "breaking down and 
badly". Several were sent away to lighter work or to hospital, 
for they were "aU middle aged men, worn with work and 
confinement and then turned suddenly on the heaviest of la-
bour". Orazio Patti, a 40-year-old father of five chUdren, died 
in the Burra hospital on 14 November 1943 after 17 months 
internment followed by months of forced labour at Burra.^^ 
Calwell's efforts were only partly successfiU and Vaccari was 
stiU pursuing the cases of 28 Queensland ex-internees anxious 
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to return to the sugar and tobacco industiies in August 1944.^ 3 
These men worked fri Victoria at Glenorchy Creswick, Mace-
don and Wondong, but their hearts were in Mareeba, 
Mourilyan, Gordonvale, Dimbula and SiUcwood in Queens-
land. Bruno Agricola was one of them. At Cowra, Bruno had 
volunteered to cut wood for the Forest Commission in Victoria, 
where he worked from December 1942 until August 1944. The 
CAC divisional officer, in supporting Bruno's application for 
release, described him as "an exceUent worker " and "extremely 
reUable". Bruno's farm was being run by his sister and the 
yearly production had dropped from 900 to 450 tons. Bruno had 
agaUi appUed for naturalisation (an earlier application had 
been suspended), and claimed that he was just "a contented 
resident of Australia", who felt his "continued retention in the 
C.A.C. whilst the Sugar Farm of which I am Co-Owner is goUig 
back to scrub thereby jeopardising many years of hard work 
constitutes a grave injustice to me personally and to this Coun-
tiy". The government had dedded that the nation's best inter-
ests now lay in providing support, particularly food, for the 
army that Macarthur was leading from island to island pushing 
north towards Japan and Frank Forde defended the release of 
experienced sugar industry workers to North Queensland be-
cause of "the sfrongest representations of the Food Production 
Committee".^'* While most Italians were released from intern-
ment camps by the end of 1944, a few were kept until the very 
end of the war. These few were interviewed in 1946 by Simpson, 
who had become a Federal court judge, but whose experience 
made him suited to conduct an inquiry into the desirabUity of 
deportfrig the friternees then still fri camps. Among the possible 
deportees was Giovanni Casotti, and Antoruo Agostfrii, both 
nominated by Lamidey as "malingerers".^ In 1945, Simpson 
was adamant that Casotti had been "very lightly dealt with" in 
receiving only two years for the manslaughter of Fantin, which 
Simpson considered was a case of "plain, unadulterated mur-
der ".^ ^ Because the names on most trials are screened out, and 
because decisions can only be inferred from the judge's final 
questions and comments, it is impossible to know whether 
Casotti was deported; but certainly Agostfrii, who killed the 
Pyjama Girl, was deported. 
Agostiru had been married to Linda Piatt, who died in a 
domestic argument, and he dumped her body in a culvert 
outside Albury. The corpse was preserved in a formalin bath for 
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years awaiting positive identification. Agostini's newspaper 
articles became fricreasingly pro-Mussolini and he was interned 
immediately Italy joined in the war. Released early in 1944, he 
went to work at Romano's restaurant, Sydney, where Police 
Commissioner W.J. Mackay observed his depressed demean-
our. Mackay arranged for Linda's body to be made presentable 
and persuaded sixteen people who had knowm her to view the 
body. Almost half of them were positive that it was Agostini's 
wife, and the ex-internee confessed when Mackay confronted 
him. The judge found him guilty of manslaughter and, after 
servfrig only half of his sentence, Agostini was deported in 
1948.87 
Australia First 
In the middle of 1944 came a reassessment of the rights and 
wrongs of the Australia First friternments. A number of people 
with experience in internment were involved. Dr Evatt estab-
lished a Commission of Inquiry under Mr Justice T.S. Clyne^^ 
who had chaired the Victorian Appeals Tribunals in 1940. As-
sisting Justice Clyne was WR. Dovey, QC, a member of the 
ACAC H.J.H. Henchman, a former member of an appeal fribu-
nal represented the Security Service. The hearings began in 
Sydney on 19 June 1944 and ended in Melbourne on 17 May 
1945. The evidence showed that Intelligence operations and 
dedsions were not without fault. Conclusions reached by some 
operators showed that they did not understand the subtlety of 
political thought and they often recorded cliches and selected 
extracts, which once they were entered on the file, were re-
garded as "prima facie" evidence. Constables quickly learned 
"to stiffen up a report on a suspect with careful selections from 
correspondence in which the innocuous became the seditious". 
The lawyer for Masey, Sailer, Bath, Hooper and Watts spoke of 
"the blithering frieptitude of certain fridividual military offi-
cers" and Dovey did not contradict him. Of the four officers 
involved in decidfrig which, and how many AusfraUa First 
members to arrest, each gave a different version of what had 
been dedded. Of those not arrested there were at least six men 
and a number of women who had equaUy as deep a commit-
ment to the movement and their non-inclusion was not ex-
plained. 
Another feature of the Clyne friqufry was the antagonism of 
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the court to any evidence of anti-British sentiment. PR. 
Stephensen refused to admit that his writings were anti-British 
but he agreed that if a person did attempt to bring Britain into 
contempt or disrepute in time of war it would be grounds for 
considering that person for internment. He also agreed with the 
proposition that "when the presence of an individual in the 
community was likely to affect the safety of the community, any 
doubt, from the point of view of common sense, should be 
resolved in favour of the community". The ultimate justifica-
tion for internment was the need for the majority to feel secure. 
The Ausfralia Ffrst internments were made in haste, at the 
moment of AusfraUa's greatest security threat, but in 1945 
Clyne concluded that the army had not been justified in recom-
mending the detention of Bath, Clarence Crowley, Hooper, 
Masey, Matthews, Salier, Tinker-Giles and Watts. Compensa-
tion ranging from three hundred and fifty pounds to seven 
hundred pounds was suggested. Those who were not exoner-
ated by Clyne continued to protest.^^ 
The Germans 
With the release of most Italians, the frivestigation of the Aus-
fraUa First cases and the contfriuing favourable progress of the 
war, Calwell's committee considered the possibility of releasing 
the Germans. The ACAC planned to visit Tatura in November 
1944 and then to report to the Attorney-General whether the 
German internees there could safely be released for work. 
Calwell was not altogether happy about the plan because the 
Camp Leaders and the Internal Court of Honour were "avowed 
Nazis". A few internees from this camp had been granted 
releases but had been fritimidated by the others into not leavfrig 
tiie camp. Further, when 50 of the 400 friternees in the camp had 
indicated their desire not to be repatriated to Germany, they had 
"been subjected to all sorts of intimidation and persecution by 
the Nazi clique". Calwell placed tiie blame for this on the Camp 
Leader, J.H. Becker, and Calwell wanted an "immediate weed-
ing out" of Becker and the Nazis, who would go to another 
camp so that the committee could test the frue feelings of the 
remainder.^" Many Germans however, had a sfrong national 
loyalty, and would not consider release to work until the war 
was over. 
By tiie end of 1945 tiiere were 47 Italians and 564 Germans in 
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camp who had been resident in Australia or her territories when 
the war commenced. There were also hundreds of others sent 
from overseas and over a thousand Japanese still in camps. Of 
the Australian-interned Germans, 357 were males, 85 females 
and 122 children.^^ It was decided that the Germans and the 
Italians, would be interviewed by Mr Justice (formerly Briga-
dier) Simpson, who would recommend for or against their 
deportation. Many of the missionaries from New Guinea 
wanted to return to the missions and after some agitation from 
the American and Australian Lutheran Missionary Societies,^ ^ 
many were allowed to do so. Germans whose homes were in 
Germany instinctively wanted to return to Germany, but the 
plight of German civilians, the lack of food available there for 
their children and the division of Germany made some recon-
sider. Newsreels of the horrors of the Belsen concentration 
camp, the starvation of civilians and the numerous displaced 
persons camps were shown to the internees before their hear-
ings^^ and parents asked if they understood that their children 
would be endangered. Naturalised and Australian-born moth-
ers, unlike other wives, were interviewed separately from their 
husbands. Most people who chose to return to Germany did so 
because they had only ever regarded Australia as a temporary 
posting.^ "* 
All who asked to stay in Australia, and this included those 
who had been long-term residents, were closely questioned 
about their political views. A number claimed that while thefr 
country was at war they were obliged to give it their loyalty but 
with the land they had known now obliterated, they no longer 
owed it loyalty. This was acceptable from those who had kept 
their original citizenship, but naturalised people and those who 
had party affiliations were not viewed kfridly. They had to 
argue hard to be allowed to stay^s Arnold von Skerst explained 
that his first life had been desfroyed by World War I and since 
then he had been knocking around the world "trying to make 
a livfrig here and there" as best he covdd. Sfrnpson summarised 
von Skerst's career as being one of service to half a dozen 
governments and because this was so widely known Simpson 
could never imagfrie anyone ttusting von Skerst's political 
outlook again. No one interested in subversive activities would 
use such a chameleon. Sfrnpson decided that the man had no 
potential as a spy and that it was neither necessary nor advis-
able to deport hUn. His reapplication for naturalisation was 
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rejected and the Prime Mfriister, Ben Chifley, barred Skerst from 
representing Australia in a radio Quiz team. On Christmas Eve 
1948 Skerst was found dead with his head in the gas oven of his 
home in Randwick.^^ 
Dr Joharmes HeUirich Becker, regarded by the press as Aus-
tiaUa's leadfrig Nazi, was recommended for deportation. To-
gether wfrh others being repatriated to Germany, Becker had 
been released from camp on parole to Uve at his own expense 
in September 1946, a year after the war was over but stUl with 
Uttle shippfrig avaUable. He also appUed for naturalisation but 
tiie protest was voluble. Deportation arrangements were made 
for 20 January 1947 but the AUied Control Council in Germany 
postponed the move indeffrutely Finally in November 1947, 
four hundred deportees were gathered at Rushworth for re-
grouping prior to departing on the Kanimbla from Port Mel-
bourne to be transfered at Fremantle to the US transport General 
Stuart Heintzelman. Becker fled from Adelaide to Sydney under 
a false name and stowed away on a tanker bound for the 
Panama Canal but was caught and flown to Fremantle to join 
the 397 Germans and Italians, 304 of whom had been Uiternees, 
beUig returned to Europe. The Heintzelman had deposited in 
Fremantle hundreds of displaced people from the Baltic states. 
In Europe Becker faced an American de-Nazification court. Dr 
Gerhard Neumann, the former Sydney University lecturer and 
Camp Chronicle editor, was also forcibly deported despite his 
wife's appeal to the newly-engaged Princess Elizabeth, and to 
Mr Calwell. Dr Greuber, a Nazi Party member and the leader 
of the Vierma Boys Choir that had been stranded fri AustraUa at 
the outbreak of war, was also deported from Australia but 
found a home in South Africa.^^ 
The deportees were a minority of internees. Most friternees 
returned to their homes or made new homes in Australia. Of 
the British internees several hundred remained in AustraUa. 
Lt-Col Layton arranged for G.F. Chodziesner's young son Ben 
to be transshipped to Ausfralia from ChUe where his mother 
had died. Some of the student members of tiie 8th Employment 
Company went on to become top-ranking academics and wear 
the Dunera tag with pride.^^ The internees from the Middle East 
were a dUemma for the Ausfralian authorities and Mr Justice 
Hutchins from Tasmania was eventually given the responsibil-
ity to look into their situation. A significant proportion of the 
internees from Palestine were members of the Temple Society 
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or Templars. Their return to Palestfrie where the civil war, tiiat 
would result in the establishment of the state of Israel raged, 
was not possible. But the Templars had assets that made them 
acceptable migrants. On 23 September 1949 Calwell introduced 
the Temple Society Trust Fund Bill which created procedures 
for the disbursement of money received by the Ausfralian 
government on the liquidation of the irrigated dfrus orchards, 
vineyards and dairy farms that the sodety members and others 
had ovmed in Israel.^^ Well over three milUon pounds sterling 
were involved. The 574 men, women and children, who were 
sent to Australia in 1941 because Palestine had become a sfra-
tegic war zone, had been interned "as a precautionary meas-
ure". They had no desfre to be fransported to Germany and the 
AustraUan government was anxious not to be burdened with 
their internment indefinitely. Could they not become one with 
us? 
Mr Justice Hutchins was satisfied that 504 were suitable for 
AusfraUan residence but he felt 70 should be returned to Ger-
many To keep the society together, 270 Templars who had been 
evacuated to Cyprus from Israel were approved for migration 
in AprU 1948. CalweU stated that the Templars' funds were not 
to be used to establish an alien colony and that the people 
should be readily accepted into the AusfraUan commimity. 
They had high standards of morality and condurt and their 
farmfrig skill would earn them respect. Calwell told parliament 
that the Templars would settle successfully in AustraUa as new 
AusfraUans "for thefr own good and in the interests of this great 
country".ioo Calwell reiterated these themes in speeches at 
naturaUsation ceremonies, at the harbour-sides when migrant 
boats arrived and at migrant hostels. His Ministerial state-
ments, his autobiography and his biographies attest to his 
devotion to frnmigration and assimUation. Another group as-
sessed by Mr Justice Hutchins were the employees of the An-
glo-Persian OU Company and others who had been in camp in 
AustiaUa since late 1941 including those from the Sfraits Settie-
ment. In a conference with Forde and CalweU fri Canberra, 
Hutchins asked for a dedsion as to whether overseas internees 
held in Australia would be allowed to settie permanently if they 
wished.^o^The ministers decided they could fr they were judged 
to be "fit and proper persons to become naturaUsed". Many 
were released from Tatura in August 1946, most expressing 
their intention to Uve in Victoria. Others found it hard to make 
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a decision. Thefr EngUsh was not good, tiieir qualifications 
might not be recogrused and the situation with their property 
and assets overseas was unclear. Some had not heard from their 
famUy for years and wanted to be reunited above all else. The 
Commissioner had found that in addition to all these problems 
many suffered "from diffidence and forms of nervousness due 
to up to seven years in internment". The government decided 
that it was reasonable to give these people a year to make up 
tiieir minds about whether to stay permanentiy. fri the mean-
time they provided fares to places where internees were offered 
employment and provided some assistance with transferfrig 
money and reuniting families. Once an internee dedded to stay, 
the years in camp would be credited for naturaUsation pur-
poses. Mr H. Tempy who had acted as secretary to Mr Justice 
Hutchins, was appointed as a Welfare officer to meet internees 
in Melbourne and to dfrect them to their accommodation and 
employment. 
The Asians 
In contiast to his freatment of the European internees, CalweU 
rejected any moves to allow any of the Asiatic groups, who had 
been flung on AusfraUa's shores by the fortunes of war, to settle. 
Calwell, Uke most other Australians of the period, was commit-
ted to the White Australia policy. There was some petitioning 
to consider the position of former long-term Australian resi-
dents, and a few of them were in fact released. Sho Takasuka's 
resfriction not to go beyond ten mUes from his farm was lifted 
just under a year after Japan had surrendered; he went on to 
become President of the Huntly Shire outside Bendigo. Denzo 
Kuringu was finaUy reunited with his family late in 1946.^ °^ 
Some of the "Japanese" interned were Formosans, and they 
were aUowed to return to that island rather than to Japan. Other 
"Japanese" had been residents of Indonesia and the Pacific 
Islands, and had no desire to return to Japan where the cUmate 
was unattrartive to them, but the sentiment against anything 
Japanese aroused by the arrival back in Australia of the emaci-
ated survivors of the Burma railway and the POW horror camps 
preduded any inquiry into those internees who did not want 
to return to Japan. When R.G. Menzies, the leader of the Oppo-
sition, protested about the deportation of ex-friternees and Japa-
nese POWs fri over-crowded conditions on the Yoiziki, CalweU 
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made one of the most vitriolic repUes ever heard in parlia-
ment.^03 
The situation with the Indonesian seamen and the employ-
ees of the Dutch government-in-exile was more complicated. 
The Dutch had offended sections of the Australian community 
by beginning to deport back to Tanah Merah, the prison camp 
for political prisoners in Dutch New Guinea, their ex-prisoners 
whom the Australian authorities had released in 1943. The 
Dutch were moving to have their republican opponents con-
fined. There was an effective lobby group of exinternees work-
ing in Mackay, Qld, and they brought the situation to the 
attention of leadfrig Labor politicians. The Indonesians wanted 
the deportations stopped and to be allowed to return to their 
homeland as free people. In all Dutch establishments in Ausfra-
lia Indonesian pro-republican feelfrig was high, and when some 
Indonesians refused duty they were interned. The clerks from 
Wacol, Brisbane, were interned at Camp Lytton and Gaythorne 
under Australian guards while marines and sailors from Mid-
dle Park and St Kilda in Melbourne were gaoled in Geelong. 
Lockwood claims that in April 1946 there were 820 Indonesians 
in prison in Australia. The Dutch and Ambonese guards at 
Camp Victory, Casino, shot at protesting friternees, kUling two 
and wounding others. Residents of Casino demanded that this 
"concentration camp" be closed, and Calwell sent sfrongly 
worded protests to The Hague. He threatened that if the Dutch 
did not free the Casino prisoners the Australian authorities 
would take action to remove the guards. The refusal of the 
Indonesians to man Dutch ships and armed services, and the 
black ban effected by the Australian Seamen's urUons, delayed 
the return of the EXitch government-fri-exile and was a contrib-
uting fartor in the establishment of the fridonesian repubUc.^ ^* 
The End — or the Beginning? 
Witii the repatriation of the Indonesians, internment in Ausfra-
lia had come to an end and it was virtually forgotten. The 
Templars and other Palestinian exinternees, the e\-Dunera men, 
tiie pre-war refugees and migrants who were friterned, aU 
sUpped quietly into tiie AusfraUan community and were sub-
merged in the surge of migrants that followed the Baits from 
tiie Heintzelman. The dramatic impart of one milUon new set-
tiers in the post-war period, on top of the censorship of the 
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activities of the ACAC has prevented AustraUans from perceiv-
ing tiie continuity from friternment in World War II to the 
post-war migration boom. Yet the links were there, and one of 
the sfrongest of them was Arthur CalweU. 
Calwell, who became Minister for Immigration in 1946 and 
then initiated and promoted Australia's vigorous immigration 
policy, had spent much of his energies in the previous four years 
working in isolation on the problems of the friternees. For much 
of this period he was not popular with Curtfri or Caucus. He 
had alienated himself from the Curtin government over con-
SCTiption and he widened the rift by aggressive and provocative 
remarks; only his sfrong position in the Victorian branch got 
him the last nomination for a junior ministry fri 1943. Calwell's 
biographer, Colm Kiernan, considered that Calwell's immigra-
tion poUcy "had grown in his mind durfrig his period of isola-
tion from Curtin's government". During the years 1942-45 
CalweU's main responsibUity was the ACAC, and his contact 
with internees convinced him that "most of them were excellent 
citizens" and Kiernan considers that, as a result, Calwell "had 
few fears about bringing more such people to Australia" after 
the war.^ °5 The most sfrUcing feature of post-war migration 
policy was its inclusion of large numbers from continental 
Europe. Migration from Britain created no conttoversy, but 
Calwell saw the benefits of a broader policy. Calwell's pro-
European view has been attributed to his frish and American 
background, and no doubt this provided fertile soil for the 
germination of his ideas on immigration. He greatly admired 
the American view of cosmopolitan citizenship, and he pro-
moted the term "New Australians" and gave additional status 
to naturalisation ceremonies. But while these influences and 
activities are well known, the contribution of his experiences 
with internees is not. 
This can partly be atfributed to Calwell's own failure to 
mention anything of the ACAC in his autobiography Be Just and 
Fear Not, and the fact that his promotion of a large white 
population was argued on defence grounds. This justification 
was necessary to make immigration acceptable to Labor sup-
porters whose depression experiences had made them suspi-
cious of migrants. Defence was also the justification used by the 
non-Labor government of 1949 who continued to pursue frnmi-
gration energeticaUy. Calwell's conviction that Europeans were 
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good migrants and his ACAC experiences just dropped out of 
sight. 
Yet his absorption vdth the status of enemy aliens who were 
refugees, and with the concerns of hard-working Italian intern-
ees and their famUies, is convindngly documented in his pa-
pers. His impassioned pleas to Curtin and Evatt on behalf of 
these "unfortunate people" are a testament to what was goUig 
on in his mind at the time his ideas on imirdgration were being 
formed. One of his first acts as Minister for Immigration was to 
help the families of Australian Jews obtain entry to Australia. ^ "^  
In his ministerial statement on Immigration on 2 August 1945 
Calwell promulgated his beUef that non-British people had a 
lot to offer Australia and that within a short time assimilation 
should occur. Australians, in CalweU's opirdon, had been "too 
prone fri the past to ostradse those of alien birth", and Calwell 
stiessed that the children of foreign-born parents had helped 
defend AustraUa. Also many young Americans, who in Ausfra-
lia's terms were "enemy aliens", had been drafted into the 
United States forces that had saved Australia. In Calwell's view, 
AustiaUa would be well advised to incorporate its migrants 
fully into its life and society in a similar way^^^ Because of its 
influence on CalweU, internment in World War n is a crucial 
link in the tiansition from a ttaditional British society before the 
war to the post-war immigration boom that moved AusfraUa 
towards a more broadly based society. 
CONCLUSION 
The outstanding feature of internment policy was its fluidity. It 
had to be fluid because it moved between two concepts that in 
wartime were not always compatible — the individual's right 
in a democratic sodety not to be detained arbitrarily and the 
need of the people to feel secure. These two prindples were 
evident when policy was ffrst considered and laid down in the 
War Book, and the dedsion that internments should be as few 
as aUowed by "public safety and public sentiment" reflerted 
both prfridples, as weU as being sensible in terms of cost. Cost, 
in capital and manpower, was a constant fartor frifluencing 
internment policy and its implementation, and it was ignored 
only when security became of overriding importance. After aU, 
the one and one half mUlion pounds spent on internment in 
World War I had Uttle proven effert on Australian security or 
on the eventual victorious outcome. 
In terms of security AusfraUan authorities were not unpre-
pared at the outbreak of war, and critidsms of the original 
internments are largely unfounded. Members of the Nazi Party 
were dedicated to Hitler's regime, and the expatriot employees 
of German firms were often completely loyal to their native 
land and thereby did represent a risk. Other measures taken at 
the beginning of the war — regisfration of aU aliens and restric-
tions on enemy aUens- were also sensible. The significant fact 
is that these original internments, together with the equally 
justifiable internment of members of the Fascist Party when 
Italy jofried the war, constituted only one-twentieth of total 
interments. The large majority of internments were made be-
cause perceptions of security needs changed and because pub-
Uc sentiment demanded it. Both were closely aligned to the 
progress of the war. There is no proof that security was actually 
improved by the internment of newly arrived migrants, Euro-
pean sodalists, and former Italian soldiers in June 1940, or of 
Italian farmers from North Queensland in early 1942. These 
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people were free for a large portion of the war and no act of 
violence to the war effort is atfributable to them. But the military 
losses at these two critical periods brought the war closer and 
the authorities were concerned that those who did not identify 
closely with the British Empire might be prompted to art if the 
authorities did not show themselves determined to prevent 
such a possibility. Military losses also unsettied the public, 
whose anxiety was the major factor confributing to most intern-
ments. 
There is a special psychological state that binds a nation in 
war time — a belief that the cause justifies the sacrifice of a 
generation, a belief that victory is possible and a belief that 
everyone is working together for that victory. If beUef in the 
cause is missing, as happened in the Vietnam War, victory is 
unlikely. If people do not beUeve they can win, as a number of 
European countries realised in the face of Germany's Blitzkrieg, 
they will surrender and hope to fight another day. If the people 
do not believe that everyone is working for a victory, as hap-
pened in France, the nation will divide and the willingness to 
fight disappear. AustraUans, on the whole, never lacked faith in 
the cause, although some groups were held to be not as com-
mitted to it as was required. Communists were regarded as not 
being wholeheartedly for the war in the period before the attack 
on the Soviet Union; and the Jehovah's Witnesses and, to a 
much lesser extent, pacifists generaUy were regarded with sus-
picion, but only considered for actual friternment if they ac-
tively campaigned to disturb the war effort. Enemy aliens and 
naturaUsed people of enemy origin were regularly considered 
for friternment because of the fear of disloyalty or divided 
loyalty. On two occasions — when France fell and when Singa-
pore fell — these sharp reminders that victory would not be 
quick, or easy, brought a dramatic increase in interrunents. 
These were the times when people came closest to questionmg 
whether victory was inevitable. When people feel threatened 
tiiey look for evidence of action by the authorities to remedy the 
situation and if a mUitary reply cannot be forthcoming some 
scapegoat has to be satisfactorily sacrificed to provide a substi-
tute. It is easier to sacrifice the Uberty of further groups of enemy 
aliens, or to throw doubt on the loyalty of naturalised persons 
than to remind an unsettied nation that lack of foresight, and 
the priorities of pre-war spending, actually caused the military 
setbacks. 
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Arthur Calwell, in his foreword to Lamidey's Aliens Control 
corrertly assessed the situation. "When passions are let loose 
by war", he wrote, "it happens all too often that foreigners, 
whether or not of enemy origin, and even locaUy born persons 
bearing foreign names, become the object of denunciation and 
persecution."! Calwell regarded it as a matter of pride that 
"popular hysteria did not reach the intensity" of that in the 
Great War. There was no significant poUtical or press campaign 
against aliens during World War n. The lack of a public cam-
paign is atfributable to the cool-headedness and commitment 
to fair play exhibited by the Prime Ministers, R.G. Menzies and 
John Curtin, who never engaged in alien baiting themselves, 
and publicly denounced it in others. They were supported by 
senior ministers such as PC. Spender and Dr Evatt. But intern-
ment was not dirertly in these men's hands, nor did their 
attfrude make them popular. Menzies' temperate approach did 
not prevent his being ousted from office, and internees from the 
lowest levels of risk were taken in Curtfri's term of office. The 
fart is that tiiere is Uttle statistical difference between the figures 
for both wars. The actual number of people friterned did not 
vary in proportional terms, that is, one thousand for every one 
million in the population. 
The explanation lies in the fact that the actual danger in-
creased. In World War I the theatres of war — with the minor 
exceptions of New Guinea and the chance raider — were far 
away. In World War n civilians were killed on Australian soil. 
Many citizens and officials demanded internments and at peak 
times of war pressure this demand had to be acceded to. CalweU 
sfressed that from the fall of France onwards "a good deal of 
avoidable human misery was caused" by internments, but he 
acknowledged that it was probably "inevitable, for war as the 
democracies wage it is largely a matter of improvisation, and 
in urgent situations which demand prompt and effective action 
there is little time to weigh the niceties of htunan rights". When 
a nation is suddenly much more threatened than it had been a 
week before, the popiUation takes fright. This fear can be 
whipped up in a campaign to emphasise and exaggerate differ-
ences between peoples, but it cannot so easily be cooled by 
soothing reassurances for it is a real fear, and together with 
actual military artion, the government must institute internal 
security measures to keep up morale. 
The most effective way to counter this fear, and to prevent 
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nervous agitation setting one group against another, is to show 
that everyone is working equally hard and making equal sacri-
fices. This is why the Aliens Service regulations were intro-
duced and, although Evatt's explanation of the return to a 
narrow internment was couched in terms of individual liberty, 
the policy was defended in terms of the need for manpower and 
the useful war work ex-fritemees were engaged fri. Everyone 
had to be seen to be sharfrig the burden and artively contribut-
ing. The most infriguing speculation in the history of intern-
ment is whether Evatt would have been able to carry out his 
return to a narrow policy if the war situation had not improved. 
The fact that aU press reference to Calwell's committee was 
censored showed that the government was determined to re-
move debate on internments and releases from the public arena. 
It was not until after the Labor Government had firmly estab-
lished itself fri office with the 1943 election that the large-scale 
releases artually took place. 
The censorship of release plans prevented open debate and 
displays of outraged public sentiment, leaving only actual se-
curity needs to be considered. Yet nothing lifted morale and 
cafrned the caU for internments like military victories. When the 
AustraUan and British divisions swept to virtory over the Ital-
ians in the Middle East, further internments of Italians in Aus-
tiaUa in 1941 became a non-issue. When the Australian and 
American armies recaptured Japanese strongholds in New 
Guinea in 1943, the question of further internments never re-
vived. Thus the national pattern of internments and releases 
reflerted the fluctuating progress of the war, but variations 
between states and between nationalities were more complex. 
Lamidey suggests that the reasons for the difference between 
internment statistics in the various states lay in the miUtary 
situation and fri the approaches of commandants. So it was both 
a question of geography and personality. Another aspect, which 
Lamidey does not suggest but which helps to explain the dif-
ferences, is the nature of tiie alien population in each state. But, 
firstiy, there is the aspect of geography. The more distant the 
state from army headquarters in Melbourne, the greater the 
number of internments. It was not just a matter of the more 
northerly (and therefore closer to tiie fighting) tiie state, the 
greater the number of internments. That element certainly ex-
plains the high rates in Queensland, where 43.11 per cent of 
male aliens were interned, but equally Unportant was the sense 
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of isolation. The next highest rates were in Western AustiraUa 
(32.66 per cent), and fri Tasmania (34.33 per cent).^ 
The personalities of the commandants were also important, 
and variable. A seruor officer's concept of loyalty and his inter-
pretation of his duties afferted internment levels. Major-Gen-
eral J.M.A. Durrant saw the ItaUans as undifferentiated, and in 
Western Australia they had either to be watched or interned. It 
is not surprising that he also oversaw the high internment rates 
in Queensland. Brigadier H.C. Bundock, had he been author-
ised to detafri tiie foreign born, regardless of naturalisation, 
would undoubtedly have pressed the South Australian rate of 
15.65 per cent much higher. Lieutenant-General V.A.H. Sturdee 
intUnated a desire to see aU Germans interned whether they had 
claims to be refugees or not. The halt brought to Eastern Com-
mand's internments after a quick roundup in June 1940 and the 
acrimonious exchanges they precipitated, between Mair and 
Menzies, and between Eastern Command and AHQ, slowed 
the rate of internments in New South Wales. The curtaUing of 
Eastern Command's authority after the unauthorised collection 
of Roumanians during the second peak of internments, held the 
New South Wales rate at 11.76 per cent. The consistent refusal 
of Virtorian-based commanders to be rushed into higher rates 
of internment, commensurate with their larger number of alien 
residents, was justified by the distance from the war zone. The 
small size of \^ctoria allowed for regular surveUlance and a 
consequent belief that resfrictions were sufficient. 
The low rate of 2.97 per cent could also have been the result 
of the personal judgement of men such as Lieutenant-General 
J.L. Whitham, Colonel S.F. Whittington and Major-General 
W.A.B. Steele that Victorian security only required a minimal 
number of internments. This personal response may have been 
influenced by intangible factors such as the psychological secu-
rity of having Australian headquarters and, for a time, Ameri-
can headquarters in Melbourne. An important factor fri this 
lowest rate was the nature of the Victorian aUen population and 
the understandfrig of this nature by the military's closest advi-
sor on aUens, Major Roland S. Browme of the CIB and, later, of 
tiie Security Service. Over half of the Jews who migrated to 
AusfraUa went to Melbourne, and Browne had met many of 
them before the war. He knew thefr anti-Nazi sentiments and 
he was confident in his judgements. Other personaUties may 
also have had an influence. Archbishop Marmix and General 
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Blarney were not unknown to the Italian community in Victoria, 
and the member for Melbourne, Arthur Calwell, and the mem-
ber for Kooyong, R.G. Menzies, not only knew the communities 
that made up Melbourne but were, in thefr different ways, 
determined advocates of legality and justice. 
Another factor fri the disproportionate internments between 
Queensland and Victoria lies in the nationaUties of the alien 
residents. Queensland and Western Ausfralia had the greatest 
population of Japanese, of whom all were interned, thus driv-
ing their overall percentage higher. The differing rates of intern-
ment of each national group would logically vary according to 
the degree of risk they were held to be, but this was not always 
the case. The Japanese were friterned at 98 per cent, Germans 
and Italians at 32 and 31 per cent, respectively, and the Rouma-
nians at 24 per cent.^ In sharp confrast to Germans, Austrians 
were only interned at 6 per cent, which means that the Ausfra-
lian Government disregarded the Anschluss and did not auto-
matically tiansfer German citizenship to resident Ausfrians. 
Nor did the even tieatment of Germans and Italians reflect a 
similar level of risk assessment. The majority of Italians who 
were interned from the low-risk category were taken only 
because they were livfrig on the northeast Queenland coast. The 
Germans were feared because they were held to be thorough, 
effident and ruthless — an opiruon not held of Italians. At the 
time of the big round-ups in 1942, not only German men but 
also their women and chUdren were taken from the vulnerable 
areas, while orUy military-aged men of Italian origin were 
included. The Japanese were all interned, not only because they 
were of the same race as the army advandng on Singapore, but 
also because they were obvious targets of abuse. It may not have 
been necessary for all Japanese to have been friterned, for the 
laundrymen and vegetable growers could have made a produc-
tive contribution to the domestic war effort, but it was advisable 
that they be not released for their own safety, as well as for law 
and order and morale. Thus the nationaUties resident fri the 
different states affected their internment rates. Had there been 
a Japanese rather than a Chfriese commimity in Melbourne, the 
Virtorian figure would have reflected this. 
The personalities of commandants were a factor, but GOCs 
were not completely free agents. They were influenced by the 
restrafrits of their superiors and they paid attention to the 
advice of their staff. There is no doubt that tiie overridfrig factor 
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was geography Any commandant woiUd have acted to remove 
the North Queensland Italians, Germans and Japanese in early 
1942. And fri so doing, the Queensland Commandant would 
have had the support of the local citizens. Corresponding with 
the variety in friternment rates there was also a difference in the 
level of demand for internment by the pubUc, with many more 
petfrions comfrig from the northern areas. However, consider-
able caution should be applied before concluding that one 
group of Australians was more xenophobic than another. 
Queenslanders were most vulnerable. Some Sydney residents 
reacted to the midget submarine attack on their harbour with a 
hasty exit to the Blue Mountains. Melbourne was not tested in 
the same way. 
Among the most friteresting comparisons are those with 
World War I. So many aspects were sfrnilar. The parallel be-
tween internments and the progress of the war, and the empha-
sis on nationality, and the doubts about naturalisation, were 
common. In both wars merchant seamen were judged to be as 
valuable as servicemen, and military-tiafried and mUitary-aged 
men were reviewed most carefully. Anti-migrant feeling and 
competition for land jobs were intermingled with prejudice and 
fear; spy scares and unjustified suspicions were evident. How-
ever, it is the differences that were more telling. The lessons of 
World War I had been learnt and noted for consideration in 
World War n. They were that cost, manpower and reciprocity 
considerations should keep internments to a minimum, and 
that a system of reviews and reassessments should always be 
available through appeals. It was the increase in the level of 
danger that eventually precipitated internments to a rate 
roughly equivalent with World War I. When that danger de-
creased a return to a smaller number of internments was possi-
ble and was instituted. This fluctuating policy was correct 
because it allowed for the unpredictabUity of war-induced 
situations and resulted fri a lack of much long-term hostiUty by 
internees. 
The most sigruficant justification for a flexible policy was the 
unusual situation of the German Jews. Amendments to legisla-
tion to take account of this special and unexpected situation 
prevented the continuation of thefr unnecessary hardships, but 
this acknowledgement of the Jewish problem and frs franslation 
into internment poUcy were not easy: security fears, anti-Semi-
tism, and anti-migrant feelings had to be overcome. The prob-
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lem of the Dunera internees would probably have dragged on 
into 1944 if the manpower crisis in 1942 had not occurred. The 
holding of overseas internees was common to both wars, but 
the difficulty of making decisions about releasfrig internees sent 
by allies was a feature of World War H. The solution was not for 
AustraUa to refuse overseas friternees, for Australia remained 
dependent on alUes who asked for this assistance, and fricon-
testably the island continent was an ideal gaol. The solution lay 
in having some means of applying the flexibUity towards the 
locally interned, to those who were not Australian friternees, 
but with no records or assessments available it feU into the "too 
hard" basket. 
The benefit of adjustfrig policy is demonsfrated by the virtual 
lack of any long-term hostility by most internees. The lengthy 
incarceration of those with a political and national commitment 
to the enemy was acknowledged by ex-Nazis and fierce patriots 
to have been warranted.^ The majority, who served less than 
two years, now consider that they were the victims of difficult 
cfrcumstances, and prefer to forget their internment. In a study 
of the areas of Queensland where the large scale internments of 
Italians took place, W.D. Borrie found that by 1951 ex-internees 
had again integrated into their communities and were taking 
their traditional interest in local affairs; for instance, they were 
weU represented on primary school committees. They were not 
proportionately represented on shire councils or high school 
committees, but this had been the case before the war and has 
not improved dramaticaUy today. Borrie suggests that the lack 
of bitterness of these ex-internees was the result of the care 
taken of their farms by their wives and the Queensland Sugar 
Board .5 The economic security they had sought by migration 
was basicaUy undisturbed, and they regarded the low yields of 
1942-3 as a temporary setback. 
In 1979 most ex-internees interviewed confirmed their belief 
that the circumstances of war satisfactorily explained their 
internment, although a few showed dissatisfaction with gener-
alised explanations and a curiosity about the cfrcumstances of 
tiieir own selertion. Ross Costanzo shrugged his shoulders — 
he had been a newly-arrived migrant who was a conscript in 
Mussolfru's army and all such men were interned, so he felt no 
personal affront. He airly waved the secateurs he used to cut 
the capsicums he sold in the southern markets. Since then life 
had been good to him. His wife worked beside him, and his 
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children and their spouses picked tiie tomatoes fri the next field. 
AusfraUa was a country that protected the "small man". The 
ABC broadcast the daily vegetable prices and if he was not 
satisfied with his agent's checque, the Marketing Board would 
investigate for him. But in the town, the pre-war naturalised 
and now retired cane farmer, Gus Orlandi, was not satisfied. 
His eyes flashed and his fist was clenched as he asked for a 
justification of his friternment. Why was a man who had made 
farming his life, who had two young Australian-born sons, torn 
from his wife and thrown frito prison? When his son was asked 
at university what his father had done in the war, he had to 
reply that he had been put in a concenfration camp!^ 
Of the minority who still search for explanations the Dunera 
internees are the more persistent questioners. In a review of B. 
Patkin's The Dunera Internees, former British internee FeUx Wer-
der concludes that "nobody ever learns anything from history" 
for in his view the middle classes stiU worship the same mate-
rialistic values that they did before World War II.'' He does not 
see evidence in today's society that people are more under-
standing. Henry Mayer, a former Dunera friternee and now a 
professor, suggests that the Dunera internments should be a part 
of a broader history of the period with comparisons made 
"between types of justice" meted out to his group, the Commu-
nists, "the quasi-fasdst Australia Firsters", and resident refu-
gees.^ One could add the long-term resident, naturalised Italian 
farmers to that list. More importantiy, Mayer asks where justice 
can be found and what it would cost. In wartime, justice cannot 
be purchased at the expense of real security or of the general 
public's need to feel secure, but the constant questioning by 
some who were sacrificed to satisfy that need, correctly remfrids 
the nation that the balance went at times cruelly against certain 
groups. 
Few people were prepared to speak out agafrist unjust intern-
ments even when the crises had passed. The majority who 
remained silent did so partly from a mixture of fear, ignorance, 
parochialism and anti-semitism, but most people accepted that, 
because "responsible authorites" thought internees were dan-
gerous, they must indeed be so. Mayer blames local Jewish 
organisations, Dr Evatt and the Labor government for not 
acting when they could have been expected to have made 
"some attempt" to fight frijustice. Mayer rightly judges that the 
lack of a quick response by Labor lies in "the atmosphere of the 
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1940s", and Paul Hasluck pushes this idea even further fri his 
recent review of a biography of PR.Stephensen.^ 
Hasluck still regards the detention of tiie Australia First 
members as a gross infringement of individual liberty, and that 
"the tardiness in rectifying it", was "a matter of shame". But he 
also points out that tiie background of wartime politics was 
critical. Curtin's government rested on the contfriuing support 
of independents who had dumped Menzies because he was not 
acting dynamicaUy. Internment was action of a kind. A firm 
stand against action was not possible. It is to Curtfri's credfr that 
he was able in early 1942 to use the manpower argument to 
have the younger Dunera internees released, that he expanded 
recruitment for national service to include aliens and refugees, 
and that he allowed tribunals to hear Japanese objertors. In 
mid-1942 he took the control of aliens and internment from the 
army and returned it to the civil domafri. By September 1942 
Evatt was able to turn internment policy around, although the 
enactment of most releases waited a year longer. Curtin, Evatt 
and Labor do not deserve to be held as more blameworthy than 
the conformists who lined up with the established authorities. 
Conformists comprised the bulk of the population, and a demo-
cratic nation that expects a higher standard of regard for civil 
liberties from its leaders than it imposes on itself, is dodging its 
own responsibilities. 
However, together with the shortened terms most internees 
served, and the economic success that many ex-internees found 
in AustraUa, there is another factor that confributed to the 
general lack of long-term bitterness. All internees stressed their 
high regard for the men who guarded them, and their general 
satisfartion with their food and freatment. Accommodation at 
Gaythorne was unfavourably commented upon, and primitive 
conditions marked the establishment phase of the camps in the 
outback areas, but the southern camps, particularly Tatura, 
were regarded as very good. When the Victorian Offidal Visi-
tors asked to be relieved of their duties late fri 1945, they 
expressed the opinion that the conduct of the camps and the 
freatment of friternees reflected "credfr on the Army''.^^ 
Not orUy had internees "been heated justiy", but with "a 
sympathetic understanding". Mr Justice Gavan Duffy and Mr 
Justice Norman O'Bryan tiiought "that some other soldierly 
virtues" were "as conspicuous in our army as valour on the 
field", and that it was a pleasure for them to have seen the 
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complete lack of a "maUgnant rancour against the helpless". 
The behaviour of the Garrison troops should not be discounted 
as a factor contributing to the successful reintegration of former 
resident internees and in the decision of many overseas intern-
ees to become Australian citizens.^^ 
So humane freatment and a fluid poUcy circumvented the 
worst aspects of internment, but the forces against a peacetime 
regard for civil liberties during war time are too powerful to be 
counter balanced, even if the offending group are AustiaUans 
and their "crime" is extreme political unpopularity, fri trying to 
assess the "lesson" of the freatment of Australia First uiternees, 
Bruce Muirden could not answer the question as to how far any 
individual can be left free in war time. When a community is 
physically threatened, how can the authorities handle dissident 
opinion and seeming sympathy with the enemy? Is "panic 
action desfroying civil liberties excusable?", Muirden asks.^^ 
The reaUty is that it is inevitable. The people, fri thefr fear and 
anxiety, demand action and particularly the removal of those 
considered as not being committed to the cause for which the 
young and best people are dying. The authorities must move 
against perceived threats, and the community can repent later. 
A better solution woiUd be that the nation become a more 
integrated, mature and tolerant community, and to some extent 
AusfraUa set out to achieve this after World War II. First, citi-
zenship and nationaUty have been welded together, and rights 
and obligations have been made to apply equaUy to every 
citizen. When National Service was required in 1950, it was 
incumbent on all 18-year-old males, and when a selective sys-
tem was introduced in 1964, the authorities fried to be obvi-
ously even-handed. Naturalisation is now legally equal to 
nationality by birth, and all cultural groups are encouraged to 
confribute to the national heritage. It was his experiences with 
migrant friternees in World War II that motivated Arthur Cal-
weU to begin the process of moving Australia towards those 
goals. 
Appendix A 
ADDITIONAL STATISTICAL 
INFORMATION 
Internments of Resident Aliens by Nationality 
(from Lamidey, Aliens Control, p.52) 
Italians 
Germans 
Japanese 
Finns 
Austrians 
Albanians 
Rumanians 
Hungarians 
Russians 
Portuguese 
Norwegians 
Czechoslovakians 
Dutch 
Poles 
Estonians 
Greeks 
4 727 
1115 
587 
142 
90 
84 
42 
33 
28 
28 
15 
11 
10 
8 
7 
7 
Swiss 
Egyptians 
Others 
Yugoslavs 
British by marriage 
U.S.A. 
New Guinea natives 
Belgians 
French 
Bulgarians 
Latvians 
Javanese 
Chinese 
Thailanders 
Lithuanians 
Spanish 
Total 
6 
5 
5 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
6 982 
Total Internments 
(from Lamidey, Aliens Control, p.22 of Interim Report) 
Aliens resident in Australia 5 475 
Naturalised British Subjects 1 388 
Natural Bom 240 
Total 7103 
The problem with this figure is that it does not match the figure 
of 6 982 given as the total number of resident aliens interned in 
the compilation from Lamidey, p.52. The two sets of figures 
were compUed at different times. The 5 475 figure for AUens 
was dated 31 December 1942 and tiie 6 982 compilation was 
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prepared on 31 March 1944, which could mean 1 507 additional 
aliens were friterned between 1 January 1943 and 30 March 
1944. This is unUkely at a time when releases were the poUcy 
(It would also mean that total internments were 8 610.) A more 
probable explanation is that Naturalised British Subjects were 
subdivided into their original nationality for the 6 982 figure of 
31 March 1944. The addition of the aUens and N.B.S. figures 
gives 6 863, which approximates 6 982. It is even possible that 
some Australian-born chUdren of alien or N.B.S. parents could 
have been included under the nationality of their parent's 
country of origfri. 
Local Internments — 31 December 1942 
Aliens 
Apprehended 
Released 
Now interned 
Males 
5 310 
1492 
3 818 
NaturaUsed British Subjects 
Apprehended 1339 
Released 280 
Now interned 1 059 
Natural bom 
Apprehended 
Released 
Now interned 
Totals 
Apprehended 
Released 
Now interned 
195 
70 
125 
6844 
1842 
5 002 
Enemy Male Internments 
Registered in Five Enemy 
Japanese 
Germans 
Italians 
Rumanians 
Austrians 
Total 
600 
3 479 
14 904 
170 
1394 
Females 
165 
16 
149 
49 
11 
38 
45 
6 
39 
259 
33 
226 
Lamidey, Aliens Contro 
as Percentage of Males 
Nationalities 
Interned 
587 
1115 
4 727 
42 
90 
Total 
5 475 
1508 
3 967 
1388 
291 
1097 
240 
76 
164 
7103 
1875 
5 228 
^p .54 
% 
97.83 
32.04 
31.71 
24.70 
6.45 
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Male Aliens Interned as Percentage of Total Alien Males, 
by States 
State 
Queensland 
Tasmania 
Western Australia 
South Australia 
N.S.W. 
Victoria 
Total 
6 968 
201 
5193 
2132 
13 060 
11530 
Interned 
3 004 
69 
1696 
334 
1536 
343 
% 
43.11 
34.33 
32.66 
15.65 
11.76 
2.97 
Lamidey, Aliens Control, p.53 
Tribunal results to 14 November 1940 
Number of internees at 31 October 1940 
Enemy aliens 
Other aliens 
British subjects 
All classes 
NSW 
595 
6 
114 
718 
VIC 
167 
1 
9 
177 
QLD 
328 
2 
55 
385 
SA 
118 
5 
16 
139 
WA 
951 
— 
17 
968 
TAS 
34 
— 
— 
34 
NG 
98 
3 
15 
116 
TOTAL 
2 291 
20 
226 
2 537 
Internees whose appeals and leave to appeal have been 
rejected from outbreak of war to 14 November 1940 
Non-enemy aliens 2 
British subjects 35 1 24 16 — — 83 
Leave to appeal granted but hearing pending 
Non-enemy aliens 
British subjects 16 — 
2 — 
20 1 
2 
39 
Applications for leave to appeal pending decision 
Non-enemy aliens — — 1 — 1 
British subjects 68 — 7 7 — 82 
Note: Arrangements for hearing appeals from those interned to New 
Guinea was being considered. 
(AWM 113 1/1/13) 
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Releases to 31 December 1944 
Italian 
Aliens 
NBS 
Aust.-bom 
German 
Aliens 
NBS 
Aust.-bom 
Japanese 
Finns 
Albanians 
Others 
Total 
Sept-Dec 
1942 
29 
23 
1 
8 
39 
3 
4 
59 
84 
18 
268 
Jan-Aug 
1943 
1078 
294 
10 
47 
10 
5 
10 
— 
— 
89 
1543 
Aug-Apr 
1943 1944 
1552 
365 
16 
141 
47 
19 
20 
75 
2 235 
Apr-Dec 
1944 
148 
29 
154 
36 
25 
__ 
112 
504 
Total 
2 807 
711 
27 
350 
132 
17 
59 
59 
84 
294 
4 550 
Lamidey, Aliens Control, p. 54) 
Overseas Nationals Interned in Ausfralia 
From 
United Kingdom 
Netherlands East Indies 
New Caledonia 
Palestine 
Dutch New Guinea 
Iran 
Straits settlements 
New Zealand 
New Hebrides 
Middle East 
Solomon Islands 
Total 
2 542 
1949 
1124 
834 
524 
495 
284 
49 
34 
18 
8 
7 861 
AA MP 842, file 115/1/198 
In this file the number of local internees is nominated as 7 485. 
On these figures 15 346 persons were accommodated in Ausfra-
lian Internment Camps at some time during World War n. 
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Overseas internees by nationality 
From German Italian Japanese Sundries Total 
United Kingdom 
Straits Settlement 
Palestine 
Iran 
Middle East 
Singapore 
(Foreign Legion) 
New Guinea 
New Caledonia 
New Hebrides 
N.E.I. 
Solomon Islands 
New Zealand 
2 342 
222 
664 
494 
18 
12 
— 
1 
— 
— 
— 
— 
200 
50 
170 
— 
— 
— 
— 
5 
34 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
1124 
— 
1949 
3 
50 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
525 
9 
— 
— 
5 
— 
2 542 
272 
834 
494 
18 
12 
525 
1139 
34 
1949 
8 
50 
Total 3 753 425 3160 539 7877 
History of the Directorate of PWI, p.l9 
Local and Overseas Internees held by AMF by years 
Germans Italians Japanese Other Total 
31 Dece: mber 1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
278 
3 245 
3 698 
2 661 
2 396 
1851 
1576 
202 
1976 
1957 
3 836 
852 
226 
99 
2 
968 
4 022 
3141 
2 800 
2 764 
— 
36 
212 
120 
97 
73 
4 
278 
5 221 
6 659 
10 731 
6 409 
4 974 
4 512 
208 
History of the Directorate of PWI, p.212 
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Appendix B 
Senior Appointments to Directorate of Prisoners of War 
and Internees 
Colonel J. McCahon, Director, June 1941 — December 1945 
Major E A. Hosking, AAG, July 1941 — October 1945 
Major W.L. Davies, AAG, May 1941 — December 1944 
Major E.G. Coffin, DAAG (Employment) January 1942 — April 1946 
Major W.H.S. Dickinson, DAAG (Intemees), May 1941 —June 1943 
The history of the Directorate was compiled by Major D.E. Cleverly (Staff 
Captain, Enemy POW Section May 1941 — April 1945) 
(History of Directorate of PWI, pp. 472-3.) 
Commandants of Internment Camp Groups 
Lieutenant Colonel W.T. Tackaberry — TATURA, 1939-1942 
Lieutenant Colonel C.S. Thane OBE YD. — HAY, 1940—1944 
Lieutenant Colonel E.T Dean DSO V.D. — LOVEDAY, 1940-1946 
Other Officers Involved in the Administration of Loveday 
Lieutenant Colonel R. Soden E.D. (Commanded 33 Grn Bn) 
Major A. Dick DSO (11/C Internee and POW Administration) 
Major C.E. Hunkin E.D. (21/C Security, Loveday) 
Captain C.R. Jury (Australian Intelligence Corps) 
Camp Commandants (Loveday, January 1943) 
No.9 camp Major W.E.L. Hill 
No.10 camp Major A.W. Lott 
No.l4A camp Major C.H. Richardson 
No.l4B camp Major J.A. McRae 
No. 14C camp Captain B.B. Buttery 
No. 14D camp Captain G.E. Whitehill, MSM 
Woolenook camp Captain T.S. Brown 
{Internment in South Australia, pp.6-7) 
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12 Intemees hiquiry by Mr Justice Simpson, AA MP 798/1, file V38702, folder 8. 
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interviewed on 1 March 1946. 
13 The story of the Vienna Mozart Boys Choir was presented in "The Class of '39' 
on Channel 0/28 on 13 and 20 February 1983. 
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Appeasement in Australia: Reactions to the European Crises, 1935-1939, Australian 
University Press, Canberra, 1970, pp. 141-64. 
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18 Major (later Brigadier) Combes, a Permanent officer, was the Intelligence 
officer in Sydney emd lectured on tactics. He became Director of Military 
Operatior\s and Intelligence at AHQ on 2 November 1939. 
19 Lieutenant-General Lavarack questioned the British Navy's ability to protect 
both the Atlantic and the Far East. As CGS he fought for a larger budget for 
the Army and Air Force. Ironically it was his awareness of Australia's lack of 
preparedness and his justifiable concern during the Munich crisis, together 
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the Briton, Lieutenant-General E.K. Squires and later, the militia soldier, 
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A.B.Lodge, "Lieutenant-General Sir John Lavarack: From Chief of the General 
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occcisionally from intemees' files. 
22 For Newcastle files, see description for CA 904, C 130, CA 3563 and C 458 
(formerly SP 26/39, 42, 43). These records on organisational material, on 
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23 The following summary of army interests is based on the Monthly Intelligence 
Notes in AAMP 729/6, file 29/401/468. 
24 The Monthly Intelligence Summaries of the 3rd Military District for 1936, AA 
MP 95/3. 
25 In addition to this report on communist activities from the Intelligence 
Summaries, Lavarack sent an analysis of the National Union of Railwaymen's 
pamphlet "Shall Communism Rule Australia" to the Defence Minister on 6 
April 1936. It was further evidence to "previous papers" on communism, that 
the CPA aimed to establish a Soviet system of government in Australia, AA 
MP 429/6, fUe 29/401/3. 
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39 Police War Book instmctions. Chapter III, p. 1, AA MP 729/6, item 15/402/24. 
40 Report "Arnold Von Skerst — German' attached to letter, Mitchell to CIB, 
Melboume, dated 19 June 1939, AACRS BB741, file V-11032/5. 
41 Translation of Die Brucke, dated 4 February 1939, AA SP 1714/1, item 43197. 
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43 AACRS 1608, item L20/1/1, part I. 
44 HaU, The Secret State, pp. 27-8 and Austin Uughlin, Boots and AlhThe Inside Story 
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46 War Book, Part 1, Chapter XII, (May 1939), p. 6, AA MP 288/27, item no. 1. 
47 Copy of cable, from Secretary of State, London, dated 31 August 1939, AA ACT 
CRS A5954, box 253. 
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48 Ibid.; copy of cable from Secretary of State, dated 2 September 1939. 
49 Ibid., copy of cablegram from Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, sent 5 
September 1939 consisting of text of statement by Secretary of State for Home 
Departments on poUcy on Germans and Austrians in Britain. 
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information for espionage purposes, R. Hall, The Secret State, p. 26. 
51 Minute Paper for Minister of Defence containing Military Board minute on 
Principles observed in connection with internment, dated 15 September 1939, 
A A MP 729/6, file 65/401/7. 
52 Details on Flauaus are from newspaper cutting "German Intemee Says", 
labelled Herald, 27 November 1945, in AAMP 798, file 38702 and register page 
51 in AA MP 1103/2, box 38. 
53 MUitciry Board Minute, Principles observed, dated 15 September 1939, AA MP 
729/6, file 65/401/7. 
54 Summary Report, "George Felix Edelmann, Austrian", W.B. Ball to Captain 
Lonergan, dated 30 November 1942, AA SP 1714/1, item N26622. On 25 
September 1939 the Review Committee comprised Lieutenant-Colonel 
Simpson, Lieutenant- Colonel A.R.M. Gibson and Major W.J.R. Scott, AA MP 
729/6, fUe 29/401/68. 
55 Argus, 12 Febmary 1940. 
56 Translation of letter headed Brisbane Deutscher Tum-Verein, dated 2 July 1938 
and other correspondence in AA BP 242/1, item Q31659. For German Club's 
suspension see Argus, 11 September 1939. The club building was only five 
years old and had cost more than 4,000 pounds. 
57 Reports to General Staff Officer (MI) 3rd District Base and Southern 
Command, relating to investigations made on behalf of the Army, AA MT 
269/8. 
58 Ibid., item 528 for Werribee farmer, item 90 for HasUnger, item 162 for PoUsh 
Jew and item 522 for Agostini. 
59 Ibid., item 596. 
60 Who's Who in Australia, (hereafter shown as Who's Who,) 1950 and Army List, 
1939. 
61 Reports to General Staff Officer (MI) 3rd District Base and Southern 
Command, AA MT 269/8, copy of letter, dated 18 Febmary 1940 attached to 
item 444. 
62 Argus, 13 September 1939. 
63 CPD, vol. 161 (14 September 1939), pp. 550-1 for Menzies, Street and Curtin 
on the internment, release and reintemment. 
64 Correspondence on the establishment of Advisory Committees in September 
and October 1939 is in AACRS A472, item W69, part 1. 
65 Emest Scott, Australia During the War, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1936,pp. 
105-137. 
66 The debate is summarised in Hasluck, vol. 1, pp. 174-6, and D. Watson, Brian 
Fitzpatrick, pp. 103-5. 
67 Copy of letter. Secretary to the MiUtary Board to HQ, 1st MiUtary District, 
Detention of Enemy Aliens, no date but reply to query 3 September 1939, AA 
MP 729/6, file 65/401/7. 
Chapter Two 
1 For a detailed account of Austreilia's defence poUcy between the wars, see John 
McCarthy, Australia and Imperial Defence, 1918-39'. For a comprehensive 
account, see Hasluck, vol. 1, Chapter 2, "Between the Two Wars, 1918-38". The 
resolutions of the Imperial Conference of 1923 are quoted on p. 17. 
2 Wynter and Curtin's comments on defence strategy and Churchill's 
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4 Major-General Sir John Northcott held a number of senior appointments 
during World War II including Chief of the General Staff under General 
Blamey, and when Blamey went overseas in April and May 1944, Northcott 
acted as Commander-in-Chief, D.M. Homer, High Command, p. 430. 
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10 D. Watson, Brian Fitzpatrick, pp. 64-70. 
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cutting "Wives of Aliens in Australia', AA SP 1714/1, item N18035. 
12 Ibid., Statement for the Press, Copy 40/8854, "British Women Marrying 
Aliens" and Argus, 29 September 1939. 
13 Minute Paper, Internment of Aliens, Laffan to Secretary of Defence dated 15 
September 1939 and undemeath. War Book Officer to Secretary, dated 18 
September 1939, AACRS A816, item 54/301/3. 
14 Copy of Aide Memoirs from Embassyof the United States of America, London, 
dated 4 October 1939, AACRS A1608, item L20/1/1, part 1. 
15 Ibid., copy of Cable No. 62, Eden to the Prime Ministers of Australia, Canada 
and New Zealand, dated 26 March 1940. Australia replied in telegrams on 27 
February and 29 March 1940, referred to in Cable 151, Caldecote to Prime 
Minister, dated 4 July 1940. 
16 Memorandum from J.T. Fitzgerald to Secretary, Defence Co- ordination, dated 
8 August 1940, states women were released "by direction", AACRS A816, item 
54/301/3. 
17 Argus, 22 May 1940, "War Prisoner Tells Her Story". 
18 "Australians' Fate in Germany", Melboume Herald, 8 March 1940, p. 4. Cutting 
labelled "Melbne Herald 7.3.40" in AACRS A1608, item L20/1/1, part 1. 
19 Letter, Lt-Col. James A. Chapman, DMO & 1, on Repatriation of Aliens, dated 
20 September 1940, AA MP 385/4, file 1940-216. The women's internment 
numbers were 1156 to 1162 and their files in AA MP 1103 Series 2, box 40 
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20 Letter, Director of S.T.M. and Q. (Quartermaster-General, AHQ), to 
Northem,Eastem and Southem Command, dated 6 February 1940, AA MP 
729/6, file 63/401/49. 
21 Defence Minute Paper, Principals observed in connection with internment, 
dated 15 September 1939, AAMP 729/6, fUe 65/401/7. 
22 Argus, 14 February 1940. 
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23 Letter, H. Hedinger to Hon. G.A. Street, dated 20 February 1940, AA MP 729/6, 
file 63/401/49. Lieutenant-General Lavarack, GOC Southem Command, 
wamed the Military Board on 1 Match 1940 that Hedinger was "alleged to be 
pro-Nazi". 
24 Ibid., Letter, Assistant Provost Marshal (Lt-Col. Hackney) to Colonel in Charge 
of Administration, Northem Command, dated 27 March 1940. 
25 Ibid., Copies of extracts from Northem Command Intemees' mail. 
26 Ibid., Wynter to Secretary, Military Board, received 5 April 1940, with Colonel 
Hackney's report attached. 
27 Copy of Letter, Street to Hedinger, stamped 23 April 1940, AA MP 729/6, file 
63/401/49. 
28 Ibid., two letters, Hedinger to Street, first dated 26 April 1940 and second dated 
29 April 1940. 
29 Administrative decisions early in World War II are summarised from 
correspondence in AAMP 729/6, files 63/401/3 and 85 and 65/401/7 
30 Copy of letter from Secretary, Military Board, on Dependants of Intemed 
Aliens, dated 7 September 1939, AA MP 729/6, file 65/401/7. The amounts 
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31 In World War 1 destitution owing to inability to find work because of general 
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32 Copy of two letters. Street to Hedinger, undated but first in response to married 
women's petition, 1 December 1939 and second follow up letter of 9 Febmary 
1940, AA MP 729/6,fUe 63/401/85. 
33 Letters, Archbishop of Sydney to Prime Minister, dated 28 September 1939; 
Menzies to State Premiers, dated 3 November 1939, AA CRS A1608, item 
A19/1/3. 
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Court of New South Wales, Sir David Ferguson, Sir Adrian Knox and Mr 
Justice Harvey. Correspondence on the appointment of Official Visitors in 
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the procedure to be observed in cormection with the OVs duties and 
inspections, attached to a letter from the Secretary Military Board, to Northem, 
Eastern and Western Commands, dated 19 July 1940 describing the suitable 
type for appointment. 
35 Defence Minute Paper, Sinclair to Galbraith, dated 14 September 1939 with 
Street's handwritten comment of same date, AACRS A5954,box 253. 
36 History of Directorate of Prisoners of War and Intemees, 1939-1951, (hereafter 
shown as History ofPWT), p.32, AACRS A2663, item 7801-6, held in AustraUan 
War Memorial. 
37 General comments on trials are drawn from AAMP 529/1, 529/3, 529/5 and 
529/6. 
38 Copy of letter, H.M.Ramsay to Secretary, Department of the Army, dated 15 
December 1939, AA MP 742, file 255/2/814 for Advisory Committee 
chairmen; Memorandum, George A.Watson (Deputy Crown Solicitor) to 
Secretary, Attomey-General's Department, dated 6 June 1941, AA CRS A472, 
item W69, part 1 for committee sittings. 
39 Copy of letter. Premier [Victoria] to Prime Minister, dated 6 October 1939, AA 
CRS A472, item W69, part 1. 
40 Ibid., Letter, Deputy Crown Solicitor to H.F.E.Whitlam, Crown Solicitor, 
Canberra, dated 8 August 1940. 
41 Letter, E. E. Cleland to the Minister for the Army, dated 23 December 1940, AA 
MP 742, file 255/2/814. 
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September 1939, AASP 1714/1, item N26622. 
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AAMP 798, file 38702. 
46 Memorandum, Secretary of the Army to Secretary, Prime Minister's 
Department, friformation re Germans in AustraUa, dated 28 November 1939. 
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1983, pp.44-5 , Michael McKeman nominates Mair as leading the campaign 
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Board's position is set out in a Department of Defence Minute Paper 
"Internment of Aliens", dated 29 September 1939 and Knowles' counter -
arguments are explained in an Attomey-General's Department Minute Paper, 
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51 On 9 January 1940 Inspector W.J.Keefe of Police HQ, Sydney, produced a 
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NSW, the consulate staff and the leaders of the Nazi Party groups . Alfred 
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AustraUa". The party began in NSW early in 1934 with six Germans and one 
naturaUsed former German. 
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100 U)id.,p. 553. 
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exchange between Calwell and Menzies is on pp. 221-2. In his speech, the 
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ex-intemees had arrived in Adelaide in "a deplorable condition" eariy in 1942 
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sponsors wanted to fill their "scarcely seaworthy" chartered ships with Jews. 
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Conclusion 
1 N. Lamidey, Aliens Control, foreword. 
2 Appendix A for intemment rates by states. 
3 Ibid., for intemment rates by nationality. 
4 For example, Herman Junge at his deportation trial on 23 November 1945 
clearly saw himself as a defeated enemy and made no criticism of being 
intemed, AA MP 798/1, fUe 38702. 
5 W.D. Borrie, Italians and Germans in Australia, Chapter VII, especially pp. 
97-101, 115-23 and 141-51. Economic success remains the aim of most 
ex-intemees and their families. In Caims the Italian consul, Elvio Meoli, is the 
largest individual sugar farmer in the disfrict. Meoli came to Innisfail in 1938. 
He described the population then as 90 per cent Italian and 10 per cent Chinese 
and says that the "Black Hand ran the place". He was studying law when war 
broke out, enlisted "but was intemed, came out, gave law away" and worked 
on his father's farm. See Janet Haw ley, "The Sugar MilUonaires" in Age, 14 
March 1981. 
6 Interviews, June 1979. 
7 Felix Werder, "The Dunera Intemees', Age, 8 September 1979. 
8 Henry Mayer, "The Dunera Affair: An Inside View", Natiorml Times, 27 January 
to 5 March 1983. 
9 Paul Hasluck, "The Unfulfilled Pabiot, Full of Steam", Age, 28 July 1984. 
10 Letter, Major-General J.S. Whitelaw, GOC Vic. L of C Area, to HQ, AMF, dated 
24 November, AAMP 742/1, item 255/9/587. 
11 G. Cresciani, from his reading of George Morel's reports to the Intemational 
Red Cross, concludes that life in Australian intemment camps was "not 
physically burdensome", treatment was "exceUent" and relations between 
intemees and guards "cordial", see Fascism, Anti-Fascism and Italians in 
Australia, p. 174. 
12 Bmce Muirden, Puzzled Patriots, p.l81. 
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 293 
MP 70/3 Security classified correspondence, 1939-1941 
file 1939/32 Authorized Establishments and Organisation HQ 3rd 
District Command 
CA1844 Headquarters, Victorian Lines of Communication Area 
MP 70/1 Security classified general correspondence 1940-1945 
36/101/86 Death of Intemees Schiessel and Grahl 
48/101/20 Establishment of L of C Areas 
MP 385/3 General Correspondence 1919-1946 
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Personal Papers 
Calwell Papers — (MS) MP 1444, National Library, Canberra (by kind 
permission of Elizabeth Calwell) 
Eichbaum, Ludwig, Diary of Ludwig Eichbaum, Hut 28, Hay — MS 9538, 
La Trobe Library, Melboume. 
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Margaret Pierce Papers — MS 8782, La Trobe Library, Melboume (by kind 
permission of A.C. Clarke) 
Society of Friends Papers — MS 9250, La Trobe Library, Melboume (by 
kind permission of A.C. Clarke) 
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Tom Aikens 
E.A.Bevege 
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u Q p Studies in Australian History 
During World War II in Australia, more than seven thousand resi-
dents were interned, and a further seven-and-a-half thousand 
people were sent from overseas to Australian camps. Censorship 
ensured that intemment was always shrouded in secrecy and fear. 
Margaret Bevege describes life in the intemment camps and the 
eventual retum of most internees, via war work, to the community. 
She also discusses the selection methods used to assess internees: 
Nazi Party members and criminals were top of the list, followed by 
newly arrived immigrants and active communists. All Japanese 
residents and men of Italian origin from the north-east Queensland 
coast, where invasion threatened, were also considered dangerous 
enough to be locked up. 
This comprehensive picture of intemment in Australia not only 
explores the nationalities chosen, it also covers arresting and hold-
ing procedures, security services, the police, the media, and the 
general public. 
Behind Barbed Wire traces the progress of the war and its 
significance for internment. Dramatic defeats such as the fall of 
Singapore and France led to increased intemments, while victories, 
combined with the need for manpower and food production, led to 
releases. 
Cover design by Craig Glasson using "Intemment Camp: Orange, NSW 'Desolation'", 
a woodcut by Ludwig Hirschfeld Mad< (a Dunera intemee). Reproduced with the 
permission of Chris Bell. 
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